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ABSTRACT 
 
Decentralised Public Administration:  A Comparative Analysis of Continuities 
and Variations in the Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia (1977-2015) 
This study brings new empirical research on sub-state government in contemporary 
Spain, addressing a gap in the literature concerning the approaches taken and 
choices made by Autonomous Governments regarding their institutional design.  It 
tests the hypothesis that decentralisation to territories with distinct and different 
characteristics will result in diversity in public administrative institutions. 
A multi-method investigation compares the responses of the Junta de Andalucía 
and the Generalitat de Catalunya to the opportunities of decentralisation and the 
challenges of the post-2008 economic crisis.  It analyses budgets, ministerial and 
civil servant hierarchies, policies and strategies.  It also evaluates the perspectives 
and statements of key politicians, senior civil servants, academics and trades 
unionists, obtained through one-to-one interviews carried out in Spain during 2014 
and 2015. 
The research finds that despite recognisable differences in the characteristics of 
Andalusia and Catalonia, and constitutional recognition of Spain’s nations and 
nationalities, decentralisation has not resulted in significant divergence between 
these two Autonomous Governments.  Priorities, structures, employment practices 
and administrative cultures demonstrate more continuities than variation.  The 
constitutional and institutional framework and Spain’s political culture have been 
shown to reduce the scope for differentiation.  This case study highlights the 
Napoleonic administrative tradition as the most significant influence for 
homogeneity.  Self-identity, strong but distinct in each community, has contributed 
to a divergence in style and emphasis in the Junta and the Generalitat, and also to 
dissimilarities in their responses to the economic crisis. 
This research adds to public administration studies evidence that decentralisation 
does not necessarily result in variation in governmental institutions at sub-state 
level.  The study concludes that the historical legacy of centralism and in particular 
the continued influence of the administrative tradition have acted as forces for 
continuity in the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia. 
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1 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 DECENTRALISATION AS A NEW AND SIGNIFICANT 
DEVELOPMENT IN CONTEMPORARY SPAIN 
Decentralisation was a cornerstone of Spain’s transition to a 
democratic state following the death of Franco in 1975.  It was a 
recognition of, and response to, the demands of some parts of Spain 
for greater autonomy and the need to create a new territorial 
distribution of power, and resulted in the creation of seventeen 
Autonomous Governments covering the whole of Spain.  Each 
Autonomous Government has its own directly elected Parliament and 
indirectly elected First Minister and Executive.  Each is responsible for 
key public services, and is staffed by public employees.  They are now 
major actors in Spain’s public life, accounting (together with local 
government) for over half of total public expenditure (Del Pino and 
Pavolini 2015: 249).  The creation of this decentralised State of the 
Autonomies (el estado de las autonomías) was a new departure for 
Spain, an opportunity to organise public administration in a way which 
was distinct from the past and which would recognise the differences 
between the many geographical parts of the country. 
This area of study has been chosen not only for its academic merits, 
the case for which is made in this chapter, but also as a result of the 
researcher’s ongoing fascination with all things Spanish, including the 
Spanish language, fuelled during a first degree in Spanish, French 
and Politics.  In addition, it seeks to benefit from, and develop, the 
researcher’s skills, experience and keen interest in public 
administration, built up over a long career in UK local government, 
culminating in the position of Chief Executive. 
 
 
2 
 
1.2 RESEARCH FOCUS AND QUESTIONS: CONTINUITIES AND 
VARIATIONS 
This thesis is an investigation into the extent to which the opportunity 
has been taken by the new Autonomous Governments to create 
public administrative structures, policies and strategies appropriate to 
their territories.  Specifically it examines the corporate and political 
management arrangements, signifying in this context, the ministerial 
and senior civil servant structures, the policies, and the plans which 
determine, at a strategic level, how the whole organisation operates.  
The study of corporate and political management arrangements 
encompasses the role of politicians, the way in which ministries are 
defined, the public employment practices adopted and how civil 
servants and politicians interact.  The budget is a key element of this 
corporate design as the way in which it is constructed is a translation 
of the relative priorities of functions and responsibilities into funded 
programmes and activities.  The corporate and political management 
arrangements also encompass an external focus:  how the 
organisation as a whole sees itself and presents itself to the outside 
world and how it deals with other organisations.  Most importantly, the 
corporate and political management arrangements can be read as an 
expression of the key values and the culture of an organisation.   
This research seeks to examine the degree to which decentralisation 
has resulted in public administrative differentiation and to analyse the 
factors affecting that level of differentiation.  Administrative 
differentiation is understood to mean the degree of variation between 
the sub-state institutional arrangements, in terms of their internal, 
organisational structures, policies, practices and processes. 
By studying two specific Autonomous Governments, those of 
Andalusia and Catalonia, this research tests the hypothesis that 
Spain’s contemporary decentralisation would result in public 
administrative differentiation by addressing the following specific 
research questions: 
3 
 
To what extent have historical, social, economic and political 
factors influenced the differential development of the 
Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia? 
How do these factors help explain the response of these two 
Autonomous Governments to the austerity regime following the 
2008 economic crisis? 
Which factors are the most influential in understanding the 
contemporary corporate and political management 
arrangements of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya? 
 
1.3 LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
There is a wide body of literature on the creation of Spain’s State of 
the Autonomies and the Autonomous Governments (notably Heywood 
1995 and Moreno 2001 after the first two decades) and on its 
subsequent development (Subirats and Gallego 2002; Colino 2008; 
Keating and Wilson 2009). Existing literature covers a range of 
aspects: 
 International comparisons of the Spanish territorial distribution of 
powers have been made (Giordano and Roller 2004; Fedele and 
Ongaro 2008; Hooghe et al 2010; Alonso 2012). 
 Specific aspects of the system have been examined, such as 
financing (López Laborda and Monasterio Escudero 2007; De La 
Fuente 2012) 
 Relations with Europe have been explored (Jeffrey 2000; Carmona 
Contreras and Kolling 2013), along with the impact of the EU on 
sub-state authorities (Fleurke and Willemse 2006). 
 Individual services as they operate across Spain have been 
investigated (Guillén and Cabiedes 1997 on health; Losada and 
Máiz 2005 on education).   
However, the bibliography at the level of individual Autonomous 
Governments is less developed.  The focus of existing work has 
largely been on the historical development of peripheral nationalisms, 
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notably Catalonia and the Basque Country (Guibernau 2004b and 
Dowling 2013) on Catalan nationalism; Mees 2003 and Muro 2008 on 
Basque nationalism; Gillespie 2015 on both).1  International 
comparisons have been made, again focused largely on Catalonia 
(Guibernau, Rocher and Adam 2014 on Catalonia, Quebec and 
Scotland).  There has been an understandable increase in recent 
years of research into Catalan decentralised government in the 
context of the surge in support for independence of Catalonia 
(Crameri 2014; Bel 2015). 
Similarly, in the field of Public Administration study, extensive 
research has been undertaken of Spain’s bureaucracy, where it is 
located within the typologies of public administrative traditions 
(Sotiropoulos 2006; Peters 2008), and the implementation of reform 
(Kickert 2007; Ongaro 2009; Alba and Navarro 2011).  With notable 
exceptions (Gallego and Subirats 2012 on welfare policy options at 
sub-state level; Jiménez Asensio 2013 on human resources and 
ethics and Gallego, Barbieri and González 2016 on health), the focus 
has predominantly been at state, not sub-state, level (Parrado Díez 
2011). 
There is limited research on developments within the State of the 
Autonomies and on comparing specific Autonomous Governments, 
resulting in a lack of insight in explaining the decisions taken and the 
choices made about public administrative institutional design at a sub-
state level.  Academic evaluations of the effectiveness of 
decentralisation are also limited (Solé-Ollé 2009).  In the light of this 
deficit, this research seeks to investigate the corporate and strategic 
working of two specific Autonomous Governments, contributing an 
understanding of their internal dynamics to the existing body of 
literature on public administration.  A comparative method is employed 
to broaden and maximise the explicative power of this study.  
                                               
1 The term ‘peripheral’ is not used here to mean secondary or less important, but rather in 
the geographical sense, stressing the distance from Madrid. 
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1.4 SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES:  CORPORATE AND POLITICAL 
MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS OF THE JUNTA AND THE 
GENERALITAT 
This is not an investigation of specific services, of service delivery or 
performance.  It is an examination of the corporate and political 
management arrangements in two sub-states.  Nor is it a commentary 
on all Autonomous Governments of Spain.  The focus is the Junta de 
Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya with analysis of the 
budgets, structures, policies and strategies as in force during the 
period 2014 to 2015.  The ‘cut off’ point for the analysis of budgets, 
structures and policies was the 2015 regional elections in Andalusia 
and Catalonia, although more recent developments have been 
incorporated into this research, where they provide a correction or 
development of the analysis.  
By restricting the parameters to a comparison within Spain, the 
research seeks to reduce the range of variables, enabling a focus on 
the factors affecting public administration at the decentralised level.  
The choice of these two specific Autonomous Communities is justified 
on the grounds that Andalusia and Catalonia offer sufficient 
similarities and also differences in characteristics to make valid 
comparisons. 
The Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya both serve 
large populations (at 8.4m and 7.5m respectively) and are both early 
adopters of autonomy, meaning that they have been responsible for a 
full range of services, particularly education and social services, for a 
long period, unlike most other Autonomous Governments.  Both 
operate under the same (Common) financing regime (unlike for 
example the Basque Country which works within a distinct financing 
framework, called the Foral regime).  Both have a sense of distance 
from Madrid (both in terms of geography and popular perception) and 
each a distinct self-identity. 
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In terms of differences, Andalusia and Catalonia have:  dissimilar 
economies - Catalonia being the more prosperous; different 
geographies in terms of both location and size (Catalonia’s proximity 
to Europe and Andalusia’s land mass covering almost three times that 
of Catalonia); dissimilar political allegiances, demonstrated by 
Andalusia’s sustained electoral support of the Socialist Party (PSOE) 
and Catalonia’s support for Catalan parties, often though not 
exclusively of the centre or centre-right; separate cultures and, in the 
case of Catalonia, languages; and a distinct position in relation to 
historic nationhood and attitudes to the Spanish nation-state.  These 
characteristics enable a valid examination of public administrative 
differentiation in the Autonomous Governments of the Junta de 
Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya.  
 
1.5 RESEARCH DESIGN, METHODOLOGY, AND METHODS 
1.5.1 RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
There are many methods available to researchers in the execution of 
their research.  However, it is important to locate choices about design 
within the framework of philosophical science.  Ontological and 
epistemological assumptions define, respectively, the way a reality is 
conceived and perceived; and how knowledge about a particular view 
of reality is to be generated, represented, understood, and used 
(Hallebone and Priest 2009: 26-7).  There are numerous 
classifications of research approaches.  Donatella Della Porta and 
Michael Keating identify positivist, post-positivist, interpretivist and 
humanistic approaches as positions on a spectrum in the social 
sciences (2008: 23).  Roger Pierce describes positivism, empiricism, 
behaviourism, naturalism, feminism and post-modernism (2008:  22-
37).  A third classification provides the categories of positivist, 
interpretivist and criticalist to illustrate the range of perspectives in the 
science of knowledge (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 6). 
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The positivist approach sees the world existing as an objective entity 
and in principle knowable in its entirety.  It exists outside the mind of 
the researcher and it is the researcher’s task to describe and analyse 
this reality.  The positivist approach can be contrasted with the 
interpretivist approach in which objective and subjective meanings are 
linked.  Unlike the positivist view that there are rules and laws 
governing the object of the study which makes it amenable to 
empirical research, the interpretivist approach sees the limits of these 
laws and places an emphasis on human beings and society being 
experienced subjectively.  This means that there is no objective 
foundation for knowledge and the researcher therefore needs to 
understand human motivations.  Humanist approaches focus on the 
subjective understanding of external reality by the object of the study 
and the researcher (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 23-5). 
There has been much debate in Social Sciences about the 
appropriate research paradigm for Public Administration, the concept 
of a paradigm brought to prominence by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) as a 
‘general orientation to reality and its analysis’ (quoted in Rainey 1994: 
41).  In particular, the conflict has centred on the positivist and post-
modernist schools of thought.  There is also a view that there can be 
no one, dominant paradigm.  Hal G. Rainey concludes that ‘what 
really matters is the appropriateness of the method to the research 
problem and, most important of all, the effectiveness of the execution 
of the method’ (1994: 44). 
The approach adopted in this research is one which recognises the 
different epistemological assumptions and one which draws on both 
positivist and interpretative frameworks in order to address the 
research questions of this study. 
1.5.2 METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
The case study methodology adopted in this research reflects 
positivist assumptions that the world exists as an objective entity and 
is knowable.  It uses empirical data to test a hypothesis deduced from 
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theory (that public administrative differentiation would result from 
decentralisation).  It seeks to describe and analyse this reality.  It does 
not aim to develop theory and therefore is not inductive.  However, it 
also adopts an interpretivist approach as the dominant paradigm, as 
the world is knowable through observation and interpretation.  It does 
not seek to develop theory to address real-world problems (Hallebone 
and Priest 2009: 45), but rather to engage with, understand and 
interpret the perspectives, and motivations of key people involved in 
the Junta and Generalitat.  The research does not draw on humanist 
assumptions which stress the subjective understanding of the external 
reality of the researcher:  the researcher’s stance here is that of an 
outsider to the field of data, not an insider or participant in the 
generation of that data (Hallebone and Priest 2009: 28-9).  It is not an 
experimental or intuitive methodology.  However, the limitations of the 
researcher’s neutrality or objectivity need to be recognised as the 
methodology draws on the expertise of the researcher as a public 
sector professional as well as an academic. 
The methods used in the case study are predominantly qualitative, 
usually associated with more interpretivist approaches, obtaining 
verbal data from in-depth interviews, and document data from existing 
publications, but some quantitative methods are also employed (in 
relation to financial analysis for example). The methodology is 
therefore concerned with describing and interpreting, in a critical way.  
1.5.3 CASE STUDY 
A case study approach was adopted, given its contribution to 
scholarship in terms of:  answering how and why (process related) 
questions; capturing the world-view of the participants; and providing 
an interpretative framework for understanding common practices and 
actions (Staller 2012: 399).   
Data was required on resources (national government policies in 
relation to budgets, the financing regime), politics and policies 
(political composition of the Junta and the Generalitat, policy priorities, 
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relations with Madrid) and on organisational capacity (budgets, 
staffing, management approaches, corporate strategies, human 
resources policies and practice).  The research design was therefore 
based on accessing three main sources.  The first source was web-
based research (predominantly the Junta and Generalitat websites, 
and also the Spanish Government website and Spanish newspapers 
on line).  Secondly, existing academic studies, both on-line and at 
Spanish Universities, were investigated.  Thirdly, the research centred 
on including interviews with key actors currently involved in the 
processes to enable the exploration of their perspectives.  The 
centrality of these interviews to the research demanded the 
consideration of a wide range of issues to ensure maximum 
effectiveness as described below. 
One-to-one interviews were the most appropriate method for a 
number of reasons.  They would enable the most up-to-date 
information, provide access to the insights of people directly involved 
in sub-state government and would offer the opportunity to address 
shortfalls in information available on line.  Semi-structured interviews 
would offer an opportunity to focus the interviews on the subject 
matter of this research, whilst allowing flexibility in terms of the 
exploration of related issues during the interview.  The recording of 
the interviews would ensure the efficient, immediate capture of 
information (and enable follow-ups by email to secure clarification), 
and support the capacity of the researcher to interact and pursue 
points during the actual interview. 
One-to-one interviews in a second language and in a second country 
would demand a number of skills, including language competency, 
interview techniques, risk assessment and technical skills, and the 
deployment of very significant logistical abilities.  The researcher’s 
language skills needed to be improved (including the acquisition of 
specialist vocabulary).  This aspect of the design and execution of the 
research was particularly important, with the ability to research and 
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communicate in Spanish being essential not only in terms of access 
and communication, but also in the avoidance of ‘cultural imperialism’: 
The loss of the sense of the need, let alone the ability, to read 
closely in another language, […] ultimately leads to a position 
of cultural imperialism, the assumption that everything can be 
done in English, so that cultural difference is little more than an 
exotic adornment to our own comfortable space. (Buffery, 
Davies and Hooper 2007: 12) 
Risk assessments were carried out of the planned programme of 
interviews and new skills in recording and transcribing voice data 
learnt.  Drawing on the researcher’s extensive experience of 
management, interview skills were further refined using ‘dry runs’ in 
both English and Spanish prior to the study visits to Spain.  A 
conscious discipline was needed to ensure that the researcher did not 
bring into the research her own professional values, based on her 
working experience in the UK.  Rather, it was vital that the behaviour 
of the researcher was as an independent, objective researcher, with 
heuristic motives.  However, as recognised above, there are 
limitations to the neutral, objective stance:  the interactive nature of 
the semi-structured interview is influenced by the personality and 
perceived personality of the researcher in terms of their knowledge 
and skills.  The requirements of the University’s research ethics 
framework were also addressed and met. 
The design of the study visits took into consideration timing, ensuring 
the avoidance of major festivals and holidays as well as election 
periods.  The decision to plan a repetition of the 2015 visits in 2016 
was taken to investigate developments, clarify issues and fill gaps 
which may have arisen, and crucially to test emerging findings.  It 
would also enable follow-up with the same interviewees as well as 
adding in new people (including new incumbents of the same post, 
enabling a comparison of different perspectives from the same post).  
Not foreseen, but beneficial to the research, a gap of twelve months 
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offered opportunities to interview leading members of newly emerging 
political parties.2   
Securing the views of high-level individuals was crucial to the quality 
of the research.  Rather than seeking a large number of interviews, in-
depth and extended interviews were organised with a smaller number 
of key, knowledgeable and influential actors.  The interviewees 
included politicians of all parties (in executive, ministerial roles and in 
opposition leadership roles), senior civil servants, academic experts in 
the field of Spanish public administration studies, and leading trades 
unions officers operating in the public sector, to secure a rounded 
view of operations within the two Autonomous Governments.  A 
gender balance was also secured. 
Resources did not permit the inclusion of other, important 
perspectives such as those of service users, front-line staff or middle 
managers (although the interviews with trades unionists and 
academics avoided an exclusively internal focus).  Nor was it possible 
to include interviews with personnel based outside of the capital cities 
of Seville and Barcelona.  Focusing on the two Autonomous 
Government headquarters was the most efficient way of meeting with 
a significant number of people in a restricted time period.  A major 
task was the identification of the right people and obtaining their 
contact details.  Contact was made well in advance of the study visits, 
to explain the nature of the research and its aims and also stress the 
researcher’s credentials not only as an academic but also as a 
practitioner with many years’ executive management experience in 
the UK public sector.  Persistence was needed to achieve the high 
level of success in securing acceptance to interview requests.  A 
schedule of meetings was organised for study visits to Seville 
(September/October 2014 and November 2015) and to Barcelona 
(October 2014 and November 2015). 
                                               
2 A list of the main political parties is given at Appendix D. 
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Careful consideration was given to the drafting of questions in terms 
of the subject matter, including consistency to enable comparisons 
between Andalusia and Catalonia and to obtain alternative 
perspectives on the same issue.  Questions were drafted to be open-
ended, not to be leading, and to demonstrate appropriateness and 
sensitivity to the interviewee’s role.  Whilst benefitting from a 
background of managerial experience, it was important to maintain a 
neutral approach, bringing no normative tendencies to the interviews 
and the research.  Interviewees were sent copies of the questions 
before the meeting.  At the meeting, the nature of the research was 
explained and issues relating to confidentiality and the use of material 
clarified.  The aim of the interviews was to advance from anecdotes 
and stereotypes of Andalusia and Catalonia and of Spanish 
bureaucracy by detailed, analytical examination. 
The semi-structured interviews were recorded and subsequently 
transcribed, with the key points summarised in English (See Appendix 
B).  A thematic analysis of the interviews was also undertaken, based 
on the interviews, the results of which informed the research (see 
Chapter Five, Section 5.5).  The consent of interviewees to specific 
quotations was obtained at a later stage of the research. 
Conducting case study interviews in a second country brings a 
number of challenges, including travel, language, time and resources.  
The cultural and structural differences between UK and Spanish 
public administration had to be charted, to secure meetings with the 
right people.  Carrying out interviews over the course of more than 
one year offered opportunities to revisit and develop particular aspects 
of the research.  It also increased the potential impact on the research 
of the shifting sands of political life in Spain, with for example, two 
general elections, four regional elections and one voluntary 
referendum taking place over the period of this research, as well as 
the shift in the official position of the Generalitat in relation to 
independence. 
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1.6 ISSUES OF LANGUAGE 
English translations are given of Castilian and Catalan terms in this 
study, with the exception of titles such as the names of the Junta de 
Andalucía, the Generalitat de Catalunya, the two Autonomous 
Governments under examination.  Some words translate more happily 
than others:  Comunidad Autónoma, for example, translates directly 
as Autonomous Community which does not convey the governmental 
institutions which are the focus of this research and so the term 
adopted here is Autonomous Government.  The term Autonomous 
Community is used to relate to the territory and people only (and not 
to the organ of government).  The English names of Andalusia and 
Catalonia are used.  The decentralised state model is called the 
‘Estado de las autonomías’, translated here as the State of the 
Autonomies, where the term Autonomies is understood as 
Autonomous Governments.  Where adequate translations do not 
exist, the original Spanish term is used and explained. 
Discussion of autonomy, decentralisation and federalism in Spain is 
particularly fraught with value-laden terminology.  Desires for self-
determination have been called ‘decentralising’, ‘regionalist’, 
‘nationalist’ and ‘secessionist’.  Catalonia, for example, has been 
described as a ‘region’, a ‘nation’, a ‘nationality’, a ‘nation without a 
state’, a ‘peripheral nation’.  Use of the term ‘the Spanish state’ rather 
than Spain (see Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 12, for example) reflects a 
questioning by some of the existence of Spain as a nation.  Certain 
terms used, such as ‘plurinational’ and ‘multinational’, do not always 
translate comfortably into English.  These issues are considered in 
greater depth in Chapter Two, but to avoid repeating the debates 
throughout this thesis, when discussing the Autonomous Government 
level of Spain, I will use the term ‘sub-state’ as a neutral term to 
denote the level of territorial organisation below that of Spain. 
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1.7 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH 
This research recognises the significance of context, particularly in 
relation to comparative research.  Christopher Pollitt’s 2013 
publication is devoted specifically to the importance of context in 
public policy and management.  Context influences how things are 
understood, how things work now and the nature of how things may 
change in the future.  Context affects the content and process of 
public administrations.  It is therefore important to understand the 
many layers and the interconnection between the many elements that 
make up the context to any research area.  ‘The cultural, societal, 
politico-institutional and administrative “context” in which public 
services organizations operate is a remarkably significant feature’ 
(Ferlie and Ongaro 2015: 121).  The first two chapters, therefore, of 
this study are devoted to providing an appreciation of the context in 
terms of concepts of nation and identity, the impact of history, public 
administrative disciplines and contemporary politics. 
The first chapter examines the conceptual framework of nationalisms 
and the formation of the nation-state before placing Spain’s current 
decentralised state into an historical context.  It reflects on Spain’s 
past through a prism of divisions and tensions, providing the 
framework for a more detailed examination of the Transition to 
Democracy and the creation of the new State of the Autonomies.  
Chapter Three provides the public administrative context to this 
research, examining relevant parameters of public administration, 
typologies of public administrative cultures and international 
developments in reform.  It also examines the policy of 
decentralisation as it relates to public administration and impact of 
Spanish membership of the European Union.   
The results of the case study work on the Junta and the Generalitat 
are covered in Chapter Four.  It scrutinises the historical antecedents 
to the current Autonomous Governments, the key elements of their 
institutional establishments, the contemporary financial context in 
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which they operate as well as analyses of their 2015 budgets.  A 
comparative analysis of the two Autonomous Governments is given in 
Chapter Five, focusing on territorial self-identification; the corporate 
and political management arrangements (people, politics and policies; 
budgets and strategies) and the words and phrases used by 
interviewees to describe themselves, their territories and their 
institutions. 
Explanations for the findings are set out in Chapter Six, with an 
examination of the factors influencing homogeneity and heterogeneity 
in the corporate political and management arrangements.  This 
enables a comprehensive response to the research questions posed 
at the outset in relation to public administrative differentiation.   
Chapter Seven:  Conclusions summarises the study, charting the 
development of the hypothesis and research questions, and outlining 
the justification for the research.  It states the key findings in relation 
to the limited degree of administrative differentiation between these 
two Autonomous Governments in terms of their corporate and political 
management arrangements and sets out explanations for this 
conclusion.  The case is made for this study’s original contribution to 
knowledge.  The chapter identifies areas for further research and 
concludes with a commentary on future prospects in the light of the 
June 2016 Spanish general elections. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical and historical 
context to the development of the modern-day State of the 
Autonomies in Spain.  A review of the literature concerning theories of 
nationalism is undertaken, contrasting primordial and modernist 
approaches.  Consideration is given to the nation-state in Western 
European liberal democracies, including debate over whether the 
dominance of the nation-state is now in decline.  The federal and 
unitary models of territorial organisation of power are briefly outlined, 
and attention given to the concepts of sub-nationalism and pluri-
nationalism, particularly as they pertain to Spain. 
The historical context is written from the perspective of a series of 
divisions or fragmentation in Spain’s past.  It assesses religious and 
political divides, the conflict between monarchism and republicanism, 
between military and civilian rule as well as territorial divisions.  The 
fragmentation of the Civil War and the repression of the Franco period 
are examined, particularly in relation to regionalism. 
Analysis of the period of the Transition to Democracy focuses on the 
1978 Constitution, the product of a consensus not to revisit the 
divisions of the past.  The constitutional provision for the creation of 
the State of the Autonomies was a key element of this compromise 
and is discussed here.  The initial establishment of the State of the 
Autonomies is documented, a critique of the weaknesses of the model 
given, and its relationship to earlier definitions of federal and unitary 
models analysed. 
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2.2 NATIONS, NATIONALISMS AND THE NATION-STATE 
2.2.1 DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONS 
The study of nations and nationalism can be considered from the 
perspective of three main categories of explanation:  primordialism, 
modernism and ethno-symbolism.  Primordialists contend that the 
nation is something natural – the result of the human race being 
naturally divided into different tribes or groups.  They therefore stress 
common descent and an underlying emotional bond of territorial 
belonging, shared language and symbols.  The nation is not a creation 
of man, but rather the result of an organic evolution (Hearn 2006: 20).  
Montserrat Guibernau describes this as an ‘essentialist’ conception, 
which regards the nation as a ‘natural, quasi-eternal entity’ (2013: 2).  
Descent is the central theme of primordialism, with blood, kinship and 
ancestry as key factors in explaining national bonds.  Landscape and 
the geography of place is integral to the primordialist view of 
belonging.  The term ‘homeland’ has been used to describe the 
intermeshing of land with notions of ancestry and family (Connor 
2001: 53).  A fundamental element of the inter-connection of 
primordialism is that of language.  Johann Gottfried Herder, writing in 
the latter half of the eighteenth century, saw language as central to a 
nation’s identity, without which a nation could not exist (Mar-Molinero 
1996: 71).  This view of the importance of language is supported by 
Elie Kedourie: 
The test, then, by which a nation is known to exist is that of 
language.  A group speaking the same language is known as a 
nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state. (1993: 62) 
The alternative perspective is that of modernists such as Ernest 
Gellner and Eric Hobsbawn who view nations as creations of the 
modern world, recent phenomena arising before, during or in the wake 
of the French Revolution.  Nations and nationalism are not natural, 
permanent features of the human condition, but came into being with 
the transition to industrialisation: ‘the age of Transition to industrialism 
was bound […] also to be an age of nationalism’ (Gellner 2006: 39).  
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Nations are thus seen as inevitable outcomes of a modern industrial 
society, not rooted to the past.  Gellner summarised the difference 
between the primordialists and modernists as follows: 
While primordialists consider that nations have existed forever 
and therefore the past is very important, modernists point to the 
end of the eighteenth century as the crucial point of creation, 
before which there is nothing to help understand present 
nations.  (Gellner 1996: 367) 
John Breuilly, a leading proponent of modernism, does ‘not regard the 
nation as having a significant pre-modern history, or as a ’real’ group 
with an identity and consciousness which produces political effects 
such as nation-states’ (2001: 32).  Importantly, modernists see the 
modern state (not any primordial historical inheritance) as the 
institution which generates the ideal of the nation, using education and 
linguistic homogeneity as drivers of a mass culture and unified 
national identity (Hearn 2006: 67).  Benedict Anderson (2006) sees 
nations as modern creations.  Membership of a nation requires an act 
of imagination which is only possible under the conditions of 
modernism, stressing in particular the role of the printed word in 
promoting and developing a shared national identity. 
Anthony D. Smith’s ethno-symbolism can be seen as a third approach 
– although he has been described by Breuilly as a primordialist (Hearn 
2006: 45).  Smith points to modernism’s failure to recognise the 
cultural or ethnic ties of those nations that had developed before the 
modern era.  Specifically, he points to three limitations:  a neglect of 
the powerful affective dimensions of nations and nationalism, a 
concentration on elite actions at the expense of popular beliefs and 
actions, and a failure to distinguish genuine constructs from long term 
processes and structures in which successive generations have been 
socialised (1999: 9).  Smith’s ethno-symbolic alternative focuses on 
the persistence of ethnic communities, or ethnies.  He argues that the 
formation of nations needs to be seen over a long period of time, not 
necessarily the result of the process of modernisation.  Whilst many 
nations did emerge in the modern period, they also referred back to 
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an older, ‘ethnic’ past for cultural traditions, those traditions being 
used as cultural sources for later nation building.  Ethno-symbolists 
stress the importance of myths and symbols in the development and 
persistence of ethnic identity.  John Hutchinson criticises modernist 
frameworks’ inability to ‘easily explain the intense historical 
identification of populations with older ethnic cultures in the modern 
world’ (Hutchinson 2001: 74). 
Ethno-symbolism is not without critics.  Smith has been criticised for 
overstressing the ethnic element of nations.  Ethnicity and territory are 
components of all political identities and can be ‘construed on the 
basis of diverse materials’ not solely from ethnies’ shared memories, 
myths and territorial belongings (Eriksen 2004: 49).  Of particular 
relevance to this thesis is the criticism that Smith’s theory does not 
distinguish between the concepts of nation and state.  Guibernau 
argues that the attribution of common legal rights and duties for all 
members is part of a state not a nation (2004a: 125-141).  This flaw is 
particularly relevant in relation to national identity in nations without 
states, a category into which Catalonia falls. 
2.2.2 NATION-STATES IN WEST EUROPEAN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
The nation-state emerged as the dominant form of political 
organisation in Western Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, as ‘a way of organising the political system (the state) and 
of relating this to society (nation)’, particularly in the context of 
industrialisation (Loughlin 2011: 46).  Centralised states developed in 
Europe between the sixteenth and nineteenth century ‘successfully 
claiming a monopoly of law making and law enforcing over a unified 
geographical territory, and independence from any external authority’ 
(Beetham 1984: 208).  Beetham dates the subsequent acceptance 
that state boundaries should coincide with a given people, a nation, as 
late as the nineteenth century and concludes that the nation-state has 
become the dominant political formation, being ‘so central a feature of 
the political landscape that it is difficult to imagine its absence’ 
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(Beetham 1984: 208).  The received view is that the state and the 
nation ‘should cohere within a single, sovereign territory and that the 
nation-state thereby constituted should express […] a determinate 
national culture or identity’ (Breen and O’Neill 2010: 1).  This 
assumption that the nation-state is the obvious focus has been called 
‘methodological nationalism’ in social science analysis (Jeffrey 2014: 
1).  The focus of debate in recent years has been whether the nation-
state remains the primary political unit or whether it is being 
superseded.  This post-nationalist debate does not deny national 
identity or its endurance, but rather points to the impact of 
globalisation and cosmopolitanism (Breen and O’Neill 2010: 1). 
In terms of the challenges of globalisation, these can be broken down 
into three main elements:  global capitalism, global threats and supra-
national institutions.  The increasingly inter-dependent international 
economic activity, the growth of multi-nationals and global operation of 
financial markets all threaten the pre-eminence of nation-states, as 
key decisions are taken outside of national governments.  Ohmae 
Kenichi’s view is that nation-states are not and should not be the 
primary actors in today’s global economy.  His theory is that the 
globalisation of world markets will continue, moving towards a 
borderless economy.  Modern nation-states are unnecessary 
middlemen.  The mobility of investment, industry, IT and individual 
consumers means that ‘nation-states no longer have to play a market 
making role’ and further ‘often just get in the way’ (Kenichi 1996: 4).  
Rather, small economies, linked to region states, possibly crossing 
national boundaries, will be fast and flexible enough to prosper in this 
new world economy (1996: 5).  The growing importance of economic 
interventions at sub-state levels of governance in the context of 
globalisation and the rise of multi-national corporations are also 
highlighted by Ray Hudson (2007), a perspective particularly pertinent 
to Catalonia and the role of Barcelona in a City Region.  
The second challenge presented by globalisation relates to climate 
change, disease and international terrorism, threats which do not 
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respect national boundaries.  Thirdly, there has been a growth in 
supra-national institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, whose decisions can reduce the ability 
of nation-states to determine their own economic policies.  
Cosmopolitanism, the global movement of people, is the other 
challenge, particularly as it relates to identity.  Cosmopolitanism is 
wider than migration as it includes diaspora and transnationalism, so 
embracing cultural, political and ethical considerations (Sutherland 
2012: 11). It is argued that national identity is diminished because of 
increasing pluralisation and affiliation within a nation-state through the 
assertion of minority national and ethnic groups and because of 
increased immigration and the diversification of population (Breen and 
O’Neill 2010: 3). In a European context, and particularly a Spanish 
one, all these challenges can be witnessed and indeed supplemented 
by the existence of the EU and its measures towards greater 
economic and political integration and by tensions with the emergence 
of sub-state level movements. 
Despite these challenges, many commentators contend that the 
demise of the nation-state in Europe is not imminent.  The European 
Union, for example, continues to be a nation-state led institution, used 
by nation-states to enhance their own powers rather than be 
subsumed in a supranational state of Europe (Hutchinson 1994: 160).  
Guibernau argues that the ‘age of the nation-state is by no means 
exhausted’ (2013: 103). Claire Sutherland’s examination of the impact 
of the challenge of cosmopolitanism concludes that nationalism is a 
flexible ideology, capable of adapting to the changes of the twenty-first 
century (2012: x).  Helen Thompson looks at the nation-state in the 
context of the global financial crisis, arguing that the claims of 
globalisation about the powerlessness of nation-states are overstated.   
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The dominance of the globalisation discourse has distorted 
understanding of states which: 
do have considerably more economic power, and the 
diplomatically and military (sic) most powerful states are more 
robust in the face of international organisations and networks 
than the variants of globalization literature supposed. 
(Thompson 2010: 147) 
Despite its late arrival to the ‘club’ of Western European liberal 
democracies, Spain has equally seen these threats against the pre-
eminence of the nation-state.  Membership of the European Union, 
the impact of economic globalisation and the cosmopolitan movement 
of people and, above all in the context of this research, the growth in 
sub-state movements, can all be argued as reducing the dominance 
of the Spanish nation-state.  The tension between Central 
Government and sub-state government in Spain is a theme which will 
be explored in the course of this study of the Junta de Andalucía and 
the Generalitat de Catalunya.  However, it is fair to conclude at this 
stage that whilst European integration and decentralisation may have 
drawn some important competencies away from nation-states like 
Spain, ‘they have by no means negated the immense resources still 
concentrated in the hands of central state executives’ (Llamazares 
and Marks 2006: 241). 
2.2.3 DIFFERENT FORMS OF THE NATION-STATE 
There are two broad models of territorial organisation of power in 
nation-states:  unitary and federal.  In unitary models there is a single 
source of sovereignty.  There is a dominant centre, administration is 
centralised and standardised and all territories are treated the same.  
Within a unitary model, however, power can be distributed away from 
the centre, creating multiple levels of government.  The form and 
nature of decentralisation as it relates to public administration is 
addressed in Chapter Three.  A decentralised model still fits within the 
unitary model as, unlike in federal states, these powers can be 
removed or changed by Central Government.  This power to remove 
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lower tiers is possible.3  However, as Tim Bale points out, ‘the idea 
that [the powers of the Autonomous Governments] can be taken back 
[…] is fanciful’ (2008: 46). 
In federal states sovereignty is shared between the national 
government and the sub-national level.  The allocation of specific 
roles to each tier is usually set out in the constitution and neither tier 
can abolish the other.  The sub-national level has a role in national 
policy-making, normally through an upper chamber.  Federalism is 
usually described as being either dual or co-operative, reflecting, 
respectively, a distinction in approach between the US and European 
states (Hague & Harrop 2007: 285-88).  Underpinning dual federalism 
is the view that the national and state governments operate 
independently of each other, each acting separately and 
autonomously in their own sphere of responsibilities.  In contrast, co-
operative federalism rests on the idea of co-operation between levels.  
Subsidiarity is key, with the assumption that decisions should be taken 
at the lowest level feasible and the view that the work of governing is 
a division of tasks rather than a separation. 
Both the UK and Spain have been described outside this dichotomy 
as unions or union-states rather than nation-states (Keating 1998: 37; 
Loughlin 2011: 54).  The development of these union-states allowed 
for degrees of autonomy to be agreed for the constituent parts, whilst 
retaining centralised and state-wide administration.  The union-state 
therefore reflected the variations that existed pre-union.  As will be 
explored in the next section, ‘variations’ did exist pre-union in Spain, 
not least in Catalonia, the ramifications of which are a central feature 
in understanding sub-state government in Spain today.  The extent to 
which Spain can be considered federal following the 1978 Constitution 
is addressed in the Section below.  Concepts of sub-nationalism and 
                                               
3 As evidenced for example in the case of the UK Government abolishing the Greater 
London Council and the Metropolitan County Councils in 1986 (King 1989). 
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pluralism are particularly relevant to Spain and its Autonomous 
Communities and so are considered at this point. 
2.2.4 SUB-NATIONALISM AND PLURI-NATIONALISM 
As anticipated in the introduction to this thesis, definition of sub-
national territories is fraught with difficulties.  The term ‘region’ is used, 
at one end of the spectrum, to describe supra state territorial entities 
(Philomena B. Murray 2011, for example sees Europe as ‘the region’), 
to, at the other end, relatively small sub-national areas such as the 
North East of England.  This problem is equally reflected in the 
terminology of nationalism and regionalism.  The tendency is to see 
nationalism as separatism and secession, and anything less as sub-
nationalism or regionalism (McCrone 2006: 238).  The term nation-
state also makes problematic the consideration of nations not formally 
independent and states in which different territorial cultural groupings 
(or nations) are present.  A failure to distinguish between nation and 
state, with the use of the hyphenated term ‘nation-state’ can give rise 
to a ‘fusing of two analytically distinct spheres’, aligning the political 
(state) and the cultural (nation) (McCrone 2006: 237).  The existence 
of more than one nation within a state is therefore complex.  Ferran 
Requejo and Miquel Caminal seek to address this failure, advocating 
the use of the term ‘plurinational’, preferring it to the term 
‘multinational’, giving two reasons: 
First, “plurinational” refers both to the descriptive side of the 
concept (the fact that some democracies include different 
national societies within them) and to the prescriptive side of 
the concept (the claim for recognition and protection of 
plurination in liberal democracies – national pluralism in this 
case).  In contrast, the term multinational only covers the 
descriptive side of the concept.  (2011: 9 n1)4 
They contend that the liberal democracies developed in a period that 
predates today’s complexities and which cannot accommodate pluri-
                                               
4 The use of the term ‘multinational’ is an inadequate translation of the Spanish term 
‘multinacional’ as the term in English usually refers to a large business which operates in 
several countries.  In this case Requejo and Caminal (2011) use it to denote the existence of 
more than one national society. 
25 
 
nationalism.  Economic globalisation and multiculturalism and 
emerging national pluralism mean that more plural responses are 
needed than liberal democratic nation-states have traditionally 
provided.  They argue that the values underpinning liberal 
democracies, such as equality, have failed to recognise the many 
political voices, especially those of minorities or minority national and 
cultural groups. 
This discourse needs to be understood as emanating from a Catalan 
perspective.  An alternative view is one in which the evolution of 
nation-states can accommodate multiple nations.  Luis Moreno 
concludes that Spain’s State of the Autonomies has overcome the 
internal confrontation of regional diversity in Spain.  With the 
Constitution of 1978, he argues, territorial politics have developed 
‘multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence’, a concept of the relationship 
between state and sub-state levels underpinned by a lack of 
compulsion to eliminate other concurrent participants, due to the dual 
identity or ‘compound nationality’ that individuals can hold (Moreno 
2001: 154).  In other words, he considers that it is possible to be a 
both a Spaniard and a Catalan, both a Spaniard and an Andalusian, 
without those identities conflicting.  The limits of this conclusion are 
revealed when ETA separatist violence and Catalan secessionist 
demands are considered.  It is however a useful construct in the 
examination of other parts of Spain, including Andalusia, where dual 
identity is strong. 
A second strand of debate in relation to multiple nations is that of 
‘nations without states’, defined as ‘those territorial communities with 
their own identity and a desire for self-determination included within 
the boundaries of one or more states, with which, by and large, they 
do not identify’ (Guibernau 2004b: 9).  The recognition of nations 
without states, such as Catalonia, does not necessarily involve them 
becoming independent.  Back in 1999 Guibernau considered that 
most ‘are likely to achieve greater political autonomy within the 
political institutions [of the EU] which are currently being developed’ 
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(Guibernau 1999: 27).  The limited evolution of the Europe of the 
Regions (discussed in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.5) would, however, 
suggest limited prospects of the EU delivering greater autonomy at a 
sub-state level in member states.  Furthermore, the European 
Commission demonstrated its reluctance to enter into any discussion 
about membership conditions for secessionist regions (Humlebaek 
2014: 213-4).  This has not however prevented speculation on the 
future of Catalonia as a new, independent state in Europe (see 
Cuadros Morató 2016). 
David McCrone (2006: 243) rejects as too simple the conventional 
view of sustainable options for nations without states.  Namely, that 
sooner or later they will emerge into statehood as the natural end 
game, or they are not nations, merely regions, in which case 
statehood is not being sought.  Like Requejo and Caminal (2011) he 
believes that this view is too bound by nineteenth-century visions of 
statehood and that the context is more complex today.  Unlike 
Requejo and Caminal, he sees the desire for greater autonomy as 
one not driven by political beliefs but rather dictated by globalisation 
and internationalisation of the economy.  He coins the term 
‘understated nations’ in recognition that most now have some form of 
governmental institutions.  He argues movements such as those in 
Catalonia and Quebec have ‘outgrown their historic relationships with 
their core states’ and want to shape the new international order ‘in a 
way more conducive to the business of alternative territorial 
formations’ (2006: 243).  The term ‘core state’ used here suggests 
that the state of Spain pre-dates that of Catalonia, an assertion which 
would be hotly contested in Catalan circles, and illustrates the 
dangers of terminology in this debate. 
From a different, legal and constitutional perspective, Stephen 
Tierney, was able to conclude back in 2005 that nationalist 
movements such as in Catalonia and Quebec were not separatist 
(although this is no longer the case in Catalonia).  Sub-state 
nationalism was increasingly concerned with ‘demands for improved 
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accommodation within the State rather than the threat of secession’ 
(Tierney 2005: 164).  An international dimension to pluri-nationalism is 
considered by Giden Gottlieb.  Gottlieb, professor of international law 
and diplomacy, rejects that national sovereignty must be absolute and 
that in every state there must be one nation.  However, he sounds 
caution at secession movements and argues for ‘a society of nations 
alongside (my emphasis) the systems of state’ (Gottlieb 1999:  123).  
Pointing out that the current concept of sovereignty was developed in 
and for a period very different from today, he argues for a new 
constitutional framework to ‘conciliate between the notions of absolute 
sovereignty and state unity – between the integrity of states and the 
claims for separation.’ 
This brief review of existing literature on the concept of multiple 
nations within a state highlights the complexity of notions of the nation 
and of the state.  The concept of pluri-nationalism can be challenged 
in the context of Spain:  can pluri-nationalism be used to describe a 
state like Spain where some parts, for example Catalonia, may see 
themselves as nations, but others, such as La Rioja, clearly do not?  
Also highlighted is a view that the pre-eminence of nation-states is 
being challenged, and that what may have developed in the past is no 
longer appropriate for current times.  The fact that the nation-state is 
changing in the context of current challenges is undeniable, but it is 
still the dominant paradigm in Western Europe and in Spain.  The 
following section examines Spain’s history as a nation and a state to 
provide a further part of the framework for the consideration of public 
administration in Andalusia and Catalonia. 
 
2.3 HISTORY OF THE TWO SPAINS 
2.3.1 FRAGMENTATION OR CONTINUITY? 
The term ‘Las dos Españas’, or ‘The Two Spains’, is a widely used 
phrase in Spain, reflecting the existence of divisions within Spain.  
The national award-winning 2004 work by Santos Juliá was entitled 
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‘Histories of the Two Spains’.  More recently, a national newspaper 
article about dogmatism as a feature of Spanish society, cites the 
2016 general election results as a prime example of issues becoming 
black and white, recalling Antonio Machado’s verse: 
Españolito que vienes al mundo, te guarde Dios, una de las 
dos Españas ha de helarte el corazón’.  [‘Little Spaniard who is 
coming into this world, may God keep you safe, for one of the 
two Spains will freeze your heart.’] (Amón 2016)  
Nicholas Manganas uses the term as the title for his 2016 publication.  
He concludes that the narrative of ‘the Two Spains’ still has a 
discursive power in contemporary Spanish politics, being used since 
the late 1990s as ‘a vehicle for political elites to settle political scores 
and to narrativize their respective national histories’ (Manganas 2016: 
4). 
The term has usually been deployed to describe the modern versus 
the traditional ideals of Spain.  However, there are a number of 
fractures within Spanish history, including those along territorial lines, 
which have influenced the development of Spain as a nation and the 
way in which it is governed.  This chapter does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive commentary on the history of Spain.  There is a 
wealth of authoritative works in this field, in English and in Spanish, 
including the aforementioned work by Santos Juliá.5  The purpose 
here is to provide a historical context to the framing of the 1978 
Constitution and the establishment of the State of the Autonomies.6 
2.3.2 MULTIPLE DIVISIONS 
The view of a Spain historically divided is, to many modern eyes, most 
vividly illustrated by the Civil War (1936-39).  However, the divisions in 
                                               
5 For example, in English, Raymond Carr (1980, 1982, 2000) and Stanley Payne (2011).  
Focusing on the period 1808 onwards, see José Alvarez Junco and Adrian Shubert (2000) 
and Carsten Humlebaek (2014); from 1900, Julián Casanova and Carlos Gil Andrés (2014) 
and Stanley Black from 1939 onwards (2010).  In Spanish, works include Manuel Tuñón de 
Lara et al (1991), Fernando García de Cortázar and José Manuel González Vega (1994), 
Juan Pablo Fusi Aizpurúa & Jordi Palafox Gámir (1997), Luis González Antón (1997) and 
Fusi Aizpurúa (2000). 
6 The dates used in this section are all taken from Garcia de Cortázar and González Vesga 
(1994), unless otherwise stated. 
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Spanish society were not new phenomena of the twentieth century.  
The concept of ‘the Two Spains’ has been in the public domain for 
many years.  Dacia Viejo-Rose (2011: 30) refers to José Ortega y 
Gasset’s often cited quote from 1914: 
Two Spains, Sirs, are caught in an incessant fight:  a dead and 
hollow Spain riddled with wormwood and a new Spain, 
industrious, aspiring that tends towards life and all is arranged 
so that the former triumphs over this one. 7 
Viejo-Rose states that the idea of two irreconcilable visions of Spain 
was often repeated during the Franco regime and ‘came to have a 
significant hold on the Spanish political imagination’.  José Álvarez 
Junco refers to ‘the two Spains’ in his 2001 work, describing a 
popular, Catholic Spain versus a liberal, secular and elitist Spain.8  
Omar G. Encarnación (2008: 5) identifies the two halves as traditional 
and modern:  a “Traditional” Spain in which the historical, social and 
political order are embodied by the Spanish monarchy, the military, 
the Catholic Church and the rural oligarchy, and a “Modern” Spain 
bringing together the Spaniards’ reputation for individualism, rebellion 
and revolution with the liberal ideas of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century of egalitarianism, republicanism and federalism.  Fernando 
León Solís also points to the strength of ideological divisions 
epitomised by the two Spains, the conservative and the liberal, in his 
case study of Spanish media coverage in the 1990s (2003: 1). 
It can be too simplistic however to divide Spain according to a 
dichotomy of modern and traditional.  As Encarnación’s description 
above shows, there have been many lines of division, and a reading 
of Spanish history reveals a range of schisms along religious and 
political lines. Differences in the view of territory have also been 
manifest throughout Spain’s history.  The application of this approach 
does not claim that conflict is unique to Spain and Spanish history.  It 
                                               
7 This first line of an often cited quote is from a text entitled ‘En defensa de Unamuno’ in 
Obras Completas, Vol VII (1902-1925), published by the Fundación José Ortega y Gasset 
(2007: 391). 
8 See also Raymond Carr (1986: 5). 
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is not.  However, the divisions have been intense, continuous and 
recent, as evidenced by the extreme manifestation of civil war 
between 1936 and 1939.  This means that the divisions in Spanish 
history continue to have a significant impact on the State of the 
Autonomies and the sub-state Autonomous Governments today. 
2.3.3 RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS 
From the end of the tenth century, Spain was divided along religious 
lines:  Christian and Muslim.  The Peninsula had been invaded by the 
Muslim Berbers in 711 from North Africa and conquered within seven 
years.  The Berbers replaced the Visigoths (409-711) and the Romans 
(197BC to fourth century) (Carr 2000: 289).  The Reconquista or 
Reconquest of Spain by the northern Christians took place in stages, 
as described in detail by Derek W. Lomax (1984) and summarised in 
the map below, with a movement south, re-gaining territory from 
Islamic rule. 
Map 1:  Stages of the Reconquest
Source:  Lomax (1984: 243). 
The Reconquista was not achieved gradually or town by town, but 
rather as a spasmodic progression and, importantly for the future 
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territorial debate in Spain, by region, such as Aragon, New Castile or 
Andalusia.  This emphasised the importance of such regions as the 
‘basic units of Spanish life’ (Lomax 1984: 228).  There were Muslim 
counter attacks but by the late fifteenth century, the Muslims had been 
defeated.  In 1492 Granada, the last Moorish kingdom (or taifa) fell to 
the Christians and in the words of Moreno ‘the first modern state in 
Europe’ was created (2001: 36). 
Divisions along religious lines did not end in 1492, however.  The 
Catholic Monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand introduced the Inquisition 
into both kingdoms, which was pursued by subsequent monarchs to 
expel and eradicate Moors and Jews in the pursuit of religious 
uniformity.  The division between religion and secularism added to the 
fragmentation of Spanish society and continued into future 
generations.  In particular, the pre-eminence of Christianity came to 
form a pivotal part of the Franco regime’s ideology of National-
Catholicism. 
2.3.4 TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS 
The claim of the Spanish modern state being created at the end of the 
fifteenth century is made because all the lands of the Peninsula came 
under the crowns of the Catholic Monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand 
(Isabella I of Castile 1474-1504 and Ferdinand II of Aragon and V of 
Castile 1474-1516).  The following map shows how the Iberian 
Peninsula was divided into six kingdoms.   
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Map 2:  The Iberian Peninsula in 1480 
 
Source:  Martín et al (1998: 213). 
This was the result of gradual territorial acquisition.  Following their 
marriage in 1469, Isabella was victorious in the Castilian civil war, and 
Ferdinand acceded to the Aragonese throne.  They added Granada 
(1492) and Navarre (1515) and created ‘a political conglomeration 
whose borders have remained basically stable for the last half 
millennium’ (Álvarez Junco 2002: 13). 
It is important to stress, however, that the Catholic Monarchs did not 
rule their territories as one united kingdom.  Rather, their marriage 
was a personal union of crowns.  Andrew Dowling describes the royal 
union as more akin to ‘an Austro-Hungarian confederation than […] 
the English incorporation of Wales [and] of Brittany by France’ (2013: 
2).  Castile and Aragon came together in the persons of their rulers, 
but were otherwise separate.  It is illuminating to note how Isabella, in 
particular, fought to rule in her own right over her own lands 
(Weissberger 2004), with serious limitations being placed on 
Ferdinand’s governance powers in Castile via their marriage contract.  
Each monarch continued to rule their own dominions separately and 
each kingdom was distinct.  In Isabella’s Castile only the Basque 
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province of Vizcaya kept some degree of autonomy, but the rest were 
ruled by the same royal institutions, laws, taxation and parliament.  
The Crown of Aragon was different, consisting of several legal and 
political entities.  The kingdoms of Aragon and Valencia, Catalonia, 
the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Sicily, and later Naples each had their 
own legislation and taxation (Edwards 2000: 39).  Within the 
monarchs’ dominions, historical fueros continued to apply.  Fueros 
were the statutes of towns and villages in medieval Spain which 
recognised the privileges enjoyed by their inhabitants.9   The fueros 
continued to play a role in the dispute over territory in subsequent 
centuries.   
In contrast, Andalusia did not conform to the general norm of 
government between monarch and kingdoms being set by ancient 
fueros in this period.  As the last lands to be taken in the Reconquista 
and occupied by Castilian nobles, Andalusia was governed directly 
from the Crown of Castile and run according to Castilian laws (Moreno 
2001: 40).10 
2.3.5 MONARCHY VERSUS REPUBLICANISM 
Since Isabella and Ferdinand, monarchical rule has been largely 
continuous in Spain.  The Habsburgs ruled from 1516 to 1700.  
Charles of Ghent became Charles I of Spain in 1516 (later in Europe 
as the Emperor Charles V), with sons successively inheriting the 
crown until Charles II died childless in 1700.  The Habsburg reign was 
not, however, untroubled by divisions – particularly by territorial 
disputes – both at home and abroad.  With a huge empire, as 
illustrated in the following map, the Habsburg monarchs were forced 
to embark on a series of military campaigns: ‘During the reigns of all 
                                               
9 Diccionario de Historia de Espana, 2o edn. (1968) 
10 The antecedents and development of sub-state movements in Andalusia and Catalonia 
will be covered in more detail in the case study chapters of this thesis.  However, reference 
to key events, particularly in Catalonia, will be made in this chapter to demonstrate the 
recurring factor of territorial division throughout Spanish history. 
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the Habsburgs and the first four Bourbon kings, the Catholic 
Monarchs participated in all the European military conflicts of 
importance’ (Álvarez Junco 2011: 23). 
Map 3: The States of Charles V in Europe (1519) 
 
Source:  Martínez Shaw (1998: 253). 
Philip IV (1621-65) sought to spread the burden of his war costs by 
demanding men and money from the Catalans (who were exempt 
thanks to their fueros).  He was met by the Catalan Reapers Revolt of 
1640 (Carr 2000: 7).  The revolt has been described as ‘one of the 
earliest expressions of incipient nationalism in Europe and 
contributing to the rise of Catalan identity’ (Guibernau 2000: 56). 
The successor to the last Habsburg was the grandson of the French 
King, becoming Philip V of Spain (1700-46).  He introduced the House 
of Bourbon to Spain which lasted until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.  His accession to the throne was the outcome of the War of 
Succession in which many Catalans had supported the (unsuccessful) 
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Austrian pretender, Charles, fearing not only the impact of French 
imports on the Catalan economy, but also the import of the French 
(centralised) model of government (Smith 2015: 15).   In 1714 Philip V 
abolished the fueros of Catalonia and Valencia, imposed Castilian as 
the official language in administration, reorganised the judiciary and 
took control of the taxing system in the territory of the Aragon Crown.  
In particular, Bel dates the development of Spain’s current centralised 
model of infrastructure to the Bourbon rule, beginning with the 
creation of a series of royal routes radiating from Madrid (the ‘Radial 
State’) (2012: 34).  For the first time, Castile and Aragon ‘became one 
political unit, sharing the same administration, laws and taxes’ (Kamen 
1973: 97).  However, as Henry Kamen goes on to point out, this did 
not end the schism:  the defeat of the Catalans in Barcelona in 1714 
symbolised for the Catalans the defeat of regional or national 
separatism by a centralising Castilian power.  This self- perception as 
the victim of a centralising Castile was to resonate for future 
generations of Catalans.11 
Republicans triumphed over monarchists in the creation of the First 
and Second Republics (in 1873 and 1931 respectively).  Both periods 
were short-lived, but the underlying division between these two beliefs 
of monarchism and republicanism ran throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Franco’s Succession Law of 1947 defined Spain 
as a kingdom, without determining the identity of any future monarch 
(Heywood 1995: 84).  Juan Carlos acceded to the throne on the death 
of Franco in 1975, and reigned until 2014 when he abdicated in favour 
of his son. 
2.3.6 REFORM VERSUS REACTION  
The War of Independence of 1808 has been described as a key point 
in the development of a unified Spain.  Raymond Carr for example 
                                               
11 The symbolism of 1714 is still strong in Catalonia.  See, for example, the 2015 work by 
Ricard Torra, entitled ‘Catalonia (and the Catalan-speaking lands) before and after the 
eleventh of September 1714’.  
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states that ‘modern Spanish nationalism of a type comparable to 
nationalism in other European counties was created by the opposition 
to Napoleon’ (1982: 105).  Andrés De Blas describes the War of 
Independence as a national war fought to defend Spanish sovereignty 
(2006: 30).  The war was a ‘landmark whose resolution would 
determine nation-building in Spain in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries (Moreno 2001: 44).  The subsequent 1812 Cadiz 
Constitution was devised along French Jacobin centralising lines, 
reflecting the liberal drafters’ view of the provinces as entities tied to 
the feudal past (Moreno 2001: 45). 
Restoration of the monarchy (with Ferdinand VII in 1814) brought 
royal absolutism but not peace.  Rather it was the beginning of a 
period of revolts and civil wars.  During the years 1808-1875 ‘Spain 
did not experience one large scale revolution but rather a period of 
short-lived episodes’ (Humelbaek 2014: 13).  Short-term revolutionary 
take-overs by the Liberals in 1810-14, 1820-3, 1839, 1854 and 1868-
74 were replaced by a dominance of conservative and reactionary 
powers (Humelbaek 2014: 13).  The Carlist civil wars (three during the 
period 1833-75) reflected the division between liberal, modernising 
republicans and those supporting a Catholic traditionalism, rural and 
monarchic.  Cutting across this division was that of territory.  For many 
liberals, centralism was an aid to modernisation, seeing Basque and 
Catalan nationalisms as ‘backward looking’ (Muro and Quiroga 2005: 
16).  On the contrary, the Carlists, whose main strongholds were the 
Basque Country, Navarre and Catalonia, supported regional fueros 
and communal agrarian customs.  In addition to the Carlist wars, there 
were widespread and different types of civil war and disturbances 
during the 1800s: peasant revolts in Andalusia (1856, 1861, 1873, 
1876 and 1892) and urban uprisings (in 1827, 1835, 1840-42 and 
1871-73) (Vilar 1977: 66). 
Paul Heywood describes this period as one where two antagonistic 
blocs began to crystallise – reform versus reaction (1995: 3).  The 
short-lived First Republic (1873-74) was faced with the Carlist wars, 
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with war against Cuban rebels and the wave of political and social 
disorder, including the declaration of ‘self-governing, independent 
cantons’ in many towns of Andalusia (Carr 2000a: 220).  The uneven 
industrialisation of Spain at the end of the 1800s, principally in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia, was a further division within Spain, 
particularly in the last decades of the nineteenth century (Muro and 
Quiroga 2005: 15).  There was a mismatch between Madrid, the 
political centre of Spain, and the peripheral economic centres of 
Barcelona and Bilbao, an incongruity between the values of ‘the pre-
modern rural oligarchs, the conspicuous bureaucratic classes and the 
frustrated military hierarchies’ and those of the industrial periphery’ 
(Moreno 2001: 49).   
2.3.7 MILITARY VERSUS CIVILIAN POWER AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
PERIPHERAL NATIONALISMS 
The military reaction to unrest in the late 1800s reflected the Spanish 
‘tradition’ of pronunciamientos or military uprisings with the overthrow 
of the Republic and restoration again of monarchy in 1874.  The 
collapse of the First Republic in 1874 has been seen as signalling an 
important shift in the attitude of the military towards politics: for the 
first time military leaders saw themselves as defenders of Spanish 
society and the Fatherland (or patria).  In the past, generals had 
intervened on the side on one political party or another (Barton 2009: 
208).  This change would have repercussions at the beginning of the 
following century. 
The so-called ‘desastre del 98’ (the disaster of 1898) was also a 
turning point in the history of Spain.  Centred on the loss of the 
colonies of the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, following a 
humiliating defeat in the Spanish-American war, it marked the end of 
Spain’s status as a world power and provoked soul-searching in Spain 
about its role and identity (Carr 2000: 224).  From a conservative point 
of view, Spain had lost the empire because it had abandoned the 
virtues which had made it great – unity, hierarchy and militant 
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Catholicism.  A more widespread view was that the decline was due to 
a failure to modernise (Balfour 1995: 25-6). 
One political response to the perceived problem of the Spanish State 
at this time was the emergence of Basque and Catalan nationalisms 
as political movements.  Whilst the self-questioning arising from the 
disaster of 1898 and the emergence of the peripheral nationalist 
movements both ‘had cultural and social roots that had been apparent 
since the mid nineteenth century’ it was in the final decades, during 
the industrialisation of parts of the Basque Country and Catalonia, that 
these movements became politicised, developing into a threat for the 
centralised regime of Spain (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 20).  By 
1898, nationalisms in the Basque Country and Catalonia, the areas of 
industrialisation, had emerged as alternatives to Spanish nationalism 
(Muro and Quiroga 2005: 15).  The spiralling violence and unrest 
(including the popular uprising of 1909 in Barcelona, subsequently 
called the Semana Trágica or Tragic Week) was brought to an end by 
General Primo de Rivera by another pronunciamiento in 1923.12  By 
1931 the pendulum had swung back from dictatorship with the 
proclamation of the Second Republic. 
2.3.8 THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1931-6) AND CIVIL WAR 
FRAGMENTATION (1936-9) 
The Second Republic sought to modernise Spain, introducing 
democracy for the first time.  There were high expectations from the 
landless labourers in the south for agrarian reform; from industrial 
workers for better wages and conditions; and from those seeking 
recognition of sub-national aspirations.  In the ‘other’ Spain – that of 
the military, Church, landowners and traditional sections of society - 
many feared the widespread violence in cities and countryside and the 
Second Republic’s ambitious reform programme.  This programme 
included reforms that affected the state, the Church, the army and 
                                               
12 Pons-Altés and López-Morell’s 2016 study argues that the Tragic Week was a more 
organised and more widespread revolutionary uprising than previously considered. 
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almost every sector of society, opening ‘a chasm between Church and 
State, employers and workers, defenders of traditional order and 
supporters of the Republic’ (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 107). 
In terms of territorial divisions, the Second Republic recognised the 
need to reorganise the state but chose a gradual policy of 
decentralisation to meet the demands of sub-states, especially 
Catalonia, while retaining centrally the powers of the state seen as 
essential to regenerate the nation (Fusi Aizpurúa 2000: 249).  The 
resulting ‘Estado integral’ model was neither unitary nor federal.  
Statutes of autonomy were agreed for the Basque Country, Catalonia 
and Galicia but only the Catalan statute went into operation before the 
outbreak of the Civil War.  However, there remained deep-seated 
divisions in Spain which became more polarised during this period.  
Under the Second Republic, the political centre ‘effectively 
disappeared and extremism and violent tactics [took] hold of both 
ends of the political spectrum’ (Encarnación 2008: 20).  The 
pronunciamiento in 1936, led by Franco, may well have been the 
catalyst of civil war, but ‘the political hatreds which polarized the 
Second Republic […] were a reflection of the deep-rooted conflicts of 
Spanish society’ (Preston 2006: 18).  Referring to the tradition of civil 
strife in Spain, Sheelagh M. Ellwood (1991: 5) calls conflict the 
‘leitmotiv of Spanish history’.13 
The division of the country under the Civil War was more complex 
than the frequently adopted simplistic view of the two bands of 
Republicans and Nationalists.14  The Nationalist side incorporated 
monarchists, fascists and the Catholic Church as well as the most of 
the Army.  The Republic side was even more complex, with liberal-
democratic republicans, anarchists, socialists and communists.  There 
was also a geographical dimension.  Helen Graham describes the on 
                                               
13 See Preston (2016) for a meticulous reconstruction of the final days of the Second 
Republic. 
14 The classic works on the Spanish Civil War are still Hugh Thomas (last re-printed 2001); 
Raymond Carr (1986), the updated work of Paul Preston (2006), supplemented more 
recently by works by Helen Graham (2012) and Stanley Payne (2012). 
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the one hand th ‘burgeoning professional, entrepreneurial and 
commercial middling strata’ of the medium-sized industrial coastal 
cities and on the other, the ‘rural fastnesses and inward looking, 
socially locked-down provincial market towns of the central heartlands 
and northern interior’ (2012: 19).  The following map shows the 
geographical division of Spain at the beginning of the Civil War, the 
shaded areas showing support for the Nationalist side. 
Map 4:  Division of Spain (July 1936) 
 
Source:  Payne (2012: 78). 
Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (2005: 1) seek to move 
consideration away from any black and white division of Spain, and 
explore the themes of violence, nationalism and religion to 
conceptualise the Civil War.  They develop their argument by pointing 
at the complex interaction of the national scene and importantly the 
local factors and events.  They describe the war as ‘a process of 
fracturing’ or ‘splintering’, an interpretation which more adequately 
reflects the many cleavages in Spanish society as outlined in this 
literature review.  Over the course of three and half years of bitter 
fighting, Spain suffered death and destruction on both sides until the 
victory of the Nationalist forces in April 1939.   
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2.3.9 THE TWO SPAINS OF THE FRANCO REGIME15 
Following his victory in 1939, Franco did not seek to heal those 
fractures in society.  There was no national reconciliation, and ‘the 
country was divided between winners and losers’ (Black 2010: 14).  
Franco reinforced the idea of ‘The Two Spains’, by promoting the 
exact opposite of what the Second Republic had sought to achieve.  
In contrast to the society based on separation of church and state, on 
promotion of multi-party democracy and recognition of autonomous 
demands, Franco declared Spain a Catholic confessional state, 
statutes of autonomy were declared void and all political parties and 
trades unions were banned.  Catholic ascendancy within the regime 
was defined in legislation, promoting Spain as ‘a Catholic, social and 
representative state’ (Townson 2007: 3).  Franco’s first priority was to 
eradicate any remnant of republican opposition.  Measures such as 
the purge of the judiciary, the imposition of a military jurisdiction, the 
Law of Political Responsibilities (which sought to punish, 
retrospectively, ‘the subversive Red opposition’) and the Law for the 
Repression of Freemasonry and Communism, ensured that ‘never 
before had any civil conflict in Spain ended with such persecution of 
the vanquished’ (Tusell 2011: 20-1).16 
Alongside communism, regionalism was seen by Franco as a major 
threat to Spain. In fact, the dual threat of socialism and separatism 
has been identified as the reason Franco initiated his coup against the 
Republican government (Alonso 2012: 77).  Any deviation from the 
‘espíritu nacional’ or national [Spanish] spirit was considered 
‘dangerous, illegitimate and punishable’ (Giner and Moreno 1990: 
182).17  The Franco regime therefore ‘consecrated the hegemony of a 
Catholic and traditionalist version of Spanish nationalism (National-
                                               
15 There is an extensive literature on the Franco regime, including Javier Tusell (1989); Paul 
Preston (1993); Sheelagh M. Ellwood (1994); Nigel Townson (2007) and Antonio Cazorla 
Sánchez (2014). 
16 For further consideration of repression under Franco see Michael Richards (1998), Julius 
Ruiz specifically on repression in Madrid (2005), Jordi Cornellà-Detrell (2011) in relation to 
Catalonia, and Richard Barker (2012) on Andalusia. 
17 ‘peligrosa, ilegítima y punible’ in the original. 
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Catholicism), which centred its nationalist discourse around the 
essentialist affirmation of a Catholic Spain basically identified with 
Castile’ (Núñez 2001: 720).  Measures of the military regime after the 
Civil War to repress territorial plurality included the abolition of the 
Basque and Catalan statutes of autonomy, the quashing of the 1878 
economic freedoms of Vizcaya and Guipúzcoa, the repression of sub-
state nationalist movements and the shooting of their leaders, the 
banning of symbols of regional identity, the systematic application of 
unitary policies and the centralisation of administration (Fusi Aizpurúa 
2000: 256).  In terms of public administration, the Government’s 
bureaucracy was used as an instrument of control over the periphery, 
with administrative (but not political) control devolved to the provinces, 
not the regions (Solé-Vilanova 1989: 207).  It was through this 
centralised and heavily bureaucratic political structure that Franco 
aimed to enforce his vision of a unified Spain – ‘una, grande y libre’ 
[‘one, great and free’].  The word ‘one’ referred not only to a single, 
centralised administrative structure, but also to the absence of all 
peripheral nationalisms (Humelbaek 2014: 81). 
However, to some degree, the linguistic and cultural oppression by the 
Franco regime served to stimulate and strengthen sub-state 
nationalisms.  The imposition of Castilian as the state language 
reinforced the social and political cohesion of the nationalist 
communities in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Núñez 2001: 721).  
A legacy of Franco was to forge a link between sub-state nationalisms 
and democratic opposition to the regime.  By the early 1970s: 
The whole Spanish opposition agreed that the Catalan struggle 
for recognition was inseparable from the Spain-wide struggle 
for democracy, and vice versa. (Conversi 2002: 225) 
The appropriation of Spanish nationalism by Francoism, on the other 
hand, meant that during the Transition to democracy, ‘any explicit 
affirmation of Spanish nationalism was automatically delegitimized 
and identified with the defence […] of Francoism’ (Núñez 2001: 721).  
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This brief review of the history of Spain has illustrated the many 
dimensions of division which have characterised and influenced the 
development of the Spanish nation-state.  Religious differences, 
competing territorial claims, the clash between republicanism and 
monarchism, tensions between reform and reaction and between 
military and civilian power, have all played a part.  However, it is also 
possible to identify a strong thread of continuity over the past five 
centuries.  A dominant paradigm has been that of a single Spanish 
State, predominantly Catholic, ruled by a monarch, based on a largely 
centralised distribution of territorial power.  This observation does not 
diminish the historic tensions within Spain, not least of which relates to 
sub-state nationalisms. Nor does it suggest that such a paradigm has 
been the wish or preferred model for all Spaniards.  The experience of 
the Civil War and the repression of the Franco regime provide 
absolute evidence to the contrary.  However, the context in which the 
Transition to Democracy took place and the State of the Autonomies 
was created was an environment characterised by a long-standing 
tradition of centralised government, over many centuries.  Despite its 
historical internal conflicts, Spain is ‘an entity clearly identifiable as a 
historic unity’ (Moreno 2001: 78).   
 
2.4 TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND THE 1978 CONSTITUTION 
2.4.1 DECENTRALISATION:  THE MOST CONTENTIOUS ISSUE 
Most commentators have described Spain’s Transition from 
dictatorship to democracy as a success (see for example Conversi 
2002; Encarnación 2008; Tusell 2011).  A key element of that success 
was the addressing of the tensions of Spanish nationalism and sub-
nationalisms – an issue widely acknowledged as one of the most 
contentious issues of the Transition to be resolved (Heywood 1995: 
142, Black 2010: 96) and described as ‘the greatest danger to the 
Transition’ (Linz & Stepan 1996: 99).  It is not my purpose to provide a 
comprehensive commentary on the years immediately following the 
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death of Franco in 1975.  Nor do I seek to comment on the full content 
of the Constitution of 1978.  Rather, I wish to consider this period 
inasmuch as it provided the context to the drafting of the Constitution 
and to examine the specific provisions in the Constitution in relation to 
the State of the Autonomies. 
Contributory factors in Spain’s successful Transition to democracy 
were leadership and a consensus not to repeat the mistakes of the 
past.  This focus on leadership is not to underplay the role of grass-
roots activism in the Franco and immediate post-Franco period.  Joe 
Foweraker (1989) highlights the connection between grass-roots 
political activity at the local level with the nationally organised 
democratic struggle, arguing convincingly the case for the popular 
contribution to the democratic process in Spain.  Paloma Aguilar 
(2000: 303) stresses that the consensus-making of the Transition 
period can only be understood against the backdrop of the activities of 
the various groups opposing the Franco regime.  Monica Threlfall’s 
work on the concept of co-construction disputes the common 
perception that the Transition was a top-down process (2008). 
However, the pivotal leadership role played by King Juan Carlos I has 
been universally stressed (Tusell 1995; Preston 2003; Black 2010), 
with the King being later popularly described as ‘the motor of the 
Transition’ (Humlebaek 2014: 78).  Within seven months of Franco’s 
death, Juan Carlos used his visit to the United States to announce to 
an international audience his intention to introduce democracy to 
Spain (Tusell 2011: 279).  Acting as a bridge between the past and 
the future, he engineered the appointment of Adolfo Suárez, a senior 
bureaucrat of the Franco regime, as President of the Government in 
July 1976. 18  The King was later to play a decisive role in the 
aftermath of the attempted coup of February 1981.  He also gained 
                                               
18 Works on Suárez include Carlos Abella (2006), (tellingly sub-titled ‘The Key Man of the 
Transition’) and Luis Herrero (2007). 
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some credibility in sub-states, speaking Catalan on his first official visit 
to Barcelona (Conversi 2002: 230). 
Suárez had credibility with the establishment created under Franco 
and had an in-depth knowledge of the workings of the institutions of 
state.  Decisive steps were taken to halt rising tensions by quickly 
extending freedoms of assembly and association before proposing 
legislative change: 
 In November 1976 the Law of Political Reform was approved to 
create a bi-cameral system based on universal suffrage 
 The Basque flag was legalised in January 1977 (the Catalans 
being allowed from the previous September to celebrate their 
national day) 
 A law of Political Association legalised political parties 
(including some regional parties) in was passed in February 
(the Communist Party being legalised in April 1977) 
 A new amnesty was granted in March 
 General elections were held in June 1977 (Carr & Fusi 
Aizpurúa 1981: 218; Black 2010: 82). 
Whilst recognising the need to address sub-state demands, Suárez 
was mindful of the need to achieve national government legitimacy 
before that of the sub-states. 
Spain was able to manage its stateness problem by successful 
devolution only because it created … legitimate state power 
with the authority and capacity to restructure the polity.  (Linz & 
Stepan 1996: 99) 
National elections were therefore held before creating the new sub-
state bodies.  However, from the Basque and Catalan nationalist 
perspective, state power was not legitimised, and their demands for 
national recognition continued to be made. 
The key role of the King, and that of Suárez, is stressed by many 
observers.  Without an equal pragmatism on the part of the wider 
political leadership (particularly that of the Communist Party) at the 
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time, it is debatable that the Transition would have been successful.  
Leadership was also being exercised at the sub-state level.  Suárez 
was ‘skilled and lucky enough to secure the co-operation of Josep 
Tarradellas, First Minister of the (Catalan) Generalitat in exile’ (Carr 
and Fusi Aizpurúa 1981: 234).  They negotiated the formal re-
establishment of the Generalitat in September 1977.  ‘Long and 
painful’ negotiations with the Basques were partially successful in 
establishing the Consejo General del País Vasco (Basque General 
Council) in December 1977 (Carr and Fusi Aizpurúa 1981: 234).  
Three months later the Junta de Andalucía was established. 
This period was characterised by dialogue and compromise between 
party political leaders and with the involvement of the trades unions 
and employers.  Daniele Conversi (2002: 238) considers that: 
This attitude of bargaining and agreement seeking can in part 
be related to the memory of the Civil War.  During the 
Transition process, an enormous effort was made to establish a 
policy of reconciliation based on a sense of collective guilt over 
the errors of the past:  the mistakes which destroyed the 
Second Republic should be avoided at all costs. 
The process of ‘forgetting’ the Civil War during the Transition to 
democracy was the result of a political consensus ‘to avoid reviving 
the armed conflict and reawakening the ‘ghost’ of the permanently 
irreconcilable two Spains’ (Núñez 2005: 45).19  This consensus was 
evident in the process of drawing up a new constitution. 
2.4.2 DRAFTING A NEW CONSTITUTION 
The environment for the drafting of the 1978 Constitution was very 
different from previous attempts to produce a new model for Spain.  
Not only was it seeking to produce a new territorial structure but also 
to advance the country from an authoritarian state to a liberal-
democratic one, build a responsive bureaucracy, develop a welfare 
state and integrate Spain into Europe (Agranoff 1996: 386; Requejo 
                                               
19 Memory and amnesia have been key aspects of study of the Transition period – see for 
example works by Resina (2000); Aguilar (2002) and Encarnación (2014). 
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2005: 82).  Importantly, the environment was also different in terms of 
style.  Unlike previous Spanish constitutions, the 1978 Constitution 
was negotiated, not imposed by the ‘victors’.  It was to be a negotiated 
settlement involving all the major parties (Encarnación 2008: 39).  In 
the post-Franco Transition, the approach was one of consensus and 
compromise.20  This consensual approach should not be understood 
as a unification of the two previously opposing visions of Spain as a 
nation.  Rather it was a temporary sharing of a common goal to 
transform Spain to a modern, democratic and European country. 
In retrospect, the period of consensus and search for a 
common ground seems more like a truce than a lasting solution 
to the problem of division. (Humlebaek 2014: 83) 
However, consensus was the basis of the constitutional process, 
exemplified by the establishment of a cross-party group of senior 
figures by the Government to draft proposals for the Constitution.21  
The success of this commission and its consensual approach can be 
gauged in the overwhelming support the Constitution subsequently 
won in Parliament, where it was approved by 325 votes in the lower 
house with only six votes against and fourteen abstentions (Casanova 
and Gil Andrés 2014: 314). 
The broad party political consensus which made the drawing up of the 
1978 Constitution possible also brought with it an element of 
ambiguity, particularly in the formulation of the territorial organisation 
of the Spanish state – the section with ‘the greatest amount of 
imprecision’ (Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: 315).  Article Two of the 
Constitution encompasses the unity of Spain and, at the same time, 
the right to autonomy of the sub-states: 
                                               
20 It is acknowledged that this consensus did not include the separatist movement in the 
Basque Country and in Catalonia, the separatist party, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 
was not legalised until after the 1977 general elections because of the party’s republicanism 
(Hanley and Loughlin 2006: 89).  The Basque Country was the only area not to vote in 
December 1978 in support of the new Constitution (Colomer 1998a: 43).   
21 The group was made up of seven people:  three of the centre, one socialist, one 
communist, one Catalan nationalist and a representative of the right (Tusell 2011: 296). 
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The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the 
Spanish Nation, the common and indivisible country of all 
Spaniards; it recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy 
of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the 
solidarity amongst them all. (Presidencia del Gobierno 1982: 
13) 22  
Article Two was therefore ‘a veritable synthesis of all the 
contradictions looming during the Constitution-making process, […] an 
authentic point of encounter between different concepts of the 
Spanish nation. […] In it, two great notions of Spain merge’ (Solé-Tura 
1985: 100).  It is contestable whether they merged in the Constitution, 
but the Constitution does reflect two different conceptions of Spain: 
Spain as one unified nation, a community of people sharing a 
common culture and history, and a Spain where Catalans and 
Basques are ‘independent, historically conditioned and justified 
communities’ (Humlebaek 2014: 87). 
Ambiguity played a role in the process of compromise and is reflected 
in the Constitution.  Javier Tusell refers to the Constitution’s 
‘apocryphal compromises … a layering of statements that tried to 
satisfy a range of contradictory requirements at one and the same 
time’ (Tusell 2011: 297).  Sebastian Balfour and Alejandro Quiroga 
consider the Constitution to be ‘sufficiently broad or ambiguous in its 
definitions for […] contradictory meanings about nation and identity to 
co-exist or at least to be read into the text’ (2007: 47-52).  For 
example, use of terms ‘nación’ and ‘nacionalidad’ (nation and 
nationality).  Any reference to another ‘nation’ (in addition to Spain) 
would not have been acceptable to some (notably the Army) and the 
demotion to status of ‘region’ would equally have been unacceptable 
to the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia.  So the use of the term 
‘nacionalidad’ allowed those fearful of the threat to Spanish unity to 
read ‘nacionalidades’ as historical cultural nations not seeking to 
                                               
22 ‘La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria 
común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce y garantiza el derecho a la 
autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas 
ellas’ (Original version). 
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establish themselves as states.  Those wanting greater recognition of 
sub-nations’ legitimacy could read it as nations without a state. 
Similarly the word ‘federal’ was avoided in this phase, either by 
supporters of a unitary state who feared it would give recognition to 
independent states and by Catalan and Basque who felt it would de-
emphasise their distinct status (Agranoff 1996: 390).  
An open model of decentralisation was the result.  Moreno asserts 
that the political parties involved in the drafting agreed ‘an unwritten 
pledge’ to continue the constructive political dialogue into the future 
(2001: 61).  This open model of asymmetrical decentralisation did not 
predetermine how the different parts of Spain would express 
themselves, allowing significant flexibility to the nationalities and 
regions.  The Constitution’s guidelines for territorial organisation of the 
state were less than precise, with ‘the advantage of not closing off any 
options and leaving open for a future time the possibility of further 
change, but only on the basis of a consensus’ (Tusell 2011: 298).  
This view is supported by one of the authors of the 1978 Constitution.  
Miquel Roca Junyent (2000: 79) states the ‘Constitution was not only 
created out of a consensus but also aimed to further it’.  He defends 
the influence of consensus at the time of the drafting of the 
Constitution, as a positive alternative to the past ‘take it or leave it’ 
approach where the majority forced their view on the minority, and as 
a positive alternative to the ‘all or nothing’ postures of the past, 
obliging the act of bargaining. 
2.4.3 BUILDING THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES 
Title VIII of the 1978 Constitution allowed any number of Autonomous 
Communities to be self-governing, depending on the will expressed by 
the inhabitants or their political representatives.  No map with 
proposed territorial boundaries was included in the Constitution.  
Neither was the degree of self-government specified, which was also 
left to the wishes of each nationality and/or region: 
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In this way, […] the constitutional model permitted regions, 
following different procedures justified on historical and political 
grounds, a broad leeway to choose, through their regional 
statutes of autonomy, the degree of devolution they desired 
among the possibilities offered by the Constitution. (Colino 
2009: 263) 
The Constitution set out three routes to and levels of autonomy: 
 For the ‘historic nations’, the Basque Country, Catalonia and 
Galicia (although they were not named in the Constitution), there 
would be an immediate step to full autonomous status, based on 
an absolute majority of the members of the pre-autonomous 
regional assembly. 
 Article 143 was to provide the easier, more gradual path to 
autonomy.  The consent of two thirds of municipal councils in each 
province was needed to initiate the process.  However full 
autonomy could only be obtained five years later and with the 
consent of the Spanish Parliament. 
 Accelerated access to full autonomy was provided to other regions 
via article 151.  In the event, only Andalusia acquired the status of 
an Autonomous Community by this route. 
An early step had been made to establish pre-autonomous bodies in 
the Basque Country and Catalonia by the end of 1977 in recognition 
of their historic demands.  Opposition to the widening of the 
autonomous model beyond the ‘historic nations’ came from Catalonia 
and the Basque Country who feared it diluted their special status.  It 
also came from some in Suárez’s party, the UCD (Unión de Centro 
Democrático), who wanted it to be restricted to the historic nations, 
some on the left who wanted federalism and those on the right who 
wanted reorganisation based on provinces.  Some provinces 
(Santander, Logrono) wanted uni-provincial solutions (Fusi Aizpurúa 
2000).  However, the autonomy fever which followed the approval of 
statutes of self-government in the Basque Country and Catalonia 
resulted in all parts of Spain securing autonomous status by 1983 as 
the figure overleaf shows. 
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Most followed the slower article 143 route.  Andalusia however 
pursued the accelerated route of article 151, arguing special grounds 
of economic deprivation.  Strictly speaking, Andalusia failed to meet 
the criteria of the article 151 route as one of the provinces did not 
return a majority in support.  A solution was reached however through 
interparty negotiation (Keating and Wilson 2009: 539). 
Figure 1:  Autonomous Communities and Statutes 
Region Government 
Title 
Date 
 
Basque Country 
Catalonia 
 
Gobierno Vasco 
Generalitat de Catalunya 
 
18 Dec 1979 
Galicia Xunta de Galicia 6 April 1981 
Andalusia 
Asturias 
Cantabria 
Junta de Andalucía 
Principado de Asturias 
Diputación Regional 
30 Dec 1981 
La Rioja 
Murcia 
Consejo de Gobierno 
Consejo de Gobierno 
9 June 1982 
Valencia Generalitat Valenciana 1 July 1982 
Aragon 
Castile-La Mancha 
Canary Islands 
Diputación General 
Junta de Comunidades 
Gobierno Canario 
10 Aug 1982 
Extremadura 
Balearic Islands 
Madrid 
Castile and Leon 
Junta de Extremadura 
Gobierno Balear 
Gobierno de la Comunidad 
Junta de Castilla y León 
25 Feb 1983 
Navarra 
 
Diputación Foral 10 Aug 1983 
Source:  Casanova and Gil Andrés 2014: xxi, supplemented 
by author’s research on Autonomous Government websites). 
The decentralisation process was not universally welcomed.  The 
centuries-old divisions in Spain were reflected in the attempted 
military coup, in February 1981, when those in support of a 
52 
 
centralised, unified country, especially in the military, saw the 
developing State of the Autonomies as a threat to Spanish national 
identity.  Although unsuccessful, the coup did provoke (or was 
portrayed as provoking) a desire amongst leading politicians nationally 
to slow down moves to regional autonomy.  Following the political deal 
to allow Andalusia to proceed to autonomy via the fast track, 
legislation was passed to ‘place a check on the proliferation of 
requests for devolution’ (Black 2010: 98).  The Statutory Law for the 
Autonomy Process (Ley orgánica de armonización del proceso 
autonómico or LOAPA) was subsequently, and successfully, 
challenged (notably by the sub-states) through the Constitutional 
Court.  The establishment of a devolved state in the Constitution and 
the approval of Statutes of Autonomy proved to be the beginning of 
the process, not the end. 
Many challenges to the decentralised model were to be made by the 
sub-states, as the State of the Autonomies developed over the 
following two decades.  The 1980s saw the major political parties 
collaborating to develop key measures to underpin the decentralised 
state model, including the Interregional Compensation Fund (Fondo 
de compensación interterritorial) and the Statutary Law of the Funding 
of the Autonomous Communities (Ley orgánica de financiación de las 
comunidades autónomas).  However, there were recurring points of 
conflict (Tusell 2011: 359).  The Basque Country and Catalonia in 
particular each sought recognition of their own special historic 
nationality, wanting this to be reflected in the relative powers of their 
institutions compared with the other sub-states.  This resulted in 
numerous appeals to the Constitutional Court.  At the same time the 
Autonomous Governments with fewer powers demanded equality.  
The Statutory Law on the Transfer of Powers (Ley orgánica de 
transferencia) of December 1992 raised the level of powers of all 
Autonomous Governments.   
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2.4.4 WEAKNESSES OF THE STATE OF THE AUTONOMIES 
In addition to the demands of some sub-state nationalists for greater 
autonomy, a number of weaknesses of the State of the Autonomies as 
established by the 1978 Constitution can be identified.  The ambiguity 
described above in the drafting of the Constitution is reflected in some 
confusion over the division of functions between Central Government 
and the Autonomous Governments.  This has led to overlap and 
duplication.  It has been calculated that in the period 1990-1999 for 
every civil servant post lost by Central Government, two were created 
at regional and local level (Chislett 2002: 72).  Some regions were 
artificially created or lacked any strong sense of identity and some 
were thought to be too small to function effectively. 
From the outset, the system did not encourage co-operation between 
Autonomous Governments.  Rather, the asymmetry of routes to 
autonomy and allocation of competencies can be said to have 
contributed to tensions between communities as well as causing 
inefficiency from a national perspective because of the numerous and 
different processes.  The development of the State of the Autonomies 
has been described as a race for greater competencies (Barbería 
2012), each Autonomous Government wanting as many as the others, 
looking enviously at Catalonia who looks enviously at the special 
financial arrangements agreed for the Basque Country and Navarre. 
Central to the weaknesses of the State of the Autonomies as 
established by the 1978 Constitution is the unresolved issue of 
whether Spain was meant to be a federal state.  The need for 
consensus can help explain why the political leaders in the immediate 
post-Franco period side-stepped the issue as a tactical manoeuvre.  
However, it has continued to be a significant source of conflict.  Whilst 
some authors have categorised Spain as a federal state (Aja 2003; 
Sala 2014), many do not.  Josep Colomer describes the model as 
‘non-institutional federalism’, referring to the lack of appropriate 
institutions, particularly in relation to promoting cooperation between 
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central and autonomous governments (1998a: 49).  Heywood argues 
that Spain is not a federal state as there is no transfer of state 
sovereignty and Autonomous Governments do not participate in 
national decision-making (1995: 162).  Requejo describes Spain not 
as a federal state but as a ‘regional state’ (2005: 82).  According to 
Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 59), the Constitution established a semi-
federal state.  For Salvador Parrado Díez, the Spanish system is a 
‘regional state with quasi-federal status’ (2011: 243). 
Based on the defining characteristics of a federal state and the 
provisions of the 1978 Constitution, both outlined earlier, it is possible 
to argue that Spain is not a federal state on a number of grounds.  In 
summary, sovereignty is not shared, the two tiers do not operate 
independently or cooperatively, and the role for Autonomous 
Governments in national policy-making is limited. 
First, the Autonomous Governments are not constituent elements, 
meaning that the principle of autonomy is derived from the State, not 
the Constitution (Canel 1994: 47).  Article 1 of the Constitution 
establishes the Spanish people as subject of the ‘National 
sovereignty’ and article 2 ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation’ 
(Requejo 2005: 82).   Balfour and Quiroga (2007: 13) point to what 
they call the Constitution’s clear definition of Spain as ‘a nation of 
nationalities and regions’, the implication being that ‘there is only one 
nation and the regions with historic claims to autonomy have no 
political status as nations, merely that they are cultural nations and 
therefore do not qualify for statehood.’ 
Article 145 explicitly prohibits the federation of Autonomous 
Communities (Presidencia del Gobierno 1982: 90).  Federalism 
‘implies a commitment to a contractual arrangement between political 
units that decide to create a new political space’ (Gagnon 1993: 17).  
Such a pact amongst partners was difficult to achieve given that some 
areas that became Autonomous Communities in Spain did not even 
exist before the Constitution and so clearly could not have been party 
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to their creation.  Arguments that federations are contractual, 
assuming that any contracting party is free to withdraw from the 
association (King 1982: 108), would also suggest that Spain is not a 
federation. 
The open-ended nature of the Constitution’s division of powers is not 
a federal distribution of power (Giner & Moreno 1990: 187). The 
senate does not have a territorial representation role like that of the 
US or Germany.  Autonomous Governments have no role in the 
judiciary and are not involved in the appointments to the Constitutional 
Court.  They have no formal role in constitutional reform (see Elisa 
Roller [2002] on the failure to reform the Senate) and a limited role in 
relation to European issues.   
In conclusion, there is a high level of decentralisation to the sub-state 
level in Spain and, as in a federal state, powers are devolved to all its 
territorial sub units, not just for some.  There are however a number of 
features of the Spanish model, as described above, which differentiate 
it from a federal state.  The classification of a highly decentralised 
‘union state’ better describes Spain’s devolved model and reflects the 
existence of nations prior to the union (namely, nations such as 
Catalonia and the Basque Country). 
Many have regarded the State of the Autonomies as transitional, 
seeing the Constitution as providing the first steps (Solé-Tura 
1985:15), or as an evolving model (Moreno 2001: 2), or a product of 
special circumstances, namely the Transition (Erk and Gagnon 2000: 
100).  The model has undoubtedly continued to be challenged, 
notably by separatists in the Basque Country, and more recently by 
the heightened secessionist debate in Catalonia.  Challenges have 
also been mounted by other, ‘non-historic’ Autonomous Governments, 
such as Andalusia, as evidenced by the multiple cases taken to the 
Constitutional Court by the Junta (Ramajo 2013).  These continued 
challenges suggest that the State of the Autonomies has not reached 
its final state.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical context to the 
formation and reform of public administration in Spain today.  It seeks 
to achieve this by considering the parameters of public administration 
and by outlining the main typologies, welfare states and public 
administrative traditions, which have been developed, with particular 
emphasis on the Napoleonic tradition and its applicability to Spain.  It 
then analyses recent (post-1970) public sector reforms in an 
international context (as measured against the classical model of 
public administration) and considers the academic treatment of the 
concept of administrative decentralisation and public sector responses 
to austerity.  The chapter turns to an analysis of how public 
administration has developed and changed in contemporary Spain, 
examining the early implementation of the decentralised state and 
taking into account the influence of European Union membership.   
 
3.2 PARAMETERS AND TYPOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
3.2.1 PARAMETERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
The existence of public administration is so evident, so widespread, 
that few studies feel the need to define this activity.  Where this issue 
is considered, there is agreement on the difficulty in defining public 
administration, pointing to the various interpretations that can be 
made, such as it being the civil service, or the structure of government 
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or the study of the two (Greenwood et al 2002: 2).23  Many studies 
cover the difference between public administration and public 
management (Greenwood et al 2002: 6; Lynn 2003: 14; Hughes 2012: 
3) without defining public administration.  Key critical framework texts 
fail to give a definition (Maor and Lane 1999; Lane 2000; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011), while Christopher Hood limits his definition of 
administration to the ‘deliberate processes of implementation and 
control’ (1976: 5).  In some cases, the terms public administration and 
bureaucracy appear to be almost interchangeable (Peters 1995). 
However, to provide some clarity for the forthcoming examination of 
the public sector and public sector reform as it relates to Spain, it is 
important to describe the parameters of the term public administration 
at this point.  Using a starting point of general administration as 
‘determined action taken in pursuit of a conscious purpose’, Ferrel 
Heady adds two further elements: cooperation between two or more 
individuals, seeing administration as a cooperative human effort 
towards a shared goal; and public administration as that sector of 
general administration found in a political setting, ‘concerned primarily 
with the carrying out of public policy decisions made by the 
authoritative decision-makers in the political system’ (2001: 2).  Public 
administration can be defined succinctly as involving ‘the co-ordination 
of all organized activity, having as its purpose the implementation of 
public policy’ (Gortner 1981: 5).  Harold F. Gornter then highlights key 
differences between the public and private sectors which are vital to 
understanding public administration and public administrative culture.  
These differences include elements such as the nature of many public 
services which operate like a monopoly, the lack of profit motivation 
and the added scrutiny that the actions of public officials attract as 
opposed to their private sector counterparts (Gortner 1981: 13).  As 
will be revealed in the case study, these aspects will have an impact 
                                               
23 Reflecting this multiple interpretation, there is a convention of referring to the academic 
discipline of Public Administration (P.A.) in upper case and to the practice of public 
administration (pa) in the lower case (Brans 2007: 280). 
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on the running of services by the Autonomous Governments.  In 
particular, the issues of scrutiny and transparency are central to an 
understanding of public administration in Spain. 
The term used here is ‘public administration’.  (However, the word 
‘bureaucracy’ is similarly used to describe public administration and is 
subject to many interpretations in popular culture. 24)  David Beetham 
(1996: 1) points to the difficulties in agreeing a definitive meaning, 
contrasting the use of the term ‘public administration’ in different 
academic disciplines to show the breadth of interpretation.  Standard 
usage in the nineteenth century was to indicate the system whereby 
ministerial positions were occupied by career officials, usually 
answerable to a hereditary monarch.  In the study of sociology, the 
term derives from the work of Max Weber for whom bureaucracy 
meant a system of administration, not a type of government, 
undertaken by trained professionals, according to written rules. (This 
school of thought is expanded upon in Section 3.3.1 below.)  Public 
Administration studies use the term to distinguish public administration 
from administration in a private organisation, highlighting the 
differences between the two.  Political economists use the term to 
define a non-market organisation, which is financed not from the sale 
of its products, but from its parent organisation (Beetham 1996: 2-4).  
For the purposes of this thesis, public administration is considered as 
the broader activity, and bureaucracy as the methodology by which 
the tasks of the organisation are achieved (Lawton and Rose 1994: 
29). 
3.2.2 TYPOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONS 
Esping-Anderson’s Typology 
Public administrations exist throughout the world, but take many 
different forms.  A number of typologies have sought to categorise 
                                               
24 The term ‘bureaucracy’ is commonly used both as a neutral term, to describe a complex 
organisation, especially in the public sector and pejoratively, to describe an ‘impenetrable, 
ponderous and unimaginative organization’ (Hill 1997: 155). 
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ideal types in order to assist the understanding of why different forms 
have developed in different places and at different times.  A 
particularly rich seam, especially for administrative systems, is that of 
typologies of welfare states.25 
One of the best-known and most frequently referenced typologies of 
developed countries’ welfare states is Gosta Esping-Anderson’s 
‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ (1990), described as ‘the gold 
standard’ of comparative welfare state studies (Kettunen and 
Peterson 2011:1).  Using the two dimensions of decommodification 
and social stratification, he identifies three clusters of regime types.26 
 The first, the liberal cluster, as exemplified by the USA, focuses on 
individualism and the primacy of the market.  Public assistance is 
means-tested and limited.  Welfare benefits cater mainly for (the 
minority) low-income groups and the majority of people provide for 
themselves through private social insurance policies. 
 The second, exemplified by Germany, is described as the 
corporatist or conservative regime.  The welfare state relies not on 
the market, but on compulsory public insurance for workers.  
Rights are in this way attached to class and status.  The influence 
of Catholicism is seen in the focus on preserving the traditional 
family. 
 The third group, social democratic, is the smallest group and 
limited to the Scandinavian countries.  Fundamental to this final 
type are the principles of universalism and social rights for all 
citizens (Esping-Anderson 1990: 26-8). 
                                               
25 See for example Leibfried 1992, Castles and Mitchell 1993; Siaroff 1994, Ferrera 1996, 
Bonoli 1997, Korpi and Palme 1998 – usefully summarised by Arts and Gelissen (2002:  
143-4). 
26 Decommodification refers to the degree to which individuals or families can uphold a 
socially acceptable standard of living independent of market participation.  Stratification 
refers to the different impact of welfare states on social structure, for example whether it 
cultivates hierarchy or status, or dualisms or universalism (Esping-Anderson 1990: 37, 58). 
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A key criticism of the Esping-Anderson typology, of particular 
relevance to this study, was the charge that the Mediterranean 
countries were inaccurately categorised.  Italy is included by Esping-
Anderson in the corporatist cluster, whereas Spain, Portugal and 
Greece are not covered at all.  This omission by Esping-Anderson has 
led to a number of commentators debating whether Southern 
European countries constitute a separate cluster rather than 
belonging to the corporatist cluster or forming a sub-set of the 
corporatist cluster (Rhodes 1997: 1-22; Moreno 2001a; Arts and 
Gelissen 2002: 145).  In particular, Maurizio Ferrera (1996) argues 
convincingly that Southern European countries differ from both the 
highly homogeneous, standardised and universal welfare states of 
northern Europe and from the more fragmented continental systems.  
The Southern Model of Welfare has been characterised by a high 
degree of polarisation in terms of welfare support:  generous pensions 
exist alongside non-existent support for unemployed young people for 
example.  This dualism of protection differentiates Southern European 
states not only from the universalism of social democratic European 
states but also from continental corporatist countries characterised by 
a smaller spread between high and low protection (Ferrera 1996: 21). 
A second defining characteristic of Southern European model has 
been the nature of health services.  Portugal, Greece and Spain have 
all aimed to establish fully fledged national health services, based on 
taxes rather than contributions, as is the case in the corporatist model.  
However, there is a mix of agencies involved, including a high 
proportion of private sector provision – a characteristic of the liberal 
cluster.  The persistence of clientelism also differentiates the Southern 
European model from Esping-Anderson’s western state clusters.  
Political clientelism – favours exchanged for support of a particular 
party - exists in all democratic countries, but the relationship is usually 
general and impersonal.27  In Southern Europe, however, a real 
                                               
27 Clientelism can be differentiated from patronage as follows:  ‘Political clientelism (selective 
distribution of state resources by political parties to win client’s electorate support) and 
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exchange of individual votes takes place accruing benefits to 
individuals (Ferrera 1996: 25; Kickert 2011: 810).28  This thesis will 
return to the issue of clientelism later in this chapter. 
More recently, this type of comparative welfare state typology has 
been criticised for its focus on national specificities.  The argument is 
made for a ‘more fluid transnational conceptualisation’, recognising 
that welfare states are not created in national isolation but are heavily 
influenced by transnational economic, political and cultural 
interdependencies (Kettunen and Peterson 2011: 1).  This criticism is 
made specifically in regard to welfare states, but highlights the 
dangers in focusing on individual nations in comparative study. 
Painter and Peters’ Administrative Traditions 
The Esping-Anderson categorisation is useful as a method of 
examining a particular aspect of public administrations, that of the 
welfare state.  The addition of the Southern European model 
enhances the understanding of the public sector in Spain as it draws 
out differences and in particular highlights the issue of clientelism.  A 
more helpful typology in considering different public administrative 
regimes is one which considers public administrative traditions.  
Administrative tradition is defined as: 
An historically based set of values, structures and relationships 
with other institutions that defines the nature of appropriate 
public administration within society. (Peters 2008: 118) 
Martin Painter and B. Guy Peters (2010a: 10-12) argue that whilst it is 
problematic to systematically analyse administrative functions, it is 
justified as it aids comparison, helps understand reform, management 
and governance capacity and assists the interpretation of 
administrative systems.  They understand administrative tradition as 
                                               
patronage (unequal, hierarchical, personalized exchange of favours between patron and 
client) are basic characteristics of southern politics and so is corruption (abuse of public 
power for private personal or party gain)’ (Kickert 2007: 50). 
28 There are counter views of the pervasiveness of clientelism in Southern European 
countries.  Hopkin (2001) in his study of the extent to which governing parties in post-Franco 
Spain have followed clientelist strategies, found little evidence of ‘votes for exchange’. 
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containing ideas and structures, and as a discernible pattern in the 
style and substance of public administration.  Four variables assist 
this analysis of administrative traditions and are set out in Figure 2 
overleaf.  These are the state’s relationships with society; 
relationships with political institutions; the relative importance of law 
versus management; and the nature of accountability (Painter and 
Peters 2010a: 6-8). 
Using this framework, nine families or groups of countries are 
identified, each sharing some common administrative inheritance:  
Anglo-American; Napoleonic; Germanic; Scandinavian; Latin 
American; Postcolonial South Asian and African; East Asian; Soviet 
and Islamic (Painter and Peters 2010b: 19). 
There is a danger when grouping together countries in this way, that 
one overlooks or minimises the institutional complexity of each 
country.  There is also the risk noted earlier regarding a focus on 
national specificities (Kettenun and Peterson 2011: 1). However, the 
model does enable the development of a framework for the 
examination of the similarities and differences between Autonomous 
Governments in Spain and as will be seen in later chapters of this 
thesis is a particularly relevant construct in the investigation of the 
Junta and the Generalitat.  Spain, together with France and other 
Southern European countries, is located in the Napoleonic Tradition, 
which is explored more fully in Section 3.2.3 below.   
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Figure 2:  Four Variables of Administrative Traditions 
1. The first variable, relationships with society, is defined first in 
macro terms.  Where does the relative permanence and power lie 
– in the state or the society?  Is the state a product of agreement in 
society (contractual) or are the state and society intertwined to the 
extent that it is impossible to separate them (organic)?  State and 
society are also related at a micro level:  in some countries the 
state is closely bound to society through networks, in others the 
relationship is more personal and individual. 
2. The second dimension, the relationship of politics to 
administration, considers how far there is political involvement in 
the bureaucracy.  In particular, it focuses on how much contact 
there is between politicians and civil servants.  Is there a strict 
separation of their roles?  This can have an impact on the level of 
commitment of civil servants to government programmes and 
raises the question of whether merit or political criteria dominate 
recruitment and promotion and therefore affect competency.  A 
further aspect is the extent to which the bureaucracy becomes a 
‘general purpose elite for the state’. 
3. The third variable, of “law versus management”, contrasts the 
public administrator and the public manager.  The public 
administrator is someone whose task is to identify the legal 
foundations of public actions and to implement that law.  The 
public manager’s job is to ensure the efficient and effective 
functioning of government programmes. 
4. The fourth variable, concepts of accountability can differ 
significantly.  Does accountability depend on law as the primary 
mechanism for controlling public bureaucracies or are political 
actors, especially parliaments, the instrument to be relied upon? 
Source:  adapted from Painter and Peters (2010a: 6-8). 
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3.2.3 SPAIN AND THE NAPOLEONIC MODEL 
 Aspects of the Napoleonic Model 
The Napoleonic administrative tradition reflects the approach of 
Napoleon I (1804-1814, 1815), whose model of the public sector 
spread throughout much of southern Europe, including Spain.  It can 
be described as legalistic and formal.  Its roots are in the French 
Revolution (1789-1799) after which Parliament became the highest 
authority in France.  Legislation became fundamental to state and 
administration, locating the constitution, laws and regulation as the 
exclusive sources of administrative action (Kickert 2011: 807).  In 
terms of Painter and Peters’ four variables, the organic nature of the 
relationship between state and society allows citizens a less 
autonomous role in relation to the state and also makes the state less 
open to change (contrasted with a contractarian relationship where 
either party can seek change).  The state is centralised and unitary, 
with an emphasis on uniformity.  There is a greater blurring of the 
roles between civil servants and politicians than in other administrative 
traditions (Peters 2008: 123).  Under the Napoleonic tradition, civil 
servants are public administrators, applying the law, rather than 
managers for whom the law is the starting, not the end point (Peters 
2008: 122).  Public administration is held to account not by citizens or 
parliament, but via the courts. 
 Roots in Spain 
Spain has been cited as the closest adherent to the Napoleonic model 
(Alba and Navarro 2011: 783), demonstrating many of the 
characteristics outlined above, and as will be explored further in this 
section.  Paradoxically, adoption of the model in Spain is usually 
dated to the beginning of the nineteenth century, specifically to the 
time of the 1808 War of Independence when Spaniards rejected 
French rule. 
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Spain was therefore at war with Napoleon I and 
at the same time adopted the Napoleonic model for everything:  
its legal codes, its administrative law, its public administration 
model, its administrative corps. (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783) 
However, it can be argued that the foundations for a Napoleonic 
model were already in place in Spain before 1808.  It seems likely that 
the French influence prior to Napoleon may well have created fertile 
ground for the establishment of the model in the nineteenth century.  It 
is possible to trace the influence of France and French thinking over 
Spain and Spanish systems and culture to the Habsburg and Bourbon 
empires of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.  Bourbons sat on the 
thrones of both France and Spain.  Charles III of Spain (1759-1788) 
brought advisers from other parts of his empire to Madrid.  A family 
compact was signed between the Bourbon monarchs of Spain and 
France in 1761.  Spain and France (as well as Portugal and Naples) 
collaborated in the expulsion of the Jesuits.  These examples show a 
high degree of shared history, cooperation and influence, not only in 
terms of the relations between the countries but also in terms of the 
development of Spanish domestic policy-making (Paquette 2009: 5). 
A powerful bureaucracy to administer the Empire had already been 
developed under the Habsburgs (1517-1668) and when the Bourbons 
took the Spanish throne in 1714, the French mode of centralisation 
was reflected in a series of steps to bring about a similar centralised 
public administration to Spain - notably with the abolition of the 
Catalan fueros by Philip V (the grandson of the French King Louis 
XIV) in the same year (Moreno 2001: 42-3).  Philip V emulated French 
centralisation and developed a state bureaucracy fashioned on the 
French model (Magone 2004: 2). The French influence after the War 
of Independence was reflected in the Cádiz Constitution of 1812 
which revealed clear objectives to centralise and apply uniformity 
(Moreno 2001: 45). 
In this way, the foundations were set for the development of a 
centralised (that is, a Castilian), law-based public administrative model 
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in nineteenth century Spain.  Three key elements of the Napoleonic 
model then became the basis of the Spanish administrative tradition.  
Firstly, centralism was used to manage a country which was not a 
unified state.  Secondly, uniformity was adopted to combat the 
differences between provinces, to counterbalance old privileges and 
to apply legal principles equally.  Finally, a professional civil service 
was introduced to replace the old ‘spoils systems’ and political 
manoeuvrings (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783).  The term ‘spoils 
system’ refers to the practice of a political party, having won an 
election, filling public sector jobs from its supporters (Hughes 2012: 
45).  It is predated in Spain by the system of ‘cesanías’ during the 
nineteenth century whereby new governments carried out purges to 
guarantee the loyalty of public employees (Molina Álvarez de 
Cienfuegos 1999: 35). 
 The Southern European Model 
Spain has therefore been located in the ‘Napoleonic family’.  It also 
shares an additional set of traits as part of the ‘New Southern 
European’ cluster as distinct from, or as a sub-set of, the Napoleonic 
model.  This Southern European model has been described in terms 
of two enduring and contrasting structural characteristics:  heaviness 
and weakness (Diamandouros et al 2006: 9-24).  This use of heavy 
and weak is useful as it captures an inconsistency inherent in these 
regimes. 
On the one hand, they are heavy in terms of their heavy-handed 
relations with their citizens and society, with large and often extensive 
state structures.  State power is centralised and is used to intervene 
extensively in the economy.  Such state intervention has included 
economic protectionist efforts and regulation of the labour market.  
These states also traditionally provided state jobs, especially for the 
middle classes, via political patronage.  It is important to recognise 
that such patronage was not exclusive to Southern European states, 
but ithas been argued that it was more extensive and entrenched in 
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these countries in the nineteenth century than in other parts of Europe 
and, moreover, actually increased during the twentieth century 
(Diamandouros et al 2006: 19).29 
However, this dominant presence of the state does not necessarily 
correspond with a characteristic of strength.  On the contrary, 
Southern European regimes have been traditionally weak.  The state 
may have had large and extensive state structures, but historically 
they have been under-resourced – both financially and in terms of 
relevant expertise.  The influence of local elites meant there was 
inadequate taxation of the wealthy to fund public services and the 
provision of jobs via local political patronage often meant unqualified 
people filled public sector posts.  The resulting uneven development 
of the administrative apparatus, coupled with inadequate social 
services and under-developed general state education, meant for a 
weak state, with widespread, and well founded, perceptions of 
administrative inefficiency and corruption (Sotiropoulos 2006: 201).  In 
terms of today’s public administration in Spain, some of these 
characteristics can be discerned, such as the presence of corruption. 
Others including the under-resourcing of state structures and 
inadequate welfare services, are no longer the case (at least before 
the post-2008 economic crisis).  These issues will be examined in the 
specific cases of the Junta and the Generalitat. 
 Grands Corps and Politicisation 
Two related aspects of Spain’s adoption of the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition have been particularly influential in the period 
of reform to be considered in the next section and therefore merit 
further examination at this point:  the grands corps or civil service elite 
and the wider politicisation of the administration. 
                                               
29 Corruption continues to be a significant issue – see for example Heywood’s article on 
corruption during the González governments (Heywood 1995a) and more recent work on 
political corruption and the construction boom (Jiménez and Villoria 2012). 
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A significant element of the Napoleonic tradition is a highly trained and 
qualified civil service organised into professional corps.  Within Spain, 
specialised groups of officials were appointed and a powerful elite 
corps (also called the grands corps, special corps or cuerpos) of top 
officials developed.30  The roots of the grands corps are not clear, but 
Carlos Alba and Carmen Navarro (2011: 785) state that at the start of 
the twentieth century some civil servants, especially in the Ministry of 
Finance, initiated a special corps based on the French model of 
grands corps in defence of their job security because they were faced 
with administrative reform.  Carlos Alba (1997: 178) had earlier 
argued that until 1918, under the spoils system, some civil servants 
had taken over the running of the state, achieving a protected 
position.  This enabled them, through establishing special corps, to 
become a powerful elite structure within government which has 
remained to the present day. 
The public administrative structures, processes and ethos in Spain 
remained largely unchanged throughout most of the twentieth century, 
including during the Franco regime.  At the conclusion of the Civil 
War, the Franco regime appointed army personnel to the civil service 
with ministries ‘split between several political families’ (Alba and 
Navarro 2011: 789).  During the 1940s and 1950s when the regime 
needed technical experts, these were filled by the traditional 
bureaucratic elite.  The grands corps secured its power in three ways: 
 They had a self-financing capacity through special taxes, as 
they charged citizens for the services they provided; 
 They had a self-governing capacity to protect their interests; 
and  
 They could veto proposals of politicians in personnel matters. 
(Parrado Díez 2011: 248) 
                                               
30 The terms ‘grands corps’ and ‘grand corps’ are used in the plural and the singular in 
different texts.  In this thesis, the term ‘grands corps’ is normally used to reflect the existence 
of numerous elite groups of civil servants. 
69 
 
Attempts to reform public administration in Spain from the 1950s 
onward ‘collided with the authoritarian essence’ of the Franco regime, 
obstructing its modernisation (Giménez Martínez 2014: 1).  The 
grands corps continued to maintain its well established position, 
despite in the 1960s some opening up of what had been a closed 
recruitment system, and legislation in 1965 ending the charging for 
services. 
There have been two key characteristics of the power of the Spanish 
grands corps which have rendered them so influential.  Firstly, they 
have controlled the recruitment and promotion of new members.  New 
members are recruited to the service of the corps, not into the general 
administration service – presumably with the expectation of loyalty to 
the corps primarily and not to the civil service in general.  Secondly, 
members of the grands corps have enjoyed high levels of influence 
over politics.  The administrative elite is strongly intertwined with the 
political elite, with many ministers and members of parliament in Spain 
being former top officials and members of the professional corps.  For 
example, civil servants have benefited from ‘leave of absence’ from 
administrative functions to take on political roles, whilst remaining 
linked to (and arguably loyal to) the corps (Alba 1997: 181).  Members 
of the grands corps still occupy the majority of top positions in the civil 
service, including posts which are political appointments such as the 
Director-Generals (Kickert 2011: 809).  Former Prime Minister José 
María Aznar is an example of a politician drawn from the high-ranking 
officials of the grands corps (Magone 2004: 74).  Mariano Rajoy, 
Prime Minister, is also a former civil servant. 
This politicisation of the administration is one of the key differences 
between Spain and the New Southern European states on the one 
hand and their Northern European neighbours on the other.  
Politicisation takes place at the top and the bottom of the civil service. 
At the lower level, it can take the form of political parties offering 
voters jobs in the public sector (Kickert 2011: 810), a practice often 
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referred to as ‘caciquismo’.31  Under the Napoleonic system public 
jobs can only be obtained officially via competitive entrance 
examinations.  However, a number of methods are used to bypass 
this barrier, such as the use of temporary contracts which are then 
converted into permanent positions.  At the top level is the 
politicisation of senior officials.  While the practice of political 
appointments to top jobs formally exists in the US and informally in 
others, the degree is higher in Southern European countries, including 
Spain.  The election victory of the Socialist Party in 1982 in particular 
saw a huge wave of new appointments to senior positions.  This was 
repeated by successful parties in subsequent elections (Kickert 2011: 
810). 
These dimensions of the Napoleonic model and the New Southern 
European model are useful therefore to illuminate the tradition in 
Spanish public administration, with its state-centric view (of particular 
importance in the context of the establishment of the Autonomous 
Governments), its emphasis on administrative law and formalism, the 
blurring of the distinction between the roles of politicians and civil 
servants, the heavy but weak state apparatus and the inheritance of 
political clientelism.  These features clearly have had implications for 
the capacity and enthusiasm for change in Spain, particularly in the 
late twentieth century, which this chapter will now address. 
 
3.3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM  
3.3.1 THE CLASSICAL MODEL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
This section begins with a consideration of the key present day 
debates in public administration and bureaucracy in western 
                                               
31 ‘Caciquismo’ is a form of corruption based on the clientelistic practices of local notables 
(or caciques) (Moreno-Luzón 2007: 417). 
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democracies in order to contextualise public sector reforms beginning 
in the 1970s. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century until the 1970s, public 
administrations in developed countries had been predominantly 
organised according to the ‘classical’ model of bureaucracy.32  This 
model was greatly influenced at the outset by the work of three key 
individuals:  Max Weber (1864-1920), Woodrow Wilson (1856-1920) 
and Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915). 
Weber outlined a number of principles of modern bureaucracy in his 
“Essays in Sociology” which are reproduced overleaf.  In summary, 
under the classical Weber model only the law, and the rules made in 
accordance with the law, provide authority.  A strict hierarchy 
maintains and organises that authority.  Power is held not by an 
individual but by the position they hold in the hierarchy.  The 
organisation is impersonal and written documents ensure consistency 
in the application of the rules.  People work in the bureaucracy as a 
full-time occupation.  Office management, because it follows rules, 
can be learnt (Hughes 2012: 48-9).  This model was in contrast to the 
earlier public administration which had been carried out by ‘amateurs 
bound by personal loyalties to their leaders’ (Hughes 2012: 43).  In 
essence, personal administration was replaced by an impersonal 
system. 
  
                                               
32 The term ‘classical model’ is used here.  However, as well as classical (used by Lane 
2000), the model has been labelled ‘Weberian’, ‘traditional’ (Hughes 2012), ‘modern’, ‘legal-
rational’ (Goñi 1992: 64), bureaucratic and ‘ancien regime’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 71). 
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Figure 3:  Weber’s Characteristics of Bureaucracy 
Modern officialdom functions in the following specific manner: 
 
I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, 
which are generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or 
administrative regulations. 
II. The principles of office hierarchy and of levels of graded 
authority mean a firmly ordered system of super- and 
subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower 
offices by the higher ones. 
III. The management of the modern office is based upon written 
documents (‘the files’), which are preserved in their original 
or draught form. 
IV. Office management, at least all specialized office 
management – and such management is distinctly modern – 
usually presupposes thorough and expert training. 
V. When the office is fully developed, official activity demands 
the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the 
fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly 
delimited. 
VI. The management of the office follows general rules, which 
are more or less stable, more or less exhaustive, and which 
can be learned. 
 
Source:  Gerth and Mills (1991: 196-8). 
The classical model was also heavily influenced by Woodrow Wilson, 
Professor at Princeton University for many years before becoming 
President of the USA (1913-1921).  Wilson’s interest was to overcome 
‘the corrupt and confusing administrative circumstances in the US with 
a public administration based on scientific research’, arguing for the 
installation of a ‘scientific, professional, meritocratic, clear-cut, rule-
based and therefore trustworthy bureaucracy’ (Sager and Rosser 
2009: 1138).  Focused on the relationship between political and 
administrative roles, he made the case for a clear separation of 
politics from the administrative and a separation of policy from the 
administrative task of carrying it out.  ‘Administration lies outside the 
proper sphere of politics’ (Wilson 1887: 209-10, cited in Peters 1995: 
3). 
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The third major contributor to the classical model in public 
administration was Frederick Winslow Taylor.  Frederick Winslow 
Taylor was an American mechanical engineer, efficiency expert and 
management consultant, and is widely regarded as the father of 
Scientific Management.  His seminal work, ‘The Principles of Scientific 
Management’, published in 1911, laid out the process of scientifically 
studying work to increase worker and organisational efficiency. The 
principles underlying his theory contributed to a wide array of 
management practices during the twentieth century including task 
specialisation, assembly line production practices, job analysis, work 
design, and production quotas and control (Giannantonio and Hurley-
Hanson (2011: 7). 
3.3.2 REFORM AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The classical Weberian model dominated twentieth century public 
administration in the developed world, described as ‘the original and 
“default” form of organisation in the public sector’ (Ferlie and Ongaro 
2015: 3).  However, by the 1970s criticisms were being made that the 
classical model was out of date, not suited to the rapidly changing 
end-of-century world.  This view is encapsulated in the introduction to 
David Osborne and Ted Gaebler’s key 1992 work: 
The kind of governments that developed during the industrial 
era, with their sluggish, centralised bureaucracies, their 
preoccupation with rules and regulations and their hierarchical 
chains of command, no longer work very well.  […]  They are 
like luxury ocean liners in an age of supersonic jets:  big, 
cumbersome, expensive and extremely difficult to turn around. 
(1992: 11) 
The basis of the criticisms reflected wider changes in society – in 
terms of politics, society and economics.  The late 1970s and early 
1980s saw a decline in the deference to authority, questioning ‘the 
legitimacy of bureaucratic decisions and actions’ (Pierre 1995: 1), and 
a ‘growing customer mindedness displayed by increasingly affluent 
and educated consumers within public services as in their private 
consumption’ (Ferlie and Fitzgerald 2002: 344).  In the private sector, 
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IT developments made new forms of performance measurement 
possible and there was a ‘dramatic and sustained rise of management 
functions, knowledge and authority’ (2002: 344). 
Significantly, there were major changes to the politico-economic 
context.  The middle class grew and taxpayers were challenging the 
size of the public sector (Ferlie and Fitzgerald 2002: 343).  Changes in 
income levels and distribution triggered a new tax consciousness 
(Hood 1991: 7), and the economic downturn required governments to 
reassess the role and function of the public sector. The bureaucracy 
was increasingly seen as an obstacle to social change and no longer 
a facilitator (Pierre 1995: 2).  Unlike the technical or legal changes 
made in the 1960s, public sector reform became a key political and 
economic matter.  Epitomised by the Thatcher government in the UK 
and Reagan administration in the USA, a market-based ideology was 
embraced, with private sector techniques and privatization seen as 
the solutions.  This change, based on the widespread adoption of 
private sector approaches, was to become a fundamental shift away 
from the legal-rational bureaucracy of the classical model. 
Initially focused on economic liberalisation and privatisation in the 
1980s, the governments of the UK and USA moved to wider 
administrative reforms of core state functions in the 1990s, including 
contracting out of public services, downsizing the public sector and 
reforming civil service employment practices (Kamarck 2000: 235-49).  
By the 1990s these types of reforms were being grouped together 
under the label of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM).  Many authors 
published work on NPM at that time.33  Christopher Hood is generally 
recognised as one of the first adopters (but not advocate) of this term 
for the group of reforms.  NPM was a rejection of the previous 
concentration of public administration on hierarchy and the elimination 
of overlap.  Rather, it championed contestability, user choice and 
                                               
33 See, for example, Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Dunleavy and Hood 1994; Ferlie et al 
1996; Lane 2000; McLaughlin et al 2002.  More recently, the focus has been on the demise 
of NPM (see comments later in this section). 
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transparency (Hood 1991: 5).  Hood defines NPM in terms of a 
number of doctrines as follows: 
 NPM reforms stress private sector styles of management 
practices and a shift to greater competition in the public sector. 
 They involve a shift to disaggregation of units in the public 
sector, breaking up former ‘monolithic’ units, to create 
manageable units based on the separation of provision and 
production. 
 ‘Hands-on professional management’ means active control by 
senior named persons who are ‘free to manage’. 
 Greater emphasis is placed on explicit standards and 
measures of performance and on output controls, stressing 
results not procedures. 
 Overall there is a focus on greater discipline and parsimony in 
resource use (1991: 4). 
A wave of public sector reforms inspired by NPM was triggered across 
many parts of the world, assisted by supra-national bodies such as 
the OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
(Eymeri-Douzans and Pierre 2011: 2).  The extent and depth of 
change in the past four decades marks a significant shift away from 
the classical model.  Indeed, the end of the twentieth century saw: 
a revolution in public administration that is every bit as 
profound as that which occurred at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, when Weberian bureaucratic principles began to 
influence many governments around the world.  (Kamarck 
2000: 251) 
NPM can be described as the opposite to the classical model of public 
administration.  Gualmini (2008: 76) contrasts the old, hierarchical, 
Weberian bureaucracy with the new, entrepreneurial or NPM 
bureaucracy, using three aspects of formal structure; civil service 
organisation; and administrative procedures and processes.  Rather 
than the formal hierarchical structure with limited autonomy under the 
classical or Weberian model, the new entrepreneurial model places 
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greater emphasis on decentralised agencies with significant 
autonomy.  Under the new entrepreneurial model, civil servants are 
organised according to professions, not on a formal-legal basis.  
Recruitment is decentralised, flexible employment contracts are 
favoured and there is a higher degree of mobility between private and 
public sectors.  In terms of rules and procedures, compliance and the 
imposition of ex ante controls is replaced by management by 
objectives and outcome measures.  A lack of customer and citizen 
focus is addressed with the adoption of codes of practice designed to 
improve relations with citizens.  This comparison is summarised in the 
table below.   
The value of Elisabetta Gualmini’s analysis to this thesis is the 
highlighting of the strong parallels between the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition as it has pertained to Spain and the Weberian 
or classical model of public administration which was being 
challenged at the end of the twentieth century.  Moreover, it 
demonstrates the very significant gap between the public 
administration operating in Spain at the time of the Transition on the 
one hand and the NPM model on the other.  This gap, and its 
implications, will be discussed in the case study. 
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Table 1:  Two Ideal Types of State Bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Gualmini (2008: 76). 
 
Entrepreneurial bureaucracy (organized by product) 
← 
Weberian bureaucratic model (organized by function) 
→ 
(1) Formal structure 
‘Departments’ as main organizational units 
 
‘Directorates General’ as main unit 
Structural decentralization Hierarchical centralization 
Administrative agencies with significant autonomy Administrative agencies with limited autonomy 
Mutual (or even conflicting) relationships between departments 
and agencies 
 
Relationship of dependency between agencies and ministries 
(2) Civil service organization 
Careers organized on a professional basis 
 
Careers organized on a formal-legal basis 
Specialist and managerial training General and legal training 
High degree of public/private mobility Low degree of public/private mobility 
Decentralized recruitment Centralized recruitment 
Wide use of flexible employment contracts Limited use of flexible employment contracts 
Minimal bureaucratic ethos Significant bureaucratic ethos 
Merit system Seniority system 
Widespread use of collective bargaining 
 
 
Limited use of collective bargaining 
(3) Administrative procedures & processes 
Management by objectives and result orientation 
 
Compliance to formal rules and procedures 
Performance audits and measurement Prevalence of ex ante controls 
Instruments for the evaluation of results No evaluation of civil servants 
Simplification and de-bureaucratization Strong normative/legal regime 
Instruments for citizens participation and open government Lack of instruments for the promotion of citizens’ participation 
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This section has focused on NPM-inspired reforms.  However, it is 
recognised that more recently (since the end of the 1990s) there has 
been a movement away from NPM as the dominant paradigm in 
management studies (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Eymeri-Douzans 
and Pierre 2011).  The ‘governance’ approach, for example, has 
gained prominence, highlighted in particular by Rod Rhodes (1996). 
Rhodes emphasised ‘self-organizing, interorganizational networks’ 
and partnerships between government and non-government 
organisations, arguing that these networks would ‘complement 
markets and hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively 
allocating resources and exercising control and co-ordination’ 
(Rhodes 1996: 652).  Nevertheless, the consideration of NPM-inspired 
reform has been significant in Spain, as will be demonstrated in later 
chapters, and so an examination of this concept in some detail is 
required as part of the context-setting for the examination of the 
practices of the Junta and the Generalitat.  
Before examining contemporary public administrative developments in 
Spain, two specific features of public service management research, 
relevant to the study of contemporary sub-state government in Spain, 
need to be considered:  decentralisation and the response of public 
administrations to austerity. 
3.3.3 DECENTRALISATION 
 Definition, Motivations, and Typologies 
Chapter Two examined the different forms of territorial distribution of 
power within a nation-state, highlighting the unitary and federal 
models.  It recognised Spain as a ‘union state’, a hybrid which reflects 
variation within the territory which existed pre-union.  In this Section, 
consideration is given to the concept of decentralisation as it relates to 
public administration in Spain.  Decentralisation is defined as the: 
transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the 
raising and allocation of resources from the Central 
Government and its agencies to field units of Central 
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Government ministries or agencies, subordinate units or levels 
of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or 
corporations, area-wide, regional or functional authorities, or 
non-governmental private or voluntary organizations. 
(Rondinelli and Nellis 1986: 5) 
 
Spain is not alone in decentralising.  The number of countries 
transferring authority and resources from Central Government to sub-
national tiers of government has multiplied over the last three decades 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008: 54; Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 
23). 
Three core dimensions of the concept can be defined as fiscal, 
administrative and political.  Fiscal decentralisation refers to the extent 
to which Central Government transfers fiscal powers to sub-state 
bodies.  Administrative decentralisation refers to how much autonomy 
sub-state bodies enjoy in relation to Central Government.  Political 
decentralisation refers to the degree to which Central Government 
allows sub-state bodies to undertake the political functions of 
governance, such as representation (Schneider 2003:  33).  Using 
these dimensions, it is possible to identify the main variants of 
decentralisation as follows: 
 Deconcentration - the dispersal of responsibility by Central 
Government for a policy to its own staff in its own field offices.  
Deconcentration allows only moderately more autonomy than 
centralised systems. 
 Delegation - the transfer of policy responsibility to sub-state 
governments or semi-autonomous organisations which are not 
controlled by Central Government but remain accountable to it.  
 Devolution - Central Government allows quasi-autonomous sub-
state units of government to exercise power and control over the 
transferred policy. Devolution provides the greatest degree of 
autonomy for the local unit.34 The local unit is only accountable to 
                                               
34 The term devolution is not to be confused with the Spanish term ‘devolución’, which refers 
to the concept of powers being handed back to Central Government by the Autonomous 
Government.  This was mooted by several PP-controlled Autonomous Governments in the 
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the Central Government insofar as the Central Government can 
impose its will by threatening to withhold resources or 
responsibility from the local unit. (Schneider 2003: 38) 
The first wave of administrative decentralisation related to the creation 
of the first federal system, that of the US, in which the main concern 
was ‘to constrain the malevolence of public officials’ and keep 
governments small and separate (Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 3).  
However, subsequent proponents have emphasised the positive 
features of decentralisation, rather than solely ‘remedying the defects 
of centralisation’ (Smith 1985: 4).  The four main arguments in favour 
of decentralisation can be summarised as follows: 
 It can enhance accountability and the responsiveness of 
government by increasing citizen voice and making local officials 
accountable locally rather than to Central Government. 
 It can improve political stability by giving minorities more control 
over issues that affect them directly. 
 It can reduce abuses of power by transferring Central Government 
functions and resources to lower levels. 
 It can increase political competition by expanding the number of 
arenas in which politicians can participate. (Faguet 2014: 2) 
Of particular relevance to this study are the first two arguments, those 
of improving accountability and recognising diversity.  
Arguments that decentralisation can improve public sector output by 
improving accountability and responsiveness are based on the 
following view: 
Greater local participation and transparency in the production 
of public services should result in services that are better suited 
to the real needs of local people, and also of higher quality or 
lower cost. (Faguet 2014: 8) 
                                               
wake of the post-2008 economic crisis, although whether it is legally possible has been 
debated (González García 2014: 477). 
81 
 
According to John Joseph Wallis and Wallace E. Oates, 
decentralisation can make government more responsive to local 
needs by ‘tailoring levels of consumption to the preferences of 
smaller, more homogeneous groups’ (1988: 5). 
Claims that decentralisation can promote political stability are based 
on a view that it can accommodate diversity, recognising ethnic and 
cultural differences in different parts of the territory.  It can preserve 
and promote cultural and ethnic identity (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 
2008: 56). 
However, there are criticisms of decentralisation on both efficiency 
and identity grounds.  Efficiency is not enhanced, but rather it is 
reduced because of duplication through multiple tiers of government 
and the loss of economies of scale.  The argument has been made in 
relation to the first in the Spanish case (Chislett 2002: 72), but the 
claim of a loss of economies of scale is questionable given the scale 
of operation of most Autonomous Governments.35  In terms of claims 
for accommodating diversity, decentralisation can be accused of 
encouraging parochialism and separatism: 
It threatens the unity of the general will.  It reinforces narrow, 
sectional interests.  It is anti-egalitarian through its support for 
regional variation in the provision of public goods. (Smith 1985: 
5) 
The quotation from Brian Smith also highlights a potential tension 
between decentralisation and equality, a key issue in the Spanish 
debate over the creation of the State of the Autonomies. 
Research has shown that decentralisation both improves and worsens 
policy outcomes in terms of service, finances and political power 
(Faguet 2014: 10).  The purpose of this study is not to argue for or 
against this model, but to enhance the understanding of the way in 
which decentralisation has been used by two sub-state governments 
                                               
35 The annual budgets of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya are in the 
region of 30,000M€. 
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in Spain to make improvements on the previous regime for the benefit 
of local people.  Consideration of the different types of models is 
instructive in this context. 
Different forms of decentralisation exist along a continuum from 
strong, authoritative regional governments which ‘play a decisive role 
not only in their respective regions but also in the country as a whole’ 
(Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel 2010: 152) such as the Länder in 
Germany, to countries where there is no regional level of government 
at all (such as Portugal and Ireland).  John Loughlin’s typology of 
central-local relations in EU member states identifies four models:  
federal; regionalized unitary; decentralized unitary; and centralized 
unitary (Loughlin 2000: 25).  He develops his analysis by considering 
the degree of autonomy enjoyed by sub-states in terms of a number of 
dimensions.  These are: 
 the legal position – whether this is defined constitutionally or 
through ordinary legislation 
 the political competencies accorded to the sub-national level 
 the degree of participation in national policy-making - the 
possibility of engaging in activities beyond the frontiers of the 
national territory 
 the degree of control over other sub-national levels 
 the degree of financial autonomy from, or dependence on the 
national government. 
Thus, a sub-state with a high degree of autonomy would have: its 
legal position guaranteed by the constitution; its own extensive 
competencies which are those powers not reserved to the central 
state; an important influence in national policy-making, including the 
right to participate in national policy-making;  the ability to participate 
in external state activity, including a role in European policy-making 
and even foreign treaties; substantial financial resources and its own 
tax-raising powers.  
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A criticism of this type of categorisation is that countries are treated as 
the units for comparison, failing to recognise the variation amongst 
sub-state governments.  Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, and Arian H. 
Schakel (2010) produced a Regional Authority Index to address this 
latter gap in research, based on the two domains of authority, self-rule 
and shared rule.  The former is the capacity of a regional government 
to exercise authority autonomously in its own region and the latter the 
capacity to co-determine the exercise of authority for the country as a 
whole (2010: 6). 
An area of research which is outside the remit of this study, but which 
is relevant to note, not only in terms of decentralisation but also in 
terms of the European context considered later, is that of multi-level 
governance.  The term is used to describe ‘the increased 
interdependence of governments operating at different territorial 
levels’ and ‘the growing interdependence between governments and 
non-governmental actors at various territorial levels’ (Bache and 
Flinders 2004: 3).  Whilst it has been criticised for being descriptive 
rather than explanatory, it is an important concept (adopted as a 
framework of reference by the Committee of the Regions and other 
EU institutions, for example, Ongaro 2015: 13) and continues to be 
the source of academic debate (see Diamond, Liddle and Ongaro 
2015). 
 Decentralisation in Modern Spain 
The Spanish model of decentralisation is located towards the higher 
end of the spectrum in terms of autonomy, Autonomous Governments 
scoring relatively highly in the previously cited Regional Authority 
Index.  Compared with forty-one other democratic states, the Spanish 
sub-states are surpassed only by Belgium, Bosnia-Hertzegovina, 
Germany and Italy (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010: Appendix A).  
Spain’s Autonomous Governments possess significant competencies 
and their own tax-raising powers.  They have a foundation in the 
Constitution.  They can pass their own laws which have the same 
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force as those of the Spanish State (Gunther et al 2004: 302).  
However, they have a limited role in national policy making and in 
terms of engaging in external state activity and, as will be explored in 
this study, they are still reliant on Central Government for resources.  
The sharing of some key competencies has also been the source of 
conflict between the two tiers of government. 
The decision to pursue decentralisation is ‘above all, a political one’ 
(Smith 1985: ix).  This was the case in post-Franco Spain, where the 
need to accommodate sub-state demands, notably from the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, could not be ignored.  It also reflected a wish 
to reverse the centralism of the Franco regime, and was seen as ‘a 
crucial ingredient of a decentralizing package’ (Solé-Ollé 2009: 257).  
Decentralisation: 
signalled a broader public desire to reverse Spain’s recent 
legacy of economic and political centralism as a way of 
delivering democracy and better governance and extending 
economic development opportunities to less favoured areas. 
(Colino 2008: 578) 
Whilst the early motivations were political, observers have commented 
on increasingly economic motivations amongst regional elites in 
Spain, particularly since the late 1990s, because of the need to 
compete in global and European markets and to respond to fiscal 
pressures (Colino 2008: 579-80; Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall 2008).  
It is a model of decentralisation which originally enjoyed public 
approval in Spain, but polls started to show falling support following 
the financial crisis post-2008.  This fall has been attributed, in part, to 
the scapegoating by the PP Government of the Autonomous 
Governments (Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 22).  As noted elsewhere in 
this study, Central Government has apportioned blame for the 
economic crisis to the spending (and borrowing) by the Autonomous 
Governments (Del Pino and Pavolini 2015: 255).  Spain is a highly 
decentralised state, a development which represents a significant shift 
from previous territorial structures.   
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3.3.4 RESPONSES TO AUSTERITY 
Prior to the financial crisis post-2008, public and private sector 
organisations, world-wide, had faced financial and economic crises on 
a number of occasions.  Studies of responses to such periods of 
reduced resources can be grouped into three main streams.  The first 
is the literature referring to the crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s 
(which was concerned about the passive role of management in the 
conduct of cutback management and was heavily influenced by the 
work of C. H. Levine [1978]).  Secondly, contemporary Public 
Administration literature deals with managing austerity (related to the 
recent economic crisis which is the context of this research) (for 
example, Kitson, Martin and Tyler 2011; Meegan, Kennett, Jones and 
Croft 2014).  Thirdly, there is generic management literature on coping 
with environmental shocks (for example, Cepiku and Bonomi 
Savignon 2012).  It is the second stream of literature within which this 
study is located. 
A number of categorisations exist within the second stream (related to 
the recent economic crisis) to describe the type of responses made 
and measures taken.  J. F. A. Overmans and Mirko Noordegraaf use 
four concepts to consider the responses to austerity:  decline, 
cutbacks, retrenchment and downsizing (2014: 101-2).  The use of the 
term ‘decline’ in this context is generally attributed to Levine’s work of 
1978, and relates to the failure of organisations to anticipate, 
recognise, avoid or adapt to pressures which threaten the 
organisation’s long term survival.  Typical measures include reducing 
capacity, such as closures.  The term ‘cutbacks’ is mainly used in the 
public sector and usually refers to temporary measures to restore 
fiscal balance.  Focused on preservation, measures have a strong 
fiscal orientation, such as hiring freezes, and percentage across-the-
board cuts.  Retrenchment involves the generation of new resources, 
typically by taxation and the focus is on expenditure levels instead of 
policy change.  Finally, downsizing is a term used in both public and 
private sectors and is a strategy for improving organisational 
86 
 
performance and restoring organisational-environmental fit.  It is 
understood to be a proactive measure, not just a reaction to 
something (external) happening to an organisation.  
One of the most widely cited contributions in this field is that offered 
by Pollitt (2010).  He describes three broad strategies for managing 
public fiscal austerity that range from uniform percentage reductions 
(also called ‘salami slicing’ or ‘cheese slicing’ in this case) to 
prioritised cuts.  ‘Cheese slicing’ or across the board cuts refers to the 
practice of applying a percentage reduction across all budget heads.  
‘Efficiency gains’ are savings as a result of reducing inputs to achieve 
the same outputs.  ‘Prioritised cuts’ are the application of a greater 
level of reductions in one area than in another.  The advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach are summarised in the table below. 
Table 2: Three Approaches to Cutbacks 
Approach Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Cheese 
slicing 
Sounds egalitarian and 
politicians avoid 
directly choosing 
which programmes will 
be most hurt 
 
Programme specialists 
may make self-interested 
choices which hurt 
effectiveness, but protect 
service providers 
(themselves) 
 
Efficiency 
gains 
Sounds less 
threatening/more 
technical; modern and 
managerial and so 
appealing across party 
political lines 
 
Usually requires 
considerable innovation 
(which may or may not 
work and will take time) 
Probably will not yield 
enough by itself 
 
Centralised 
priority 
setting 
 
Looks more strategic 
and leaves politicians 
in direct control 
 
Politicians become visibly 
and directly responsible 
for painful choices, the 
consequences of which 
may not be foreseen 
 
Source:  Adapted from Pollitt (2010: 22). 
Classifications of this nature help draw out the different types of 
responses.  They do not suggest discrete, mutually exclusive, 
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approaches.  In reality, strategies often ‘combine [the] features of all 
three approaches’ (Pollitt 2010: 22). 
Studies have also considered the relationship between public 
management reforms and periods of financial austerity.  Sometimes 
economic crises have precipitated major reform, other times not.  In 
some scenarios, financial crises are managed by cuts alone and 
without fundamental reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 26).  It seems 
then that a financial crisis can either make reform more difficult to 
achieve, because there are restricted resources with which to make 
change happen, or make reform easier, because the consideration of 
more radical options has become more possible.  The choice of 
strategy will be examined in the case of the Junta and the Generalitat 
as part of this research. 
3.3.5 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN SPAIN 
The Context of the Transition to Democracy 
The international trend in public sector reform, as described in Section 
3.3.2 above, coincided with Spain’s Transition to Democracy.  With 
the Transition’s agenda of democratisation, unprecedented 
decentralisation and expansion of the welfare state, it is unsurprising 
that administrative reform was not a priority for the Spanish politicians 
in the 1970s and early 1980s.  Furthermore, there were also concerns 
that major reform in this area would threaten the necessary but fragile 
consensus of this period as previously discussed (see Chapter Two). 
However, that is not to say that reform was not considered necessary 
(Kickert 2007: 43).  Under the Franco regime, ‘the Wilsonian division 
between political and administrative spheres lost all meaning … 
Politics was bureaucratized and the bureaucracy was politicized’ 
(Bañón and Tamayo 1997: 90-91).  Specifically, in relation to the 
legacy of the authoritarianism of the Franco regime, it is illuminating to 
consider again the previously described ‘heaviness and weakness’ 
dimensions of the administrative tradition of Southern European 
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states.  For example, in terms of the heavy-handedness of the state, 
the rigid state control of labour in Spain made the flexible 
reassignment of workers difficult, undermining productivity and 
competitiveness.  The new post-Franco regime would also need to 
deal with large parastatal companies similarly ill-suited for open 
competition. 36  In terms of weakness, the Transition would have to 
cope with low levels of public spending on social services and 
education as well as a regressive and evasion-prone taxation system 
(Diamandouros et al 2006: 25-27). 
There were numerous problems and tensions latent in the 
bureaucracy not caused by the Transition to democracy but which 
would hinder, not help, the Transition.  These included restrictive 
practices in the civil service such as the backdoor entrance to 
recruitment and the lack of discipline and impunity of civil servants.  
The so-called ‘bronze law’ was ‘the custom in which civil servants 
adjusted their efforts to their perceived salaries; if they thought that it 
was 50 per cent of what it should be, they would work half as hard’ 
(Alba and Navarro 2011: 792).  Democratic change itself brought its 
own challenges.  A new form of clientelism developed within the 
administration through a ‘nepotistic network’ of the political parties and 
trades unions, undermining recruitment and promotion.  The transfer 
of staff and services to the new Autonomous Governments brought 
duplication and the need to reconfigure Central Government 
structures and personnel (Alba and Navarro 2011: 792). 
This chapter has focused so far on the national position in Spain, to 
provide the context to public administration at a sub-state level.  In 
particular, it is important to recognise it as the environment of the 
majority of civil servants who had been operating under the Franco 
                                               
36 The Spanish term “paraestatal” does not translate easily into English.  It is used to 
describe an institution or organisation which, via its delegated powers from the State, 
cooperates to achieve the goals of the state, without forming part of the Government 
(<<Dicho de una institución, de un organismo o de un centro: Que, por delegación del 
Estado, coopera a los fines de este sin formar parte de la Administración Pública.>>)  Online 
Dictionary of the Real Academia Española http://lema.rae.es/drae/?val=paraestatal.  
Accessed 01.07.13). 
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regime, individuals who were then transferred from Central 
Government to the Autonomous Governments with the constitutional 
transfer of competencies.  From 1990 to 2001 the proportion of civil 
servants in central administration was almost halved and in 
Autonomous Governments doubled (Magone 2004: 74).  This 
redeployment was one of the greatest difficulties of the 
decentralisation process (Parrado Díez 1996: 265) – and was badly 
managed (Alba 1997:  185).  Most civil servants opted to stay in 
Madrid where there were perceived to be better jobs, despite the 
incentives offered.  This meant that the new sub-state bodies were 
staffed with relatively inexperienced and lower grade personnel 
(Parrado Díez 1996: 265).  This inherited group of staff, would bring 
their existing administrative culture which, when added to the 
Constitution’s stipulation that there was only one civil service model 
(Molina Álvarez de Cienfuegos 1999: 38), would significantly reduce 
the new bodies’ ability to develop their own, new, model of 
administration.   
 Central Government Initiatives 
The need for change was recognised by politicians and by civil 
servants alike.  For example, a survey of civil servants in 1982 found 
that 94% felt that reform was necessary (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 343).  
Attempts have been initiated by each and every Central Government 
to reform public administration in Spain, unleashing an ‘unending 
process of administrative reform’ (Alba and Navarro 2011:  790).  The 
discussion below of the main Central Government initiatives is in 
broadly chronological order, and focuses particularly on the first two 
decades of democracy.37  Immediate changes were made to remove 
                                               
37 Raj Chari and Paul M. Heywood (2009) reject the use of time periods as an organising 
framework for analysis of the policy process in Spain because it fails to draw the distinction 
between policy choices and outcomes on the one hand and the policy process on the other.  
This is a valid approach in order to examine institutional factors influencing the policy 
process such as the economic model and design of contemporary Spanish democracy.  
However, I am interested in the outcomes in as much as they reflect the administrative 
tradition of Spain and influence the subsequent framework for the establishment of the 
Autonomous Governments. 
90 
 
the very visible Fascist elements of the Francoist regime:  between 
1976 and 1982 the official trade union and the National Movement 
were dismantled, the ‘mass media’ structures and repressive Interior 
Ministry, propaganda and censorship departments were abolished.  
Approximately 30,000 public employees of the former Francoist 
administrative structures were converted into regular civil servants. 
There was no purge of civil servants (Ongaro 2009: 210) and top 
hardliners were allowed ‘to gradually fade away to the backstage of 
the Spanish political scene’ (Sotiropoulos 2006: 213).  New legal 
procedures, the right to strike and freedom to form unions among civil 
servants were established (Alba 1997: 184).  The 1978 Constitution 
‘provided for the political neutrality of civil servants, the submission of 
the public administration to the elected government, the principle of 
merit in the recruitment of administrative personnel and the principle 
of administrative decentralization’ (Sotiropoulos 2006: 213). 
Under the Socialist Governments (PSOE) of Felipe González, there 
was a series of initiatives to bring about change to the public 
administrative system.  Indeed, the very first policy of the newly 
elected government in 1982 was a decree on public administrative 
reform.  It was to be the first of a number of announced reforms, which 
were rarely fully implemented – the reasons for which will be 
addressed shortly – and was seen as more symbolic than effective.38  
Parrado Díez describes the 1984 Act as a first step to introducing 
rationality into the civil service promotion system (1996: 265).  
Included in the 1984 legislation were measures which: 
reduced the number of cuerpos, introduced a new 30-level 
grade scale, modified pay scales, standardized and 
modernized recruitment and in service training practices, made 
the transfer of civil servants from one sector of the public 
administration to another more flexible, lowered the retirement 
age from 70 to 65 and introduced new technology and modern 
management practices.  (Sotiropoulos 2006:  226) 
                                               
38 ‘Despite the frugal content of the 1982 decree, its explanatory preamble describes 
administrative reform as one of the fundamental political objectives of the Government’ 
(Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342). 
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In particular, it tried to weaken the power of the corps by establishing 
a ‘post system’ whereby career and remuneration depended on the 
post occupied and not on the internal rules of the corps (Ongaro 2009: 
210.  The earlier ‘Ley de Incompatibilidades’ (1983) had however 
outlawed the ability of civil servants to hold more than one job in the 
public sector and restricted their access to jobs in the private sector 
(Sotiropoulus 2006:  226). 
In 1986 a new Ministry was created for public administration – a first 
for Spain (Alba and Navarro 2011: 794).  The Minister for Public 
Administration (MAP) was charged with evaluating past failures and 
proposing changes, and, importantly, with the coordination of relations 
between central and sub-state administrations.  1989 saw the 
publication by the MAP of ‘Reflections on Modernising the State 
Administration’ (MAP 1989).  In keeping with the international context 
of public administrative reform (outlined above), the diagnosis was a 
need to change the administrative culture from one focused on the 
legality principle to one more focused on results and outcomes.  The 
three main aspects of reform were organisational aspects (particularly 
to reflect the newly created Autonomous Governments); procedural 
and functional aspects (to promote the responsibilities of managers 
through targets, rationalisation of procedures and the introduction of 
IT); and human resources aspects (to introduce efficient management 
of civil servants) (Alba 1997: 188). 
Little had changed by the time of the presentation of the ‘Plan of 
Modernisation of the State Administration’ in 1992.  Containing 204 
elements, it sought to improve information and communication with 
citizens as customers; enhance the quality of services; and introduce 
new management techniques (Alba 1997: 190).  Parrado Díez is 
dismissive of the Plan as failing to create new public managers, 
merely putting ‘administrative reform on the agenda’ (1996: 269).  
However, it is clear from the above commentary that reform was 
already on the Government’s agenda. 
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Public sector reform was central to the support by sub-state parties for 
the minority right-wing Partido Popular (PP) Government in 1996.  The 
Governability Pact between the PP and the Catalan nationalists (CiU), 
the Basque nationalists (PNV) and the Canaries Coalition (CC) was 
based on PP promises to consolidate the decentralised State of the 
Autonomies by carrying out the statutory reforms already agreed; to 
draft bills on the structure of government and the central 
administration; and to review civil service statutes (Gallego and 
Barzelay 2010: 286).  By 1997 Parliament had agreed the Law on the 
Organisation and Functioning of the General Administration of the 
State (LOFAGE) and the Law on Government, rationalising the central 
administration of the state and of quangos, and reserving the senior 
posts of the administration to civil servants only.39  
The PP Government was keen to modernise public administration, 
changing 3,000 high ranking offices:  in the political-administrative 
structures, 91% of secretaries of state, sub-secretaries and director 
generals were changed (294 out of a total of 322); in the high ranking 
administrative structures, 554 out of a total of 1,185 (sub director and 
equivalent) were substituted by new people and at the provincial and 
regional level 2,200 posts changed hands (Magone 2004: 73-4).40  
The prefectorial post of Gobernador Civil or Civil Governor was 
abolished in 1997.  This was a significant step for the Autonomous 
Governments given the historical position of the Civil Governors as 
‘the presence of the central state in the provinces’.  At the rank of 
Director Generals, these had been highly politicised posts (Molina 
Álvarez de Cienfuegos 1996: 35). 
  
                                               
39 This legislation was supported by the PSOE in parliament – both having been initiated 
during the earlier PSOE administrations (Gallego and Barzelay 2010: 289).  However, 
fieldwork for this research suggested that in reality exceptions are allowed from this 
requirement (author’s interview with an academic, University in Barcelona 2015). 
40 This contrasts with the continuity of elites from the Franco regime reported in the early 
Transition period: ‘Between 1975 and 1982 996 appointments to high ranking positions 
within the public administration were made, of which 57.6% included civil servants who had 
served under the Francoist regime.’ (Magone 2004: 73). 
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This section has focused on Central Government initiatives taken in 
relation to public administration at the end of the twentieth century 
during the period of the establishment and consolidation of the new 
State of the Autonomies.  The most important pieces of legislation 
subsequently passed are examined in Chapter Four:  Reforms to the 
financing of the Autonomous Governments, Central Government 
measures taken in relation to managing the post-2008 crisis, and 
Constitutional Court rulings in relation to the status of the Catalan 
Statute. 
 Limitations in Early Implementation 
Few commentators have argued against the view that public sector 
reform initiated at national level has been largely unsuccessful in 
Spain – especially in terms of new public management reforms.41  
Parrado Díez (1996: 275) argued that ‘the old public administration 
has not yet given way to a new public management in the Spanish 
public sector’.  More recently, Edoardo Ongaro (2009: 263) concluded 
that the main features of the administrative tradition had not 
undergone significant change.  Explanations offered for this failure 
have included the context for reform in Spain being different, the 
impact of the administrative law tradition, the obstruction of civil 
servants, the lack of skills on the part of civil servants and ministers, 
the lack of political will and the crowding out of the reform agenda by 
devolution.  These explanations for the early period of implementation 
are expanded on below, providing a national context to the case study 
of public administration at a sub-state level at the heart of this thesis. 
                                               
41 Some improvements have been recognised.  Parrado Díez (2008: 230) for example points 
to a degree of modernisation of central public administration, particularly through ‘layering’ of 
policies and institutions (meaning the creation of new ones without the elimination of the old 
ones).  Ana M. Guillén and Laura Cabiedes (1997: 335) in their analysis of the reform of the 
Spanish health-care system, refer to positive improvements cited by some health economics 
experts due to the devolution process.  They conclude that competitiveness has increased, 
as has dynamism and innovation.  However, these findings need to be read alongside 
increased administrative costs and greater difficulties in coordination. 
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Lourdes Torres and Vicente Pina (2004: 447) conclude that whilst 
Spain may have implemented many ‘ingredients of the NPM recipe, 
there are few visible changes’.  Comparing the experience in Spain 
and the UK, and focusing on why similar concepts and initiatives could 
produce such different results, they suggest that it is probably due to 
the different context in which these initiatives have been developed:  
In the UK, NPM changes were a package of reform to minimise the 
state, viewing the private sector as superior to the public sector and 
placing trust on the effectiveness of markets and competition.  By way 
of contrast, support for NPM-inspired reforms arose in Spain as a 
response to citizens’ views of public administration as bureaucratic 
and inefficient (Torres and Pina 2004: 447).  Carles Boix similarly 
compares the concern of countries such as Britain about the 
inefficiencies of the public sector with the majority of Spaniards 
wanting an expansion of public services (1997: 276). 
The administrative law-based culture of the public service is 
repeatedly given as a key reason for the failure to reform (Parrado 
Díez 1996; Alba 1997; Peters 2008; Ongaro 2009), with civil servants 
not developing the necessary change management skills.  The delay 
in introducing NPM reforms can be explained by ‘the dominance of a 
red tape philosophy, traditional compliance to formal rules, and the 
extensive presence of ex ante controls’ (Gualmini 2008: 92).  The 
emphasis of the Napoleonic model on law, formality and uniformity 
can make the implementation of NPM reform difficult if not impossible 
(Peters 2008: 129).  An additional factor cited is the lack of an 
academic knowledge in the country to ‘inspire and sustain any 
managerial reform’ (Boix 1997: 276), a reference to the dominance of 
legal academics. 
It is important to note that public sector reform, including international 
trends such as NPM, takes place within the national context, being 
‘filtered, interpreted and modified through the combination of 
nationally based processes’ (Carboni 2010: 104).  NPM can be 
perceived as having ‘cultural, ethical and political features’ which do 
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not ‘fit’ certain countries - notably those with Napoleonic administrative 
traditions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 10).  This thesis will examine 
whether this issue of variation and distinctiveness between nations is 
also true between different parts of the same country, at sub-state 
level. 
Any reforms had to be implemented by the very bureaucracy which 
was the object of the proposed changes.  Bureaucrats throughout the 
world are very capable of frustrating reforms they believe are to their 
detriment. 42  In particular, the Spanish grands corps have kept their 
position of power, setting the agenda on policy and continuing to be 
the main recruiting ground for both the administrative and political 
elites (Alba and Navarro 2011: 799).43 
The ability and commitment of politicians with regard to reform are 
also questioned, in the light of the repeated failure to secure the 
passing of regulation and legislation and, just as importantly, to 
manage the subsequent implementation of reform.  It is interesting to 
note that while the majority of civil servants in 1982 agreed with the 
need for reform, only 57% believed the Government was really 
interested in public administrative reform (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 343-
4).  Referring specifically to the period 1986-1991, Ongaro reflects on 
the loss of momentum in reform due to the lengthy process of defining 
that reform (2009: 210).  Felipe González in 1992 described the 
delays in administrative reforms as the greatest frustration of his 
premiership (Heywood 1995: 138).  However, the PSOE governments 
in particular have been criticised for not only failing to clarify the 
administrative from political roles (a key aim of the modernisation), but 
                                               
42 Eduardo Zapico Goñi (1992: 47-8) equates Spanish civil servants with Sancho Panza:  
like Sancho Panza remaining agnostic and passive about confronting the windmills, civil 
servants do not try to stop the reformers, they accept instructions.  They do not however 
actively propose alternatives. 
43 Mariano Baena del Alcázar’s study of the governing elites and institutional power in Spain 
between 1939 and 1992 confirms that ‘elites circulate’:  37% of the people who made up the 
elite during the Franco period continued in power in the following political period and 19% of 
the people who formed the elite during the Transition and the time of the UCD Government 
were still members of the elite in the period of the PSOE Government (2002: 333). 
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actually accentuating the blurring of the administrative/ political divide 
with their ‘one of ours’ approach.44 
Finally, it is difficult to overestimate the dominance of the national 
political agenda by the actual creation of the new State of the 
Autonomies, the scale of which squeezed out reform of administrative 
procedures, processes and human resource policies.  The magnitude 
of the change involved in such a massive decentralisation programme 
would have made huge demands on change management skills – 
attributes not previously highly rated nor covered in civil servants’ 
training (Parrado Díez 2008: 248).  It is also likely that politicians at 
the sub-state level were more interested in making sure that the new 
bodies had political legitimacy and in transferring powers, than in the 
need to establish the means, via the civil servants and public 
administrative structures, to develop better public services.  The 
tensions and uncertainties of the process of creating the State of the 
Autonomies put the construction of administrative apparatus very 
much into second place (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 101). 
 Influence of the European Union  
A fourth aspect to be considered in terms of developments in 
contemporary Spain with an impact on public administration is that of 
Europe.  The perceived importance of EU membership was clear from 
the beginning of the Transition.  As Prime Minister Suárez stated 
within two weeks of the first democratic election in 1977, ‘Spain is in 
Europe and forms part of it’ (MacLennan 2000: 147).  The contribution 
of Europe to Spain’s democratisation is still held to be important four 
decades later.  According to Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s Prime Minister in 
2013: 
                                               
44 The phrase ‘one of ours’ is used to describe the desire of incoming governments to 
appoint senior civil servants who are more sympathetic to their party’s policy objectives and 
is not a phenomenon exclusive to Spain.  However, for the newly legalised parties, the long 
association of the civil service, especially of senior civil servants, with the Franco regime, 
and then the UCD, gave the PSOE a strong motivation to appoint different senior advisors 
(Sotiropoulos (2006: 226). 
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For Spain, European integration has been a success, one of 
the best things that has ever happened to us.  For us, who lived 
with 40 years of an authoritarian regime [under Franco], Europe 
means democracy, freedom, and progress.45 
EU membership was thus perceived by Central Government to add 
legitimacy to the new democratic state.  It was also the source of 
significant funds.  The opportunities of EU membership were also 
recognised by the sub-states of Spain.  During the Transition, Europe 
was seen by some sub-states as ‘a new framework in which their 
aspirations to self-government could be realised, without confronting 
the Spanish state head-on’ (Keating 2000: 32). 
Spain’s accession to the European Union coincided with a growing 
debate in Europe about the role of regions in European governance.  
The EU was widening and deepening:  enlargement by countries such 
as Spain and greater integration, notably the 1992 Single Market.  At 
the same time there was lobbying from within Europe by those who 
wanted to see further European integration with greater federal 
elements (Loughlin 2001: 24).  Two key changes were made at the 
end of the 1980s or early 1990s reflecting this new interest in a 
‘Europe of the Regions’.  Firstly, the 1988 reform of European 
Regional Policy and the Structural Funds increased the budget and 
introduced the principle of subsidiarity (Bache and Jones 2000: 1).  
Secondly, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Committee of the 
Regions (COR), enshrining the principle of subsidiarity in policy 
making and making it possible for regional ministers to participate in 
Council (of Europe) meetings (Coates 1998: 268).46  
However, claims of a new Europe of the Regions need to be 
qualified.47  The reform of the 1988 Structural Funds was a 
                                               
45 http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2013/12/08/actualidad/1386520536_280805.html.  
Accessed 19.12.13. 
46 The Committee of the Regions is a consultative body which allows local and regional 
representatives to take part in EU legislative work (http://ec.europa.eu/regional-
policy/glossary).  Accessed 14.12.13. 
47 It has been argued that the failure of the EU to create this regional tier across Europe 
added to the frustration of Catalans with the EU and central government post-2008, 
contributing to the growing demands for independence from Spain (Dowling 2013: 6). 
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regionalisation policy – in other words, a top-down policy to address 
regional imbalances.  It was not a policy of regionalism.  The COR 
was considered to be a marginal force and the Assembly of European 
Regions, which had been a major lobbying organ, had lost profile 
because of the creation of the COR (Jeffrey 2000: 4).  Fundamentally, 
the EU remains an organisation based on member states.  Andrea 
Noferini, for example, points to the continued gatekeeper function of 
Central Government, particularly in relation to the participation of the 
Autonomous Governments in meetings of the Council and European 
Commission (2012: 378). 
Reflecting on the Europe of the Regions in 2014, Michael Keating 
considered that the concept was overplayed in the first instance and 
adds four further points to explain the failure of a third tier in Europe: 
 The minimum response of the European Union, with the 
Maastricht Treaty the only measure to offer something 
substantial. 
 The weakening of the Committee of the Regions by the 
diversity introduced by the municipalities. 
 The use of subsidiarity to the states, not to the regional level; 
the linking of regional policy to social policy ‘which has now 
almost disappeared’. 
 The domination of the European Commission by a neo-liberal 
ideology which does not recognise the concept of market 
intervention (author’s interview with Micheal Keating 06.01.14). 
EU entry also posed threats as well as opportunities to sub-state 
governments.  Some competencies newly acquired by the 
Autonomous Governments were transferred to the EU level at the 
same time as the Spanish Government, as representative of state 
interests in the Council of Ministers, participated in decision-making in 
areas of Autonomous Government competencies (Morata 2007: 
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151).48  Furthermore, Autonomous Governments were to be the main 
implementers of EU policies in whose formation they were not 
involved (Noferini 2012: 368).  European membership exposed 
tensions in the provisions of the Spanish Constitution.  The shared 
competencies, lack of clarity and ambiguities in the Constitution 
(previously covered), and the provisions of individual Statutes of 
Autonomy, some of which amplified the role of the Autonomous 
Government in relation to Europe, provided for a complexity leading to 
conflict between centre and periphery in Spain.49   
The opportunity for lobbying in Europe was taken up by most 
Autonomous Governments.  By 1989, twelve (out of the seventeen) 
had established their own offices in Brussels for this purpose (Coates 
1998: 266).  Many have been active in collaborative interregional 
groups across Europe such as Medcities, REGLEG or the Atlantic 
Arc.50  Some Autonomous Governments have been more proactive in 
the EU than others.  Arguably Catalonia has been the most proactive, 
being involved for example in the creation and in the subsequent 
operation of key associations such as the Four Motors of Europe, the 
Trans-Pyrenees Euro-region and the High-technology Route.51  Jordi 
Pujol (First Minister of the Generalitat 1980-2003) was described as 
one of the leaders of the Europe of the Regions concept, ‘losing no 
opportunity to press the cause of regionalism within the European 
Union’ (Keating 2000: 33). 
                                               
48 The loss of key competencies to Europe included the areas of agriculture, fisheries, 
industrial policy, environment, regional planning, transport, energy policy, fiscal policy and 
culture (Closa and Heywood 2004: 85). 
49 This conflict was resolved, in part, by a pragmatic response of the Constitutional Court 
which authorised the activity of Autonomous Governments in international affairs so long as 
it did not compromise the unity of Spanish foreign policy (Closa and Heywood 2004: 85). 
50 Medcities is a network of Mediterranean coastal cities.   REGLEG is a political network for 
EU regions with legislative powers.  Atlantic Arc is a network of regions with Atlantic coasts 
in Ireland, UK, France, Spain and Portugal.  www.medcities.org; www.regleg.eu; 
www.arcatlantique.org.  All accessed 22.12.13. 
51 The Four Motors of Europe was created in 1988 by Catalonia, Baden-Wuerttemberg, 
Rhone-Alpes and Lombardy as a lobby group; the Trans-Pyrenees Euro-region, created in 
1989 by Catalonia, Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azure, Liguria, Piedmont 
and Lombardy; and the High-technology Route, created in 1990, to act as an alternative to 
northern technological dominance (Closa and Heywood 2004: 92). 
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A wider component of the study of Europe from a public administration 
perspective is the ‘europeanisation’ of public policies.  This is 
understood to be the process by which domestic policy areas become 
increasingly subject to European policy-making (Borzel 2000: 18).  
More broadly, it encompasses the institutionalisation of formal and 
informal rules, procedures, styles, and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public 
policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of the domestic 
public administrative arena (Radaelli 2003: 30).  This field of academic 
study is outside the remit of this research, other than to acknowledge 
the existence of EU influence inasmuch as it affects all Autonomous 
Governments in Spain, as significant implementers of EU legislation 
and policy by dint of their competencies.52  The political stances taken 
by the Junta and the Generalitat towards Europe are however 
considered in this research. 
This chapter has placed Spain in the Napoleonic administrative 
tradition, highlighting the gap between this form of bureaucracy and 
one underpinned by NPM-inspired reforms.  It has demonstrated that 
the model of decentralisation in Spain is a highly devolved one.  The 
Autonomous Governments have a foundation in the Constitution, their 
own law-making and tax-raising powers, and have extensive 
competencies in key areas of public administration.  The limitations of 
early public administrative reforms by Central Government have been 
examined and, to complete the context-setting, public administrations’ 
approaches to austerity and the impact of EU membership have been 
explored. 
The next two chapters examine in detail the Autonomous 
Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, providing an overview of 
key characteristics of the territories and the historical antecedents to 
                                               
52 See for example works by Andrew Massey (2004) on the impact of the EU on public 
administrations; César Colino et al (2014) on the adaptation of sub-national governments to 
Europe and the impact of the EU on inter-governmental relations and Federica Cacciatore et 
al (2015) on the relationship between europeanisation and national reform programmes. 
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the sub-state administrations.  The institutional establishments and 
budgets are studied to investigate the extent to which the 
opportunities have been taken to be different from Central 
Government and other Autonomous Governments. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
4.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the 
investigation of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya.  It sets out a brief profile of the two territories in terms of 
their key demographic, geographical and economic characteristics.  
Definitional issues are addressed regarding the nature of regionalism 
and nationalism as they relate to Andalusia and Catalonia.  The 
development of Andalusian regionalism and Catalan nationalism is 
then outlined, concluding with a summary of key events after 1975 in 
relation to the State of the Autonomies in these two territories. 
An examination is made of the corporate and political management 
arrangements in the Junta and the Generalitat, scrutinising the 
institutions of Government, the role of politicians, the organisation of 
ministries and public employees and changes in political control.  The 
analysis of the 2015 budgets is undertaken within the context of the 
national financing system of the Autonomous Governments and the 
post-2008 economic crisis. 
4.1.2 PROFILES OF ANDALUSIA AND CATALONIA 
This section presents an introductory, outline profile of the 
contemporary territories of Andalusia and Catalonia, in terms of 
geographical and socio-economic characteristics, providing context to 
the subsequent comparative analysis of regional government in these 
two areas of Spain.  The following map shows Spain’s seventeen 
Autonomous Communities. 
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Map 5: Autonomous Communities of Spain 
 
Source:  Aja (2003: 15). 
Andalusia and Catalonia share a number of similar characteristics:  
they are the two largest regions of Spain in terms of population, are 
both peripheral regions in terms of their distance from the seat of 
national government in Madrid, and both have their own widely 
recognised identity.  Both were early adopters of autonomy as will be 
developed in this chapter.  Both have embraced active membership of 
the European Union, although with distinct foci as will also be 
considered in due course.  Both have developed very significant 
service and tourist industries, and construction has been a major 
element of the economy for both.  However, there are also key 
differences.  Andalusia is characterised by significant rurality and low 
density of population compared with Catalonia.  It is a poorer region in 
terms of per capita income, and levels of unemployment have 
historically been and are currently higher.53  Catalonia is a more 
urbanised area and has a larger industrial sector than Andalusia.  It 
                                               
53 Juan Antonio Lacomba (1992: 34) points out however that in 1865 in some aspects the 
Andalusian economy was in line with that of Catalonia, the most developed part of Spain. 
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has its own language, Catalan, and a history of independent 
institutions.  These characteristics are summarised in the table below: 
Table 3:  Key Characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia 
 Andalusia Catalonia 
Population (2011)* 8,371,270 7,519,843 
Surface area (km²)* 87,597 32,091 
Population density (2011)* 95.6 234.3 
% GVA by sector (2011)* 
 Agriculture 
 Industry 
 Construction 
 Services 
 
4.5 
11.9 
11.0 
72.5 
 
1.2 
20.7 
8.8 
69.2 
Unemployment rate (%)** (2014) 34.94 22.1 
GDP per capita (€)** (2013) 16,666 26,666 
Sources: *Spanish Government; 
 **Instituto Nacional de Estadística.54 
Placing these two areas in a Spanish context, Catalans enjoy a higher 
GDP capita than the national average (22,518€), a similar level of 
unemployment (22.37%) and an economy with a greater reliance on 
the industrial and construction sectors than the national picture (16% 
and 5.1% respectively).  In contrast, Andalusians have a lower GDP 
per capita than the national average and a higher unemployment 
level.  Agriculture and services are more significant contributors to the 
Andalusian economy than the national economy (2.3% and 67.9% 
respectively) (Spanish Institute of Statistics 2015).55 
  
                                               
54 www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/644B9A54-87E6-46AF-8E6E-C542D84C59F9/0/ 
Spain_Today _1172013.pdf and http://www.ine.es/FichasWeb/RegComunidades. 
do?fichas=49&buscador=&botonFichas=Go+to+Table+of+results.  Both accessed 10.06.12. 
55 www.ine.es/prodyser/espa_cifras/2015/index.html#30/z.  Accessed 03.08.15. 
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4.2. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE CURRENT AUTONOMOUS 
GOVERNMENTS  
4.2.1 DEFINITIONAL ISSUES 
This section considers the historical antecedents to the current 
establishments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya.  This is examined under the categories of Andalusian 
regionalism and Catalan nationalism, a distinction which merits 
elaboration in advance.  The sense of territorial identity in Andalusia 
has predominantly been articulated as existing within the context of a 
unified Spain.  No incompatibility is recognised in the dual identity as 
Andalusian and Spanish at the same time.  The most up-to-date 
comparative data shows that in Andalusia, 67% consider themselves 
to be as Spanish as Andalusian (CIS 2015). 
This is not to suggest that there is not a strong sense of Andalusian 
identity.  There is no lack of commentators pointing to the clear 
personality or identity that is Andalusia.  Manuel Clavero Arévalo 
(1984: 121) gathers a range of commentators to support this: Caro 
Bayora describes Andalusia as ‘the most famous slice of Spain’.  
Julián Marias states that ‘of all the parts that make up Spain, 
Andalusia has the most distinct and unmistakeable personality’.  José 
Ortega y Gasset propounds that Andalusia is the Spanish region 
which ‘most fundamentally possesses its own culture’.  However, it is 
not separatist in nature.  Unlike other regions, Andalusia has wanted 
more involvement from Madrid (in the sense of the demands for 
support in addressing centuries long underdevelopment and poverty), 
not less and in this sense can be described as anti-separatist (Gilmore 
(1981: 60).56 
 
                                               
56 A notable exception to this view of an andalucismo within a unified Spain was that 
expounded by the nationalist Partida Andalucista, which became defunct in 2015 (Gómez 
2015).  The Director of the Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados de Andalucía (IESA), 
Manuel Pérez Yruela, foresaw the end of the Party in 2008 when he opined that the Socialist 
Party had taken on the role of defender of Andalusia, seeing andalucismo in its broadest 
sense as a movement to tackle underdevelopment (Pedrote 2008). 
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In the immediate post-Franco period, andalucismo (or Andalusian 
regionalism) was defined in terms of freedom and equality, not ethno-
cultural differences.  It was 
aimed at achieving self-government for the Andalusian people, 
on an equal footing with the rest of Spain, … and the 
overcoming of the conditions of alienation, underdevelopment 
and subordination from which it suffers. (Cruz Artacho 2011: 6) 
 
The economic underdevelopment aspect is a particularly important 
point.  The mobilisation prior to the 1980 referendum for autonomous 
status was not only the expression of regional pride but also a 
reflection of the sense of grievance, borne of history (Moreno and 
Trelles 2005: 525), an aspect which will be expanded upon below.  
Andalucismo therefore is viewed as a regionalist rather than a 
nationalist movement.57 
However, the case of Catalan identity is different.  More than half of 
Catalans (meaning those living in Catalonia) consider themselves to 
have a separate identity:  66% declare themselves either to be a 
Catalan living in Catalonia or a Catalan living in Spain, whereas 24% 
state they are Spaniards living in either Catalonia or Spain (Centre 
d’Estudis d’Opinió [CES] 2016).  The two key issues for consideration 
of Catalan nationalism in the context of public administration are: 
geographical boundaries and separatism.  In terms of geography, the 
area that is the remit of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia is 
clearly defined (see Map 5 at the beginning of this chapter).  However, 
as the following map shows, a wider Catalonia, ‘Països Catalans’, has 
been claimed not only beyond this boundary into neighbouring regions 
of Spain, but also across the border into Andorra, France and Italy, 
where Catalan is spoken.  The 1979 monograph of Fernando 
Soldevila and Miquel Coll i Alentorn covers this subject.  
                                               
57 A feature particular to Andalusia is the sentiment of an Andalusian stereotype being used, 
or ‘stolen’, by the state, especially under Franco, to promote a united Spain.  Isidoro Moreno 
describes this appropriation by state powers to try and construct a generic Spanish culture 
as a ‘process of vampirisation’ as it ‘emptied the Andalusian culture of its most important 
meanings and possibilities’ (2002: 141).   
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Map 6:  Catalan-speaking Regions of Europe 
 
Source: www.helpcatalonia.cat/2014/10/about-catalan-language.html.   
Accessed 18.05.15. 
This thesis is not the place to debate the legitimacy of these claims to 
awider Catalonia, but rather to note its existence as part of the broad 
historical context to Catalan identity.  Its impact on regional 
governance has been limited.  Whilst there is acknowledgement by 
others of linguistic and cultural links, today ‘there is little indication of 
enthusiasm for the political project of a ‘Greater Catalonia’ (Payne 
2009: 10).  It is interesting to note however that the new political party 
CUP which won ten seats in the 2015 Catalan elections is one based 
on the independence of the Països Catalans.58 
Of greater relevance is the debate about the extent to which current 
Catalan nationalism is a separatist movement, one seeking 
independence from the rest of Spain.  Historically, Catalan nationalism 
has concerned itself with Catalonia’s place within Spain (Crameri 
2015: 104).  The shift from a movement predominantly about greater 
autonomy from, and greater influence over, Spain to a situation where 
there is significant stated support for independence will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  The term Catalan nationalism and not 
                                               
58 http://cup.cat.  Accessed 10.01.16. 
108 
 
regionalism is used here to reflect the fact that most Catalans see 
Catalonia as a nation and not a region.  The latest survey data by the 
Generalitat’s Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió states that 41.6% of Catalans 
would prefer independence for Catalonia, compared with 26.5% in 
favour of Catalonia as an Autonomous Community of Spain (CEO 
2016). 
4.2.2 ANDALUCIAN REGIONALISM 
 The Accelerated Drive for Self-government 
At the time of the preparation of the 1978 Constitution, Andalusia was 
not recognised as a historic nation as was the case with the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Galicia and therefore not entitled to rapid 
elevation to full autonomy status via article 151.  However, Andalusia 
did achieve autonomy via this fast route, despite a lack of a distinctive 
language and limited history of independent government institutions.  
This accelerated drive for self-government in Andalusia after the death 
of Franco is a reflection of a number of factors.  Some are common 
with the rest of Spain such as the shared identification of pro-
democratic opposition with regionalism (Conversi 2002: 225).  Others 
are more specific to Andalusia, notably a history of neglect generating 
a sense of grievance, a fear of ‘falling behind’, and of being seen as 
second-class citizens, and secondly a more recent and forceful 
political mobilisation, based on a strong sense of identity. 
 Historic Colonisation and a Sense of Grievance 
Andalusia is one of the largest regions of Spain in terms of 
geographical size and population.  However it has also historically 
been one of Spain’s poorest regions.59  A history of colonisation can 
be traced from as early as the Roman occupation (300 years BC to 
500 years AD), involving an exploitation not only of resources but also 
                                               
59 This relative poverty has continued in current times with the relative buying power of 
Andalusians consistently lower than the Spanish average (Alcaide Guindo 2011).   
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in terms of preventing ‘any evolution of an indigenous culture’ 
(Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 172). 
The name ‘Andalusia’ derives from ‘Al-Andalus’, the name originally 
used to describe the Muslim territory which, by the year 720, covered 
almost the entire Iberian Peninsula (Barton 2009: 23).  As the map 
below shows, Al-Andalus gradually reduced its scope from the 
eleventh century, following waves of Castilian conquests, to the area 
recognised as Andalusia today (Lacomba 1992: 25): 
Map 7:  The Shrinking of Moorish Spain 
 
Source: Fletcher (1992: 130). 
The incorporation of all Moorish lands into the kingdoms of the 
Catholic Monarchs by 1492 brought a new period of colonisation.  
Unlike the fueros enjoyed in other parts of Spain, Andalusia was ruled 
from Castile, according to Castilian laws (Moreno 2001: 40).  Nobles 
from the north of Spain, together with the Church and the military 
order, obtained huge tracts of cheap land in the south following the 
Reconquest, creating vast estates (Lomax 1984: 230; Barton 2009: 
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73).  This system of large landed estates (or latifundios) was to have 
repercussions for Andalusian development – or lack of it – in future 
centuries.  The end of Al-Andalus has been described as the moment 
in history when Andalusia lost ‘its political autonomy and became 
subjugated to an external, dominant, centre’ (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 
9).   
The continuation of this phenomenon of colonisation can be traced 
over the following centuries.  Despite its position as the doorway to 
the Americas in the sixteenth century, the ‘encrucijada cósmica’ or 
universal crossroads of the new world (Machado Santiago and Kurs 
2000: 176), Andalusia did not emerge from its dependence on Castile.  
Goods and silver imported from the Americas did not stay in 
Andalusia, but were transported on to other parts of Europe, whose 
greater development meant that they profited from the market 
exchange, not Andalusia (Sánchez Mantero 2001: 89). 
Spain’s decline from being central to the world order in the sixteen 
century to being semi-peripheral in the seventeenth century, was 
reflected in Andalusia, as it suffered 
from agricultural regression, de-industrialisation and under-
investment as well as three waves of famine.  In the eighteenth 
century, the centralisation by the Bourbons imposed a territorial 
organisation in Andalusia by and for the centre, leading to a 
drain of the region’s agricultural, mineral and commercial 
resources.  (Machado Santiago and Kurs 2000: 176) 
Throughout its history, Andalusia has been, for significant periods, 
occupied, colonised, and made dependent by those who have 
controlled its geostrategic position and its resources (Machado 
Santiago and Kurs 2000: 188).   
 Early Development of andalucismo 
This is not to say that there was no regionalist movement in Andalusia 
prior to the Transition to Democracy in the 1970s.  During the second 
half of the nineteenth century alternatives were developed across 
Spain, including in Andalusia, to the Spanish centralist liberal vision, 
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which was deemed to have failed.  In Andalusia, a group of 
ethnologists and folklorists in the late 1860s developed a ‘theory that 
the Andalusians were an amalgam of Arab and Christian blood, and 
therefore of an entirely separate national category from their Castilian 
neighbours’ (Moreno 1981: 233).  These anti-state nationalists took a 
primordial perspective to nation-building (see Chapter Two), appealing 
to a past Golden Age before the fall brought about by the conquest by 
Castile. In Andalusian terms, the Moorish period could be portrayed 
as a time of arts, culture, and civilisation – an age ended by Castilian 
conquest (and not re-conquest as depicted in the Spanish nationalist 
narrative).  This period has been described not as an Arabisation as is 
conventionally held, but a synthesis of Roman (Baetica) culture, 
Arabic traditions and Islamic Berbers culture (Moreno, no date, no 
page). 
 
Most notably, however, andalucismo made marked advances in th 
early twentieth century under the impetus of intellectuals including 
Blas Infante Pérez (1885-1936), considered subsequently to be the 
father of modern Andalusian regionalism.  Key developments at the 
beginning of the twentieth century included the publication by Blas 
Infante of El ideal Andaluz in 1915, and the Ronda and Córdoba 
meetings of 1918 and 1919, at the first of which the claim for 
autonomy was made and the symbols of andalucismo (the flag and 
shield) were fixed (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 204).  These developments 
took place in a wider context of the national crisis of 1898 and a 
rejection of the centralist Bourbon state in many parts of Spain.  This 
was also the period of Catalan nationalist developments (specifically 
la Mancomunitat) and the attempt to establish the Integral State of the 
Second Republic (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 189). 
Blas Infante promoted three objectives: autonomy for the Andalusian 
people to determine their own future, recovery of the Andalusian 
identity, history and culture, and the liberation of the day labourers, 
described as ‘a stain on Andalusian society’ (Acosta Sánchez 1978: 
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193).  During the Second Republic a campaign began to support a 
Statute of Andalusia, with Blas Infante heading the pro-Statute Junta 
(Cruz Artacho 2011: 5).  However, a start on a definitive Statute was 
not made until April 1936, by which time the outbreak of civil war and 
the murder of Blas Infante rendered the effort futile (González Antón 
1997: 595). 
Unlike nationalist movements in other parts of Spain during this period 
at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, 
the Andalusian movement had been unable to build a significant 
social base.  Smith and Mar-Molinero (1996: 15) highlight two factors 
to explain the lack of development, both related to the pattern of land 
ownership.  Firstly, the Andalusian landholding elite, as one of pillars 
of the Restoration regime (1874-1931) and later during the Second 
Republic (1931-36) as supporters of right-wing nationalist parties, was 
fearful of losing its privileged position and so was unlikely to be 
sympathetic to regionalism.  Secondly, the anarchists and socialists 
had greater success in securing support amongst the landless 
peasants, who were more interested in working conditions and land 
ownership than regionalism (Córtes Peña 1994: 219). 
The bourgeoisie at that time was inadequate in terms of quality and 
quantity to influence the Andalusian discourse, with a series of factors 
preventing the intellectuals and professionals from joining with the 
working classes and advancing andalucismo.  An Andalusian 
bourgeoisie did not exist as was the case in Catalonia and the Basque 
Country where the emerging regional identity was used as a way of 
safeguarding their own interests.  The social structure was so 
polarised in Andalusia that the small bourgeoisie could only side with 
the working classes, but it was unable or unwilling to be ‘popular, 
emancipatory or radical’ in order to win over the working classes and 
replace the anarchists.  In addition, the advocates of the andalucismo 
discourse did not have a programme of institutional change which 
differentiated itself from the general federalism for the whole of Spain 
(González de Molina and Sevilla Guzmán 1987: 91-3). 
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A further factor to be considered in the weak development of 
andalucismo is the internal socio-cultural diversity within Andalusia.  It 
has no single centrifugal city, is geographically vast (triple the size of 
Catalonia), and considerable economic and social disparities exist 
across the region (Gilmore 1981: 59).  It has been argued that 
historically the Andalusians have not shared a unified regional 
sentiment and that localisms and provincialisms have superseded any 
regionalist feeling (Bernal 1978).  However, all regionalisms, including 
andalucismo, were left in suspense with the outbreak of the Civil War 
and were actively supressed during the Franco regime. The 
suppression of the Andalusian identity under Franco ranged from the 
suborning of its images for a Spanish stereotype to encouraging the 
consolidation of sub-regional structures within Andalusia (Lacomba 
2001: 471).60 
 Contemporary Steps to Autonomy 
As in other parts of Spain in the late 1970s, regional autonomy was 
seen in Andalusia as part of the democratic opposition equation: 
social and economic progress + political autonomy = democracy 
(Cruz Artacho 2011: 5, author’s translation) 
Andalusian regionalism in the final decades of the Franco dictatorship 
is overshadowed in most literature by consideration of activity in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia.  For example, Stanley G. Payne 
(1993: 106) makes a single reference to the raising of the Andalusian 
flag before the town hall of Seville to symbolise the mobilisation of an 
Andalusian movement in November 1932.  However, Javier Tusell 
does recognise the existence of Andalusian political nationalism in his 
coverage of peripheral nationalisms at the end of the Franco period, 
tracing it to the 1966 elections when Alejandro Rojas Marcos became 
a councillor in Seville.  His activism and that of others led to the 
creation in 1972 of the Socialist Alliance of Andalusia (Alianza 
                                               
60 For accounts of Andalusia and the Civil War see works by Lacomba (1987); Álvarez Rey 
(2006); Cobo Romero (2012). 
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Socialista de Andalucía or ASA), the forerunner of today’s pro-
Andalusian movement (Tusell 2011: 241).  
An important consideration in the development of an Andalusian 
consciousness is the impact of the migration of many Andalusians to 
other parts of Spain during the 1960s and 1970s.  This economically 
forced migration not only highlighted the economic disadvantage of 
Andalusians but also brought about 
for the first time for many Andalusians the awareness of their 
own identity such that Andalusia was a people culturally 
defined by a specific characteristic. (Moreno 1984: no page) 
As early as June 1979, the pre-autonomous Junta resolved to seek 
full autonomy via article 151.  Following a popular referendum and 
royal ratification of the Statute, the first elections to the new Junta 
were held in May 1982.  The key steps are shown in the table 
overleaf. 
The decision to opt for the fast route reflected the fear in Andalusia of 
falling behind the historic nations of the Basque Country, Catalonia 
and Galicia. 61  It also reflected a sense of grievance, based on a 
history of past failures.   
  
                                               
61 This was not exclusive to Andalusia.  Leaders in the “non-historic regions” sought to ‘ask 
for everything, if only to see, in the next moment, what this everything would consist of’ 
(Acosta España 1981: 15). 
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Table 4:  Chronology of Andalusian Autonomy Process (1977-82) 
 
Oct 1977 
 
Andalusian Parliamentary Assembly 
created 
 
April 1978 Pre-autonomous body created 
 
June 1979 Pre-autonomous Junta agrees to pursue 
autonomy via art 151 
 
Feb 1980 Voters support route 151 in the referendum  
 
Oct 1981 Referendum approves Statute 
 
Dec 1981 King ratifies Statute 
 
May 1982 First elections held to the Junta 
 
Source:  Adapted from González de Molina Navarro 
and Cruz Artacho (2011: 10-11).  (Author’s translation) 
The Junta’s 2011 publication to celebrate thirty years of autonomy 
describes these manifest historic failures in all aspects of Andalusian 
history:  in terms of agriculture, industry, society, politics and identity: 
 Agricultural failure was manifest in terms of low productivity, an 
inefficient and unequal structure of cultivation and ownership which 
condemned thousands of peasants to misery. 
 A failed industrialisation showed the limitations of Andalusian 
industry, the scarcity of available resources and the lack of market 
competitiveness. 
 An economic failure led to social failure, shown in persistent 
poverty, extreme inequality and stark social polarisation making 
social modernisation impossible. 
 A political failure was evident since the mid nineteenth century with 
the continuation of clientelist behaviour and the establishment of 
caciquismo, making difficult the modernisation of custom, practices 
and politics, and turning Andalusia in the twentieth century to a 
land little prepared for a popular democratic culture.62 
                                               
62 Both clientelism and caciquismo are defined earlier in Chapter Two, Section 2. 
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 A failure of identity was due to the lack of a political project 
specifically to defend the Andalusian identity and prevent the 
stigmatisation of the Andalusian culture as an inferior culture 
(González de Molina Navarro and Cruz Artacho 2011: 6-9). 
This background helps explain the rejection by Andalusians of any 
attempt to force Andalusia to accept ‘second class’ status in terms of 
level or speed of their autonomy in the 1970s.   
[A] very clumsy presentation of the issue [of Andalusia’s path to 
autonomy] on the part of the UCD and a certain demagogy 
from the opposition, resulted in an outright rejection by the 
majority of Andalusians of any delay in bringing in the Statute. 
(Tusell 2011: 305) 
The double standard (of a slower path to less autonomy for Andalusia 
compared with a faster route to greater autonomy for the Basque 
Country and Catalonia) was perceived as an injustice.  In this context, 
‘the Andalusians felt the urgent need to assert themselves as full 
equals of the Basques and Catalans.  A new Andalusian national 
consciousness was generated’ (Pérez-Díaz 1998: 201).  Andalusians 
may have shared a regional consciousness for a long time, but it can 
be argued that it was not politicised until the post-Franco period 
(Gilmore 1981: 60). 
4.2.3 CATALAN NATIONALISM 
 Long Historical Roots 
Catalonia’s historical roots date back centuries. There is a library of 
books dedicated to this theme, in English, Spanish and Catalan, 
written before the more recent surge in publications regarding 
secession post-2006 (for example, Hernàndez 2007; Payne 2009; 
Balcells 2011).  Other authors have concentrated on Catalan 
nationalism:  most recently, Dowling (2013) on Catalonia since the 
Civil War and Smith (2014) on the origins of Catalan nationalism.  This 
brief summary concentrates on the political and governance aspects 
of Catalan history.  It does not examine cultural and linguistic aspects.  
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However, it is clearly acknowledged that these are vital aspects which 
make up the Catalan identity today.  Works which give prominence to 
cultural aspects and the use of culture for nation building include 
Conversi (1997) and Crameri (2008).  Of particular importance is the 
Catalan language which is arguably at the centre of all claims for 
nationhood (Kedourie 1993: 62).  Its repeated suppression over the 
centuries by Bourbons, by Primo de Rivera and by Franco 
demonstrates its significance (McRoberts 2001: 6). For consideration 
of the importance of the Catalan language to identity, see Miquel 
Strubell (1999 and 2011) who makes no claim for impartial objectivity. 
The Diada on the eleventh of September is the Catalan national day 
and it commemorates the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 
1714.  The victor, Philip of Bourbon, had defeated Charles of Austria, 
the claimant backed by the Catalans.  Philip V of Spain subsequently 
passed a decree (the Nueva Planta), which abolished the distinctive 
institutions and laws of Catalonia, replacing them with direct rule from 
Madrid and required the use of Castilian, not Catalan, as the official 
language.  This defeat and the subsequent imposition of a unitary 
state has symbolised for many Catalans all that is wrong with the 
centralising Castilian power. 
Catalonia’s distinctive laws and institutions pre-dated the eighteenth 
century.  Catalans claim that the Generalitat can draw on over 600 
years of history.  José Montilla, in 2009, then First Minister of the 
Generalitat, for example, speaks of the country’s ‘deep rooted 
historical desire for self-government’, pointing to the longevity of the 
Generalitat as a governing body stating that ‘very, very few institutions 
of government in Europe […] have six and a half centuries of history 
behind them and are still alive today’ (Montilla 2009: 221).  The 
Catalan Statute of Autonomy (Preamble) made it clear that the 
Generalitat is not a newly created institution, but one established in 
1359. 
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Catalonia’s history as a separate entity is usually recorded from the 
end of the first century.  During the late Middle Ages Catalonia 
became a major economic and political power in much of the Western 
Mediterranean (McRoberts 2001: 11).  In 1137 the crowns of Aragon 
and Catalonia were united (into the Crown of Aragon) and, later, the 
Aragon sphere of control was expanded into the Mediterranean lands 
of Majorca in 1229, Valencia in 1238 and then on to Montpellier, Sicily 
and Sardinia (Sobrer 1992: 6).  These lands had their own institutions 
and laws which were not abolished by the union of the Aragonese and 
Castilian crowns in the fifteenth century.  As has been stated earlier, 
the two kingdoms of the Catholic Monarchs continued to be ruled 
separately, according to their own historic laws (Kamen 1973: 52).  
However, the focus of the new Spain was not the Mediterranean but 
the Americas, and was a Castilian-led enterprise, driven from Madrid, 
not Barcelona.  Catalonia, from being central in the Mediterranean-
focused world in medieval times, became marginalised with the rise of 
the Spanish empire and the shift of trade to the Atlantic (Keating, 
Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 43). 
Madrid’s pre-eminence over Barcelona extended through the 
Habsburg rule of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when royal 
focus was more on imperial development, beyond Spanish borders.  
The Catalan Reapers’ Revolt in 1640, which was a rejection of the 
demand of Philip IV for money and men to spread the burden of his 
war costs, demonstrated the challenges in managing such an 
extensive empire (Carr 2000: 7).  With Philip V’s Nueva Planta 
referred to above, ‘seven centuries of Catalan self-government had 
been ended. […] Catalonia’s descent from its golden age was 
complete’ (McRoberts 2001: 15). 
Following the War of Independence (1808-14), Spanish liberals 
planned a French-inspired Jacobin, centralised state.  This included 
the creation of provinces as an administrative unit, a measure rejected 
in areas such as Catalonia and the Basque Country (Moreno 2001: 
44).  The Carlist civil wars of the nineteenth century were in part a 
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reflection of this conflict, with the Carlist movement being particularly 
strong in these two regions: 
It may well be that Carlism at that time owed its strength to a 
combination of the remoteness of Central Government and the 
proximity of industrial production, superimposed on the strong 
ethnicity of those regions. (Moreno 2001: 46) 
Industrialisation at the end of the 1800s and beginning of the 1900s 
has been linked with growing nationalist movements (Esenwein and 
Shubert 1995: 49; Keating et al 2003: 47).  This economic 
development was uneven across Spain, concentrated in Catalonia 
and the Basque Country.  A key driver for Catalan industrialists was 
their poor view of the ability of Spain to run and develop the national 
economy.  In contrast to Basque nationalism, which could be seen as 
a reaction against modernisation, Catalan nationalism was ‘an 
affirmation of modernity against the failure of the Spanish state to 
bring about political and cultural modernization’ (Balfour and Quiroga 
2007: 9).  Tensions arose between Catalonia and the rest of Spain 
following the loss of empire in 1898 and the refusal of Spain ‘to 
support a series of ideas designed to compensate for the loss of the 
crucial market for Catalan textiles’ (Esenwein and Shubert 1995: 50). 
Catalan nationalism was also strengthened by Catalan frustrations 
with the Spanish state’s domination by large land-holding southern 
agrarian elites, and also by the impact of xenophobia directed at large 
numbers of internal migrants at the end of the nineteenth century 
(Miley 2013: 9).  Catalonia’s sense of responsibility to teach Spain 
how to govern is a theme of the work of Fernando León Solís (2003: 
142-5) and is captured by Keating et al: ‘For the early Catalan 
movement, the dream was to ‘Catalanise’ Spain, converting it to 
Catalonia’s modernising and industrial values’ (2003: 47).  This 
pedagogical attitude, based on a self-image of the superiority of 
Catalonia, is reflected in a number of this author’s interviews, carried 
out for the case study, with Generalitat politicians and civil servants. 
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Following male universal suffrage in 1890 the Catalan regionalists 
achieved electoral success in 1901 and again in 1908 (Moreno 2001: 
50).  Strengthened demands for greater autonomy were reflected in 
the formal elaboration of Catalan nationalism in the writings of Enric 
Prat de la Riba (La nacionalitat catalana of 1906) (McRoberts 2001: 
26).  The turbulence of this period was demonstrated by ‘Tragic Week’ 
in 1909 when a week of general strike and riot against the sending of 
Catalan reservists to fight in the Moroccan War was met by repressive 
action by the army.  However, it was also during this period that the 
highly symbolic Mancomunitat (or Commonwealth) was established in 
1914, but then abolished by the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in 1925 
(Buffery and Marcer 2011: 229).  The functions of the Mancomunitat 
were administrative but importantly it covered the whole territory of 
Catalonia (Moreno 2001: 51).  More substantial in governance terms 
was the Statute of 1932 during the Second Republic in which the 
Generalitat had authority over local government, courts, public works, 
roads, law and order, but not education (Esenwein and Shubert 1995: 
55).  The Catalan language was given co-official status with Castilian 
(McRoberts 2001: 34). 
As discussed earlier, the different visions of Spain, including the 
territorial distribution of power, were at the heart of the conflict which 
became the Spanish Civil War.  It was reflected in Catalonia in the fact 
that the Generalitat was re-established in 1931, suspended in 1934 by 
the right-wing Spanish Government, and then re-established in 1936 
following the election of the Popular Front Government (Payne 2009: 
98-100).  Following the Civil War a significant number of the Catalan 
Government fled into exile.  Josep Tarradellas, who had been the First 
Minister and Minister of Finance in 1937, was chosen by the exiles to 
be First Minister of the Government of Catalonia.63  Franco abolished 
sub-state government institutions, banned the Catalan language and 
other symbolic elements of Catalan identity and imposed a Castilian 
                                               
63 http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/ historia/historia_4/index.html#72453940-fac4-11e3-
a5dd-005056924a59-5.  Accessed 22.05.15. 
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centralised state, denying the validity of any kind of peripheral 
nationalism.  This repression continued throughout the regime,  
valthough it ‘proved incapable of destroying regional-nationalist 
consciousness’ (Miley 2013: 9). 
In summary, therefore, when Franco died in 1975 and Spain’s 
Transition to Democracy began, Catalan nationalism had much to 
draw on:  a political entity since the late 900s, a medieval empire, 
early parliamentary institutions and a literary tradition based on a 
distinctive language (McRoberts 2001: 44). To this list can be added 
the dynamics of a long-standing relationship between centre and 
periphery characterised on the Catalan side by either frustration with 
and/or resentment of the central authority for repressing their 
language and culture and a sense of superiority over Madrid in terms 
of management of the economy. 
 Catalonia during the Transition 
Catalonia was at the forefront, with the Basque Country, in voicing its 
demands for autonomy at the end of the Franco period.  An early act 
of Adolfo Suárez as Prime Minister of Spain was to recognise the 
strength of Catalan demands, with the return of Josep Tarradellas 
from exile in France as the guardian of the Catalan Government in 
October 1977.  Pre-autonomous status was granted to Catalonia, and 
also to the Basque Country and Galicia, acknowledging the special 
status of these areas which had held plebiscites in favour of their own 
statutes under the Second Republic.  With its fast route to full 
autonomy for the three historic nationalities, Spain’s decentralised 
model of Autonomous Government began as a ‘differentiating’ one.  
Its subsequent implementation moved Spain towards a 
‘homogenising’ model, making no distinction between the different 
Autonomous Governments (Guibernau 2004b: 75).64  This 
                                               
64 It should be noted however, that the special financial agreement extended only to the 
Basque Country and Navarre, a continued point of contention for Catalonia. 
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homogenising model has subsequently been a source of conflict as it 
is at odds with Catalonia’s self-image as ‘different’. 
In this early period of the Transition, the 1979 Statute of Autonomy for 
Catalonia reflected the national context of compromise and fear of 
renewed conflict.  It was not a statute of independence or separatism.  
It placed Catalonia as part of Spain, explicitly rejected federation, 
preserved the provincial councils and did not refer to claims for a 
‘Greater Catalonia’.  Nor did it position Catalan as the exclusive 
language of Catalonia.  It did however stress continuity over time and 
differentiation from others.  In terms of continuity, it included reference 
to ‘regaining democratic freedom’ and ‘recovering institutions of self-
government’.  Differentiation from others was emphasised through 
references to the collective identity of Catalonia, its collective life and 
the collective freedom of Catalonia (McRoberts 2001: 56-7).  As Jordi 
Pujol, the First Minister of the Generalitat following the 1980 elections, 
commented much later: ‘a willingness to compromise existed in 1978-
9.  It made it possible to restore democracy and Catalan self-
government after the dictatorship’ (Strubell 2011a: 56). 
The Generalitat’s central role in the national reconstruction of 
Catalonia in the late 1970s was a recognition not only of the symbolic 
importance of the Generalitat as an institution, but also of the fact that 
the pre-Franco society dominated by the Church and the old 
bourgeoisie no longer existed.  Furthermore, the influx of immigrants 
and the expectations of a new welfare state were beyond the means 
of the extensive civil society traditional in Catalonia (McRoberts 2001:  
115).65  This issue of the civil society and its role in public services will 
be explored in Chapter Six. 
The elections to the Generalitat of 1980 returned the Convergence 
and Unity Coalition, Convergència i Unió (CiU) as the largest party.  
                                               
65 Migration into Catalonia was significant. Between 1950 and 1975 net migration added 
almost 1,400,000 to Catalonia’s population.  Largely because of immigration, Catalonia’s 
population increased by 75% (1962-75), 52% of immigrants coming from Andalusia 
(McRoberts 2001: 31). 
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The CiU was a centre-right coalition, made up of two parties – the 
Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya and the Unió Democràtica 
de Catalunya.66  Jordi Pujol was elected First Minister – a position he 
was to hold for over twenty years.  The key stages of this period are 
summarised in the table below. 
Table 5: Chronology of Catalan Autonomy Process (1977-80) 
Sept 1977 
 
 
October 1977 
 
Pre-autonomous Catalan Government 
created 
 
Josep Tarradellas sworn in as First 
Minister of the Generalitat 
 
October 1979 Statute approved by referendum 
 
Dec 1979 Ratified by King Juan Carlos 
 
March 1980 Elections held to the Generalitat 
 
Source:  Generalitat de Catalunya.67 
 2006 Revision of the Statute of Autonomy 
Pujol and the CiU dominated Catalan politics at the end of the 
twentieth century.  Indeed the CiU has been described as ‘the most 
important nationalist formation in the Spanish state and the most 
electorally successful representative of state-less nationalism in 
western Europe’ in the period up to 2003 (Dowling 2013: 6).68  Their 
stance had been very much one which saw Catalonia as part of 
Spain.  Catalonia had a ‘dual position […] within Spain as a region 
                                               
66 See Dowling (2001) for an in-depth analysis of how CiU became the dominant force after 
Franco’s death, rather than the historic parties of Catalonia, the Lliga Regionalista and the 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC).  The CiU has now been disbanded (2016) and 
its constituent parties re-emerged as new parties DCD and PDC (Orquín 2016). 
67  http://web.gencat.cat/en/generalitat/historia/historia_4/index.html#72453940-fac4-11e3-
a5dd-005056924a59-5.  Accessed 20.05.15. 
68 Potential rivals in Catalonia, the ERC, had a more radical position in terms of 
independence, but were less electorally successful at this time.  The ERC was 
organisationally weak due to persecution during the Franco era and had to compete with 
other parties on the left.  State-wide parties, the PSOE and UCD/AP, were less able to 
present a credible territorial political agenda and so the CiU’s moderate territorial strategy, 
based on increasing autonomy within the existing Constitutional framework was successful 
(Elias 2015: 85-6). 
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with a strong sense of identity but also with strong economic and 
political interests in Spain’ (2005 speech by Duran, then CiU leader, 
quoted in León Solís 2010: 77).  At this time, the CiU promoted itself 
as a nationalist party, but not one seeking independence from Spain.  
It reflected its base in the Catalan bourgeoisie who were ‘usually 
hostile to anything that would weaken their position within the Spanish 
state’ (Crameri 2008: 18).  This non-separatist stance would also 
underpin the role sought and played by the CiU in national politics as 
evidenced by pacts with minority governments of the PSOE and PP 
(1993-96 and 1996-2000 respectively).  It was an approach described 
as ‘nationalist progressive consolidation of greater degrees of self-
government via political negotiation’ (Bel 2015: 62). 
The major shift in support for independence in Catalonia, and with it a 
shift in the stance of the CiU (and the Generalitat), began in the first 
decade of the current century.  This section provides an overview of 
the key events.  (Commentary on the significance of the shift in the 
CiU and in the wider population towards Catalan independence is 
given in Chapter Six.)  Responding to the opportunity offered by the 
newly elected Prime Minister Zapatero, the Catalan Parliament 
produced and approved a revision to their Statute.  The main 
objectives of reform were to increase the symbolic and political 
recognition of Catalonia as a distinct national reality within the 
Spanish state, increase the level of self-government of the Catalan 
institutions and improve the financial settlement for Catalonia 
(Requejo 2010: 159). 
Negotiations with Central Government watered down the revision but 
it received majority support at a popular referendum in June 2006 
(albeit on a low turnout).  However, the PP challenged the revised 
statute, ‘hoping that the [Constitutional] Court would repeal no fewer 
than 128 of its 223 articles’ (Crameri 2014: 44).  After deliberations of 
four years, the Constitutional Court made its ruling, finding 14 articles 
unconstitutional and ordering the re-interpretation of 27 others.  
Fundamentally, the Court rejected the Generalitat view that their 
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statute was ‘a quasi-constitutional instrument with the capacity to 
indirectly define and regulate the distribution of powers and finances 
across the country’ (Colino 2013: 89).  It rejected the positioning of the 
Catalan language as the ‘preferred’ language and Catalonia’s 
determination not to give unconditional financial support to other 
Autonomous Governments.  Reference to Catalonia as a nation was 
not accepted as having any legal effect, as Spain was the only nation 
recognised by the Constitution (Crameri 2014: 44). 
The reaction in Catalonia to the ruling was popular demonstrations in 
support of the Statute. Over 1 million people were reported to have 
protested in Barcelona on tenth of July 2010.69  Many Catalans saw 
the ruling as a demonstration of a lack of respect to the Catalan 
people, a feeling subsequently voiced also by former Catalan First 
Ministers José Montilla and Jordi Pujol (Strubell 2011a: 50 and 59 
respectively). The 2010 regional elections returned the CiU to the 
Generalitat, under Catalan First Minister Artur Mas, and the 2011 
general elections replaced the PSOE with the PP, under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.  The rapid and continued 
deterioration in relations between the Governments of the Generalitat 
and the Rajoy Government have been comprehensively covered 
elsewhere (Martí 2013; Serrano 2013; Crameri 2014; Bel 2015).  
Highlights of this antagonistic relationship have included the legality of 
a ‘right to decide’ referendum (November 2014) (Serrano 2013: 531), 
the election of a pro-independence coalition to the Generalitat in 2015 
and the subsequent approval of a road map to independence (Piñol 
2016).  Relevant to this thesis is an understanding of this context of 
political dispute and the Catalan sentiments regarding their 
relationship with Spain.  To be explored in this study is the extent to 
which this affects the corporate and political management 
arrangements of the Autonomous Government. 
                                               
69 www.lavanguardia.co./politica.  Accessed 04.06.15.   
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The next section presents a profile of the institutional features of the 
Autonomous Governments of the Junta de Andalucía and the 
Generalitat de Catalunya. 
4.3 INSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS 
4.3.1 JUNTA DE ANDALUCÍA 
 Parliament 
The original Statute of Autonomy of 1981 was replaced by the Statute 
of 2006.  The Junta is made up of a Parliament, First Minister and 
Government.70  Other sub-state authorities include the Andalusian 
Public Prosecutor, Consultative Council, Accounts Court, Audio-Visual 
Council and Economic and Social Council, but these bodies are 
outside the remit of this study. 
The Parliament is made up of 109 elected representatives, each with 
a term of office of four years.  Its role is to represent the people of 
Andalusia, approve the annual budget, act as legislative body and 
elect the First Minister.  Its composition following the March 2015 
elections was Socialist Party 47 seats, Popular Party 33 seats, 
Podemos 15 seats, Ciudadanos 9 seats and United Left 5 seats and 
is shown in the following figure.  
  
                                               
70 The source for the information in this section is largely the Junta’s website 
www.juntadeandalucia.es. 
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Figure 4:  Distribution of Seats in Andalusian Parliament (2015) 
 
Source: Parliament of Andalusia website.71 
 Presidency/First Minister 
The First Minister’s role is to represent the Autonomous Community of 
Andalusia, and to direct and co-ordinate the activity of the 
Government.  The current incumbent is Susana Díaz (PSOE) and it is 
the First Minister who chooses the ministers for the Government. 
 Government and Ministries 
The Government is the collective which exercises the executive and 
administrative functions of the Junta.  It is made up of the First 
Minister for Andalusia, the Deputy First Ministers and Ministers.  
There are thirteen Ministries including that of the First Minister:72 
  
                                               
71http://www.parlamentodeandalucia.es/webdinamica/portal-web-
parlamento/composicionyfuncionamiento/gruposparlamentarios.do.  Accessed 15.08.15. 
72 The number of ministries was increased from ten following the 2015 elections. 
Socialist Party (PSOE)
Popular Party (PP)
Podemos
Ciudadanos
Izquierda Unida
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Table 6:  Ministries of the Junta (2015) 
La Presidencia y 
Administración Local  
Presidency/First Minister 
and Local Administration 
(headed by Deputy First 
Minister) 
Hacienda y Administración 
Pública 
Finance and Public 
Administration 
Economía y Conocimiento 
 
Economy and Knowledge 
Salud Health 
 
Igualdad y Políticas 
Sociales 
 
Equality and Social 
Services 
Educación 
 
Education 
Cultura 
 
Culture  
Empleo, Empresa y 
Comercio 
 
Employment, Business and 
Commerce 
Justicia e Interior 
 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Fomento y Vivienda 
 
Public Works and Housing 
Agricultura, Pesca y 
Desarrollo Rural 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Rural Development 
Medio Ambiente y 
Ordenación Territorio 
Environment and Planning 
Turismo y Deporte Tourism and Sport 
 
Source:  Author’s translation and elaboration from information 
on the website of Junta de Andalucía.73 
  
                                               
73 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos.html.  Accessed 15.08.15. 
129 
 
Each Minister is responsible for a government department.  Political 
appointments are made to the most senior levels as shown below, in 
hierarchical order: 
Consejero/a Andalusian Minister 
Vice Consejero/a 
Secretaría General 
Andalusian Deputy Minister 
Andalusian Secretary General 
Director/a General Andalusian Director General 
  
The figure overleaf shows the hierarchy at the highest levels of the 
Finance and Public Administration Ministry as an example of the 
structure adopted across the Junta. 
The most senior civil servant (which is not a political appointment) is 
the Assistant Director General (or Sub Director) level.  Below this 
level, staff are organised into Directorates, Departments, Sub-
departments, Services and Sections.  It has not been possible to 
identify from the Junta’s information the total number of staff and the 
types of contracts under which they are employed.  However, national 
statistics state that as at January 2015, the Junta employed 237,549 
staff (Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas 2015). 
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Figure 5:  Finance Ministry as Exemplar of Junta Political Hierarchy (2015) 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s translation and elaboration from information 
on the website of Junta de Andalucía.74 
  
                                               
74 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/haciendayadministracionpublica/consejeria.html.  
Accessed 15.08.15. 
131 
 
 
 Political Control 
The first elections to the Junta were held in 1982 when the PSOE won 
an absolute majority.  The composition of the Andalusian Parliament 
following subsequent elections is shown below: 
Table 7:  Composition of Andalusian Parliament (1982-2015) 
 PSOE-
A 
AP/PDP/ 
UL/PP 
PCA/PCE/ 
IU-CA 
PSA/PA UCD 
1982 66 17 8 3 15 
1986 60 28 19 2 - 
1990 62 26 11 10 - 
1994 45 41 20 3 - 
1996 52 40 13 4 - 
2000 52 46 6 5 - 
2004 61 37 6 5 - 
2008 56 47 6 - - 
2012 47 50 12 - - 
Source: Cano Buesco (2011: 33) 
 supplemented by information from Junta de Andalucía website. 
The PSOE have therefore controlled the Junta throughout its 
existence, either with an overall majority or as the largest party in 
coalition, provoking some national commentators to describe 
Andalusia as ‘pathologically’ of the left (Barbero 2015).  This is 
summarised in the table overleaf. 
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Table 8:  Phases of Political Control of the Junta (1982-2015) 
 
 1982-1994: Hegemony of PSOE – three absolute majorities 
following elections in 1982, 1986, 1990 
 
 1994-1996: Loss of overall majority for first time.  PSOE 
continue in power with increased pressure from opposition 
 
 1996-2004: Coalition government for the first time (PSOE 
and Partido Andalucista)75 
 
 2004-2012: PSOE absolute majority again. 
 
 2012-2015: PSOE in coalition with Izquierda Unida (IU) 
 
Source:  Adapted from Cano Bueso (2011: 30-35) 
(author’s translation) supplemented by author. 
A breakup of the coalition with IU in 2015 resulted in the calling of 
fresh elections by the First Minister, Susana Díaz.  The PSOE 
retained 47 seats and remained the largest party, albeit without an 
overall majority.  Díaz was eventually voted in as First Minister three 
months later after three failed votes with the support of Ciudadanos.  
Partido Popular, Podemos and Izquierda Unida opposed her 
investiture (El País 11.06.15). 
4.3.2 GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA 
 Parliament 
The original statute of Autonomy of 1979 was replaced in 2006, a 
document subsequently amended by the Constitutional Court ruling of 
                                               
75 The roots of the (now defunct) Partido Andalucista, a centre-left party, date back to the 
1960s when the Alianza Socialista de Andalucía was founded by Alejandro Rojas Marcos 
(Tusell 2011: 241). 
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June 2010 (see Section 4.2.3 above).  The Generalitat is made up of 
a Parliament, First Minister and Government.76  Other sub-state 
authorities exist, including the Catalan Court of Auditors, Ombudsman 
and Anti-Fraud Office, but these are outside of the remit of this study. 
The Parliament is made up of 135 elected representatives (diputats), 
with a term of office of four years.  Its role is to represent the people of 
Catalonia, approve the annual budget, act as legislative body and 
elect the First Minister.  Its composition following the September 2015 
elections is as follows and is shown in the diagram below:  Together 
for Yes (Junts pel sí) 62 seats, Ciutadans 25 seats, Socialist Party 16 
seats, Yes We Can (Catalunya sí que es Pot) 11 seats, Popular Party 
11 seats and Popular Unity (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular) 10 seats. 
Figure 6:  Distribution of Seats in Catalan Parliament (2015) 
 
Source: Parlament de Catalunya.77 
Junts pel sí is a coalition created for the 2015 elections.  Its platform is 
‘full sovereignty’ and is supported by the CDC (Catalan Democratic 
Convergence) (formerly one of the two leading parties of the CiU) and 
                                               
76 The source for the information in this section is largely the Generalitat’s website 
www.gencat.cat. 
77 http://resultats.parlament2015.cat/09AU/DAU09999CM_L2.htm.  Accessed 29.12.15. 
Junts per sí
Ciutadans
Socialist Party
Yes We Can
Popular Party
Popular Unity (CUP)
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the ERC (Catalan Republican Left).78  CUP (Candidatura d’Unitat 
Popular) is a new, left-wing party, supportive of an independent 
Catalonia.79 
 Presidency/First Minister 
The First Minister’s role is to represent the Autonomous Community of 
Catalonia, and to direct and co-ordinate the activity of the 
Government.  The current incumbent is Carles Puigdemont (from 
January 1016) and it is the First Minister who chooses the ministers of 
Government.  
 Government and Ministries 
The Government is the collective which exercises the executive and 
administrative functions of the Generalitat.  It is made up of the First 
Minister for Catalonia, the Deputy First Minister and Ministers (or 
Secretaries of State).  There are twelve Ministries, including that of the 
Presidency, as shown in the table overleaf: 
  
                                               
78 www.juntspelsi.cat.  Accessed 01.01.16.   
79 http://cup.cat.  Accessed 10.01.16. 
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Table 9:  Ministeries of the Generalitat (2015) 
Presidència 
 
Presidency/First Minister 
Governació i Relacions 
Institutionals 
 
Government and 
Institutional Relations 
Economia i Coneixement 
 
Economy and Knowledge 
Ensenyament 
 
Education 
Salut 
 
Health 
Interior 
 
Home Affairs 
Territori i Sostenibilitat 
 
Planning and 
Sustainability 
Cultura 
 
Culture 
Agricultura, Ramaderia, 
Pesca, Alimentació i Medi 
Natural 
 
Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Food and Environment 
Benestar Social i Familia 
 
Social and Family Welfare 
Empresa i Ocupació 
 
Enterprise and 
Employment 
Justícia 
 
Justice 
Source:  Source:  Author’s translation and elaboration 
 based on information on the Generalitat website.80 
Each Minister is responsible for a government department. Political 
appointments are made to the most senior levels.  The following figure 
shows the hierarchy within the Economy and Knowledge Ministry as 
an example of the senior, political organisational structure within the 
Generalitat. 
  
                                               
80 www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/govern/consell-executiu/index.html.  Accessed 
10.01.16. 
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Figure 7:  Ministry of Economy and Knowledge 
as Exemplar of Generalitat Political Hierarchy (2015) 
 
 
 
Source:  Author’s translation and elaboration 
 based on information on the Generalitat website.81 
  
                                               
81 http://sac.gencat.cat/sacgencat/AppJava/organigrama.jsp?codi=1103&jq=200001.  
Accessed 10.01.16. 
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The most senior civil servant (excluding those who are political 
appointments) is the Assistant Director General level.  Under the 
Secretary General, staff are organised into Directorates, Departments, 
Sub-departments, Services and Sections.  The table shows the overall 
number of staff and the type of contract under which they are 
employed. 
Table 10:  Breakdown of Public Employees by  
Type of Employment Contract (2015) 
 Generalitat 
Ministries 
ICS 
Institute of 
Catalan 
Health 
Others, 
notably 
SPVs 
Total 
Altos cargos 141 0 23 164 
Other directors 3 46 266 315 
Advisors 135 0 0 135 
Civil servants 92,607 21,508 3,510 117,645 
Temporary civil 
servants 
21,760 9,112 1,095 31,314 
Permanent 
labour 
2,887 174 36,253 39,314 
Temporary 
labour 
3,773 2,390 5,238 11,401 
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya82  
Political Control 
The first elections to the Generalitat, post-Franco, were held in 1980 
when the CiU became the largest party, but did not achieve the 
absolute majority of 68 seats.  The composition of the Catalan 
Parliament following elections is shown overleaf.  
                                               
82 http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx.  Accessed 29.12.15. 
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Table 11:  Composition of Catalan Parliament (1980-2012) 
 CiU ERC PSC/PSOE UCD/AP/ 
PP 
Other 
1980 43 14 33 18 27 
1984 72 5 41 11 6 
1988 69 6 42 6 12 
1992 70 11 40 7 7 
1995 60 13 34 17 11 
1999 56 12 52 12 3 
2003 46 23 42 15 9 
2006 48 21 37 14 15 
2010 62 10 28 18 17 
201283 50 21 20 19 25 
Source:  Parlament de Catalunya84  
The results of the 2015 elections, previously detailed, reflect the 
arrival of new parties to the Spanish political scene and a new 
electoral coalition in Catalonia.  It resulted in a pro-independence 
coalition in control of the Generalitat. 
Jordi Pujol of the CiU was First Minister 1980-2003.  Coalitions of 
PSC-PSOE, ERC and IVC were led by Pasquel Maragall of the PSOE 
between 2003 and 2006 and by José Montilla (PSOE) between 2006 
and 2010.85  Artur Mas of the CiU was First Minister from 2010 to 
2015.  After failed attempts by Mas to be re-elected First Minister 
following the September 2015 elections, Carles Puigdemont (CDC, 
formerly CiU) was elected in January 2016. 
  
                                               
83 Snap election called by Mas following demonstrations in Barcelona on Diada in 
September 2012. 
84 www.parlament.cat/composicio/dades_electorals.pdf.  Accessed 25.08.14. 
85 A list of the main political parties in Andalusia and Catalonia is shown in Appendix D. 
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4.4 CONTEMPORARY FINANCIAL CONTEXT 
4.4.1 NATIONAL FINANCING SYSTEM OF AUTONOMOUS 
GOVERNMENTS 
A key element of any decentralised state is the way in which the 
devolved levels of government are funded.  This section analyses the 
funding regime of the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and 
Catalonia and the way Central Government policies in the wake of the 
2008 economic crisis have affected the Junta and the Generalitat. 
 Developments in the Common System of Financing 
The possible sources of income permitted (by the Constitution and 
subsequent laws) for the Autonomous Governments include income 
from their own taxes, income from fees and charges, shares of central 
revenues, totally or partially ceded taxes, grants from Central 
Government and from borrowing (Toboso and Scorsone 2010: 161).  
As will be seen later in this section, own taxes have not been 
significant.  The key issue, in terms of scale, and the one to be 
considered here, is that of Central Government grants and ceded 
taxes. 
Underpinning the financing model of the Autonomous Governments 
from the outset has been two distinct systems of financing:  a charter 
or special system and the common system – the latter introduced by 
the 1980 LOFCA (Ley Orgánica de Financiación de las Comunidades 
Autónomas or Statutory Law for the Financing of the Autonomous 
Communities).  The charter system is applicable only to Navarre and 
the Basque Country, and provides for much greater autonomy as both 
these regions are able to establish and regulate their own fiscal 
system.86  The following analysis of the national system relates to the 
common system under which both Andalusia and Catalonia operate. 
                                               
86 The Basque Country and Navarre have full powers over all personal and corporate 
income taxes and extensive control over VAT and other excise duties.  Central Government 
transfers are not required to fund Autonomous Government expenditure in these two 
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Since the establishment of the State of the Autonomies, Autonomous 
Governments have increasingly taken on a wider range of 
responsibilities and the common system of financing has been 
progressively modified accordingly.  The initial differences in terms of 
higher levels of responsibilities between the historic nations and the 
rest, have now been largely equalised (López Laborda and 
Monasterio Escudero 2007: 423).  Some asymmetries do remain – for 
example, policing responsibilities in Catalonia are shared between the 
Generalitat and Central Government.  These powers rest exclusively 
with the State in Andalusia.  However, the key services, including 
education and health, are competencies which are held at a sub-state 
level across the country (Gil-Serrate et al 2011: 2632, Colino 2013: 
83). 
Three main phases can be traced during the period since the 
establishment of the State of the Autonomies of changes to the way in 
which the Autonomous Governments are financed: 
 The initial focus was on ensuring continuity of public services 
during the asymmetrical devolutionary process when regions 
were largely funded by state transfers. 
 The second stage concentrated on seeking equality across the 
country and adopting a more objective method of calculating 
expenditure needs. 
 The third stage involved the ceding of taxation from central to 
regional governments to bring about a re-balancing of funding 
(De la Fuente 2012: 4).  The taxes, now transferred and 
controlled by Autonomous Governments for which they receive 
100% of the collection, include tax on net wealth, inheritance 
and gift tax, capital transfer tax, gaming tax, vehicle excise and 
hydrocarbons retail sale tax.  In addition, following a further 
                                               
regions.  Rather, they both negotiate a single payment with Central Government as a 
contribution to the cost of providing federal services. (Gil-Serrate et al 2011: 2635; López 
Laborda & Monasterio Escudero 2007: 443). 
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agreement, increases were made to the percentages 
transferred, with regional governments receiving 50% (up from 
33%) of personal income tax.  Furthermore, sub-state 
governments share tax income with the Government on the 
following taxes:  VAT (50% up from 35%), alcohol, tobacco and 
petrol (58% up from 40%) and electricity (100%) (Gil-Serrate et 
al 2011: 2633, updated from Treasury website).87 
As part of the 2009 reform of the financing system which significantly 
increased the assignment of taxes to the Autonomous Governments, 
three new funds were created:  Convergence Fund, Competitivity 
Fund, and Cooperation Fund (Fondos de Convergencia, de 
Competitividad, de Cooperación).  Together with the Sufficiency Fund 
(or Fondo de Suficiencia) (the Government instrument to guarantee 
an equal level of public service in all parts of Spain), they transfer 
state funds to the regional bodies (De la Fuente 2012: 6).  The Basic 
Public Services Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía de Servicios 
Públicos Fundamentales) seeks to reinforce equality by ensuring 
equal basic per capita financing in each Autonomous Governments for 
health, education and social services, determining 
the global financing amount to distribute, its financing sources, 
and the distributional and updating criteria according the needs 
and characteristics of the population. (Díaz de Sarralde 2011: 
85) 
An analysis of the resources allocated to each Autonomous 
Government according to the 2009 legislation reveals a differential 
impact.  Whilst Catalonia receives the largest amount in ceded income 
taxes and VAT (Andalusia being third after Madrid), Andalusia is the 
largest beneficiary of the Basic Public Services Guarantee Fund (with 
Catalonia one of the lowest).  Catalonia and Andalusia are the top 
recipients of the Sufficiency Fund (first and second out of seventeen) 
and significant recipients of the Convergence Fund (first and fifth 
                                               
87 www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/ 
Regimen%20comun.aspx.  Accessed 16.06.14. 
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respectively) (Ministerio de Política Territorial y Administración Pública 
2009). 
The 2009 changes sought to increase the amount of money for 
Autonomous Governments but also to alter the balance of tax 
revenues so that more tax would be raised regionally, not nationally, 
thus improving transparency and aiding accountability to citizens (De 
la Fuente 2012: 8).  However, others have argued that the 
arrangements adopted at the end of 2009 retained the basic features 
of the previous model (Colino 2013: 86).  Government publications 
state that the proportion of all Autonomous Governments’ resources 
coming from taxes transferred partially or fully from the State, would 
increase from 70% to around 90%.88  This thesis does not examine 
the veracity of these claims, but does consider below the reaction of 
the Junta and Generalitat to the calculations and the impact of those 
calculations within the financing system. 
 The Impact of Financial Decentralisation 
The argument has been that the original form of decentralisation 
established in Spain provided Autonomous Governments with 
significant levels of spending and borrowing autonomy, but limited 
responsibility for taxation.  Autonomous Governments expected 
Central Government to bail them out if necessary, risking fiscal 
indiscipline amongst those Autonomous Governments (Gray 2014: 
22).  The following table shows the rise in spend of regional (and 
local) governments which made this issue of an accountability gap 
significant. 
  
                                               
88  www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/ 
Regimen%20comun.aspx.  Accessed 16.06.14. 
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Table 12:  Territorial Distribution of Public Expenditure in Spain (%) 
 1982 1996 2009 2011 
Central Government 53.0 37.5 20.9 21.6 
Autonomous Governments 3.6 22.3 35.6 34.3 
Municipalities 10.6 11.6 13.6 12.3 
Social Security 32.5 29.2 29.9 31.9 
Sources:  Ruiz Almendral 2013: 198 
 and Pérez García et al 2015. 
In this way, reforms to the financial system have progressively shifted 
the balance of revenues for Autonomous Governments from Central 
Government grants as the table below shows.  During the 1980s and 
1990s Autonomous Governments were very reliant on external 
(Central Government) grants but by the mid-2000s, their ‘own 
revenue’ exceeded 50%. 
Table 13: Revenue for Autonomous Governments 
(% of Total National Budgets) 
 1988 2000 2005 2006 
Own revenue 
Own taxes 
Ceded taxes 
Total 
 
0.85 
28.65 
29.49 
 
0.98 
36.31 
37.29 
 
 
0.83 
53.59 
54.42 
 
0.83 
59.30 
60.13 
External sources 
Grants 
Borrowing 
 
 
70.25 
0.26 
 
 
57.28 
5.43 
 
 
36.63 
8.95 
 
 
39.88 
(-0.01) 
 
Total 100 
 
100 100 100 
Source: Toboso and Scorsone (2010: 166). 
So does this mean that Autonomous Governments are in charge of 
their own income streams?  Powers have increased substantially and 
so has financial autonomy, largely due to ceded taxes.  However, the 
Autonomous Governments have only some control over some of the 
shared taxes and no control over others.  Whilst the financial 
autonomy of Autonomous Governments has increased, ‘financial 
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autonomy places emphasis on the degree of security of [income 
received], not on their legal capacity to settle and regulate taxes’ 
(Toboso and Scorsone 2010: 165).  Moreover, whilst there has been a 
high level of decentralisation and regional autonomy, it is still 
overwhelmingly at Central Government level that the policy making 
and legislative powers still reside (Medizabal 2014: 7). 
As a final point in relation to the income of Autonomous Governments, 
reference must be made to the impact of the EU.  Since its accession, 
Spain has received significant funding from Europe, particularly in the 
form of structural funds.  However, not all parts of Spain have 
benefitted equally. Andalusia has been the recipient of significant EU 
funds – both structural and cohesion funds – estimated to exceed 
28,000M€ in the period 1989-2013 (Sosvilla Rivero 2009: 99).  Not 
only is this financial support considerable in comparison with the rest 
of Spain as the table overleaf shows (in relation to structural funds 
only), it is also markedly higher than many if not most other parts of 
the EU in this period. 
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Figure 8:  Structural Funds Received by Autonomous Governments 
(2000-2006 and 2007-2013) (M€) 
 
Source: Carmona Contreras and Koelling (2013: 253). 
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4.4.2 THE ECONOMIC CRISIS POST-2008 IN SPAIN 
 Spanish Government Policies 
To place the analysis of the 2015 budgets of the Junta and the 
Generalitat into a wider context, this section examines the Spanish 
economy, specifically the response of the Spanish Government to the 
economic crisis which unfolded from 2008.  The economic crisis of the 
beginning of the twenty-first century was a global one and affected all 
members of the Euro Zone.  Some countries were more affected than 
others, with Spain, Portugal and Greece facing the greatest 
challenges.   Spain for example suffered the greatest fall in public 
revenues in the Euro Zone, experiencing a drop of 5.4% in GDP in the 
period 2007-2011 (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 21).   
The reasons for this economic crisis are beyond the scope of this 
study, but of relevance is that it exposed underlying weaknesses in 
Spain’s various economies, because of their heavy reliance on the 
property and construction sectors. Some parts within Spain were more 
affected than others.  Worst affected have been those with greatest 
proportion of industry, those with economies based on services and 
construction and those reliant on tourism – Andalusia and Catalonia 
being prime examples.  Amongst the regions with the biggest falls in 
employment have been Andalusia and Catalonia (Ruiz-Huerta 
Carbonell et al 2009: 93).  The response of the Spanish government 
has been similar to other European states inasmuch as there have 
been two phases – firstly stimulus packages (August 2008 – April 
2010), followed by a regime of austerity (from May 2010 onwards) 
(Colino and Del Pino 2014: 167). The expansive fiscal policy 
measures of the Spanish Government in the first phase included 
increased public spend to stem the sharp decline in the economy, 
such as the 8M€ Plan E of public investment, as well as measures to 
stimulate private spending such as personal income and corporation 
tax cuts (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013: 22-3).  In parallel with Central 
Government actions to stimulate the economy, Autonomous 
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Governments also introduced measures in this first phase, particularly 
to stimulate house building.  The emphasis on stimulating house 
building is clear in the table below, reflecting the fact that Autonomous 
Governments already had powers in this area and the importance of 
the sector to job creation and/or job retention (Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell 
et al 2009: 100). 
Table 14:  Measures Taken by the Junta and Generalitat 
 to Tackle Effects of Economic Crisis 
Measure  Catal’a And’a 
Income  Income tax changes   
  Reduced tax on 
animal inspection 
X  
Spend    
Investment  Bidding for public 
works 
 Other housing and 
infrastructure works 
 Boats and industrial 
equipment 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
Grants to 
businesses 
 Restoration of 
housing 
 Construction of 
housing 
 R&D projects 
 Car sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X 
Payments to 
families 
 Buying social housing 
 Education grant 
X 
X 
 
 
Other  Training for 
employment 
  
Source:  Author’s elaboration and translation from 
Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al (2009: 99-100). 
However, by 2009/10 the stimulus measures began to be withdrawn 
by Central Government, to be replaced by austerity measures, largely 
in response to external factors, notably from the EU, the IMF and 
international financial markets, to reduce the public deficit (Muñoz de 
Bustillo and Antón 2013).  Measures were taken to bolster 
Government revenue including increases to VAT, corporation and 
personal income taxes.  In terms of expenditure, a pay cut was 
imposed on public sector workers and reductions made in public 
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investment programmes (Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013:  23).  In total, 
tax increases and spending cuts ‘added up to one of the most severe 
austerity packages in Europe designed to cut the budget deficit from 
11.2% in 2009 to 3% in 2013’ (Salmon 2010: 85).  These government 
measures are summarised in the table below. 
Figure 9:  Summary of Spanish Government 
 Austerity Measures (July 2012) 
 
 Increase in VAT from 18% to 21% 
 Public employees’ Christmas bonus payment 
removed for 2012, 2013 and 2014 
 Number of public employees’ ‘personal days’ 
reduced 
 Unemployment benefit reduced 
 More taxes, particularly environmental taxes 
 Tax Reform 
 Reduction in number of councillors 
 End of housing purchase tax relief 
 Reduced spend in ministries 
 Reduction in number of public sector 
companies 
 Reduction in financing of political parties and 
trades unions 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration from Garea (2015: 10-11). 
 Impact on Autonomous Governments 
The downturn in the economy had a direct impact on the finances of 
the Autonomous Governments in a number of aspects.  First, there 
was a significant drop in their own income from property taxes and 
stamp duty as a direct result of the housing crash.  Secondly, the 
income from their share of national taxes such as income tax and VAT 
fell.  The impact of severe reductions in the Sufficiency Fund was to 
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some extent reduced by additional Government resources as part of 
the reform of the system of financing of Autonomous Governments.  
Andalusia had been by far the biggest beneficiary of the Sufficiency 
Fund, receiving 8,248M€ in 2010 (whilst the next highest was Galicia 
at 3,279M€) (Ruiz-Huerta Carbonell et al 2009: 105).  Thirdly, whilst 
public spending nationally was being reduced, the devolution of 
welfare responsibilities continued, leaving Autonomous Governments 
faced with growth in demand for health and education services at a 
time of reduced resources (Mendizabal 2014: 8). 
Autonomous Governments were also affected by the delay in the 
public finance system, contributing to a build-up of deficits.  The 
‘payment on account’ mechanism by which Central Government 
transfers to Autonomous Governments (accounting for approximately 
80% of their revenue) did not work well.  The delay of two years 
between estimates and actual for 2008 and 2009 contributed to the 
swelling of Autonomous Governments’ deficits in 2010 and 2011 
(Conde-Ruiz and Marín 2013:  25).89 
The Government’s stimulus package did not provoke much opposition 
amongst the Autonomous Governments.  As seen above, a number of 
them introduced similar measures.  In addition, the Government 
injected resources into the sub-states through the 2009 reform of the 
financing system, made grants for public works and social services, 
provided subsidies to regional industries and bailed out some regional 
banks.  Moreover, it allowed Autonomous Governments to continue to 
spend and borrow.  However, Autonomous Governments were at the 
same time being bypassed by these Central Government grants and, 
in the enforced mergers of banks, being excluded from the new 
boards (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 171). 
                                               
89 Both Andalusia and Catalonia were amongst the Autonomous Governments who 
experienced a significant drop in the level of resources per capita between pre and post 
equalisation, ending up in the bottom half of the table of resources per capita (Gray 2014: 
28). 
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One of the consequences of the delay in adjusting for Central 
Government transfers, referred to above, was that ‘the spirit of 
austerity was late in filtering through to the regions’ and while 
Autonomous Governments revenues had started to reduce in 2008, 
reaction to adjusting expenditure accordingly did not start until 2010 
(Gray 2014: 28).  The impact of the ‘fiscal irresponsibility’ built into the 
financing system of the State of the Autonomies referred to earlier 
meant there was little incentive for Autonomous Governments to 
reduce spending (a bail out by the Government was assumed) or 
raise their own taxes (consistently preferring to increase their 
percentage of revenue sharing with the centre rather than use their 
discretion to raise revenues by taxing their citizens) (Colino and Del 
Pino 2014: 168).  But phase two – austerity – meant Autonomous 
Governments were faced with major reductions in funding, increased 
demands on their services and significant, new, Central Government 
controls over spending and borrowing. 
Most symbolic of the renewed primacy of Central Government in 
economic and financial policy-making was the constitutional 
amendment (article 135) of 2011 to implement the obligations of the 
European financial sanctions, and which required all public authorities 
to follow the principle of budget stability.  Importantly in this context, it 
gave Central Government powers to curb deficit, debt and growth 
rates of all public authorities, including those of Autonomous 
Governments. Moreover, it: 
created a constitutional mandate to meet repayments and 
servicing debts as a first priority, effectively transferring all 
tensions and conflicts that could arise (e.g. in terms of 
implementing public cuts) to primarily regional and local 
authorities. (Mendizabal 2014: 12) 
Autonomous Governments therefore sought to reduce their 
expenditure, in line with Central Government requirements.  However, 
Autonomous Government expenditure on staffing at 55% makes this 
more difficult than at a national level where spend on personnel 
accounts for only 22% (Gil Ruiz, Luisa and Quintana 2007: 200).  
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Furthermore, two-thirds of Autonomous Government spend is on 
health, education and social services, services which can be difficult 
to control and hard to cut painlessly and without public opposition.  
Caroline M. Gray contrasts this task with the easier solution open to 
Central Government of cutting infrastructure works, civil servant 
salaries and the foreign office budgets (2014: 28). 
Autonomous Governments have been successful in delivering 
significant reductions.  A Government report released in April 2014 
summarised how they had achieved savings of 7,000M€.  The biggest 
budget items were increased income from taxes (2,235M€), reduced 
salary costs (2,407M€) and current and capital transfers (2,908M€).90  
The very significant salary reductions have been achieved by HR 
policies to reduce pay, freeze posts, filling posts only on a temporary 
or agency basis and restricting rights or conditions of employment 
(Jiménez Asensio 2013: 78).  A significant, but unquantified reduction 
in the budgets of Autonomous Governments has been through the 
use of agencies to spread the debt burden – displacing debt and 
responsibilities down from central to regional and local government 
followed by a lateral displacement from regional and local government 
to arm’s length bodies (Mendizabal 2014: 9). 
There has been much debate about ‘the use of the crisis’ by the Rajoy 
Government to re-assert Central Government dominance in relation to 
the Autonomous Governments.  ‘Both de jure and de facto 
centralisation has taken place in Spain’ (Muro 2015: 40).  The Partido 
Popular based its campaign for the 2011 general election on ‘the need 
for austerity and control of the profligate regions’ (author’s own 
emphasis) (Del Pino and Pavolini 2015: 255). Both stimulus and 
austerity measures have strengthened the state in relation to the 
Autonomous Governments (Viver Pi Sunyer 2010: 80). An obvious 
example would be the introduction of Central Government 
                                               
90 http://cincodias.com/cincodias/2014/04/02/economia/1396458448_214346.html.  
Accessed 03.04.14. 
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equalisation grants and liquidity loans to fund deficit spending and to 
service debts. Both were based on strict financial conditions and 
monitoring.  So without changing the division of powers as set out in 
the 1978 Constitution, centralisation has increased, as Autonomous 
Governments became significantly more dependent on Central 
Government (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 173). 
An undeniable characteristic of this period has been the rise of 
‘executive government’ in Spain – via the use of law decrees, which 
bypass Parliament.  Government measures with a very direct impact 
on Autonomous Governments include the reform of the labour market, 
increases in VAT, raising the retirement age to 67, introducing co-
payment in health services, making cuts in the legal system and in 
investment in infrastructure, and reducing education spending, and 
have all been made under decree.  In terms of measures regarding 
administrative and public institutions, the funding of political parties 
was reduced and the decision was taken to rationalise local 
government bodies (Mateos and Penades 2013: 162-6). 
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4.5 AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT BUDGETS 
4.5.1 2015 BUDGET OF JUNTA DE ANDALUCÍA91 
 Budget 
The 2015 budget of the Junta was 29,625M€.  The largest proportions 
of the budget are allocated to health, 8,413M€ (28%) and education, 
6,584M€ (22%), followed by local government, social services, debt, 
and agriculture and farming.  The major budget heads and relative 
share are summarised in the table and figure overleaf. 
The Junta frames its 2015 budget in the context of an improved 
macro-economic climate for Andalusia.  It cites a general economic 
growth rate higher than those of the Euro Zone and the rest of Spain 
(1.8% for Andalusia compared with 1.3% and 1.7% respectively), (but 
notably lower than that of the world economy at 3.8%) and growing 
business confidence as ‘clear signs’ of the recovery of the Andalusian 
economy (Junta de Andalucía 2014a).  For the first time in three years 
there is growth in the construction industry – a key sector in the 
Andalusian economy (Junta de Andalucía 2014b).  Whilst employment 
prospects are also improving, caution is sounded by the Junta at the 
quality of employment (in terms of stability and pay levels) (Junta de 
Andalucía 2014b). 
  
                                               
91 This section on the budget draws on two key source documents from the website of the 
Junta de Andalucía: ‘Proyecto de Presupuesto de la Comunidad Autónoma de Andalucía 
www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/resources/files/2014/10/28/1414496551952
C.pdf.  Accessed 12.11.14 2015’ (cited here as Junta de Andalucía 2014a) and 
www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuesto2015/e
stado/estado.html (cited here as Junta de Andalucía 2014b).  Accessed 26.11.14. 
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Table 15:  Budget of the Junta de Andalucía (2015) 
 
     
Public Debt 
€ 
2,642,964,000 
Health 8,413,908,000 
Education 6,584,442,000 
Social Services 2,856,413,000 
Agriculture and Fishing 2,276,197,000 
Infrastructure and Transport 841,902,000 
Research and Development 456,438,000 
Community Services 406,117,000 
Justice 393,445,000 
Economic & Financial Regulation 369,404,000 
Business Development 347,930,000 
Housing 207,442,000 
Info and Telecomms 146,516,000 
Culture 144,234,000 
Administration 
Local Government 
162,475,000 
3,178,689,000 
Other 196,650,000 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration from data on Junta de Andalucía website.92 
 
  
                                               
92 www.juntadeandalucia.es/economiayhacienda/planifpresup/proy presupuesto2014/IEF/ief-
3.pdf.  Accessed 15.01.2014. 
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Figure 10:  Division of Junta Budget by Main Services (2015) 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration from data on Junta de Andalucía website.93 
The financial settlement from Central Government is deemed by the 
Junta as inadequate with the recent reforms to the system and 
changes to the Inter-territorial Compensation Fund described as ‘very 
prejudicial’ to Andalusia (Junta de Andalucía 2014b).  A figure 
published by the Junta is reproduced below and contrasts Andalusia’s 
net loss as being greater than that any other Autonomous 
Government.  Government grants and income from the sale of assets 
has dropped by 180 M€ and 292 M€ respectively and expenditure on 
salaries has increased by 447 M€ (Junta de Andalucía 2014a).  
However for the first time since the beginning of the economic crisis in 
2008/9, the Junta approved a budget without fresh overall reductions, 
and with modest growth in education and health.94  Strategies to 
enable this budget have been two-fold:  a reduction in financing costs 
(interest charges by 274 M€) and an increase in income from taxes 
(235 M€) as well as an increase in European Fund income (325 M€) 
(Junta de Andalucía 2014a).   
                                               
93 www.juntadeandalucia.es/economiayhacienda/planifpresup/proy presupuesto2014/IEF/ief-
3.pdf.  Accessed 15.01.2014. 
94 www.ccaa.elpais.co/ccaa/2014/10/28/andalucia.  Accessed 31.10.14. 
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Figure 11:  Difference from Mean Resource Levels via the National Financing System (cumulative 2009-2012) (€M) 
 
Source:  Website of Junta de Andalucía (Junta de Andalucía 2014b). 
 
157 
 
 Priorities 
As in previous budgets, frontline services are given as priorities for the 
Junta, with benefit payments being maintained and the range of health 
and education services being protected. (This is a slight reordering of 
priorities from 2014, which were jobs and the economy, welfare 
services and education (Junta de Andalucía.)95  A restructuring of 
ministries following the 2015 elections gave a greater emphasis on 
education, health and culture by creating three single-focus 
government departments in these areas.96  An emphasis on care 
services reflects Andalusia’s relatively high levels of dependence and 
a wider social inclusion focus is reflected across a number of 
departments including in education (with family support programmes), 
in the re-statement of the no co-payment policy in health services 
(which are to be ‘public, universal and free’) and in specific 
guarantees (such as minimum income levels) (Junta de Andalucía 
2014a).  Spending in health and education is increased by 2.5% 
(Junta de Andalucía 2014a).  The budget addresses a contentious 
public employment issue by re-instating employees’ bonus payments, 
previously withheld.  Employment is also stated as a priority, with 
funding for specific programmes to tackle unemployment. 
The budget signals a focus on efficiency and budget control with 
measure to tackle fraud and improve income collection.  Officials are 
being given six months to justify grants, with recipients required to 
provide auditors with information.  The Audit function benefitted from 
an increase of 10% to recruit more staff (El País 28.10.14).97 
Expenditure by the arm’s length agencies or Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs) is to be reduced by 1.5% (Junta de Andalucía 2014a).  A 
specific innovation announced with the budget was the creation of a 
                                               
95 www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planifpresup/presupuesto2014 
/IEF/ief.pdf.  Accessed 15.01.14. 
96 http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/06/17/actualidad/1434555962 
_897558.html.  Accessed 18.06.15. 
97 www.ccaa.elpais.co/ccaa/2014/10/28/andalucia.  Accessed 31.10.14. 
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public credit agency (ente público crédito) to provide loans to promote 
economic growth, innovation and job creation (ABC 27.10.14).98 
4.5.2 2015 BUDGET OF GENERALITAT DE CATALUNYA 
Budget 
The 2015 budget of the Generalitat was 32,483M€.  The major budget 
heads and relative share are summarised below and overleaf. 
Table 16:  Budget of the Generalitat de Catalunya (2015) 
 
     
Public Debt 
€ 
7,004,765,000 
Health 8,313,925,000 
Education 5,116,143,000 
Social Services 2,446,416,000 
Infrastructure and Transport 1,293,468,000 
Civil Protection 1,111,238,000 
Justice 799,610,000 
Information and Telecomms 268,504,000 
Research and Development 218,221,000 
Culture 173,052,000 
Housing 161,018,000 
Administration 
Local Government 
1,441,745,000 
3,330,522,000 
Other 805,458,000 
Source:  Generalitat website.99 
Health and education are the biggest service budgets with 8,314M€ 
(26%) and 5,116M€ (16%) respectively.  A significant budgetary 
provision is made for public debt at 7,005M€.  
                                               
98 http://sevilla.abc.es/andalucia/20141027/sevi-acuerdo-presupuestos-junta-andalucia-
201410271931.html.  Accessed 01.11.14. 
99 http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf.  
Accessed 04.08.15. 
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Figure 12:  Division of Generalitat Budget by Main Services (2015) 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration from data on Generalitat website.100 
In presenting the budget for 2015, the Generalitat emphasises the 
failure of the Spanish State to provide sufficient funding to Catalonia, 
demanding that the State’s historic debts and other income due to 
Catalonia be paid: 
The 2015 accounts show once again that the resources 
available to finance the necessary expense that come mostly 
through Spain in the form of transfers, are insufficient and do 
not reflect the fiscal reality of Catalonia.101 
The Generalitat strategy, faced with financial constraints, is not to 
increase local taxes further:  changes have already been made to 
some devolved taxes including income taxes, wealth taxes and stamp 
duty and new own taxes have been created such as the tourist tax.  
Nor is the strategy based on anticipated income from the sale of 
assets (although the Generalitat is committed to seek to maximise the 
latter).  Rather, its alternative strategy is to seek the following key 
measures from the Spanish Government:  payment of historic debt, 
                                               
100 http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf.  
Accessed 04.08.15. 
101 Press release of Generalitat released on the approval of the budget.  
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres-fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/detall.do?id=277081.  Accessed 
05.01.15.  Author’s translation. 
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negotiation of a new financing model, a share of the State’s additional 
income due to the economic recovery and a fairer deficit target.102 
 Policy Priorities103 
The primary commitment of the 2015 budget is to maintain a similar 
level of spending on services to that of 2014. Social spending is 
highlighted as a priority, with the protection of social services and 
services for those most affected by the economic crisis.  Social 
spending is calculated to absorb over 71% of total spend on services 
– reflecting expenditure in education, health and social services, as 
well as in other departments’ programmes such as minimum income 
guarantees and housing support to families.  This continues the 
commitment of the 2014 budget to maintain spending levels, protect 
social and welfare spending and support the economic recovery.  
Fiscal consolidation measures highlighted in 2014 included the 
reduction of running costs and increasing income (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2014).104 
Whilst spending on services is up by 4.2%, a significant proportion of 
this is to meet increased salary costs, due to the commitment to re-
instate the bonus for public sector employees and the pay and hours 
of temporary staff imposed three years ago. 
A second major priority is supporting the economic recovery via the 
Catalan 2020 Strategy such as promoting research and innovation as 
drivers of job creation, initiatives to support youth employment and 
infrastructure improvements, especially the airport connection. 
                                               
102 The payments due under this heading of historic debt are calculated by the Generalitat as 
759M€ which should have been paid in 2011, an advance from the Competitiveness Fund 
for 2015 (789 M€) and compensation for tax on deposits in banks (635 M€).  
http://premsa.gencat.cat/pres-fsvp/AppJava/notapremsavw/detall.do?id=277081.  Accessed 
05.01.15. 
103 This section draws on the Generalitat’s document ‘Projecte Pressupostos 2015’ 
http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf.  
Accessed 04.08.15. 
104 Powerpoint presentation entitled ‘Pressupostos 2014’.  
www.20.gencat.cat/docs/economia/Modul%20Multimedia/DocumentsPOWERPOINT%2020
14.pdf. Accessed 24.02.14. 
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2015 sees a reduction in the number of SPVs to 204 (down from 268 
in 2011) as part of the Generalitat’s plan to simplify, streamline and 
redefine the public sector.  Total spend however has increased from 
26,209M€ to 27,317M€.  A significant policy development is the 
creation of the Catalan Health Services as a SPV.  The use of SPVs is 
expanded upon in the following chapter. 
Reductions in executive posts, advisory and civil service posts are 
shown below:105 
Table 17:  Reduction in Public Sector Posts in Catalonia 2010-2015 
 2010 2015 Reduction 
Executive posts 247 201 18.6% 
(Temp) Advisory posts 303 187 38.3% 
Other Executive posts 
(in SPVs) 
161 124 23.0% 
Civil servants 167,418 162,005 3.2% 
Public employees on 
labour contracts 
58,193 58,138 0.1% 
Source:  Generalitat de Catalunya.106 
The following chapter develops and analyses these findings in a 
comparative context to determine the extent of continuities and 
variations. 
 
  
                                               
105 A difference exists between the total number of posts in this set of figures and those in 
Table10, both provided by the Generalitat.  However, the scale of the difference (10%) was 
not considered significant to the argument in this study and so was not further explored. 
106 http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf.  
Accessed 04.08.15. 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
5.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare and analyse the responses 
of Andalusia and Catalonia to the decentralisation opportunities 
offered by the creation of the State of the Autonomies, examining the 
choices and decisions made in relation to their corporate political and 
management arrangements.  The chapter begins with an examination 
of the issue of territorial self-identification as a potentially key 
influence in the way in which these two Autonomous Governments 
have developed since their creation.  It continues with an analysis of 
the similarities and differences between the Junta and the Generalitat 
under the principal headings of political structure and control, human 
resources, budgets and strategies.  Finally, consideration will be given 
to the narratives deployed to describe these two Governments by 
those involved, including a thematic analysis of the interviews, to 
illuminate differences and similarities. 
5.2 TERRITORIAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
5.2.1 OPINION SURVEYS ON SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
This section examines survey data on self-identification in Andalusia 
and Catalonia.  Reference in Chapter Four was made to the 
distinction between what has been called Andalusian regionalism and 
Catalan nationalism.  This differentiation was made to help explain the 
context in which public administration at a sub-state level operates.  
Both areas have a strong sense of their own identity.  However, the 
impact of that territorial identification manifests itself differently when 
set in its relationship with Spain.  This difference is evident in the 
politics of secession (referred to in Chapter Four) but also in the 
nomenclature adopted by the two Autonomous Governments and the 
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terminology deployed in the interviews, which are analysed at the end 
of this chapter. 
National surveys undertaken by the Spanish Centre of Sociological 
Research (CIS) enable a comparison of the sense of belonging 
declared in different parts of Spain.  The results for Andalusia and 
Catalonia are extracted and summarised below and show that there is 
a stronger sense of dual identity in Andalusia than in Catalonia.  A 
greater proportion of Catalans than Andalusians consider themselves 
to have a single identity.  Andalusians and Catalans share the 
characteristic of each feeling a stronger sense of their own identity 
than is the case across the rest of Spain:  only 10-13% of people in 
Andalusia and Catalonia considered themselves to be ‘only Spanish’ 
or ‘more Spanish than Andalusian or Catalan’.  This compared with 
24% across Spain. 
Table 18:  Comparative Sense of Belonging (%) 
  Andalusia 
2012 
Catalonia 
2012 
Spain 
2015 
Only Spanish 3.7 5.7 18.8 
More Spanish than region/sub-
nation 
6.6 7.2 5.5 
As Spanish as region/sub-nation 67.1 34.3 49.4 
More region/sub-nation than 
Spanish  
19.9 29.9 12.4 
Only region/sub-nation 1.3 21.9 6.9 
None of the above/no answer 0.8 1.7 7.0 
Source:  CIS 2012 and 2015. 107 
A significantly greater proportion of Andalusians consider themselves 
to be as Spanish as Andalusian, than in the Catalan case.  In contrast, 
a significant proportion of Catalans consider themselves to be only 
Catalan, compared with those Andalusians who consider themselves 
                                               
107 This section used the most up-to-date, published comparative data as at September 
2015.  There was no comparable national survey in 2012 with these questions and 2012 is 
the most recent survey broken down by autonomous community. 
164 
 
to be only Andalusian (CIS 2012).  When these proportions are 
contrasted with national statistics we can see that the proportion of all 
Spaniards placing their Spanish identity on a par with the 
regional/sub-state identity is lower than in Andalusia and higher than 
in Catalonia (CIS 2015).  Furthermore, the proportion of all Spaniards 
who consider themselves to be ‘only Spanish’ is significantly higher 
than in both Andalusia and Catalonia, suggesting a stronger sense of 
regional or sub-state identity in these two areas. 
Examining the trends over time for Andalusia and Catalonia, it is 
possible to identify differences.  It is clear that the strong sense of 
dual/equal Spanish and Andalusian identity has been consistent 
during the past decade in Andalusia.  This is demonstrated in the 
following figure which shows almost 70% of Andalusians self-
identifying as much Spanish as Andalusian over the course of at least 
the past seven years. 
Figure 13:  Sense of Belonging in Andalusia (2005, 2010, 2012) (%) 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on CIS (2005, 2010, 2012). 
In contrast, a changing picture emerges in Catalonia.  The same 
period (2005-2012) saw a significant drop in the proportion of 
Catalans who felt equally Catalan and Spanish and an even greater 
increase in the proportion identifying themselves as ‘only Catalan’ or 
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‘more Catalan than Spanish’.  A more recent survey by the 
Generalitat-funded CEO shows that while the ‘equally Spanish and 
Catalan’ group has increased since 2012, it has not regained its 2005 
level.  It also shows that the ‘only Catalan’ group has further 
expanded, whereas the ‘more Catalan than Spanish’ group has 
declined.  These changes are shown in the figure below. 
Figure 14:  Sense of Belonging in Catalonia 
 (2005, 2010, 2012, 2015) (%) 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on CIS (2005, 2010, 2012) 
and CEO (2015). 
This dynamic in the sense of belonging is a reflection of the wider 
debate in Catalonia and in Spain about the future of Catalonia and its 
status within or outside of Spain.  This debate was heightened in 2010 
with the Constitutional Court ruling on the 2006 revision of the Statute 
of Catalonia (addressed in Chapter Four above).  A recent (2014) 
study on the collective identity of Andalusians concluded that the 
development of the State of the Autonomies had had a favourable 
impact on the Andalusian and Spanish-Andalusian identities.  It 
contrasts the Spanish-Andalusian identity as inclusive or dual, 
whereas the Spanish-Catalan identity had failed to ‘build bridges’ with 
the Catalan identity (Echavarren Fernández 2014: 29-30). 
  
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
Only
Spanish
More
Spanish
than
Catalan
As Spanish
as Catalan
More
Catalan
than
Spanish
Only
Catalan
No reply
2005
2010
2012
2015
166 
 
5.2.2 PREFERRED STATUS FOR CATALONIA 
Opinion surveys specifically in relation to the preferred 
governmental/constitutional status of Catalonia, have recorded 
significant changes among the population.  There has been a 
significant increase in support for independence (specifically following 
the conflict over the revision of the Catalan Statute of Autonomy and 
the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 2010). 
When January 2010 is compared with June 2015, preference for 
status as a region (blue line), already low, has dropped as has support 
for Catalonia as a state within a federal Spain (green) or for the status 
quo (red).  Support for a Catalan independent state has increased 
(purple).  This is shown in the figure overleaf. 
These findings can be placed in a national context.  A survey across 
the population of all Spain recorded stronger support for the status 
quo in terms of the current system of Autonomous Governments at 
32%, and less support for independence for their own area at 10% 
(CIS 2014).  Thus Catalans are less supportive than all Spaniards of 
the status quo. Interestingly, the national survey included an option of 
a centralised state with no Autonomous Governments, which was 
supported by 19% of Spaniards.  This option was not included in the 
Catalan CEO survey, evidence of a lack of interest in such a model in 
Catalonia.  The sense of Catalonia being special and different from 
other parts of Spain is reflected in many aspects of Catalan public life 
as demonstrated throughout this analysis. 
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Figure 15:  Preferred Status for Catalonia (January 2010 – June 2015) 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on statistics from Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (2015). 
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Stereotypes about communities of people can offer powerful 
representations, influencing the way people think about others and 
about themselves.  This is shown in the later analysis of narratives in 
this chapter.  In addition to many Catalans feeling themselves to be 
different, they are also perceived to be different by other parts of 
Spain.  Andalusians arouse the most positive attitudes from other 
Spaniards whilst Catalans are the group viewed with least sympathy 
(Bel 2015: 26).  According to Bel, this is the equivalent of being seen 
as ‘the most distant, most different group’, a negative image making 
the integration of the Catalan people within a Spanish State 
problematic (Bel 2015: 26 and 38).  This may be a self-fulfilling 
argument from a Catalanist perspective.108  However the image exists 
and has implications for the way in which each Autonomous 
Government operates, as will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
5.3 PEOPLE, POLITICS AND POLICIES 
5.3.1 STATUTES 
Consideration of a sense of identity provides a necessary context for 
an examination of the legal and constitutional manifestations of 
Andalusia and Catalonia in terms of sub-state statutes, political 
hierarchies and party political control.  This section also considers the 
different public employment models adopted before analysing 
budgets, priorities and strategies. 
Both the Junta and the Generalitat revised their own Statute of 
Autonomy in 2006.  The structure of the two statutes is shown in the 
summary table overleaf: 
  
                                               
108 In this context, it is relevant to note that Germà Bel, in addition to being an academic, is 
also an elected member for Junts pel Sí. http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2016/03/10/ 
catalunya/1457617140_307880.html.  Accessed 14.03.16. 
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Table 19: Comparison of Statutes of 2006  
of Andalusia and Catalonia 
 ANDALUSIA  CATALONIA 
 Preamble  Preamble 
1 Social Rights, Public 
Policies and Duties 
1 Rights, Obligations and 
Governing Principles 
2 Powers 2 Institutions 
3 Territorial Organisation  3 Judicial Powers 
4 Institutions 4 Powers 
5 Judicial Powers 5 Institutional Relations 
6 Economy, Employment 
and Finance 
6 Funding 
7 The Environment 7 Reform of the Statute 
8 Communications   
9 Institutional Relations   
10 Reform of the Statute   
Source:  Author’s elaboration of information on the websites 
 of Junta and Generalitat.109 
This thesis does not provide a legalistic and detailed analysis of the 
statutes.  However a significant degree of similarity in overall 
structures is evident, with seven chapters covering the same ground.  
This is not surprising given the apparent replication of the Catalan 
Statute structure by many Autonomous Governments (Porras Nadales 
2007: 31).  However, it is interesting to note the greater prominence 
given by the Catalan Statute to institutions.  This reflects the existence 
of long-standing Catalan governmental institutions not shared by 
others, including Andalusia.  Andalusia specifies ‘social rights, public 
policies and duties’, rather than the Catalan’s ‘rights, obligations and 
governing principles’, signalling a greater emphasis in Andalusia on 
community solidarity and the importance of government intervention.  
The Catalan Statute devotes a chapter to funding, reflecting an 
                                               
109 www.Parlamentodeandalucia.es/opencms/export/portal-web-
parlamento/comentarios_ea/articulo/PART_000.html.  Accessed 31.08.15. 
http://web.gencat.cat/es/generalitat/estatut/estatut2006/preambul/index.html.  Accessed 
09.08.15. 
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emphasis on the financial status of the Autonomous Government.  In 
the Andalusian Statute funding is linked with the economy and 
employment.  This could indicate a fundamental difference in overall 
emphasis, with the Generalitat focused on “being”, with identity as the 
most important driver, in contrast with the Junta where the focus is on 
“doing”, on delivering public services. 
An analysis of the Preamble texts reveals differences in emphasis.  In 
the case of Andalusia, the Preamble defines Andalusia as an historic 
nationality within the framework of a unified Spanish nation.  It 
stresses the strong identity of Andalusia forged throughout its history, 
with its social and cultural heritage being an essential part of Spain.  It 
refers to the struggle of the people of Andalusia, which has been 
‘rewarded in the recent democratic era’ with autonomy.  It also refers 
to the mass demonstrations of December 1977 and the referendum of 
February 1980 when Andalusians rejected being a second-class 
autonomy, demanding access to autonomy via the fast route (the ‘vía 
rápida’ or route via article 151).  Moreover, this route, the Statute 
argues, has given Andalusia a unique legitimacy, having its ‘own 
identity and an undeniable position in the territorial configuration of the 
State’. 
The values given prominence in the Preamble are liberty, justice, 
equality and political pluralism.  The first three are the same as in the 
Catalan Statute.  The fourth however is purely Andalusian.110  This 
may signal remembrance by the Socialists of their opposition status 
during the Franco period when Spain was a single-party state.111  
Finally, Andalusia’s determination not to fall behind others (principally 
Catalonia and the Basque Country) is demonstrated with a statement 
                                               
110 Pluralism (although not political pluralism) does however appear later, in article 4 of the 
Catalan Statute, as one of a number of values to be promoted by the Catalan public 
authorities:  freedom, democracy, equality, pluralism, peace, justice, solidarity, social 
cohesion, gender equity and sustainable development 
www.gencat.cat/generalitat/eng/estatut/titol_preliminar.htm.  Accessed 31.03.2014. 
111 However, this is not the case in the other Socialist-controlled Autonomous Government, 
that of Asturias.  www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1982-634&p=20100717&tn=1#ti.  
Accessed 04.02.16. 
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that, whilst differences in Spain are to be respected, ‘such differences 
cannot serve as excuses for special privileges’ which allow inequality 
between Spaniards. 
The Preamble to the Catalan statute refers to the long history of 
Catalonia and specifically its ‘constant will for self-government’, thus 
separating Catalan history from Spanish history.  Unlike Andalusia, 
Catalonia draws on long-standing self-government institutions, notably 
the Generalitat created in 1359.  The Preamble also refers to the 
multiple attempts after 1714 to restore the institutions of self-
government including highlights such as the Mancomunitat of 1914 
and the 1932 Statute.  The Preamble does not position Catalonia as 
part of a unified Spain in the same way as the Andalusia statute.  
Rather, it describes a wish ‘to develop its political personality within 
the framework of a State which recognises and respects the diversity 
of identities of the peoples of Spain’.  Catalonia is considered as a 
nation, a definition which reflects ‘the feelings and the wishes of the 
citizens of Catalonia’.  This definition in the Statute is placed next to a 
reference to the 1978 Spanish Constitution’s recognition of Catalonia 
as a nationality, possibly to reinforce the vagueness of the term 
‘nationality’ or to make synonymous the terms ‘nation’ and 
‘nationality’. 
There are two further differentiating elements referenced in the 
Preamble:  civil society and language.  The role of the civil and 
associative tradition of Catalonia is emphasised, described in the 
context of the way it ‘underlines the importance of the Catalan 
language and culture’.   
5.3.2 POLITICAL STRUCTURES 
 Political Hierarchy 
The organisational structures of both Autonomous Governments 
reflect the Central Government structures existing at the time of their 
creation, structures which have not changed significantly 
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subsequently.  The current hierarchy of Central Government is based 
on Ministers or Secretaries of State, Secretary Generals and Director 
Generals.112 
Both Autonomous Communities have established a directly elected 
Parliament for a four-year term, which elects a First Minister, who then 
appoints a Cabinet and a Government.  Both have adopted the same 
political hierarchy, as summarised in the table below, based on a 
President or First Minister, then Ministers, supported by Secretary 
Generals and then Director Generals. 
Table 20: Comparison of Political Hierarchy 
 in Junta and Generalitat (2015) 
English 
translation 
Andalusia Catalonia 
First Minister Presidente/a 
Vicepresidente/a 
President/a 
Minister Consejero/a Conseller/a 
Deputy Minister 
Secretary General 
Viceconsejero/a 
Secretaria General 
 
Secretari/a 
General 
Director General Director/a general Director/a general 
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on information 
from websites of Junta and Generalitat. 
This structure is similar to that of the UK Government with a Prime 
Minister, Ministers and Parliamentary Under Secretaries of State.113  It 
also bears similarities with UK local government.  For example, 
Birmingham, the largest UK local authority outside London, with a 
population of over one million, is led by a Leader and eight cabinet 
members, organised by function.114  In Scotland, the Scottish 
Government is led by a First Minister and Cabinet Secretaries.115  
                                               
112 www.minhap.gob.es/en-GB/El%20Ministerio/Organigrama/Paginas/OrganigramaFlash 
MHAP.aspx.  Accessed 03.01.16. 
113 www.gov.uk/government/how-govt-works.html?  Accessed 19.10.15. 
114 www.birmingham.gov.uk.  Accessed 02.01.16. 
115 www.gov.scot/about/people/ministries.  Accessed 04.01.16. 
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However, the most significant difference in terms of management of 
public services between the Spanish and UK establishments is the 
extent to which politicians are placed in positions of executive 
authority.  In Spain, including the Junta and the Generalitat, these 
politicians with executive authority (‘altos cargos’) extend much further 
into the public administrative structure:  183 in the Junta and 144 in 
the Generalitat.  When the senior appointments in the Special 
Purpose Vehicles (considered below) are added, the totals rise to 277 
and 479 respectively. 116  This politicisation of what are, in other 
models of public administration, civil servant roles, is a significant 
element of the Napoleonic tradition.  There is no ‘public service 
bargain’ (or PSB) in Spain whereby senior civil servants give up overt 
partisanship and offer professional obedience and in return politicians 
give up their right to appoint and dismiss civil servants and change 
working conditions (Hood and Lodge 2006: 7).  This reciprocal 
arrangement has no place in the Spanish public administrative 
tradition and so the idea of the most senior civil servant serving all 
incoming Governments, be they of the left or right or coalition, as is 
the case with the UK Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service, 
is inconceivable in Spain. 
 Ministries 
The table overleaf compares the ministerial structures in the two 
Autonomous Governments in 2015.  
As all Autonomous Governments now have broadly the same 
competencies, it is not surprising that there is a similarity between the 
two sets of Ministerial portfolios.  However, a number of observations 
can be made.   
  
                                               
116 www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/rdac-
ptr/publico/buscarAltosCargosActivos.html.  Accessed 14.01.16. 
http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx.  Accessed 29.12.15. 
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Table 21: Comparison of Ministerial Structures 
 in the Junta and Generalitat (2015) 
Junta de Andalucía Generalitat de Catalunya 
 Presidency 
Presidency/First Minister and 
Local Administration 
Government and 
Institutional Relations 
Finance and Public 
Administration 
 
Economy and Knowledge Economy and Knowledge 
(including Finance) 
Employment, Business and 
Commerce 
Business and Employment 
Equality and Social Services Social and Family Welfare 
Education Education 
Health Health 
Culture Culture (including 
language and tourism) 
Justice and Home Affairs Home Affairs 
 Justice 
Public Works and Housing  
Environment and Planning Planning and 
Sustainability, including 
Housing 
Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Rural Development 
Agriculture, Fisheries, 
Food and Environment 
Tourism and Sport  
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on information 
from the websites of Junta and Generalitat. 
The Generalitat’s Presidency/First Minister is stand-alone, without 
departmental responsibilities, whereas in Andalusia it is linked with the 
local administration function, signifying relationships with the 
Andalusian Parliament and with local councils.  This suggests in the 
Generalitat a greater external focus for the whole organisation, 
working outside of Catalonia, whereas the Junta’s focus is more 
inward-looking within Andalusia, suggesting a greater community-
based emphasis.  Equality features specifically in the Junta’s 
ministerial portfolios, as does tourism, potentially reflecting the 
influence of the PSOE values in the former, and the importance of the 
tourism sector to the Andalusian economy in the latter.  In the 
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Generalitat, tourism and language are part of the Culture portfolio.  
This is not to ignore the importance of language in Catalonia.  The 
Generalitat devotes 23,000M€ annually to this activity, and spend by 
the Culture ministry is some 20% higher in Catalonia than in 
Andalusia (2015). 
The combination of finance and public administration in an Andalusian 
Government ministerial portfolio supports the earlier suggestion of the 
focus of the Junta being very much on the delivery of public services.  
The way finance and public administration are linked views resources 
as an enabler of public administration, of public service delivery.  In 
contrast, finance is seen as part of the Economy and Knowledge 
portfolio in Catalonia, thus relating finance to the operation of the 
whole economy, public and private.  Thus public provision of services 
by the Generalitat is not seen as the primary focus. 
A notable difference in functions lies in the respective international 
work by the Autonomous Governments.  Whilst the Junta has a 
presence in Brussels, in Madrid and in Gibraltar, the Generalitat 
places a greater emphasis on international work.  The function of 
Andalusia’s office in Brussels is described in terms of ‘tracking’ 
developments in the EU, and ‘supporting the socio-economic, sectoral 
and professional interests of our community’.117  In the case of the 
Generalitat’s Delegation in Brussels, its role is described in more 
proactive terms, seeking to promote ‘the international projection of 
Catalonia’ and to influence decision making.  As the following figure 
demonstrates, the Generalitat and its agencies have a presence in all 
continents.  
                                               
117 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/presidenciayadministracionlocal/areas/accion-
exterior/delegacion-bruselas.html.  Accessed 04.01.16. 
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Figure 16:  International Work of the Generalitat (2015) 
 
Source:  Generalitat de Catalunya.118 
                                               
118 www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/monografics/287263/catalunya-nacio-global.html.  Accessed 03.09.15. 
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The Generalitat has ten delegations including in the USA, Germany 
and the UK, offices of representation (three), offices of ACCIÓ 
(Agència per a la competitivatat de l’empresa, or Agency for Business 
Competitiveness) to promote the internationalisation of Catalan 
businesses (36), Tourist Offices (12), Agencies for the promotion of 
Catalan cultural businesses (four), Ramon Llull (cultural) Institutes 
(four) and Agencies for Development Cooperation (three).  It is 
significant that Madrid is included in those places regarded as 
‘exterior’.  A national audit report in 2016 on the work of Autonomous 
Governments on external affairs highlighted Catalonia as the clear 
frontrunner in terms of levels of expenditure on delegations abroad, as 
the figure overleaf shows. 
This international presence reflects the Generalitat’s view of Catalonia 
as a nation, with an international profile to maintain and a language 
and culture to promote.119  It may also reflect the nature and size of 
the Catalan economy, sections of which operate in the international 
market.  A comparison of the stated roles of the Madrid offices of the 
Junta and the Generalitat also reveal a difference.  The Junta’s office 
is an ‘institution providing provides services to the general public, and 
particularly to those Andalusian citizens who are permanently or 
temporarily outside their Autonomous Region’.  The emphasis is 
therefore on providing support to its citizens.120  In contrast, the 
Generalitat’s office focus is on the representation of the Catalan 
Government and on public relations.  Notably, Madrid is referred to by 
the Generalitat as the capital of the state, not of the nation. 
 
                                               
119 As evidenced in the interviews carried out for this thesis and included in the narrative 
analysis at the end of this chapter, the Generalitat does not believe that the Spanish State 
does or can meet the needs of Catalonia, including its overseas interests.  This is despite 
the existence of a much larger network of Spanish bodies working in an international context 
such as the Spanish Cervantes Institute, whose aim is to promote Spanish language and 
the co-official languages of Spain.  It has centres across the world as well as centres in the 
principal cities of Spain, including Barcelona and Girona.  
www.cervantes.es/sobre_instituto_cervantes/informacion.htm.  Accessed 22.01.16. 
120 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/presidenciayadministracionlocal/areas/accion-
exterior/delegacion-bruselas.html.  Accessed 04.01.16. 
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Figure 17:  Autonomous Government Foreign Offices Expenditure (2011-14) 
 
 
Source:  Hernández and Gil 2016. 
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The Generalitat has also entered into international cross-border 
cooperation with France in relation to some services, whereas 
cooperation with neighbouring Autonomous Governments is less 
evident (see Harguindéguy 2007 and García-Álvarez and Trillo-
Santamaría 2013 for example).  Based on the results of research on 
transborder networking, it has been suggested that Catalonia’s 
approach to Europe is one based on the involvement of ‘many and 
numerous prominent actors, integrating the local, regional, national 
and transnational spaces of engagement’ (Hakli 1998: 93). 
Policy towards Europe across Autonomous Governments has been 
largely positive.  As discussed earlier, membership of the EU was 
widely seen as a fundamental element of the Transition - democracy, 
decentralisation and EU membership.  The perspective in Spain at 
that time of Europe and the EU was as ‘the promised land’, ‘a model 
of everything the new Spain wanted to incarnate’ (Boix Palop 2013: 
5).  Generalitat policy towards the EU has also been influenced by the 
desire to deploy European institutions to promote the Catalan identity.  
For Andalusia, Europe has been a significant source of funding.  Back 
in 1999 it was claimed that for Catalonia a key objective was the 
recognition and strengthening of Catalonia’s position vis-à-vis Madrid, 
thereby enhancing claims for greater autonomy (Squires 1999: 37).  
More recently, Andrew Dowling has suggested that: 
Political Catalanism has invested hugely in Europeanisation as 
a project that would provide an inter-mediate space which 
would allow Catalonia to by-pass Spain. (2013: 149) 
Enthusiasm for the EU may have declined post-2008 in many 
Autonomous Governments because of EU-imposed fiscal 
consolidation targets which have especially affected this tier of 
government (Colino, Molina and Hombrado 2014: 290).  However, the 
perceived lack of support for Catalan independence claims from the 
EU will only have added to disappointment in the failure of the EU to 
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deliver on the Committee of the Regions (Giordano and Roller 2002: 
111).121 
Following the election of the new First Minister in January 2016, 
Carles Puigdemont, a new Cabinet was appointed.  Whilst the 
majority of the posts shown previously in Table 9 were retained, a 
number of important changes were made, changes which bear out the 
above comments regarding the Generalitat’s view of Catalonia as a 
nation.  Firstly, a Catalan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Institutional 
Relations and Transparency was appointed for the first time, 
illustrating the importance the Catalan Government has given to the 
field of foreign affairs.  This Ministerial portfolio also includes the task 
of setting out ‘a road map for the constitution of a new state’.122  The 
second key change has been the creation of a Deputy First Minister 
with responsibility for the Economy and the Treasury.  The use of the 
term ‘hisenda’ or treasury rather than (public) finance, which is usually 
associated with state rather than sub-state government, is also 
indicative of the style and self-image of the Generalitat.  The 
incumbent of the Deputy First Minister is the leader of the ERC, a 
major coalition partner with the CDC (formerly half of the CiU) forming 
the electoral coalition Junts Pel Sí.123 
For completeness and because of the key changes elaborated upon 
above, the full list of Ministerial Departments is shown below (as at 
February 2016).  It has not been used for comparative purposes (see 
earlier Table 21) because it is still a Transitional structure, showing 
both pre- and post-January 2016 departments.124  
                                               
121 As an example of the ‘lack of support from the EU’, see statements of consecutive EU 
Presidents that a newly independent territory [such as Catalonia] would have to apply for EU 
membership (Martínez 2015). 
122 www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/government/en/pressnotice/290172/raul-romeva-
takes-office-minister-foreign-affairs-institutional-relations-transparency.html.  Accessed 
17.01.16. 
123 www.govern.cat/pres_gov/AppJava/govern/govern/consell-executiu/84/oriol-junqueras-
vies.html?mode=static.  Accessed 22.01.16. 
124 It also post-dates the ‘cut-off date’ for the gathering of information as explained in the 
introduction to this thesis. 
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Table 22:  Ministries of the Generalitat (2016) 
Departament  Ministry 
 
La Presidència The Presidency 
 
La Vicepresidència i 
d’Economia i Hisenda 
Deputy First Minister and 
Economy and Treasury 
(Subsumes part of former 
Ministry for the Economy and 
Knowledge) 
Afers Exteriors, Relacions 
Institucionals i Transparència 
Foreign Affairs, Institutional 
Relations and Transparency 
(Subsumes part of  the former 
Ministry of Government and 
Institutional Relations) 
Governació, Administracions 
Públiques i Habitatge 
 
Governance, Public 
Administrations and Housing 
(Subsumes part of  the former 
Ministry of Government and 
Institutional Relations) 
Ensenyament 
 
Education 
Salut 
 
Health 
Interior 
 
Home Affairs 
 
Territori i Sostenibilitat 
 
Planning and Sustainability 
 
Empresa i Coneixement Business and Knowledge 
 
Cultura 
 
Culture 
 
Agricultura, Ramaderia, 
Pesca, Alimentació i Medi 
Natural 
 
Agriculture, Food, Fishing and 
Environment 
 
Treball, Afers Socials i 
Families 
Labour, Social Affairs and 
Families 
(Subsumes former Social and 
Family Welfare) 
Justícia 
 
Justice 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration of information from 
the website of Generalitat de Catalunya.125  
                                               
125 www.govern.cat/pres_gov/govern/ca/govern/consell-executiu/index.html.  Accessed 
19.01.16. 
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In terms of gender balance, there are more male Ministers than 
female Ministers in both Autonomous Governments.  However, in 
Andalusia women occupy six compared with five posts and they 
occupy not only the posts of First Minister but also the Minister with 
responsibility for finance.  In contrast, Catalonia has male incumbents 
not only as First Minister, but also as Deputy First Minister (which 
includes responsibility for finance) and the newly-created and high 
profile Minister for Foreign Affairs, charged with leading the move 
towards independence.  Further analysis, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, would be needed to examine the extent of this pattern within 
the structure and the implications.126  However, it is noteworthy that 
the three leading political roles in the Generalitat are all held by men.  
In contrast, the prominence of women in Andalusia may be a 
reflection of the PSOE’s long-standing involvement in gender parity 
issues, in continuous gender monitoring and a willingness to publish 
such data (Threlfall 2000: 31). 
 Political Control 
In terms of political control, the Socialists have held power in the Junta 
of Andalusia since its establishment.  In Catalonia until 2015, the CiU 
controlled the Generalitat throughout, with the exception of a period of 
coalitions between 2003 and 2010, led by the Socialists.  
Furthermore, in addition to a domination by a specific party/electoral 
coalition, both organisations have had stability in term of the First 
Ministers.  Just two incumbents, Jordi Pujol and Manuel Chaves, 
account for over 40 years between them: Jordi Pujol of the CiU in 
Catalonia for 23 years (1980-2003) and Manuel Chaves of the PSOE 
in Andalusia for 19 years (1990-2009).  Both have been powerful 
politicians regionally, nationally and certainly in the case of Pujol, at a 
European level, securing benefits in terms of financial assistance in 
the case of Andalusia and using the stage of the EU to promote the 
                                               
126 Research by Monica Threlfall (2000: 31) comments on the difficulties in comparative 
analysis of the participation of women in such diverse bodies as the seventeen Autonomous 
Governments. 
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case for the identity and status of Catalonia as a nation (Squires 1999: 
34).  However, equally clear from recent corruption cases involving 
both Jordi Pujol and Manuel Chaves, the longevity of these leaders 
has not assisted transparency nor public confidence in public 
administration at the level of Autonomous Governments (Cañizares 
2014; Sanz 2015).  Single-party domination of the organs of 
government, the PSOE in Andalusia and the CiU until 2015 in 
Catalonia, over a long period of time can be considered as a factor in 
the incidence of corruption (see for example work on party finance 
and political scandal by Veronique Pujas and Martin Rhodes 2002: 
739-760).  Political parties in power have been described as 
increasingly functioning like cartels, employing the resources of the 
state to limit political competition and ensure their own electoral 
success (Katz and Mair 2009: 753).  Party system competitiveness, 
which shapes the effectiveness of elections as tools to select and 
control politicians, plays a critical role in conditioning the scope for 
governmental corruption (Schleiter and Voznaya 2014: 675).  It is 
recognised that party system competitiveness is only one aspect of a 
wider range of party system features but it is not unreasonable to 
expect that party system institutionalisation may affect the scope for 
corruption (2014: 684).  These interesting and important questions are 
however outside the scope of this study. 
5.3.3 PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
 Staffing Structures 
Both Autonomous Governments are staffed by public servants.  Civil 
servants are organised in professional corps. The most senior non-
political appointment in the civil service is that of the Assistant Director 
General in both the Junta and the Generalitat.  The hierarchy in both 
Autonomous Governments is similar, with Assistant Director Generals 
reporting to the Director Generals and being supported by Heads of 
Service (Jefe de Servicio in Andalusia, Cap de Servei in Catalonia).  
National terms and conditions exist for employees, including terms set 
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out in a basis statute for civil servants (Parrado Díez 2011: 243).  This 
model replicates the structure of the Napoleonic tradition existing at 
Central Government level.  There is no overall head of the civil 
service, nor is there the equivalent of a Chief Executive Officer in 
either sub-state body. 
This model has implications for reform as will be explored in Chapter 
Six.  However, in terms of staffing structures, the departmentalism of 
the Autonomous Governments is worthy of comment here.  The 
development and implementation of organisation-wide, corporate 
programmes of change are particularly challenging in a structure 
which is so fragmented, based on individual and separate 
departments – known as fiefdoms in English public administration and 
‘reinos de taifas’ in Spanish (Porras Nadales 2005: 479).  Recruitment 
is still dominated by the corps, as noted in Chapter Three, which can 
add to departmentalism.  There is little evidence to suggest that there 
is a strong corporate centre coordinating such activities, in either the 
Junta or the Generalitat, indicating that the large departments of 
Health and Education have a great deal of autonomy (author’s 
interview with Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation 
of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, 
Junta de Andalucía, 2015 and Head of Communications, Cabinet 
Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015).  Corporate functions such as Human Resources 
and Communications are replicated in each principal Ministry in the 
Generalitat (but recently centralised in the Junta).  It has been 
suggested in the case of the Generalitat that each department has its 
own values, based on professional corps, in the place of an 
organisation-wide set of values and rules for the institution (author’s 
interview with Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, 2014).127  As 
has been noted earlier, there is no overall head of the civil service in 
                                               
127 Throughout this thesis, the job title and date in brackets after citations refer to the 
author’s interviews.  A full list of interviewee name, title and date of interview is given at 
Appendix A. 
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either Autonomous Government.  It is difficult to detect where the ‘co-
ordinating brain’ for the whole system resides. 
 Numbers of Employees 
Using statistics from the Spanish Government’s Personnel Register, it 
is possible to state that the Junta of Andalusia has a greater number 
of employees than Catalonia - 237,549 compared with 164,586 
(Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas [MHAP] 2015c).  
Furthermore, a calculation of workforce to population size of these two 
Autonomous Government highlights that the Junta employs almost 
50% more than the Generalitat, whilst serving less than 15% more 
inhabitants.  Expressed differently, these figures suggest that there is 
one Autonomous Government employee for every 35 Andalusians, 
and one for every 45 Catalans.  The national average is one for every 
36 Spaniards.  These figures are shown in the table below: 
Table 23:  Comparison of Autonomous Government  
Staffing Levels (January 2015) 
Autonomous 
Community 
Autonomous 
Government 
employees 
Population Inhabitants 
to 
employee 
Andalusia 237,549 8,401,567 35 
Catalonia 164,586 7,391,133 45 
All Spain 1,284,026 46,449,565 36 
               Source:  Author’s elaboration using data of 
MHAP 2015c and INE.128 
This difference is striking:  similarities may have been expected given 
that both are large in terms of population, thus potentially benefiting 
from economies of scale and both were early adopters of the devolved 
services in the decentralisation process and so have been operating 
the same services for the same length of time.  Moreover, higher 
employment figures in the Generalitat could be anticipated as a result 
                                               
128 www.ine.es//jaxiT3/Datos.htm?t=9681.  Accessed 10.11.15. 
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of the additional police and prison competencies particular to 
Catalonia. 
Whilst both the Junta and the Generalitat publish their own workforce 
details, the lack of a consistent classification between Autonomous 
Governments makes a comparative analysis extremely problematic.  
This lack of nationally based comparative information is an issue to 
which this thesis will return in later chapters.  However, it is possible to 
make a number of observations about the difference in the level of 
public employment based on the available information.  The economic 
situation and the structure of the labour market can play a role in the 
design of public sector staffing structures (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 
117).  The Generalitat may have opted for a model based on a smaller 
number of employees, reflecting the fact that other sources of 
employment were available in Catalonia.  This contrasts with the 
situation in Andalusia where there have historically been higher levels 
of unemployment, and where public sector jobs have been more 
important.  Jobs with the Junta would have been seen as a source of 
secure and if not well-paid jobs, then salaries that are ‘with dignity’ 
(author’s interview with Secretary General of Podemos in Seville 
interview 2015, also a civil servant).  However, a more convincing 
explanatory factor is the model of service provision adopted in each of 
these two Autonomous Governments.  In Catalonia, a higher 
proportion of public services have been delivered by the private sector 
or by third sector organisations.  In Andalusia the dominant model is 
that of directly managed and delivered public services, with directly 
employed staff. 
 Contracts of Employment 
A further difference in employment patterns between the two 
Autonomous Governments relates to the use of labour contracts as 
opposed to civil servant contracts.  In both Autonomous Governments, 
the principal distinction is between civil servants or funcionarios on the 
one hand, and on the other, those on labour contracts with fewer 
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rights or guarantees.  However, under the Junta’s model more people 
were employed under labour contracts than under civil servant 
contracts and a greater number than the average of all Autonomous 
Governments.  The Generalitat employed significantly more civil 
servants than labour employees and more than the average.  This is 
summarised in the table below: 
Table 24:  Type of Employment Contract Used (2002) 
Autonomous Government % civil 
service 
contracts 
% labour 
contracts 
 
Andalusia 
Catalonia 
All Autonomous Governments 
 
 
44 
68 
60 
 
56 
32 
40 
 
Source:  Ramió and Salvador 2002: 120). 
The choice of private or public sector can help explain this difference.  
Front-line services, in which labour contracts dominate, are still 
delivered in-house in Andalusia.  In contrast, in Catalonia there is 
greater private or third sector involvement in these services, resulting 
in fewer Generalitat-employed people on labour contracts.  This 
distinction between types of work has been described as white-collar 
and blue-collar:  white-collar civil servants commission or authorise 
services and blue-collar workers or those on labour contracts deliver 
services.  It is a terminology commonly used in the context of the UK 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering regime from 1980 onwards 
(Wilson 1999: 38; Shaw et al 1994) and can be applied to help 
illuminate the difference here.  A similar, albeit somewhat value-laden, 
definition can be found in a Spanish context, with civil servants 
undertaking ‘key administrative and executive functions’ and those on 
labour contracts carrying out ‘secondary type functions’ (Sánchez-
Motos 2007: 2). 
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Recent comparable figures on use of employment contracts are not 
available to conduct a more up-to-date comparison.  However, given 
the continuation of the chosen model by each Autonomous 
Government, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the differentiation 
has also continued.  More recent figures for the Generalitat alone 
suggest not only a continuation of this feature, but an accentuation:  
the ratio of civil servant to labour is 94:6 for Generalitat employees 
only and for all public employees 75:25. 129 
5.3.4 POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS 
 Numbers and Types of Political Appointments 
A third important group of public employees are the political 
appointees (not the political hierarchy of altos cargos in earlier 
Section).  They are similar to the posts of ‘Special Advisors’ in UK 
Government, who are described in the Cabinet Office Code of 
Conduct for Special Advisers as adding ‘a political dimension to the 
advice and assistance available to Ministers’ and who ‘are exempt 
from the general requirement that civil servants should be appointed 
on merit and behave with impartiality and objectivity, or that they need 
to retain the confidence of future governments of a different political 
complexion’ (UK Government Cabinet Office 2015).  These posts also 
exist in the Scottish Government, but are not permitted in local 
government in the UK.130 
In Spain, these political appointments are usually made to advisory 
positions, communications posts and as ministerial aides.  They are 
described as ‘de confianza’, the literal translation of which is ‘insider’, 
‘friend’, or ‘intimate’, reflecting the expectation that these individuals 
are trusted in political terms by the ministers.  There is a clear link with 
                                               
129 http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx.  Accessed 29.12.15. 
130 The Local Government and Housing Act 1989 introduced the principles of ‘politically 
restricted posts’ (PoRPs), restricting the activities of local authority employees. 
www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/42/part/I/crossheading/political-restriction-of-officers-
and-staff.  Accessed 20.02.16. 
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the Minister’s career as when the tenure of the Minister ends, so does 
that of the advisor.  Sharing the same political goals, their role is to 
bring policy expertise to ministerial consideration.  Their expertise, it is 
argued, makes up for any lack of direct experience a Minister may 
have in their portfolio in taking up their post.  An alternative 
perspective on this ‘compensation’ for lack of ministerial experience is 
that they ‘rely on their team of civil servants’, although it is unclear 
how effective this arrangement is (author’s interview with Coordinator, 
Department of Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry 
of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2015).  
These large Ministerial Cabinets staffed with political appointments 
are common to both the Junta and the Generalitat and are 
characteristic of the previously described Napoleonic administrative 
model. 
This group of political advisors is a phenomenon has been described 
as a ‘nube de cargos eventuales’, or ‘cloud of political appointees’, 
reflecting not only the large number but also their hidden or shadowy 
nature (author’s interview with an academic, a University in Barcelona, 
2014).  It is not possible to state unequivocally that the statistics for 
this category of staff published by each Autonomous Government are 
calculated on the same basis.  However, an interrogation of the two 
websites suggest that there are 135 such advisory posts in the 
Generalitat, almost equal to the number of executive politicians or 
altos cargos at 144.  In the Junta, web pages of each ministry suggest 
that there are between six and eight advisory posts for most 
ministries, but with Health employing 48 and the Presidency and Local 
Administration Ministry employing 111, making a total of 178.  These 
figures for Andalusia also appear to include some appointments to the 
Special Purpose Vehicles considered in the section below.  By way of 
comparison, there were twelve Special Advisors in total for Scottish 
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Government and less than one hundred for the UK Government.131  In 
terms of this comparative analysis, it is concluded that both the Junta 
and the Generalitat deploy significant numbers of political 
appointments, characteristic (although not exclusively so) of the 
Napoleonic tradition. 
 Deployment Issues 
As recognised earlier, political appointments in public administrations 
is not a phenomenon exclusive to Spain.  However, the extent of their 
deployment in the sub-state governments does expose a number of 
issues in relation to the management of public services.132  Potential 
problems relate to accusations of clientelism as these posts are not 
filled through normal recruitment processes, but are direct 
nominations by politicians.  (This reduced level of transparency also 
applies to the posts in the Special Purpose Vehicles discussed 
below.)  Relations with civil servants can also be problematic, thus 
hindering effective management of the whole organisation.  The 
existence of political appointees may mean that the civil servants are 
excluded from strategic decision-making at ministerial level, having a 
negative impact on the quality of policy development and decision-
making processes:  civil servants can offer constructive challenge and 
produce balanced options based on scientific or technical knowledge 
as opposed to what can be the more short-term, politically driven 
options likely to be considered in an exclusively political circle.  
Exclusion could also be de-motivating for civil servants, and a lost 
opportunity for non-political civil servants to experience and therefore 
understand how politicians work and the constraints within which they 
operate.  In summary, the danger is that actions are based solely on 
                                               
131 Response to Scottish Parliamentary Question S4W-10032 on 04.10.12 and 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/special-adviser-data-releases-numbers-and-costs-
october-2013.  Both accessed 20.02.16. 
132 The Andalusian Union of Civil Servants was reported to have claimed that at the end of 
2014 the Junta employed 2,300 senior civil servants, appointed by ‘libre designación’ (or 
‘free appointment’, without going through formal appointment processes).  
www.libertaddigital.com/c.php?op=imprimir&id=1276511232.  Accessed 15.10.14. 
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political criteria and public managers are relegated to merely 
‘mechanical labour’ (Porras Nadales 2005: 469-70). 
It is important to note the difference in the role of the Special Advisors 
in the UK.  Whilst both have a role in providing advice from a political 
perspective, the UK code of conduct adds that this should respect the 
neutrality of civil servants: 
Special advisers are a critical part of the team supporting 
Ministers. They add a political dimension to the advice and 
assistance available to Ministers while reinforcing the political 
impartiality of the permanent Civil Service by distinguishing the 
source of political advice and support. (UK Government 
Cabinet Office 2015) 
 
Furthermore, Special Advisers can ‘help Ministers on matters where 
the work of government and the work of the government party overlap 
and where it would be inappropriate for permanent civil servants to 
become involved’ (UK Government Cabinet Office 2015).  This is not 
the role deployed in Spanish Autonomous Governments. 
5.3.5 EMPLOYEES OF ‘SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES’ (SPVs) 
 Definition and Use of SPVs 
A final group of employees paid for by public funds are those engaged 
in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) or arm’s length organisations.  
The main forms taken in Spain are public companies, foundations and 
consortiums.  These SPVs carry out specific public functions and are 
publicly funded.  They are however seen as separate, and existing 
with some independence, from the main administrative body (in other 
words, from Autonomous Government bodies such as the Junta and 
the Generalitat) (Fernández Llera 2014: 225).133  These types of 
organisations are not unique to Spain.  Quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organisations or quangos are deployed across the 
world at regional and Central Government levels as well as at the 
European and international level.  Quangos are not new, but there has 
                                               
133 For a more detailed exploration of the definition of a quango in an international 
comparative context, see Greve et al 1999. 
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been a ‘quango explosion’ in recent years, associated with public 
sector reforms (Greve et al 1999: 130).  Specifically, the transfer of 
functions to a wide range of quasi-autonomous, task-specific bodies 
has been associated with, although not exclusively, NPM-type re-
organisations with their focus on delegation, disaggregation and 
privatisation (Greve et al 1999: 129-30).  This is certainly the case in 
terms of Autonomous Governments as is explored below. 
Arguments presented by interviewees in both Andalusia and Catalonia 
for the creation of SPVs centre on the view that they are more flexible, 
and therefore more effective in delivering public services.  The 
expectation is that these agencies are more agile and can provide a 
more rapid response (author’s interview with Director of the 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2014).  This view is 
largely based on the belief that they can operate outside of the rigid 
administrative law framework of civil servants, the so-called ‘huida del 
derecho administrativo’ or ‘flight from administrative law’ (author’s 
interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local 
Administration, Ministry of the President and Local Administration, 
Junta de Andalucía 2014).  Notably, they employ staff on the basis of 
labour contracts, which provides an easier way to appoint and dismiss 
people.  A contrary view is that the perception of inflexibility in civil 
service contracts is ill founded and that the collective agreements with 
those on labour contracts may prove more rigid.  Furthermore, the 
perceived inflexibility in the civil service is a reflection of the necessary 
bureaucratic processes and procedures when dealing with public 
money and public services.  It is not the result of civil service terms 
and conditions (author’s interview with Assistant Director General of 
Inspection of Personnel Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  It 
might be expected that a more right-wing leaning Autonomous 
Government would favour the use of such arms’ length bodies, or 
SPVs, as it is in keeping with the perceived value of a smaller public 
sector and of private sector management skills and so there would be 
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more in Catalonia than in Andalusia.  However, as the next section 
demonstrates, the PSOE-led Junta has also favoured their creation. 
 Numbers of SPVs 
SPVs are especially prevalent at the sub-state level of government in 
Spain.  In 2009 there were over 4000, nearly half of which were 
created by Autonomous Governments (Fernández Llera 2014: 241).  
The figure overleaf shows how Andalusia and Catalonia have created 
significantly more SPVs than any other Autonomous Government. 
 Deployment Issues 
The extensive use of SPVs indicates a view that the existing model of 
public administration in the Junta and the Generalitat can not deliver 
public services as well as SPVs.  Moreover, it suggests that neither 
the leadership of the Junta and Generalitat believe that it is possible to 
reform the existing model to achieve those improved ways of working.  
Internal reform may be deemed too difficult and the creation of an 
additional body operating outside of the existing model is a more 
effective approach. 
Whilst these bodies are accountable to the Autonomous Government 
which established them, the concern about SPVs across Spain has 
been the lack of transparency and financial control over this very large 
sector of public spend.  The scope for corrupt practices in this sector 
as well as the scale of their operations has led to a lack of public 
confidence in these institutions and by extension to the ‘parent’ 
Autonomous Government. 
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Figure 18:  Number of Special Purpose Vehicles 
by Autonomous Government (2015) 
 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (2015b). 
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One of the most notorious corruption scandals in Andalusia has been 
the so-called ERE scandal.  Implicating former Junta First Ministers 
Griñán and Chaves as well as leading to the resignation of at least 
one Junta Deputy Minister, this case involves the alleged payment of 
millions of euros by the Junta to a SPV to make fraudulent early 
retirement payments (Rincón 2015; Martín-Arroyo 2016).134  A second 
line of criticism has been the sheer number of SPVs and the view that 
they duplicate existing arrangements, a so called ‘parallel 
administration’ (author’s interviews with Member of Andalusian 
Parliament and Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015 and 
President of Ciudadanos Group, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015). 
The reduction of SPVs has featured in Central Government reforms of 
the public sector (in the wake of the financial crisis post-2008) and is 
reflected in the current plans of the Junta and the Generalitat.  
However, as the figure overleaf shows, Andalusia and Catalonia will 
continue to have the largest number of all seventeen Autonomous 
Governments, even after the Spain-wide programme of reductions.  
The first bar (orange) reflects the situation in 2010, the second 
(yellow) is the situation in 2014 (including action underway) and the 
third (green) the predicted position after the reduction (MHAP 2014: 
14).  Savings from the restructuring of continuing SPVs are estimated 
for the period 2011-15 to be 19,499,43M€, including 6,376,440M€ in 
Catalonia (the highest) and 1,625,125M€ in Andalusia (third after 
Madrid) (MHAP 2014: 25). 
   
                                               
134 There has been extensive coverage of this case nationally.  The articles cited here are 
from El País, details included in the bibliography. 
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Figure 19:  Reduction in Special Purpose Vehicles by Autonomous Government 
 
Source: Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas (2014: 14). 
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 Health – An Example of the Application of SPVs 
The choice of SPVs as a delivery mechanism in both Andalusia and 
Catalonia illustrates a similarity and a difference between the two 
governments.  Both Autonomous Governments justify the creation of 
SPVs in similar ways, but each locates them differently: in the public 
sector in the case of the Junta or in the private/third sectors as in the 
Generalitat.  In this section, health services are used to illustrate the 
different approaches adopted in the use of SPVs by each 
Autonomous Government. 
Catalonia has in its health services a mutual tradition which favoured 
the creation of private health centres (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 
117).  The current Catalan model of health care is distinctive in Spain.  
It is based on a purchaser/provider split, a SPV and the involvement 
of the private and third sectors as the figure overleaf shows. 
In brief, the Generalitat’s role in relation to guaranteeing public health 
in Catalonia is carried out by a SPV, the Servei Català de la Salut or 
CatSalut (the Catalan Health Service).  This operates outside of the 
public (administrative) law and is the purchaser of health services.  
CatSalut purchases services on behalf of the citizens of Catalonia 
from public, private and voluntary sector providers.  This model also 
recognises the significant role of the private sector in the purchasing 
of health care, another distinguishing feature of the Catalan system.  
These private health care insurance companies commission health 
services directly on behalf of their customers.  The purchaser/provider 
split is characteristic of NPM initiatives to increase efficiency by 
reducing the size of the public sector and introducing market forces 
and private sector practices. 
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Figure 20:  Catalan Health Service Model 
 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on Generalitat de Catalunya (2008).135 
                                               
135 Although this figure is based on a document from 2008, the model illustrated is still valid, as confirmed in the 2015 article by De Lara et al (2015: 52-3). 
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In Andalusia health is predominantly a public sector service.  It also 
uses a SPV, but this is a public sector body and provision is delivered 
by the predominantly public sector as the figure overleaf 
demonstrates. 
The health care system in Andalusia is therefore a model based on 
public provision, reflecting the commitment of the PSOE-led Junta, 
whereas the Catalan model reflects the pre-existing tradition of 
hospitals and health institutions being run in the private and third 
sectors.  It can be debated whether the private/third sector model is a 
positive choice by the Generalitat, reflecting a Catalan trait, or the 
making of a virtue out of a necessity, given the poor state of the public 
health service inherited by the Autonomous Government in the 1980s.  
Whatever the reason, while both use SPVs, there is a very real 
difference between the two in the way they operate.  In Andalusia, 
SPVs are not independent, they operate within the Ministries.  ‘They 
are still part of the public sector’ (author’s emphasis, author’s 
interview with Director General of Planning and Organisation of Public 
Services, Junta de Andalucía, 2014).  The operation of such a large 
network of SPVs requires robust mechanisms to control spending, 
monitor operation and evaluate performance, not least of which to 
address undoubted tensions between civil servants and the SPVs 
(author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public 
Administration, 2014).  However, this demands a new set of skills on 
the part of civil servants and is recognised as an area in need of 
development (author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian 
Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  An added complication exists 
in Catalonia of managing across the sectoral boundaries of the private 
and public spheres (author’s interview with Director General of 
Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2015).  This means that more sophisticated systems of regulation, 
monitoring and payment are needed than would be required if all 
activities were carried out ‘in-house’.   
200 
 
Figure 21:  Andalusian Health Services Model 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Junta de Andalucía (2009). 
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The challenge of re-orientating the organisation to address the needs 
of such new NPM-type structures is not unique to Spain.  It has been 
suggested that the creation of quangos or the contracting out of 
services has ‘allowed the introduction of a variety of new management 
styles and procedures’ (Greve et al 1999: 130).  It is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to examine whether this opportunity has been taken up 
within the SPVs.  However, evidence uncovered in this comparative 
analysis suggests that fundamental change to the way in which the 
‘core’ of the Junta and the Generalitat operate has been limited. 
 
5,4 BUDGETS AND STRATEGIES 
5.4.1 2015 BUDGETS 
 Overall Dimensions and Similarities 
This section contains a comparative analysis of the budgets, looking 
at the macro level in terms of overall size, biggest budget heads, and 
‘rankings’ in term of which services command the most resources.  It 
examines similarities and variations and offers explanations.   The 
table overleaf summarises the main budget heads for each 
Autonomous Government in 2015. 
Overall total budget levels for 2015 were similar:  29,625,000,000€ in 
Andalusia against 32,483,000,000€ in Catalonia.  However, when this 
is divided by the respective populations (of 8,401,567 and 7,391,133), 
per capita spending by the Generalitat is higher at 4,395€ compared 
with 3,526€.  Expenditure by public authorities is a function of a 
number of factors including statutory responsibilities, local needs and 
political decisions.  At a macro level, the higher level of per capita 
spend in Catalonia may reflect the aspiration that Catalans want better 
services than in other parts of Spain and are willing to pay for it 
(author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of 
Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat 
de Catalunya, 2015).  
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Table 25:  Comparison of Budgets (2015) 
 
Junta de 
Andalucía 
Generalitat de 
Catalunya 
 € € 
Executive Management 125,027,768 95,064,100 
General Administration 37,447,222 1,341,482,600 
Institutional Relations and 
elections 0 5,199,000 
Justice 393,445,433 799,609,900 
Civil Protection 47,732,539 1,111,237,600 
External Relations  0 18,583,600 
Social Services 2,856,412,949 2,446,416,300 
Health 8,413,908,288 8,313,924,600 
Education 6,584,442,076 5,116,143,500 
Housing 207,441,562 161,017,800 
Culture 144,233,602 173,052,300 
Catalan Language 0 23,457,800 
Community Services 406,116,508 0 
Consumer Services 0 6,841,800 
Sport 31,294,277 52,969,900 
Transport and infrastructure 841,902,489 1,293,468,000 
Info Society and Telecoms 146,515,874 268,503,800 
Land and Planning 0 5,908,100 
Environment 0 120,599,100 
Research and Innovation 456,438,231 218,221,300 
Economic Development 0 32,407,900 
Agriculture, Food and Fishing 2,276,197,046 106,008,200 
Industry 0 55,035,500 
Energy and Mining 0 9,867,900 
Commerce 17,099,334 34,490,400 
Tourism 100,523,803 51,468,200 
Business Development 347,929,567 65,045,500 
Credit and Financial Sector 0 22,774,800 
Local Government 3,178,688,846 3,330,522,000 
Contingencies 0 200,000,000 
Public Debt 2,642,963,767 7,004,764,600 
Economic & Fin Regulation 369,403,787 0 
TOTAL 29,625,164,968 32,483,086,100 
Source:  Author’s elaboration based on information 
 from websites of Junta and Generalitat.136 
                                               
136 http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/PRE_L_CAT.pdf.  
Accessed 04.08.15. 
www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupuesto2015/I
EF/ief-3.pdf.  Accessed 26.11.14. 
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In presenting the 2015 budget both the Junta and the Generalitat 
emphasised the priority of protecting front-line services, maintaining 
spending levels on social services, on education and health.  Both 
made a feature of re-instating the bonus payments for employees, 
reducing SPVs or reducing expenditure in SPVs.  The Generalitat 
focused on supporting the economic recovery while the Junta 
stressed the priority of tackling unemployment.  As reported in 
Chapter Four, both Autonomous Governments retained the similar top 
priorities from 2014 into 2015.   
In terms of the overall balance of key service budgets within each 
Autonomous Government, it can be seen that their relative share has 
remained largely consistent over this period, with the exception of 
debt.  In Andalusia, the distribution has stayed at 32%/25%/8% for 
health, education and social services respectively, with debt provision 
falling from 12% to 10%.  In Catalonia, the relative shares of these key 
budgets have also stayed the same, with the exception of debt 
provision falling from 27% to 24% (Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas [MHAP] 2015a: 32, 94). 
Viewing the budgets as a manifestation of policy priorities, the 
following similarities can be seen: 
 Total annual expenditure (2015/6) is similar in overall scale at 
30,000,000,000€ each. 
 In terms of ranking, health is the single largest budget head in 
both, at 8,413,908,288€ in Andalusia and 8,313,924,600€ in 
Catalonia. 
 Subsequent rankings (excluding debt which is discussed below) 
are mirrored in both with education being the second largest, local 
government third and social services fourth. 
 Absolute figures in these top-ranking service budgets are 
comparable - local government is allocated 3,178,688,846€ in 
Andalusia and 3,330,522,000€ in Catalonia and Social Services at 
2,856,412,949€ and 2,446,416,300€. 
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It is unsurprising that these key services command such a significant 
proportion of the overall budgets in both Andalusia and Catalonia 
(from 70% to over 80% of total spend depending how spend on 
health, education and social services is calculated), as is the case in 
all Autonomous Governments.  The similarity in scale is indicative of 
the fact that these are national services, with national standards – the 
‘national menu of services’ (author’s interview with Director of 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  Although they 
are managed at a sub-state level, the scope for variance is limited 
compared with wholly discretional services such as culture or sport.  
‘In the case of health, education and social services, the menu of 
services is set by Central Government’ (author’s interview with 
Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, 
Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2015). 
There are differences however in the model of service delivery for the 
key service areas of education and health.  In Catalonia, there is a 
greater reliance on the private and voluntary sectors.  Health was 
examined earlier in this chapter.  In the case of education, the new 
democratic state of Spain inherited a poor education system, heavily 
reliant on the private and third sector provision.  It was characterised 
by great shortages: in 1976 there were more than one million children 
without a `compulsory’ school place (Bonal 2000: 203).  The reality 
was that ‘there were not enough public schools [at the time of the 
Transition] and using the existing network of private schools was a 
‘cheap and quick’ way for the new State to ensure universal access’ 
(Olmedo 2013: 62).  This was true across Spain.  However, the 
picture has changed over subsequent years, leaving significant 
territorial differences, with areas like Catalonia continuing to operate 
with a large number of private and publicly-funded private schools.  
Andalusia does not.  Of 1,480 secondary schools in Catalonia 772 are 
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state and 708 are private, an almost 50:50 split.137  To put this pattern 
into context, the proportion of secondary age pupils in Andalusia in 
private education was 20%, 37% in Catalonia, and 27% across all 
Spain (Bonal 2000a: 19). 
 Differences 
There are however some significant differences between the two 
Autonomous Government budgets.  In terms of variations: 
 Catalonia spends more on administration, external affairs, 
transport, language, civil protection (policing and prisons). 
 Andalusia spends more on tourism, community services, education 
and on agriculture, food and fishing. 
 Contingency and particularly debt provision are very different. 
Some differences are straightforward to explain: 
 Policing and prison provision are not competencies of the Junta 
and therefore only appear in the Generalitat’s budget. 
 The Catalan language is a very visible manifestation of the role of 
the Generalitat in the promotion and protection of Catalan culture, 
with 23,457,000€ allocated to this function. 
 The heading ‘external affairs’ in the Generalitat budget which does 
not appear in the Junta budget, may reflect the use of different 
budget codifications.  However, it is reasonable to suggest that it 
reflects the significant activity in promoting Catalonia in the 
international arena (as discussed in Chapter Four and also earlier 
in this chapter). 
 Different approaches to codification of budgets may account for 
the ‘internal relations and elections’ provision in the Generalitat.  
However, it may also reflect the anticipation of additional elections 
(one which was realised in September 2015) and the holding of an 
                                               
137 Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya.  www.idescat.cat/pub/?id=aec&n=742&lang=en.  
Accessed 08.03.16.   
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official referendum (one which was not realised, being replaced by 
a voluntary, non-binding referendum in November 2014). 
 The greater investment/expenditure in agriculture, food and fishing 
by the Junta can be explained by the greater importance of the 
rural economy in Andalusia, in terms of the economy and 
especially jobs. 
 Spending on tourism is higher by the Junta, again reflecting the 
importance of this sector in Andalusia.  The role and spending of 
the Barcelona City Council with regard to tourism may also help to 
explain the lower level in the Generalitat budget.  Barcelona City 
Council spends over 4M€ on tourism development and 
promotion.138   
 The greater level of spend by the Generalitat on transport has 
been, in part, explained by the fact that the city metro in Barcelona 
is funded by the Generalitat unlike in other areas, for example the 
Madrid metro, which is funded by the City Council (see 
correspondence from the Generalitat dated 21.07.15 and attached 
as an appendix).  However, an interrogation of the websites of the 
City Council of Madrid reveals annual expenditure of over 100M€ 
on public transport which is comparable to that of Barcelona City 
Council at 133M€.139  Furthermore, the budgetary provision of the 
Autonomous Government of Madrid for Infrastructure and 
Transport at 1,451,090,090€ is comparable with that of the 
Generalitat at 1,293,468,000€.140  The Generalitat also argues that 
the high level of spend reflects the inadequate investment of the 
State in transport in Catalonia particularly given its position next to 
                                               
138 http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/.  Accessed 20.02.16. 
www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/El-
Ayuntamiento/Hacienda/Presupuestos?vgnextfmt=default&vgnextchannel=15d74706945b82
10VgnVCM1000000b205a0aRCRD.  http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/.  Both 
accessed 20.02.16. 
139 www.madrid.es/portales/munimadrid/es/Inicio/El-
Ayuntamiento/Hacienda/Presupuestos?vgnextfmt=default&vgnextchannel=15d74706945b82
10VgnVCM1000000b205a0aRCRD.  http://w28.bcn.cat/pressupostos2015/en/.  Both 
accessed 20.02.16. 
140 www.madrid.org/presupuestos/index.php/politicas-y-programas.  Accessed 20.02.16. 
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France and also in the toll motorways (author’s interview with 
Head of Communications, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). 
 The Junta’s budget includes a significant provision for ‘community 
services’ which is not replicated in Catalonia.  Investigation of the 
Junta website would suggest this is to fund services aimed at 
communities as a whole rather than services for individuals, such 
as supporting community activities to tackle social exclusion, 
promoting participation and volunteering.141  The Generalitat may 
consider that less input of public resources in this field is 
necessary given the tradition of civil association in Catalonia. 
 A significant proportion of the contingencies budget head in 
Catalonia was to provide for the reinstatement of employees’ 
bonus payment.  Although this reinstatement was also a feature of 
the Andalusian budget, it had not been agreed in Catalonia by the 
time of the budget, reflecting a self-described ‘character of 
prudence’ in the Generalitat’s setting of the budget (see 
correspondence from Generalitat dated 21.07.15 and attached as 
an appendix). 
 The very significant variation in administration is more difficult to 
explain.  The scale of the difference suggests that it is a function of 
the way in which some expenditure is coded, namely that a wider 
range of activities are accounted for under this heading in the 
Generalitat than in the Junta (author’s interview with Director 
General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat 
de Catalunya, 2015).  Further analysis is problematic given the 
complexity of public sector accountancy.  
 A number of factors have been put forward to explain the 
Generalitat’s higher debt levels, including the poor state of 
infrastructure in Catalonia inherited from the state, the impact of 
the Sufficiency Fund and the less favourable basis of transference 
of competencies of earlier adopters (although this latter point 
                                               
141 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/igualdadypoliticassociales/areas/inclusion/ 
servicios-comunitarios/paginas/presentacion-servicios-sociales.html.  Accessed 05.01.16. 
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would also impact on Andalusia).  However, it is the national 
financing system which is blamed above all for the debt levels.  
Specifically, the Generalitat argues that Catalonia was 
disadvantaged because of the predication of the 2009 financing 
model on 2007 data, that is the use of figures from before the 
economic crisis (author’s interview with Director General of 
Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of 
Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  This 
model assumed that the ‘Mediterranean half’ of Spain (Catalonia, 
Valencia, Murcia and Andalusia) would receive significant funds 
from taxes related to the construction industry.  Government 
guarantees of compensation for the lack of such anticipated 
income for the Autonomous Governments in the other half of Spain 
were built into the model. When the economic crisis hit, Catalonia’s 
tax income plummeted. However, again this would also apply to 
Andalusia whose debt levels are not so high. 
 In terms of education, it can be seen that by placing the two 
budgets in a national context, Catalonia spends less on education 
per head of population than the national average.  Andalusia 
spends above average, which has been a consistent picture for 
Andalusia over the past five years. 142  This may reflect the greater 
financial contribution of Catalan parents given the higher 
proportion of children in private or third sector schools.  However, 
one of the features of the Generalitat’s 2015 budget has been a 
significant increase in education spend, an increase surpassing 
the other Autonomous Governments (Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Administraciones Públicas 2015b: 21).  Between 2014 and 2015 
budgets, Catalonia’s spending on education increased by 6.8%, 
compared with 2.3% in Andalusia and 2.4% across all 
Autonomous Governments.  This may be the result of 
demographic pressures:  Catalonia’s population growth is due to 
                                               
142 http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/12/media/1431452440_395334.html.  Accessed 
20.05.15. 
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both natural increase and positive net migration (Bonifazi and 
Crisci 2013: 230).  Catalonia also increased its Social Services 
spend at a greater rate, with a 10.5% increase, compared with 
0.1% in Andalusia and 4.8% across all Autonomous Governments.  
The growth in the aging population may be a factor, but this is not 
a phenomenon exclusive to Catalonia.  It may be a function of 
regional costs of living as covered in the following section. 
 Analysis of Expenditure on Staffing, Goods and Services 
In addition to examining budgets from the perspective of spend on 
specific services such as education or social services, it is possible to 
analyse spending across all services on staffing, goods and services.  
Such a comparison of the type of expenditure can reveal aspects of 
how the Autonomous Governments operate.  Based on a comparison 
of spend between 2010 and 2014, the Generalitat spent significantly 
more per head of population on personnel costs (staffing) than the 
average of Autonomous Governments and more on goods and 
services. 
The Junta, on the other hand, spent in line with the average on 
personnel, but significantly less on goods and services.143  This may 
appear surprising given the earlier evidence of higher staffing levels at 
the Junta than at the Generalitat.  It may reflect the Generalitat’s 
greater proportion of civil servants to those on labour contracts:  the 
total civil servant wages bill is likely to be higher due to the wider 
range of benefits to which they are entitled, compared with those on 
labour contracts (see earlier discussion of the differences).  Higher 
expenditure on goods and services may be a reflection of the higher 
costs of living Catalonia than in Andalusia.  A study by the Pompeu 
Fabra University, Barcelona, confirms that the price index for 
Catalonia is 108.5 with respect to the national indicator of 100, while 
                                               
143 http://elpais.com/elpais/2015/05/12/media/1431452440_395334.html.  Accessed 
20.05.15. 
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the index for Andalusia is 92.7 (see correspondence from Generalitat 
dated 21.07.15 and attached as an appendix). 
The difference in cost of living may also be a factor in explaining the 
difference in the annual remuneration for each senior political position 
as shown in the following table.  Figures suggest that there are more 
senior political posts (altos cargos) in the Junta than in the Generalitat 
(183 compared with 144) and so the argument could be made that 
each Generalitat politician carries a greater set of responsibilities.144  
However, even when taking into account the inclusion of two 
extraordinary payments, senior Catalan politicians are being paid 
significantly more than their Andalusian counterparts:  the First 
Minister’s salary is 92% higher, that of Ministers around 58% higher, 
General Secretaries 42% higher and Director Generals 50% higher. 
Table 26:  Comparison of Senior Politicians’ Salaries (2015) 
Position Junta de 
Andalucía 
€ 
Generalitat 
de 
Catalunya* 
€ 
First Minister 63,808 144,030 
Deputy First Minister 62,800  
Minister 62,800 
59,564 
53,770 
108,576 
General Secretary 59,564 84,078 
Director General 53,770 80,589 
*includes two extraordinary payments 
Sources:  Author’s elaboration based on information 
from websites of the Junta de Andalucía 
and the Generalitat de Catalunya.145 
  
                                               
144 www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/rdac-
ptr/publico/buscarAltosCargosActivos.html.  Accessed 14.01.2016.  
http://analisiocupaciopublica.gencat.cat/default.aspx.  Accessed 29.12.15. 
145 www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/ap_profesionales/altos 
cargos/retribuciones.html.  Accessed 28.09.15.  
www15.gencat.net/ecofin_wpres14/pdf/VOL_L_ANP.pdf.  Accessed 28.09.15. 
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 Income 
In terms of income derived by the Autonomous Governments from the 
national financing system in 2015, Andalusia benefits from the 
Sufficiency Fund, the Competitiveness Fund and the Basic Public 
Service Guarantee Fund to a larger extent than Catalonia:  at 
3,806M€ it is the top recipient, whilst Catalonia receives one of the 
lowest amounts at 2,468M€.  Given the aim of these Funds is to 
ensure greater equality across Spain, this outcome is not 
surprising.146  In terms of (ceded) income tax and VAT, Catalonia and 
Andalusia, together with Madrid, receive the largest amounts, 
reflecting the size of their economies compared with the rest of Spain.  
However, the difference in income taxes received between, on the 
one hand Catalonia and Madrid (12,671M€ and 12,943M€ - first and 
second highest) and Andalusia (third) on the other (8,915M€) is 
significant, again reflecting the wealth and economic vitality of these 
areas and not just their size relative to the other fifteen Autonomous 
Governments (Ministro de Hacienda y Administraciones Públicas 
2015a: 15). 
5.4.2 STRATEGIES 
 Budget Strategy and Tactics 
Reference has already been made to the responses of Autonomous 
Governments to the economic crisis which began in 2008.  During its 
first stage, the Spanish Government implemented a number of 
stimulus measures, as did the Junta and Generalitat (see Chapter 
Four, Table 14).  The response of the two Autonomous Governments 
to the second phase, that of national austerity measures, was to 
implement incremental, tactical steps to reduce spending, such as 
freezing posts, eliminating duplication and reducing running costs.  In 
this way, both the Junta and the Generalitat adopted a combination of 
the three main approaches to austerity identified previously:  uniform 
                                               
146 These funds were described in Chapter Three, section 4.   
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percentage reductions; efficiency gains; and prioritised cuts (Pollitt 
2010: 22).  Financial crises can precipitate public sector reforms, as it 
can be easier to consider radical options than in a period of stability 
(Polllitt and Bouchaert 2011: 26).  However, it does not appear to 
have been the case in the Junta or the Generalitat (notwithstanding 
the Generalitat’s secessionist demands which have used economic 
and financial arguments). 
One of the most salient features of the strategies of the Junta and the 
Generalitat has been public and damning criticism of Central 
Government, or to use a more accurate description ‘distancing and 
blaming’ (Ongaro 2012: 119).  The resources provided by the State 
financing system are deemed to be inadequate by both the Junta and 
the Generalitat (as evidenced in Chapter Four), with both being 
vociferous in their opposition to the impact of the austerity 
programme, shifting blame and pointing to failures in the financing 
system.  This opposition has continued, for example with First Minister 
Susana Díaz in 2016 claiming that Andalusia has been ‘badly treated 
financially by Central Government’.147  However, in Catalonia, this 
opposition has contributed to a strengthening secessionist movement, 
an evolution not replicated in Andalusia. 
 Modernisation Strategies 
An analysis of the modernisation strategies by the Autonomous 
Governments was undertaken for two purposes.  Firstly, given the 
context of an inherited and shared public administrative tradition, 
modernisation strategies may indicate future paths of variation or 
adaptation to local needs and aspirations.  Secondly, modernisation 
plans can indicate the values and the type of organisation desired by 
the organisations’ leaders. 
                                               
147 www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/gobierno/110094/diaz/tiende/ 
mano/grupos/politicos/reforma/financiacion/autonomica/defienda/intereses/andalucia.  
Accessed 05.05.16. 
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In Andalusia, the Junta has been working on a Reform Plan for a 
number of years.  It was reported to be in progress, with a release 
date of December 2014 (author’s interviews with Director General of 
Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Junta de Andalucía and 
Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, both 
2014).  A revised release date of July 2016 was then given in 2015 
(author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public 
Administration, 2015) and then a possible date of the end of 2016 
offered in the summer of 2016.  There can be a number of reasons for 
the delay in producing the Plan, including the snap election in 2015, 
the subsequent hiatus in electing the First Minister and the need to 
include staff in its development (author’s interview with Director of 
Andalusian Institute for Public Administration, 2015). 
This is not to say that there have been no modernisation reforms.  
One of ‘the most comprehensive reforms of the administration of the 
Junta’ was that of the creation and subsequent reorganisation of the 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) (Ramos 2011: 13).  The model 
behind the re-organisation was that of the purchaser-provider split, 
and more specifically the creation of special purpose vehicles to carry 
out public sector activities.  It sought to distinguish between functions 
appropriate to a central bureaucratic sphere and those functions 
involved in service delivery and therefore more appropriate as SPVs 
(Ramos 2011: 20).  This type of approach has been characteristic of 
NPM reforms, and as the Minister in charge at the time stated, seeks 
to achieve agility and efficiency, key words for NPM (Justice and 
Public Administration Ministry, Junta de Andalucía 2004).  The 
proposal related to a wide range of bodies including autonomous 
organisations, public enterprises, consortiums and foundations, active 
in as diverse a spectrum of activities including statistics, health, 
contemporary arts, energy, radio and television, individual hospitals 
and schools, tourism and sport.  Investigation into the effectiveness of 
these changes is not possible within the scope of this thesis.  
However recent research failed to find extensive evidence of the 
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operation of such an evaluative framework.  The change in status was 
described as nominal in some cases – so-called agencies did not 
claim to be separate, but rather continued as part of the Junta 
(González Espinosa 2013: 53). 
In contrast, the Generalitat’s proposals for modernisation were set out 
in their ‘Reform Plan for the Administration of the Generalitat de 
Catalunya and its Public Sector’ in 2014 (Generalitat de Catalunya 
2014).  In setting out the need for reform, it asserts that ‘the 
modernisation of public administration has gone from being an option 
to a necessity’ (2014: 6).  The Plan refers to the reforms being made 
along similar lines by other (unnamed) countries to respond to the 
demands of citizens, technological advances and the international 
context.  It encapsulates the aim as follows:  ‘The Catalan 
Government wishes to introduce change to bring about an 
administration of and for the twenty-first century’ (2014: 6). 
Based on ‘points of convergence’ identified in three separate expert 
reports commissioned by the Generalitat, the Reform Plan identifies 
drivers and main lines of action, and nine delivery initiatives.148  These 
are set out in the two tables overleaf. 
 
  
                                               
148 The three expert reports cited in the Generalitat’s Reform Plan are: the Consejo Asesor 
para la Reactivación Económica y el Crecimiento (Advisory Council for Economic Recovery 
and Growth), the Comisión de Expertos para la Reforma de la Administración Pública y su 
Sector Público (Expert Commission on Public Administration and Public Sector Reform) and 
the Forum de Entidades para la Reforma de la Adminstración (Forum of Organisations for 
Administrative Reform). 
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Figure 22: Drivers and Main Lines of Action (Reform Plan 2014) 
 Boosting mechanisms for transparency and accountability 
 Establishing a senior public management profession 
 Modernising the workforce 
 Enhancing the flexibility of human resources management 
 Increasing support for private-public partnerships 
 Using IT in government more intensively 
 Simplifying and rationalising the public sector 
 
 Establishment of a new relationship model with citizens 
 Installation of HR and management systems in the Administration 
 Establishment of the bases of a new model of governance and 
organisation. 
 
Figure 23:  Nine Initiatives (Reform Plan 2014) 
1. Transparency:  To encourage and promote transparency in all actions of 
the Generalitat and its public sector as a key element to inspire and 
guide its reform and modernisation. 
2. Ethics:  To develop an ethical infrastructure, through the promotion of 
codes of ethics, training and a unified framework of management, 
enabling the assessment of management and accountability in this area. 
3. Human Resources:  To develop a model of progressive policies in this 
field, in which the Generalitat, through appropriate regulatory changes, 
can introduce greater flexibility and facilitate the professionalism and 
mobility of staff. 
4. Senior Public Management: To create a senior public management 
system which ensures professional competence and the adequate 
supervision of people, including open recruitment procedures. 
5. Digital Government:  To simplify administrative procedures through the 
promotion of technological solutions. 
6. Innovation and talent:  To design and implement a corporate programme 
to promote innovation and talent, valuing the potential and abilities of 
staff. 
7. Organisation of the Government of Catalonia:  To streamline and simplify 
the organization of departments and the public sector. 
8. Public sector the Government of Catalonia:  To reorganise the public 
sector, in keeping with the values of public service, focused on the 
effective development of public policies, added value and accountability. 
9. Private public partnerships:  To promote public-private collaboration 
processes, ensuring minimum quality standards and strengthening 
internal capacity to manage those processes. 
Source:  Author’s translation from Reform Plan, Generalitat de Catalunya 
(2014). 
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The key elements of the Reform Plan are well researched, and based 
on a range of independent advice (as referenced above).  The 
proposed actions address the areas in need of reform as set out in the 
diagnosis underpinning the Reform Plan.  They are corporate in their 
scope, to be applied across the whole of the organisation and not to 
specific ministries or functions.  Most are in keeping with wider NPM 
tenets, including for example streamlining and simplifying structures, 
private-public partnerships and exploiting information technologies.  
Not part of NPM, but specifically in relation to the realities of public 
administration in Spain today, the Plan highlights issues of 
transparency and ethics and sets out proposals for codes of ethics 
and measures to improve transparency and accountability.  Human 
resource issues are prioritised, promoting the need for what it calls 
‘professional public management’.  By this the Generalitat means the 
establishment of a new layer of management between the political 
and administrative spheres of professionally qualified managers, 
recruited through open advertisement and short-listed on the basis of 
merit.  This is a very significant, and very ambitious, reform in 
personnel practices for a Spanish public authority. 
Progress was reported in July 2015.149  Significant advances have 
been made in terms of enabling laws, agreements and decrees.  In 
fact, no less than ten separate pieces of the regulatory framework 
were reported as approved.  There is also evidence of working parties 
being established (such as the Interdepartmental working group for 
Public-Private Partnership) and the creation of Commissions such as 
the Commissioner for Transparency and Access to Public Information.  
Codes, guidelines and plans have been written such as the ethics 
code for senior officials, for procurement procedures and for the 
police.  Training plans for the promotion of innovation are cited.  The 
Transparency Portal has been launched.  These processes are all 
                                               
149http://governacio.gencat.cat/web/.content/funcio_publica/documents/pla_reforma_adminis
tracio/Documents/Pla-de-reforma-de-lAdministracio-Informe-anual-de-progres-2014-
2015.final.pdf.  Accessed 17.12.15.  As at August 2016 no further progress report had been 
published. 
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very necessary to ensure the consistent and corporate implementation 
of this type of change. 
Less evident are measures of outcome, indicators of performance and 
success.  A good example of this is a separate and more detailed 
report on progressing the e government agenda.150  Significant 
increases are recorded in the volume of digitised transactions since 
2012 but limited reporting is made on quality of transactions (feedback 
on customer experience for example), about financial or time gains 
and efficiency improvements.  Comparisons are not made with other 
bodies or comparison with pre-set targets, and no future targets are 
set out in terms of numbers or percentages.  This information may be 
reported elsewhere, but without this type of information being reported 
in the context of a progress report, the monitoring information on 
numbers suffers from being one-dimensional and therefore of limited 
assistance to good management.   
In terms of customer orientation, the Generalitat’s plans do not 
highlight citizen engagement.  By way of contrast, the Modernisation 
Plan 2014-2016 of the Basque Autonomous Government emphasises 
a focus on citizens, not just in terms of their rights to receive and 
expect efficient and effective services, but also to be involved in the 
design, implementation and evaluation of those public services.151  It 
is beyond the scope of this research to examine whether this variation 
is due to a differential impact of the administrative tradition, to the 
characteristics of the Basque Government or to the political and social 
culture of the Basques.  However, customer service is a key element 
of NPM-inspired reforms, and a particular challenge to administrations 
with a Napoleonic model. 
                                               
150 ‘Transaccions a PICA gener-setembre 2015’, Oficina de Processos i Administració 
Electronica, Generalitat de Catalunya. 
151 https://www.euskadi.eus/r47-edukia/es/contenidos/plan_programa_proyecto/xleg_ 
plangub_07/es_plang_07/adjuntos/pipes.pdf.  Accessed 17.03.16. 
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The drafting and approval of a strategy or a plan of action is not the 
same as the implementation of change.  The disconnect between 
policy and implementation has been considered within the research 
community, pioneered by Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky 
(1984), but further developed in three main phases, looking at 
implementation as an administrative competency, to implementation 
as a top-down and bottom-up decision making process and more 
recently as an inter-organisational negotiation (Watson 2014: 449). 
During the course of this research, a number of comments have been 
made to the author about this disconnect and the failure to implement 
reform in both Autonomous Governments.  There can be little doubt 
about the commitment of the lead Secretary General to reform the 
Generalitat, nor about her recognition of the need for internal and 
external consensus to drive this long-term change to make the 
Generalitat ‘fit for the twenty-first century’ (author’s interview with 
Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Department 
of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2014).  However, there are significant threats to successful 
implementation of reform in both Autonomous Governments, the 
principal ones being considered below. 
Individual interviewees have pointed to the political and economic 
crises in both places slowing down the process of reform.  The 
specific example of the freeze on recruitment preventing the 
implementation of changes to recruitment was given (author’s 
interview with Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel 
Service, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  These crises have also been cited 
as a reason for politicians’ focus to be taken away from reform 
(author’s interview with Director General of Planning and Organisation 
of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, 
Junta de Andalucía, 2014).  This point is even more valid in the case 
of Catalonia, where the secessionist debate is seen to have overtaken 
any other debate within the Generalitat (author’s interview with 
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Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist 
Group, 2015).  This is a good example of how situations of conflict 
impose high functioning costs on organisations (Bel 2015: 50). 
The reported lack of active cross-party involvement and support for 
the reform programme also threatens its implementation (author’s 
interview with Modernisation Policy Officer, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2015).  Equally, the opposition of trades unions and civil servant corps 
can impede implementation (author’s interview with General Workers’ 
Union of Catalonia spokesperson, 2014).  A lack of consensus and 
broad-based support within the Autonomous Government risks the 
continuation of the modernisation programme in the event of a change 
of political control in the Generalitat (author’s interview with Head of e 
government, Department of Government and Institutional Relations, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  The very limited resources 
dedicated to modernisation imperil meaningful and corporate 
progress, particularly in Catalonia where an ambitious plan has been 
clearly articulated.  Most telling has been a frequent refrain about the 
lack of political will to change, both in Andalusia (author’s interview 
with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local 
Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, 
Junta de Andalucía, 2014; Member of Andalusian Parliament and 
Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015) and in Catalonia: 
The [administrative reform of the Generalitat] is more than 
necessary.  The current culture is very bureaucratic, 
hierarchical and fundamentally focused on process and not on 
outcomes.  It needs to be more centred on the citizen.  
However there is no political will to change, to modernise.  
They say a lot, but don’t deliver.  (Author’s interview with 
Member of Catalan Parliament and Assistant Spokesperson, 
Socialist Group, 2015)   
A particular criticism made of the Generalitat’s reform plans has been 
that they are ‘superficial, box-ticking’ (author’s interview with Professor 
of Pompeu Fabra University, 2014), a ‘discurso aprendido’ 
(understood as a way of talking about something rather than it 
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necessarily being the reality) (author’s interview with an academic, a 
University in Barcelona, 2015).  Public administrative reform in 
Catalonia, it is alleged, is about ‘aesthetics and image’ and not about 
values, analysis and planning (author’s interview with General 
Workers’ Union of Catalonia spokesperson, 2014).  These sentiments 
echo observations made in relation to Central Government reforms, 
described as attempts to change the image rather than the structure 
(Torres and Pina 2004: 447).  Even if these comments are ill founded, 
and many (but not all) were made by opposition politicians, they are 
genuinely held.  The lack of awareness or of credibility of the 
Autonomous Governments’ programmes of reform and the lack of 
involvement of key players such as the trades unions or staff, 
seriously undermine the embeddedness of the changes.   
 
5.5 INSIGHTS FROM THE NARRATIVES DEPLOYED 
5.5.1 NOMENCLATURE  
In addition to the previous points of comparison, for example budget 
heads and employment contracts, it is possible to consider a less 
quantifiable but equally important aspect, namely a difference in style 
between the two Autonomous Governments.  In the case of Catalonia, 
its self-image as a nation is evident in the promotion of the Catalan 
language.  It is also very discernible in the nomenclature deployed by 
the Generalitat.  For example, the web domain is not .es, as would 
normally be the case for Spanish authorities and is the case for the 
Junta de Andalucía (www.juntadeandalucia.es) , but .cat, for 
Catalonia (www.gencat.cat). 
The counterpart of the Andalusian Government departments 
‘Presidency and Local Administration’ and ‘Finance and Public 
Administration’ in Catalonia is not administration but ‘Government and 
Institutional Relations’.  Reference has already been made to the use 
by the Generalitat of the term ‘hisenda’ or treasury rather than (public) 
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finance, which is usually associated with state rather than sub-state 
government.  A senior civil servant in the Junta interviewed for this 
study pointed out that the term ‘ministry’ was reserved for Central 
Government, and that the term ‘departments’ was usually deployed in 
Autonomous Governments. 
The importance of the international work of the Generalitat has been 
referred to above and the different stance taken by the Generalitat 
and the Junta towards the EU.  It would be overly simplistic to suggest 
that for the Junta, the EU is seen solely as a source of funding.  
However, as demonstrated earlier, Andalusia has been a major 
beneficiary of EU funding.  In contrast, for the Generalitat, the EU is 
an arena to promote the Catalan nation.  This self-image as a Catalan 
nation is reflected in the interviews conducted for this thesis and 
expanded upon in the analysis below.  In the words of a Member of 
the Catalan Parliament, ‘we conduct ourselves as a state’ (author’s 
interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015).  The 
lyrics of the anthems of Andalusia and Catalonia demonstrate long-
standing contrasts:  Andalusia talks of freedom, as part of Spain, 
whereas Catalonia talks of Catalonia being triumphant again, fighting 
off the oppressors (Sobrequés i Callicó 2007: 165).152 
5.5.2 THEMATIC ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS 
For the purpose of this research, almost thirty, in-depth, one-to-one, 
interviews were conducted in Spanish, over a period of two years, with 
leading politicians, civil servants, academics and trade unionists in 
Andalusia and Catalonia.153  A number of themes emerged during the 
course of these interviews in the way in which these individuals spoke 
about public administration in their area.  These themes are in 
addition to the specific insights and data they provided about budgets, 
priorities and management structures, which have informed this 
                                               
152 www.juntadeandalucia.es/organismos/sobre-junta/simbolos.html.  Accessed 10.12.15. 
153 Throughout this section, the title and date in brackets after citations refer to the author’s 
interviews.  A full list of interviewee name, title and date of interview is given at Appendix A. 
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research.  This section reflects on the discourses themselves as 
sources of understanding of the wider societal and cultural 
perspective of the individuals involved in public administration as it 
operates today.  The analysis of these interviews reveals differences 
and some similarities in terms of the dominant discourse in Andalusia 
and Catalonia. 
Amongst the Andalusian participants, there were a number of 
common themes.  The most frequent thread was that of the needs of 
Andalusia – a poverty that is historical and which requires the support 
of the rest of Spain to help redress and overcome.  This has been 
described by some commentators as a victim mentality (see recent 
example of Gutiérrez-Rubi 2015).  It has often been framed within 
Andalusia as a belief in solidarity and equity across the Spanish State.  
Catalans are frequently, but not universally, criticised for a lack of 
solidarity in this context.  One interviewee talks of Andalusia ‘only 
wanting what it needs’ and Andalusia ‘wanting the same rights for all, 
irrespective of where they live.  Andalusia does not seek advantages 
for itself, rather that the needs of all are covered, perhaps this is not 
understood in Catalonia.  Catalonia wants advantages for itself’ 
(author’s interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, 
Workers Commissions, 2014).  Another interviewee laments how 
Andalusia is ‘a place with a wealth of resources, which should be at 
the forefront’, the clear implication being that it is not (author’s 
interview with Secretary General of Podemos in Seville, 2015). 
When Andalusians and Catalans describe themselves or others 
stereotypes are repeated.  Andalusian culture is described by 
Andalusians as ‘working to live, whereas Catalans are more likely to 
live to work’ (author’s interview with Director of the Andalusian 
Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  Another Andalusian talks of 
Andalusians ‘knowing how to enjoy themselves, but also working hard’ 
(author’s interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, 
Workers Commissions, 2014).  Catalans celebrate their own culture 
as ‘open, hard-working and entrepreneurial’ (author’s interview with 
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Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015).  This self-promotion 
may be a reflection of self-image or a rejection of the negative views 
of others of the Catalan character.  As previously noted, survey data 
suggests that Catalans ‘generate an intense and unanimous dislike’ in 
all other parts of Spain.  Catalans may or may not want to be different, 
but are definitely perceived to be different (Bel 2015: 47). 154 
Also notable in Andalusian discourse is a frequent equating of the 
PSOE with the Junta and vice versa.  The spokesperson for Podemos 
in Andalusia talks of the arrival of Podemos (and Ciudadanos) as 
‘putting the brake on the PSOE [in the Junta]’.  This is an acceptance 
of the dominance of the PSOE in the Junta, not an expectation of 
usurping them.  Recent election results (in 2012 and 2015) have 
removed the PSOE’s absolute majority, but it has continued to be the 
dominant political force in Andalusia. 
In terms of the Catalan discussants, the conflictual relationship with 
Central Government is a dominant theme.  They see an unfairness in 
the treatment of Catalonia by the Government and the rest of Spain.  
Interviewees in Catalonia speak of the unfair financing system, 
summed up as ‘Espanya ens roba’ (Spain robs us) – also the name of 
a Facebook page.155  Catalans complain of how they have provided 
financial help to other parts of Spain in the past, but now ‘Spain is not 
willing to help us’ (author’s interview with Secretary General of 
Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).  
Complaints about the unfairness of the financing system is not 
exclusive to Catalonia, however in Catalonia a perceived element of 
inadequacy on the part of Spain is added.  This inadequacy is woven 
into the complaint.  The (Spanish financial) system ‘is unable to 
accommodate the needs of the Catalan people’ (author’s interview 
                                               
154 Work by Carol Galais et al counters the view of Catalans lacking solidarity with the rest of 
Spain.  Survey work into citizenship discovered that although Catalans are less supportive of 
principles of fiscal solidarity than in Galician and Castilla la Mancha, most Catalans do agree 
with inter-regional fiscal transfers (2014: 76-77). 
155 https://www.facebook.com/Espanya-ens-roba-136434949725026/.  Accessed 12.02.16. 
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with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). 
The interviews took place in Autumn 2014 and Autumn 2015 when 
there was a heightened atmosphere of dispute between the 
Generalitat on the one hand and the Rajoy Government on the other.  
However, as explored elsewhere in this thesis, this discourse has 
long-standing, historical perspective, dating back to the end of the 
1800s and beginning of the 1900s when many Catalan entrepreneurs 
shared a view of a self-governing Catalonia within a weak Spanish 
state (Keating et al 2003: 52).  It is a perspective that clearly still 
informs the judgements of some Catalans.  For example, Generalitat 
officials justify as necessary their network of offices abroad because 
State embassies do not meet the needs of Catalan businesses 
(author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of 
Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  State-run services 
are criticised for being old-fashioned and bureaucratic, still stuck in the 
eighteenth century (author’s interview with Head of Communications, 
Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015).  This latter point appeared to be made in a light-
hearted way, but the emphasis on Catalonia being different from 
Spain was underlined with a banging of a hand on the table. 
There is a clear shared sense that Catalonia is different, and a 
confidence that Catalonia is more advanced than other parts of Spain 
and that it deserves, if not special treatment then, recognition of that 
difference.  ‘We have a different language, culture, history and 
geography.  We want this to be recognised – and it isn’t’ (author’s 
interview with Secretary General of Administration and Public 
Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).  The Generalitat wanted a 
model (of public administration) different from the rest of Spain 
(author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of 
Public Finances, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  Another 
interviewee pointed out with pride that while the display of photos of 
(post-Franco) former ministers in public buildings was common across 
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Spain, in Catalonia, this also includes portraits of ministers from the 
1930s, referring to Catalonia’s long-standing institutions of self-
government (author’s interview with Head of e government, 
Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015). 
All Catalan interviewees pointed to the tradition of civil society in 
Catalonia in positive terms, and as a phenomenon particular to them.  
One describes it as ‘tejido de asociaciones’, literally a fabric or web of 
voluntary organisations, reflecting the view that the many 
organisations in the third sector are part and parcel of Catalan life 
(author’s interview with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 
2015).  Another points to the Generalitat’s collaboration with the 
private sector as ‘part of our individuality’ (author’s interview with 
Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, Generalitat 
de Catalunya, 2014). 
In the context of the perceived unfairness of the financing system, one 
interviewee stated that Catalonia needed more resources, because 
Catalonia ‘did not want average’ (author’s interview with Director 
General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015), a sentiment echoing one made by another Catalan 
that Catalonia ‘wants more and deserves more’ (author’s interview 
with Secretary General of Administration and Public Services, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).  This sense of being special, some 
might argue better, is strong, indicating a clear and separate identity. 
Reference needs to be made to the alternative Catalan discourse of 
those not supportive of independence.  Spokespersons of Ciutadans, 
the Catalan branch of the Spain-wide Ciudadanos political party, use 
the term ‘territory’ when referring to Catalonia, rather than the term 
nation or region.  (This was also the case of the Andalusian 
Ciudadanos Group Leader and the PP spokesperson in the Junta).  
The significance of terminology in this area has been discussed 
earlier.  In this case, the use of the term territory may be seen as more 
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neutral, avoiding the nation/nationality debate.  An indication of the 
strength of feeling against Catalan nationalism is demonstrated in the 
Ciutadans’ description of the work of the Generalitat to promote the 
Catalan language and culture as ‘radicalisation’.  This is emotive 
terminology.  On the other hand, and also deploying emotive 
language, Catalanists point to the use by Central Government of the 
term ‘indoctrination’ to characterise the Generalitat’s public 
communications work.  This is forcibly rejected, and described as ‘a 
bad joke’ (author’s interview with Head of Communications, Cabinet 
Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015). 
As is to be expected, corruption is declaimed by opposition politicians, 
and others, in both Andalusia and Catalonia, but it is criticised in a 
very blunt and strong way.  There is no denial of its existence.  Rather 
than using the term ‘libre designación’ (or free appointment) to 
describe the appointment by politicians of senior positions, the more 
pejorative term ‘a dedo’ (literally, appointment by pointing a finger) is 
used to denote the subjective nature of this method of selection 
(author’s interviews with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department 
of Local Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local 
Administration, Junta de Andalucía 2014; Ciutadans Member of 
Catalan Parliament, 2015).  The blurring of the line between civil 
servant and politicians is condemned as ‘the invasion of 
administration by politicians and the invasion of the political sphere by 
professionals’ (author’s interview with Professor, Pompeu Fabra 
University, Barcelona, 2014). 
Emotive language is used.  Corruption in public administration is 
described by an insider as ‘a cancer’, offering an image of a body 
being eaten away, making healthy cells non-functional (author’s 
interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local 
Administration, Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, 
Junta de Andalucía, 2014).  The proliferation of SPVs have been 
created ‘for reasons of political clientelism’ (author’s interview with 
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Ciudadanos Group Leader, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015), 
organisations which are ‘full of party appointees’ (author’s interview 
with Spokesperson for Popular Party of Andalusia, 2014). 
A theme common to both Andalusian and Catalan interviewees is that 
of ‘the other’ or the sense of being separate from the rest of Spain.  
Thus Catalan interviewees speak of Madrid and that ‘they want us to 
change our system’ (author’s interview with Secretary General of 
Administration and Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014), 
whilst in Andalusia one interviewee referred to some in Spain treating 
Andalusia as a cliché  - ‘a place of sunshine, fiestas and beaches, a 
place of leisure’ (rather than investing in developing industry) (author’s 
interview with Secretary for Institutions and Employment, Workers 
Commission, 2014).  In the context of the 2014 budget settlement, the 
Andalusian Minister for Finance and Public Administration is reported 
to complain of the Spanish Government’s willingness to sacrifice lower 
income Communities due to pressure (not from Catalonia but) from 
Madrid ‘who wants to maintain its status and the benefits of being the 
centre’ (González-Santiago 2013). 
Evidence of the history of Andalusian regionalism and Catalan 
nationalism discussed earlier suggests that this sense of ‘other’ is not 
new in either place, but it is differently experienced and described.  In 
Andalusia, the work of the Junta is seen in the context of Spain.  For 
example, a question about public administrative reform during the 
author’s interviews elicited a response about the national programme 
of reform agreed between Central Government and Autonomous 
Governments (Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation 
of Public Services, Junta de Andalucía, 2015).  This is not the case in 
Catalonia, which is more assertive about difference and autonomy – 
‘The [Spanish] Government wants to interfere in our business’ 
(author’s interview with Secretary General of Administration and 
Public Services, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014). 
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Irrespective of the individual interviewees’ personal positions (and the 
interviews covered a wide range of types of positions), there is a clear 
divergence between Andalusia and Catalonia along the axes of 
drivers:  political in the former and identity in the latter.  In Andalusia, 
the focus is on the building of the Andalusian economy, on getting a 
‘fair share’ of prosperity and about equality and solidarity.  Andalusia 
is frequently described as a community not a nation, with the role of 
the Junta to defend the interests of the Andalusians.156  It is about 
public services and has been consistently so since the creation of the 
State of the Autonomies.  In Catalonia the impulse is one of identity 
protection and promotion.  Catalonia should be recognised, it is felt, 
for its differences and its successes.  One might have expected that 
financial disputes between the Spanish Government and the 
Generalitat would have become more important in the context of the 
post-2008 economic crisis.  However, the strengthening secessionist 
movement suggests that identity has become just as, if not more, 
important.  The individuality of the interviewees in each locale 
produced a range of opinions and standpoints.  However, this does 
not negate the dominance of key themes in the discourse.  This 
analysis helps the interpretation of the specific comments made and 
the understanding of the meaning behind the words. 
Chapter Five has examined a number of aspects of the corporate and 
political management arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat, 
finding continuities and variations.  It has also reflected on similarities 
and differences within a thematic analysis of the interviews.  The 
following chapter seeks to explain the findings of the case study. 
 
  
                                               
156 http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/presidencia/portavoz/gobierno/110094/diaz/tiende/ 
mano/grupos/politicos/reforma/financiacion/autonomica/defienda/intereses/andalucia.  
Accessed 05.05.16. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  CONTINUITIES AND VARIATIONS: 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS AND INFLUENCES 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
6.1.1 PURPOSE OF CHAPTER 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the findings from the case 
study of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de Catalunya.  It 
provides a summary of the findings and analyses those factors which 
have been found to generate uniformity and those which encourage or 
have influenced differentiation. 
As Chapter Five demonstrated, there are limited differences between 
the Junta and the Generalitat in terms of their organisational 
structures, the roles of politicians, public employment patterns, tactical 
responses to the economic crisis, respective policy priorities and 
budget profiles.  These similarities have arisen, and been maintained, 
despite apparently strong forces for variation as explored in earlier 
chapters of this thesis.  Significant differences have existed between 
Andalusia and Catalonia and the rest of Spain in terms of their 
geography, history, wealth and economy, politics and culture.  The 
establishment of the decentralised state in the 1978 Constitution was 
a very explicit recognition of the variations within Spain.  However, this 
case study has revealed more similarities than differences between 
the two Autonomous Governments of the Junta and the Generalitat. 
 
6.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDY  
6.2.1 SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
The organisational structures of both sub-state governments 
demonstrate ‘mimetism’, a term used by a number of authors when 
writing about Spain (Peters and Painter 2010: 235; Alba and Navarro 
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2011: 795).  The use of this term denotes the mimicking or copying of 
what others have done.  In the context of the Autonomous 
Governments, it reflects the copying of the Central Government 
structures existing at the time of their creation, structures which have 
not changed significantly since then and which are not dissimilar from 
each other now.  They are both based on directly elected parliaments, 
and on First Ministers with cabinet governments.  Political hierarchies 
in terms of Ministers, Secretary Generals and Director Generals, are 
alike and the executive roles of politicians are configured in the same 
way.  Departments are similarly structured around functions, a major 
difference being the greater prominence of an external focus in the 
Generalitat. 
Civil service structures and practices reflect national patterns of 
employment, although there are more civil service contracts than 
labour contracts in the Generalitat than in the Junta.  Political 
appointments and the use of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are 
prevalent in both.  Statutes are similar in their provisions and 
structure, but there are important differences in emphasis.  Explicit, 
corporate modernisation strategies may be more developed in 
Catalonia than in Andalusia, but progress over the two year period of 
fieldwork on the Generalitat’s plans has been limited (see Chapter 
Five, Section 5.4).  In the Junta’s case, the publication date of a 
modernisation plan has been repeatedly deferred.  The attitude of the 
Junta and the Generalitat towards Europe has been largely positive – 
albeit for slightly different reasons. 
Budget totals and profiles are similar in each Autonomous 
Government.  Clear priority is placed on health and education 
services, and these functions are allocated the lion’s share of 
resources in both Andalusia and Catalonia.  However, in terms of the 
specific services of education and health, a significant difference is the 
use of the non-publoc sector in the delivery of public services. 
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Initial responses to the economic crisis were similar, as both 
Autonomous Governments pursued stimulus measures in the early 
years of the crisis.  In the following period of fiscal consolidation, 
budget reductions have been largely tactical or incremental.  Both the 
Junta and the Generalitat have deployed a similar combination of 
approaches to the reduced availability of resources, namely, ‘cheese-
slicing’, ‘efficiency gains’ and ‘some priority setting’ (Pollitt 2010: 22).  
Less evident have been fundamental reappraisals or radical 
realignments of resources: 
The economic crisis has not been used to reform the 
Generalitat.  Reductions have been made by salami slicing 
rather than a reappraisal of priorities. (Author’s interview with 
Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 2015) 
In terms of a more strategic response in relation to finance, both the 
Junta and Generalitat have complained vociferously to the 
Government, seeking to shift the blame for their financial difficulties to 
Madrid.  In the case of the Generalitat however, this vociferous 
complaining has been transformed into a strengthening of its 
secession stance since 2010.  The table overleaf summarises the 
differences and similarities between the Junta and Generalitat 
revealed in this research. 
The thematic analysis of the interviews covered in Chapter Five, 
Section 5.5 demonstrated a strong self-identification amongst both 
Andalusians and Catalans, each expressing a clear sense of being 
distinct from others.  However, a significant difference is revealed in 
how that identity relates to Spain as a whole.  The Generalitat’s view 
of Catalonia is as a potentially separate state, whereas the Junta sees 
Andalusia as an integral part of Spain.  This difference is also 
reflected in the nomenclatures of the websites of the Junta and 
Generalitat, their titles of ministries, and the use and promotion of the 
Catalan language. 
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Table 27: Overview of Similarities and Differences between the Junta and the Generalitat 
Comparative feature 
 
Junta de Andalucía Generalitat de Catalunya 
STATUTES 
 
Content 
 
Preamble 
 
 
 
Similar chapter headings 
 
Locates Andalusia within a unified Spain.  
Greater emphasis on solidarity and ‘doing not 
just being’ 
 
 
 
Similar chapter headings 
 
Sees Catalonia as a nation within a (Spanish) State.  
Greater prominence given to international work and 
‘being not just doing’ 
 
Catalan language is emphasised 
 
POLITICAL 
STRUCTURES 
 
Political Hierarchy 
 
 
Ministries 
 
Political Control 
 
 
Role of politicians 
 
Gender issues 
 
 
 
 
First Minister, Government and Ministers, 
Secretary Generals and Director Generals 
 
Based on functions 
 
PSOE since creation of Junta.  Long-standing 
leaders with national influence 
 
Extensive use of executive roles 
 
Greater profile of women 
 
 
 
First Minister, Government and Ministers, Secretary 
Generals and Director Generals 
 
Based on functions, greater focus on external activities 
 
Predominantly CiU (until 2015).  Long-standing leaders 
with national influence 
 
Extensive use of executive roles 
 
Less of a profile 
233 
Comparative feature 
 
Junta de Andalucía Generalitat de Catalunya 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
 
Structures 
 
 
Contracts of 
Employment 
 
Numbers of Employees 
 
 
Political Appointments 
 
 
 
Assistant Director Generals, Heads of Service, 
no Chief Executive post 
 
Civil service national terms and conditions 
 
 
Public employment seen as a priority role for the 
Junta. One employee for every 35 Andalusians 
 
Extensive use made across all functions 
 
 
Assistant Director Generals, Heads of Service, no 
Chief Executive post 
 
Civil service national terms and conditions 
 
 
Public employment not seen as a priority role.  One 
employee for every 45 Catalans 
 
Extensive use made across all functions 
SERVICE DELIVERY 
MODEL 
 
Private or public sector 
 
Use of SPVs 
 
 
 
 
Predominantly public sector 
 
Extensive use made, predominantly within the 
public sector 
 
 
 
 
Greater role of private and third sectors 
 
Extensive use made, especially in the third sector 
2015 BUDGETS 
 
Overall Dimensions 
 
 
 
 
 
Total revenue budget of 30,000,000€.  3,526€ 
per capita spending by Junta 
 
 
 
 
Total revenue budget of 32,000,000€.  4,395€ per 
capita spend by Generalitat 
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Comparative feature 
 
Junta de Andalucía Generalitat de Catalunya 
 
Priorities 
 
 
 
Biggest budget heads are health, education and 
social services.  Higher spend on tourism and 
agriculture than in Catalonia 
 
 
Biggest budget heads are health, education and social 
services.  Higher spend on language and culture, debt, 
transport, policing and prisons than in Andalusia 
STRATEGIES 
 
Budget Strategies and 
Tactics 
 
 
Modernisation 
Strategies 
 
 
 
Incremental reductions made.  Vocal opposition 
to Central Government policy 
 
 
Strategy being prepared, but not yet published. 
 
 
Incremental reductions made.  Complaints about 
Central Government policy.  Opposition to Government 
economic policies contributed to secessionist demands 
 
Reform plan developed and published, reflecting NPM 
ideas.  Partial implementation 
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6.3 THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY  
6.3.1 THE INEVITABILITY OF THE PAST DETERMINING THE 
PRESENT? 
This research has revealed a striking lack of variation between the 
Junta and Generalitat.  A diachronic approach can help explain how 
this situation may have arisen as it considers the subject through its 
historical development (Kay 2005: 553).  Specifically, a path 
dependency perspective suggests that previous actions in one 
direction elicit further moves in that same direction: 
In other words the order in which things happen affects how 
they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point 
constrains the trajectory after that point. (Kay 2005: 553) 
History matters: 
It matters not just because we can learn from the past, but 
because the present and the future are connected to the past 
by the continuity of a society’s institutions.  Today’s and 
tomorrow’s choices are shaped by the past.  And the past can 
only be made intelligible as a story of institutional evolution. 
(North 1990: vii) 
It is an approach which has been particularly associated with historical 
institutionalism.  Historical institutionalism embraces the idea that 
individuals act within institutional arrangements, and that a historical 
perspective is needed to understand the present structure and how it 
functions (Kay 2005: 555).  Institutions are understood to include both 
the formal organisations and the informal rules and procedures that 
underpin relationships within those organisations (Thelan and Steinmo 
1992: 2).  
[HI] scholarship is historical because it recognizes that political 
development must be understood as a process that unfolds 
over time. It is institutionalist because it stresses that many of 
the contemporary implications of these temporal processes are 
embedded in institutions - whether these be formal rules, policy 
structures, or social norms. (Pierson 1998: 29) 
This is a useful approach in considering how the institutional 
arrangements and the people operating in those institutions have 
been influenced by historical developments, how the individuals 
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influence and are influenced by the institution in which they operate.  It 
is particularly relevant in the comparative study of the Autonomous 
Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia, where not only are formal 
structures examined, but the way in which the institutions function.  
Knill, for example, uses a historical institutionalist approach to explain 
different outcomes in terms of public administrative reform.  
Contrasting Germany and Great Britain, he emphasises the impact of 
the type of relationship between politicians and senior civil servants 
(Knill 1999: 116). 
The evidence of this thesis supports a historical institutionalist 
explanation in the case of Spain.  Chapter Two of this thesis shows 
that, whilst there have been multiple divisions over the course of 
Spanish history, including that of territory, the dominant paradigm has 
been that of centralism.  A particularly influential element of this 
centralising legacy in terms of Spanish public administration has been 
the Napoleonic Administrative Tradition. 
6.3.2 THE PERSISTANCE OF THE NAPOLEONIC ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRADITION 
 Post-Franco and Post-Transition Periods 
The Napoleonic Administrative Tradition (as analysed in Chapter 
Three, Section 3.2) has influenced the political structures, 
employment patterns and organisational cultures of the Autonomous 
Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia.  But as the name suggests, 
this tradition dates back to the early 1800s.  The question is why has it 
persisted, and how has it resisted change? 
It persisted into the immediate post-Franco decentralised State of the 
Autonomies because of the special set of circumstances pertaining in 
Spain at the time of its establishment in the 1980s.  The transfer of 
powers from Central Government to Autonomous Governments was 
accompanied by the transfer of existing civil servants.  Those civil 
servants inevitably brought with them their own processes, structures 
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and culture.  Politicians at the time were more interested in creating 
the new political governance structures, less interested in the 
management arrangements of the public services for which they were 
to become responsible (Ramió and Salvador 2002: 101).  There was 
also a time imperative.  A completely new tier of government had to 
be established quickly and in a context of heightened political tension.  
So despite the opportunity to create a completely new body of sub-
state government, or in the case of Catalonia, a modern version of the 
Generalitat, civil servants opted for the safer option and created 
structures in line with their own experience – those of the Napoleonic 
Model.  This is a rational decision as it was the model they knew (Alba 
and Navarro 2011: 795).  It is the one which also would have been 
considered feasible to deliver the new Autonomous Governments in a 
time-critical context, as confirmed in interviews carried out for this 
case study (see, for example, author’s interview with Secretary 
General of Administration and Public Services, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2014). 
However, over three decades have elapsed since the creation of the 
new Autonomous Governments, prompting questions as to why they 
have not subsequently changed to reflect the specific needs, priorities 
and cultures of the different Autonomous Communities.  The 
Napoleonic Model was defined and discussed earlier in this thesis 
(Painter and Peters 2010).  It has persisted for two sets of reasons.  
Firstly, taking a functionalist view, it worked, in terms of supporting the 
creation, almost from scratch, of multi-million euro organisations 
delivering key public services, with new democratic governance 
arrangements.  Despite initial reservations, there has been no 
collapse of the new territorial system (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342).  On 
the contrary, Autonomous Governments were established 
successfully across the whole country and they have been part of 
Spain’s success story in establishing a modern, universal welfare 
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system, comparable to the rest of Europe, in a relatively short period 
of time.   
Secondly, this research has highlighted a number of the 
characteristics of the Napoleonic Model which make it, if not 
impervious, then, resistant to reform.  These include the capacity of 
the civil service to obstruct change, the legal focus which can be 
incompatible with managerial reform and the blurred line between 
politicians and senior civil servants making for shared interests and 
the impact of clientelism (the form of corruption related to the 
exchange of favours for votes).  These aspects, as they relate to the 
Junta and the Generalitat, are expanded upon below. 
 Bureaucratic Resistance 
Resistance to change by civil servants is a feature of most, if not all, 
bureaucracies.  However, features of the Napoleonic system relating 
to public employment can exacerbate a tendency to minimise change, 
including the formal tenured appointments for civil servants which 
reinforces the closed nature of the bureaucracy.  Although the ‘jobs for 
life’ guarantee has been eroded in part by the use of labour contracts, 
the majority of core personnel in the Junta and the Generalitat still 
operate on tenure.  It is a practice which can engender ‘a culture of 
lack of consequences for the actions of civil servants’ (author’s 
interview with Professor of Political Science, Pablo de Olavide 
University, 2015).  The method of appointment is via entry 
examinations which have traditionally tested the ability to memorise 
and reproduce facts, and not test problem-solving skills or aptitudes to 
public service.  It is a problem acknowledged by the leaders of both 
the Junta and the Generalitat: 
We want to change the way in which staff are recruited.  The 
system of entry examinations tests things not aptitudes.  We 
have many long-term employees.  To advance we need not 
only knowledge but also different abilities and attitudes. 
(Author’s interview with Secretary General of Administration 
and Public Services, Department of Government and 
Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014) 
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The current approach to recruitment has major implications for the 
design of the organisation.  It is the opposite of the ‘position-based 
approach’ practised in the US and the UK under which the position is 
the key component in the design of the entire organisational system 
(Gamarra et al 2014: 7-8).  The focus in the position-based approach 
is on the suitability of the candidate to a particular post, based not only 
on their qualifications but also their experience.  It seeks to fill the 
positions with the best people, a concept which was found in the 
fieldwork interviews to be unknown, and, whilst attractive to some 
managers, even preferable, would ‘not be possible in Spain’ due to 
resistance within the system (author’s interview with Director of the 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  These 
recruitment practices of the Junta and the Generalitat also have the 
potential to restrict the introduction of new ideas from outside the 
organisation.  Internal promotions, the norm, are less likely to 
challenge the status quo.  The reverse is more likely, reinforcing 
existing patterns and cultures.  The ‘revolving door’ phenomenon was 
illustrated within the fieldwork for this research:  the holder of the post 
of Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration in 2014 
had been appointed in 2015 as the Director General for Human 
Resources in the Junta’s Ministry of Finance and Public 
Administration. 
Appointments are made to professional groups not to specific posts.  
This has the potential to perpetuate departmentalism, with loyalty and 
values specific to professional groups and not to the overall corporate 
organisation.  The impact of this lack of corporate approach was 
evident in the structures and working practices of the Junta and the 
Generalitat.  In the Generalitat, ‘Ministries are autonomous’ with 
‘coordination by agreement’ (author’s interview with Head of 
Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and 
Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  In the Junta where the 
HR function is centralised, ‘there is a lot of [HR] autonomy in [the 
departments of] Health and Education’ (author’s interview with 
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Coordinator, Department of Planning and Organisation of Public 
Services, Ministry of Finance and Public Administration, Junta de 
Andalucía, 2015).   
 A Legal Focus 
The emphasis on the law in the Napoleonic Model can make public 
administrations formal and bureaucratic.  Civil servants in Spain are 
seen as public administrators applying the law, not managers of public 
services.  Statements gathered in the fieldwork for this research 
support this conception of the role of civil servants, confirming the 
focus on process and the law: ‘the tradition brings codification, a 
systematic integration of rules’ (author’s interview with Director of the 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  ‘Civil servants 
are there to ensure things are done in accordance with the law and 
with the rules’ (author’s interview with Secretary for Institutions and 
Employment, Workers’ Commissions [Trades Union], 2014).  
Managerial ideas can be mistrusted by the dominant legal scholars 
and practitioners who insist ‘on the principles of (top-down) 
bureaucratic rationality’ (Boix 1997: 276).  Managerial ideas have to 
show they are compatible with the existing legal framework (Bovaird 
and Loffler 2009: 45).  Whilst this research did not reveal a dominance 
of lawyers in the current ministerial positions of either the Junta or the 
Generalitat, evidence of the legal focus in the progress report on the 
Generalitat’s Reform Plan was found, with its heavy reliance on the 
passage of a series of new laws necessary before implementation can 
take place (see Chapter Five, Section 5.4). 157  
 Politicisation of the Bureaucrats and Bureaucratisation of the 
Politicians 
The blurring of the line between politicians and senior civil servants 
under this model can make for powerful shared interests, a scenario 
                                               
157 Interrogation of the websites of Junta and Generalitat (accessed 20.04.16) did not permit 
further analysis into the incumbents of the lower tiers of management, making an 
examination of the extent of this phenomenon beyond the remit of this research. 
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more likely to support the status quo.  A career in the civil service is 
often a precursor to a career in politics in Spain, the most current and 
relevant example being Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy.158  The 
interconnection of politicians and senior civil servants has the potential 
to enable more radical reform because of a shared interest and 
ownership (Ongaro 2009: 225).  However, the case study does not 
bear this out in terms of administrative reform in the Junta or the 
Generalitat.  It is just as realistic to believe that civil servants would be 
less likely to challenge politicians under this model than under a 
system based on meritocratic recruitment of civil servants which 
separates the careers – and the interests – of elected officials and 
professional bureaucrats. 
In both the Junta and the Generalitat senior politicians are given 
executive roles, meaning that they are more involved in day to day 
decision making than, for example, in the UK arrangements.  The 
occupation of executive roles by politicians who may or may not 
possess relevant professional skills and/or experience to manage 
public functions can have an impact on the quality and quantity of 
management staff and therefore the capacity of the organisation to 
manage its functions efficiently and effectively.  The blurring of roles 
can lead to potential confusion and de-motivation of civil servants 
(Ramió 2012: 94-105).  The interviews in this research of senior civil 
servants and leading politicians of the Junta and the Generalitat, did 
not reveal confusion or de-motivation.  Their senior positions would 
suggest success in their career and therefore indicate they are more 
likely to be supportive of the system. However, a statement from a 
Trades Unionist offers a different view: 
There is a high level of clientelism in the Generalitat, via “libre 
designación”, … leading to the entrance of a large number of 
altos cargos [senior executive politicians], many of whom have 
little professional experience or background.  This generates a 
lack of leadership, management capacity and a high 
                                               
158 After graduating with a law degree, Rajoy became a Property Registrar in the Civil 
Service before embarking on his career in politics.  www.rajoy.es/en-confianza-
biografia.html.  Accessed 11.04.16. 
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dependence and complicity with political power.  It results in a 
lack of confidence amongst staff in these bosses and gives rise 
to frustration. (Author’s interview with spokesperson for 
General Workers’ Union of Catalonia, 2014) 
A statement from a leading Trade Unionist in Andalusia pointed to the 
failure to implement, on the grounds of cost, proposals to improve the 
accountability and mobility of civil servants through sideways moves 
thereby improving motivation (Secretary for Institutions and 
Employment, Workers’ Commissions [Trades Union], 2015).  Whilst 
this is a recognition of the problem, the failure to implement a solution 
could suggest a lack of political will, obstruction by civil servants or 
trades unions, or the lack of a strategic plan for human resources.  
Clientelism 
The extent of clientelism, a particular feature of the Southern 
European variation of the Napoleonic Model (discussed in Chapter 
Three), can also reinforce the status quo and militate against change.  
This phenomenon can reduce capacity, by not employing the best 
people to do the work and by not deploying scarce human resources 
in the most effective way: ‘So we have people without the relevant 
knowledge or necessary experience in charge of important services.  
It is awful, shocking’ (author’s interview with Head of Economic 
Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First 
Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014).  People 
appointed in this way may not believe further career prospects will be 
based on merit, nor will they be likely to be supportive of modernising 
reforms (Ongaro 2009: 228). 
This case study found widespread recognition of the problem of 
clientelism in both the Junta and the Generalitat.  In particular, and not 
surprisingly, opposition members were most vehement in their 
criticism of ‘jobs for friends’ (author’s interviews with Member 
Andalusian Parliament and Popular Party Spokesperson, 2014 and 
Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015).  It was not within the 
remit of this research to quantify the extent of clientelism, but the high 
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profile corruption cases involving former First Ministers and senior 
members of Autonomous Governments confirm its existence in 
Governments of Andalusia, Catalonia, and other regions. 
 Resistance to Reform 
In France, the origin of the Napoleonic Tradition, public administration 
today is also still shaped by this legacy, sharing key characteristics 
with Spain such as the linkage between the careers of politicians and 
bureaucrats, the presence of a system of corps and the centrality of 
the law (Rouban 2008; Bezes 2010; Ongaro 2009).  A potential 
difference between France and Spain is the conception of public 
employment as social policy.  In the case of France, it has been seen 
as a means of combatting unemployment.  In Southern European 
countries this deployment of public employment as social policy is 
often used to satisfy ‘clientelistic interests’ (Ongaro 2009:  223).   In 
the case of Andalusia, employment has been demonstrated in this 
research to be an important role of the Autonomous Government, 
given ‘the low presence of the private sector in many fields, such as 
health’ (author’s interview with an academic, a University of 
Barcelona, 2014). 
This study has so far examined the ways in which the Napoleonic 
tradition, as reflected in the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia 
and Catalonia, can impede change and how this contributes to the 
persistence of the model.  The following concluding discussion on the 
tradition focuses specifically on public administrative reform and the 
adoption or otherwise of NPM-inspired reforms.  A normative 
argument about desirable strategies of reform is not being made here.  
It is however particularly important to consider the propensity to 
change and to produce variation in this context, given the near 
homogeneity of the public administrative pattern adopted at the 
creation of the Autonomous Governments. 
Resistance to change has been particularly highlighted by academics 
in relation to the weak implementation of NPM-inspired reforms in 
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countries sharing the Napoleonic administrative tradition (Parrado 
Díez 1996; Alba 1997; Torres and Pina 2004; Gualmini 2008). 
More recent research suggests that there has been an intensification 
in the implementation of NPM reforms in the four Southern European 
Governments (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) as a result of the 
economic crisis, suggesting that economic crisis has acted as a 
‘critical juncture’, forcing the implementation of delayed administrative 
reforms (Sotiropoulus 2015: 235).  The reforms referred to are the 
reduction in public employment, a shift to a performance criteria and 
results-based culture, greater use of IT and, in the case of all but 
Spain, decentralisation (2015: 238).  Sotiropoulus also points to a 
centralisation of government decision-making, describing it as 
government ‘almost by fiat’ (2015: 241).  The focus of Sotiropoulos’ 
work is on Central Government, and this thesis would certainly 
support the argument, in the context of relations with the Autonomous 
Governments, of centralisation by the Spanish Central Government as 
part of their response to the economic crisis. 
In terms of the two studied Autonomous Governments, there is 
evidence of some NPM reforms, particularly the reduction in public 
employment.  However, the implementation of reforms at a sub-state 
level, such as performance management and a results-orientated 
culture have not be found in this case study.159  The weak introduction 
of NPM reform is despite the fact that the ideology of market solutions 
underpinning NPM have become widely institutionalised within the 
public sector in Europe, including Spain (Christensen and Laegreid 
2007: 2).  Statements by the leaderships of the Generalitat, in 
particular, have extolled reforms based on NPM elements such as 
supporting public-private partnerships and establishing a new model 
of organisation based on effectiveness, efficiency and coordination 
                                               
159  The reporting by Sotiropoulos (2015: 234) of similar responses to the crisis by the four 
Southern European governments (and thereby differentiating themselves from other EU 
member states) supports the validity of the typologies of public administrative traditions 
considered earlier and the argument that the Napoleonic tradition has continued to be a 
force in shaping these public bureaucracies. 
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(Reform Plan, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014).  Developments such 
as the creation of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), a feature of NPM, 
have been embraced by the Junta, an acceptance or 
acknowledgement of NPM claims of improved efficiency: 
The Special Purpose Vehicles belong more to the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition [than the Napoleonic tradition].  In Andalusia they were 
not common in the 1980s, but now operate across the fields of 
health, culture and infrastructure.  The perception at the time of 
their proliferation was that they were more agile and provided a 
more rapid response. (Author’s interview with Director of the 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2014) 
The quotation reveals a stated view of the merits of this feature of the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition and how it was not part of the administrative 
tradition of Spain.  A more recent update from the former Director of 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, points out that the SPVs 
are increasingly becoming subjected to the same rules and controls 
as the public law regime (correspondence from the former Director’s 
office dated July 2016).  This ‘return to the fold’ probably reflects a 
public demand for greater transparency and overall control of these 
bodies, but does not undermine the assertion that the SPVs were 
seen as a (positive) modernising import.  
Explanations for the less than enthusiastic implementation lie in the 
mismatch of values of the Napoleonic Model and those of NPM as 
explored, both in terms of the theory (Chapter Three), and in terms of 
actual practice outlined in this case study.  The Napoleonic tradition’s 
formal hierarchical structures, emphasis on process, and limited 
autonomy for employees are contrasted with the focus of NPM on 
managers being given the freedom and accountability to manage, and 
on its championing of competition, user choice and transparency.  As 
analysed earlier in this thesis (see Chapter Three, Section 3.2) there 
is a significant gap between the two models, suggesting the extent of 
the challenge in introducing NPM reforms. 
Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert’s seminal work identified a 
number of dimensions of the politico-administrative context which may 
246 
affect reform:  the basic structure of the state; the nature of executive 
government; relations between ministers and senior civil servants; the 
philosophy and culture of governance; and the sources of policy 
advice (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011: 48-67).  These features are ‘likely 
to exert a significant influence over the choice of reform to be adopted 
and the feasibility of implementing certain types of reform’ (2011: 73).  
The argument is clear that the public administrative context is a key 
factor in explaining which countries are more or less likely to adopt 
NPM-inspired reforms.  This research has demonstrated that the 
greater the consistency between the values underpinning the reform 
and the values of the existing administrative culture, the more likely 
the reform is to be successful.  The lack of consistency in the case of 
the Autonomous Governments provides an explanation of the 
relatively weak implementation of reform. 
A ‘new institutionalist’ approach can help to explain the dissonance 
between what an organisation states as its aims, objectives, priorities, 
and the actual behaviour and actions of that organisation as it is 
concerned not only with what is formally stated but also with the 
informal conventions and coalitions that shape political behaviour.  It 
sees institutions not as physical organisations but as stable, valued 
and recurring patterns of behaviour, otherwise known as the ‘rules of 
the game’ (Lowndes 2009: 92-4).  The reality of implementing 
reforms, publicly advanced by the Autonomous Governments, has 
been described succinctly in the course of this research as ‘buying the 
formula, implementing half’ (author’s interview with Professor of 
Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, 2015).   This case study shows 
that it is not solely the Napoleonic tradition which does not offer 
conditions conducive to reform, but it is the way in which that tradition 
is practised in the Autonomous Governments today which has 
prevented change and therefore variation in the way in which the 
Junta and the Generalitat organise themselves and their services.  
This analysis reflects the research considered earlier in this thesis 
regarding the constraints on reform at a national level.  Similar forces 
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for continuity have been demonstrated including the administrative 
tradition’s focus on the law, the obstruction of civil servants and the 
lack of political will to change. 
However, there are dangers in an exclusive adoption of path 
dependency as ‘the concept of administrative traditions tends to 
emphasize the continuities in governing and in the organizational life 
of the public sector’ (Painter and Peters 2010b: 234).  The limitations 
of adopting this approach are discussed in the next section, after 
which an analysis of other influences is offered. 
6.3.3 THE LIMITATIONS OF PATH DEPENDENCY APPROACHES 
A focus on the past does not offer predictions of future choices: ‘It is 
not a story of inevitability in which the past neatly predicts the future’ 
(North 1990: 98–9).  It is a concept that has attracted criticism.  It can 
lack explanatory power and crowd out other perspectives, and it is 
also better at explaining stability than change.  As Ongaro points out 
in his study reflecting on reform in Napoleonic systems, administrative 
traditions are not immutable and ‘the influence of administrative 
traditions cannot be intended statically’ (2012: 109).  A further set of 
criticisms centres on the ‘implicit assumption that a policy would be 
“better” without path dependent processes acting as a barrier to 
effective reform’ (Kay 2005: 561-8).  In the case of the Autonomous 
Governments, the evidence gained through the fieldwork for this 
thesis is that past policy decisions and actions in the public 
administrative arrangements of Spain have constrained more recent 
past and present choices. The impact of previous decisions on the 
method of recruiting employees, the executive roles of politicians and 
the pre-eminence of the law can clearly be seen today.  Thus current 
structures and cultures continue to be influenced strongly by the 
Napoleonic administrative tradition. 
There are changes which can not be explained by the past, however, 
such as the adaptation to EU membership.  Studies have examined 
the europeanisation of sub-state public administrations (see for 
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example Bursens and Deforche [2008]; Cole et al [2015]).  This case 
study has highlighted a difference between the two Autonomous 
Governments, outlining the Generalitat’s more proactive role in 
relation to the EU institutions from a representation perspective (see 
Chapter Five, Section 5.4).  Another change, of particular profile in 
recent years, has been the greater focus on transparency in 
governmental activities.  The fieldwork confirmed the relatively recent 
promotion of the Transparency Portals for both the Junta and the 
Generalitat following the passage of legislation in 2014.160  These are 
two examples of change not driven by past choices.  Rather, they are 
driven by current forces - external, in terms of EU membership in the 
former, and internal, Spanish political and societal demands relating to 
corruption in the latter. 
The most significant public administrative reform is arguably that of 
Spain’s decentralisation.  The creation of the State of the Autonomies 
has been described as the ‘most important transformation of Spanish 
administration since 1918’ (Beltrán Villalva 1990: 342).  It is certainly a 
development which is diametrically opposed to the Napoleonic 
tradition’s focus on uniformity and centralisation.  This tension can be 
seen in the many conflicts between central and regional government 
over the territorial distribution of powers.  In his study of the 
implementation of NPM in Spain (and other Southern European 
countries with Napoleonic systems), Ongaro concludes that reform 
has occurred, mainly at the institutional level in the re-designing of the 
state on regional bases (2012: 115).  Moreover, such reforms were 
triggered not by external NPM drivers but by ‘endogenous dynamics’, 
a reference to the political pressures of the Transition period 
considered earlier in this research. 
An area for further research would be to examine the extent to which 
the Autonomous Governments have exercised decentralisation within 
                                               
160 http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/transparencia/transparencia-andalucia/tus-derechos.html 
and http://transparencia.gencat.cat/ca/acces-a-la-informacio-publica. Both accessed 
27.06.16. 
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their own responsibilities.  A statement made in the fieldwork 
interviews suggested that private health services are more 
decentralised in Andalusia than in Catalonia (author’s interview with 
Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  
This may be a reflection of rurality in the case of Andalusia and 
historic reasons in Catalonia.  
 
6.4 SPANISH POLITICAL CULTURE 
In terms of drivers of uniformity, one group of factors which can help 
explain the lack of variation is the wider political culture prevalent in 
Spain today.  Aspects revealed in this research with a direct impact on 
the lack of change from inherited patterns include corruption, the 
dominance by individual political parties, the state’s relationship with 
the citizen, and the weakness of consumer power. 
6.4.1 CORRUPTION 
Reference has been made earlier in this thesis to the existence of 
corruption within public administration in Spain.  Corruption continues 
to be a major feature of Spanish political life with recent scandals 
involving political leaders in Andalusia and Catalonia.  In 2015 Spain 
was 36th out of 168 countries (higher ranking indicating lower 
corruption) in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index 2015.161  To put this in a European context, Spain’s 
performance is worse than that of Portugal and France (who share the 
same administrative tradition) and significantly poorer than all 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, the Benelux countries and the UK.  
Greece and Italy, sharing the Napoleonic or South European 
administrative tradition, score worse.  Spaniards’ perception of the 
extent of corruption in their country is high:  95% believed the problem 
                                               
161 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-table.  Accessed 09.04.16. 
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to be very or fairly widespread (compared with an EU average of 
76%).162  
The relevance to this research is that clientelism in particular is such 
an engrained aspect of Spanish life, that there are many more people, 
beyond the politicians and civil servants, who have a vested interest in 
the status quo and so are less likely to put forward any challenge to 
the current system.  Anti-corruption stances have certainly featured 
strongly in the national manifesto positions of the two recently 
emerged parties of Podemos and Ciudadanos.163  Tackling corruption 
was cited as a top priority and described as ‘recovering the 
institutions’ by the Secretary General of Podemos (Seville), 2015.  
Corruption was recognised as a problem by a wide range of 
interviewees during the course of the fieldwork, from opposition 
politicians, to trades unionists, academics, civil servants and senior 
executives within the Junta and the Generalitat (see notes from 
author’s interviews in Appendix B).  The problem of corruption also 
featured in the investiture speech of Susana Díaz to the Andalusian 
Parliament in 2015: 
Few can doubt that one of the main problems of our society is 
corruption and that it is not only regrettable for all of us who 
believe in honourable public administration, but it is also an 
unacceptable burden on democracy. (Junta de Andalucía 
2015) 
6.4.2 DOMINANCE BY A POLITICAL PARTY 
A second aspect of political culture is that of the dominance by a 
single /political party.  Political leadership of the Junta and Generalitat 
has been dominated since their creation by, respectively, the PSOE 
and, until recently, the CiU.  Party cartelisation, as previously 
discussed (Chapter Five) reinforces and develops the dependency of 
                                               
162 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_special_399_380_en.htm.  Accessed 
29.03.16. 
163 The leader of Podemos, for example, set out five priorities in 2015: electoral reform, 
independent judiciary, anti-corruption measures, social and environmental rights guaranteed 
by the constitution, and the recognition of the pluri-nationality of Spain and the right to 
decide (El País 10.12.15). 
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individuals and society on the political parties controlling the 
Autonomous Governments (Katz and Mair 2009).  This form of 
clientelism does not challenge the status quo.  Rather it underpins and 
continues it.  ‘There is no political will to change things.  Spain can be 
considered as a State of [Political] Parties’ (author’s interview with 
Head of Economic Cooperation, Department of Local Administration, 
Ministry of the First Minister and Local Administration, Junta de 
Andalucía, 2014). 
Political life in Andalusia and Catalonia has also been dominated by a 
small number of powerful individuals.  Autonomous Government First 
Ministers such as Manuel Chaves and Jordi Pujol, and, more recently, 
Susana Díaz and Artur Mas, have been much more than 
figureheads.164  Throughout their tenure, they have been influential 
nationally and regionally and have been very much part of ‘the 
permanent state of bargaining and bilateralism with the Central 
Government, of the horizontal competition between Autonomous 
Governments and the ‘blame shifting’ that have characterised inter-
governmental relations in Spain (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 166).  The 
implications of this competitive relationship are considered in the 
section below on the National Constitutional and Institutional Context. 
6.4.3 WEAK POSITION OF CITIZENS 
A third aspect of the Spanish political culture which can hinder change 
is the relatively weak position of citizens.  This is not to be conflated 
with earlier consideration of the importance of the third sector, 
particularly in Catalonia, which relates to the charitable and voluntary 
sector and not to individual citizens.   As discussed earlier (Chapter 
Three), Spanish political culture has historically been characterised by 
an asymmetrical relationship between the state and the citizen.  This 
                                               
164Whilst the high profile of Mas has been clear during the secession debate, the importance 
of Díaz has also been evident, being frequently quoted in the national media in relation to 
national politics.  See for example http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2016/04/30/actualidad/ 
1462009770_259974.html.  Accessed 30.04.16. 
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relationship allows citizens a less autonomous role in the state and 
also makes the state less open to change and variation.  The 
relationship is organic, rather than contractual, meaning that the state 
is independent of any particular agreement with society and ‘thus, the 
state […] is a more powerful and enduring actor, which has inherent 
powers and is entitled to exercise those powers in the name of the 
public’ (Painter and Peters 2010a: 6).  It is a relationship where 
‘interest groups are often considered almost as illegitimate 
interventions into the governing role and autonomy of the state’ 
(Peters 2008: 118).  As explained by one civil servant during this 
research: 
One of the differences between Spain and Anglo-Saxon 
countries is that in the latter citizens and the state are equal 
before the law.  In Spain, this is not the case, the State is in a 
privileged position with respect to the citizen, from superior to 
inferior.  Citizen participation in public affairs is very low. 
(Author’s interview with Head of Economic Cooperation, 
Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the First 
Minister and Local Administration, Junta de Andalucía, 2014) 
Levels of satisfaction with local public services in Spain are lower than 
in countries such as Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and France.165  
A combination of low satisfaction levels, high incidence of corruption, 
lack of confidence in public authorities and ‘the feeling of a lack of 
responsiveness of the authorities to the demands of the Spanish 
public’ (Villoria 2015: np) can contribute to a lack of engagement.  
This view of the Spanish political culture was borne out in the 
fieldwork, even though it is recognised that many of the interviewees 
were ‘inside’ the system.  Public cynicism about government, at all its 
levels, can translate into low expectations and a disinclination to 
agitate for reform and change.  This is not to ignore recent 
developments such as the protest movement of the ‘Indignados’ (or 
‘indignant ones’) and the rise of Podemos and Ciudadanos.  It is 
revealing that these protest movements are frequently termed 
‘antisistema’ (or against the system) in the press. 
                                               
165 www.ipsosglobaltrends.com/local.html.  Accessed 11.04.16. 
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The ability of citizens to hold those in power to account, to know what 
is being done and to be involved, all impact on their power to influence 
public administrations.  The existence of the gap between aspirations 
for transparency and the reality is reflected in this research.  The First 
Minister of the Generalitat has referred to the need for a route map to 
‘construct a more transparent and more open public administration so 
that citizens can involve themselves more actively in the governance 
of their institutions’ (Villoria 2014: 7).  As an opposition member in the 
Andalusian Parliament stated, ‘administration should be at the service 
of the citizen, not the other way round’ (author’s interview with 
Member of Andalusian Parliament and Popular Party Spokesperson, 
2014). 
6.4.4 WEAK CONSUMER POWER 
A related aspect to the limited influence of the citizen on the state in 
the context of public administration is that of weak consumer power in 
Spain.  The consumer power which was part of the neo-liberal surge 
of the 1980s in other western countries was not so evident in Spain 
and its absence or weak presence continues to be a factor in public 
administrations’ resistance to change.  This can be explained in part 
by the focus in Spain at that time of growing the welfare state, not 
seeking to reduce the size and scope of the public sector as was the 
case in the US and many countries in Western Europe.  While there 
was a focus on efficiency elsewhere, in Spain there was majority 
public support for the expansion of public services and for the 
universal provision of welfare goods (Boix 1997: 276). 
In addition to criticisms of Southern European bureaucracies for their 
rigidity and inefficiency, a ‘lack of customer orientation’ is also key to 
understanding the impact of citizen-state relationship (Kickert 2007: 
48).  As part of the fieldwork for this research a simple test was 
undertaken of how a citizen could make a complaint about a service 
via the website.  It revealed a limited customer focus:  Both the Junta 
and Generalitat offer telephone contact numbers, but information on 
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the website is opaque, hard to find and is not written with the user in 
mind.  This is in contrast with the typical website of local authorities in 
the UK, for example, where such information is usually clear, concise 
and customer oriented.166 
Customer engagement was not revealed in the fieldwork as a priority 
in terms of the development of the Generalitat’s egovernment plans 
(author’s interview with Head of egovernment, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2015).  When the concept of ‘front office/back office’ was discussed in 
the case study interviews, it was not translated by the interviewees 
into Spanish or Catalan.  This suggests that the notion of organising 
services to be customer facing on the one hand supported by 
‘invisible’ efficient support operations is not an established one within 
Spanish public service.  A similar conclusion can be arrived at in 
relation to the term ‘one stop shop’.  These are described as 
‘ventanillas únicas’ or single hatch windows (Porras Nadales 2005:  
477).  It is an indication of a different approach, where a ‘shop’ is part 
of NPM use of private sector terms and tools, and a window hatch is a 
place at which supplicants applied.  It supports the comments made 
earlier on the mismatch between the Napoleonic administrative 
tradition and NPM reforms. 
It is not only citizens who find ‘doing business’ with Spain’s public 
administrations difficult.  The World Bank’s ‘Doing Business 2012’ 
report compared regulation for domestic firms in 183 countries.  It 
ranked Spain at 45, lower than the US, the UK, Denmark, and Norway 
(all in the top ten) and also lower than fellow Napoleonic states such 
                                               
166 The word ‘queja’ or complaint was entered into the websites, returning the following 
pages:  http://consum.gencat.cat/temes_de_consum/reclamacions/index_es.html; 
http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/ciudadania/procedimientos
?p_p_id=catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet&p_p_lifecycle=0&p
_p_col_id=column-
2&p_p_col_count=1&_catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet_idPro
cedimiento=675&_catalogoProcedimientos_WAR_catalogoProcedimientosportlet_cmd=deta
lle; 
http://www.northumberland.gov.uk/About/Contact/compliments.aspx#makeageneralcomplim
entcomplaintorsuggestion.  All accessed 14.04.16. 
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as France at 29 and Portugal at 30.  Customer engagement in Spain 
would be a fruitful area for further research, but it is reasonable to 
suggest that that citizen/customer demand experienced in other 
countries for enhanced services, more customer choice and improved 
efficiency in public services has not so far had the same impact on 
Spanish public services. 
 
6.5 NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
6.5.1 1978 CONSTITUTION:  FLEXIBILITY FOR COMPETITION NOT 
DIVERSITY 
The contemporary Spanish constitutional and institutional context has 
had a major influence on the lack of diversity amongst Autonomous 
Governments – both at the outset and to date.  The 1978 Constitution 
was a permissive vehicle in as much as it allowed, from the 1980s, 
each part of Spain to determine its boundaries and the degree of 
autonomy it wished to assume, leaving the territorial institutions to 
sub-constitutional regulations such as statutes of autonomy (Colino 
2009: 263). 
However, it can be argued that the flexibility for Autonomous 
Governments was only in relation to each other.  There was a race to 
maximise competencies by all Autonomous Governments, including 
the Junta and the Generalitat as described in earlier chapters.  The 
phrase ‘café para todos’ was widely used in Spain to describe an 
expectation of the same arrangements for everyone, or ‘home rule all 
round’.  It should be noted that at the same time for some, notably the 
historic nationalities, ‘café para todos’ was seen to threaten their own 
claim for greater levels of self-government.  On the other hand, some 
regions, notably Valencia, felt threatened by Paїsos Catalans 
encroachment.  Although the rate and pace in the transfer of 
competencies varied across the Autonomous Governments, by the 
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second decade of the twenty-first century there was near homogeneity 
(Giordano and Roller 2004: 2163-8). 
The pursuit of equal competencies has been part of a continued 
competitive relationship between Autonomous Governments, which 
has not assisted co-operation, the sharing of good practice, or the 
joint development and dissemination of new ideas and approaches.  A 
competitive rather than collaborative relationship may in some 
circumstances be expected to lead to a rivalry for excellence in 
governance and performance.  However, in the case of Spain, the 
competition appears to have been focused on acquiring 
competencies, and having more (in the case of Catalonia) and not 
less (in the case of Andalusia) than the rest (as attested in the 
interviews carried out for this case study). 
The need for reform of the Spanish territorial system may therefore 
need to be framed in terms not of greater self-government but in terms 
of the need for better co-ordination between the different parts (Porras 
Nadales 2007: 45).  The fieldwork discovered that in some cases 
there was an awareness of reform developments in other Autonomous 
Governments to be considered if not copied.  There was no formalised 
approach to sharing best practice (author’s interview with Director of 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015).  Interviewees 
consulted in this research, including academic experts in political 
science, confirmed the limited benchmarking available and the 
difficulties in obtaining comparative information.  The limited nature of 
a Spain-wide bank of comparative information can also be seen as a 
consequence of the extensive decentralisation of competencies and 
resources: ‘National systems have lost their capacity to offer 
comparative information on indicators or outputs’ (author’s interview 
with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, 
Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2015). 
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This substantiates the absence of a culture of collaboration or even 
helpful competition for the practitioners in public administration.  It also 
suggests a lack of evidence to enable citizens to make comparative 
judgements on their local public services and hold them to account.  
The approach contrasts with the UK practice, for example in local 
government, now no longer adopted, whereby the national Audit 
Commission, until it was abolished in 2014, was the source of 
extensive comparative management information and best practice 
advice.  It organised peer reviews of local services and corporate 
management arrangements carried out by officers and politicians of 
similar councils, the results of which were made public.167 
6.5.2 SHARED LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The decentralised State of the Autonomies is based on a shared legal 
framework, which contributes to uniformity in the Autonomous 
Governments.  Many functions are shared between Central 
Government and the Autonomous Governments (including health and 
education) and so the discretion of Autonomous Governments in 
running these services is circumscribed (Colino and Del Pino 2014: 
163).  This restriction was confirmed in the field work: 
We do not enjoy a high level of autonomy.  In the case of 
health, education and social services, the set of services are 
laid down by Central Government and decisions such as which 
medicines to prescribe or the salaries of hospital staff, are 
made by the State, not by the Catalan Government. (Author’s 
interview with Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of 
Public Finances, Department of Economy and Knowledge, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015) 
Recent research on the development of the welfare state in Spain 
found ‘a remarkable shared corpus of main values, benefits and 
service’, and any divergence in public or private sector provision (for 
example, health services) categorised as a ‘consequence of path 
dependence’ (Gallego and Subirats 2012: 286).  The extent of Central 
                                               
167 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150421134146/http:/www.audit-
commission.gov.uk/.  Accessed 29.05.16. 
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Government intervention in the running of these services has however 
been the source of repeated dispute between the two levels of 
government. An example would be the dispute over the structural 
changes to the health service introduced by decree by Central 
Government in 2012 as part of its budget cuts.  The proposed 
changes, to exclude undocumented migrants for all but basic 
emergency care, prenatal care and paediatric care as well as 
extending co-payment were denounced by some Autonomous 
Governments, including those of Andalusia and Catalonia, to be 
unconstitutional (Legido-Quigley et al 2013: 18).  However, Central 
Government has the framework legislative powers and sets minimum 
standards, thereby limiting Autonomous Governments’ discretion.  
The balance of power in favour of Central Government in relation to 
the Autonomous Governments prior to the 2008 crisis can explain why 
the economic crisis did not fundamentally alter the system of political 
decentralisation in Spain.  The system of distributing competencies is 
strongly ‘deconstitutionalised’, meaning they are largely at the 
discretion of the state (Viver Pi-Sunyer 2010: 88-9).  This unequal 
relationship was recognised in the fieldwork: 
The transfers of competencies are not protected by the 
Constitution.  The State can take them back whenever they 
want. (Author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and 
Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and 
Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya 2015) 
The current secession debate in Catalonia, however, is a very direct 
challenge to the territorial distribution of power. 
6.5.3 THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY THE NATIONAL FINANCIAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The national financial framework has reinforced homogeneity for 
those Autonomous Governments under the common regime.  The 
reliance on Central Government for a significant proportion of revenue 
and the reticence of Autonomous Governments to introduce local 
taxes (as discussed at Chapter Four, Section 4.4) has not engendered 
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variation.  Post 2008, the financial dependency of the Autonomous 
Governments on Central Government has increased, as a result of the 
fiscal policy adopted nationally, and there has been evidence of 
recentralising tendencies in the Rajoy Government going beyond 
fiscal management (see Chapter Four, Section 4.4).   
Conflict situations impose ‘high functioning costs’ on organisations 
(Bel 2015: 50).  In the context of heightened inter-governmental 
tensions, this research revealed a perception that the politicians of the 
Autonomous Governments are indeed being challenged to manage 
the financial constraints as well as maintain a focus on service 
improvement or reform. 
In Catalonia, the Generalitat is also preoccupied with the secession 
question.  Statements by civil servants and politicians obtained in this 
research attest how it is overriding other necessary changes: 
The economic crisis and political crisis has slowed down 
reform. (Author’s interview with Assistant Director General of 
Inspection of Personnel Service, Department of Government 
and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015) 
The debate about secession has overtaken all other interests. 
(Author’s interview with Member of Catalan Parliament and 
Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group, 2015) 
The Plan of Reform is not being implemented.  It has our 
support but nothing is happening.  Everything is being 
overwhelmed by the nationalist debate. (Author’s interview with 
Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015) 
The financial constraints have not resulted in a fundamental 
reappraisal of the way in which the corporate and political 
management arrangements of the Junta and the Generalitat are 
organised.  The economic crisis has not brought about a significant 
movement away from the inherited public administrative paradigm, 
although principles of modernisation are espoused in both, and in the 
case of the Generalitat, have been incorporated into an ambitious set 
of plans for future reform. 
260 
It is possible to interpret this lack of divergence from a path 
dependency perspective.  In most instances governments do what 
they have always done.  More particularly, the way in which 
governments operate is heavily influenced by the past because 
‘governance patterns are supported not only by ideas but also 
institutions that reinforce the status quo and have employees and 
clients’ (Peters, Pierre and Randma-Liiv 2011: 16).  It can be argued 
that crises offer opportunities to make change, to consider options 
which may not otherwise be palatable to the institution or the wider 
public.  However, the evidence of this research suggests that the 
Junta and Generalitat have taken the view that the economic crisis 
may not be the best time to reorganise to create new structures, 
procedures, and processes. 
 
6.6 FACTORS EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES 
6.6.1 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE JUNTA AND THE GENERALITAT 
The previous chapters identified a number of differences between the 
Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia which included 
different budget priorities, per capita spend levels, models of service 
delivery, policies towards Europe and, modernisation and inter-
governmental strategies.  Explanations for these variations are now 
considered. 
6.6.2 THE INFLUENCE OF TERRITORIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
 Economic Differences 
This case study has demonstrated that the differences in the way in 
which the Junta and the Generalitat have established themselves and 
how they operate are reflective of the different characteristics of the 
territories of Andalusia and Catalonia.  It is, for example, the nature of 
the respective economies that has led to the greater emphasis on 
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agriculture and tourism in the Junta’s budget.168  The importance of 
the public sector in Andalusia, both as a key employer and, as 
described by one senior civil servant in the Junta, as ‘a motor of the 
Andalusian economy’, is not mirrored in Catalonia where the private 
sector is more developed (author’s interview with the Director of the 
Andalusian Institute of Public Administration, 2015). In Andalusia, in 
re-establishing the extra payment for public employees, the Minister 
for Finance recognised this measure not only in terms of workers’ 
rights, but also in terms of the contribution of public sector wages to 
the local economy (Lucio 2014). 
The relative wealth of Catalonia, previously referenced, can be seen 
in the ability (and wish) of many Catalans to make financial 
contributions towards their own medical and educational services, via 
health insurance premiums or school fees.  This is less evident in 
Andalusia, where the Junta budget includes provision for community-
support activities, such as tackling social exclusion and promoting 
participation (see Chapter Five Section 5.4).  The relative wealth of 
the Catalan economy is also seen in the apparent citizen acceptability 
of a higher level of Autonomous Government spending per capita than 
in Andalusia (author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and 
Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and 
Knowledge and Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister 
of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015). 
 Civic Tradition 
The greater importance to the Generalitat of the private and third 
sectors has been evidenced in this research.  The third sector, in 
particular, has been described as what makes public services in 
Catalonia different: 
                                               
168 A 2012 report on the Andalusian economy confirmed that activity in services, construction 
and primary sectors was higher as a proportion of the economy in Andalusia than in Spain 
overall and that the industrial sector counted for a lower proportion (Junta de Andalucía 
2012).  
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A further differentiating factor, in the case of Catalonia, is the 
pre-existence of models of service delivery.  In our case, the 
high level of involvement of civil society in public services has 
influenced our form of government.   Our system is ‘singular’. 
(Author’s interview with Director General of Analysis and 
Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of Economy and 
Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015) 
At the time of the Transition, all governments relied on the existing 
non-public sector networks to continue these services (Del Pino 2015: 
25).  In Catalonia, however, a further dimension can be added:  it has 
been an important feature ‘where the state has for decades been 
either absent or hostile’ (Roca 2000: 89).  In a similar vein, the 
traditional importance of the organisations of civil society to the 
Catalan identity and to Catalonia as a stateless nation can be seen in 
the following statement: 
The people of such small advanced stateless nations [as 
Catalonia] must find their collective identity by falling back on 
the institutions of their civil societies, as public and state 
institutions are alien and often hostile to them. (Giner 1980: 12) 
Whilst this quotation is relatively historic, the case study has revealed 
that the centrality of civil society to the Catalan culture is still valid.  It 
can be seen in claims that Catalonia’s rich network of private 
institutions and a strong tradition of citizen participation enabled it to 
persist as a nation without a state, especially during the Franco period 
(McRoberts 2001: 117).169  It is indicative of the importance of this 
sector to note that some Catalan Foundations, created at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, continued their activities in exile 
after 1939 (Roca 2000: 98).  This continued activity would have been 
seen by some as part of the opposition to the Franco regime, helping 
to explain their continued popularity. 
The role of the non-public sector in the delivery of ‘public’ services 
such as health and education is a key element of the Generalitat’s 
view of Catalonia as special and different.  The current scale of the 
                                               
169 There is a rich bibliography, largely in Catalan, on the history of associations and 
voluntary sector bodies in Catalonia, see for example Risques, Duarte, de Riquer and Roig 
Rosich (1997: 416-7) on associations’ response to cultural repression under Franco. 
263 
not-for-profit sector in Catalonia is beyond the scope of this research, 
although there is some evidence that the private sector is overtaking 
the third sector in the provision of public services, especially regarding 
care for the elderly (Del Pino 2015: 26).  In terms of variation between 
the two Autonomous Governments, the third sector is not a feature 
which figured significantly in the Andalusian profile of provision of 
public services.  A contributory factor in a perceived weaker social 
fabric in Andalusia could be the negative impact of mass migration out 
of Andalusia from the 1970s (Porras Nadales 2005: 468).  The 
development of philanthropy in Spain and in particular in Catalonia is 
likely to have been influenced by the early industrialisation and 
associated development of the entrepreneurial class in Catalonia 
which did not happen to the same degree in Andalusia (González de 
Molina and Sevilla Guzmán 1987: 91-3).170   
 Party Politics 
Territorial party politics has also influenced the development of the 
two organs of sub-state government.  PSOE policies prioritise the 
delivery of public services by publicly employed workers.  The 
preference for public SPVs in Andalusia is not replicated in Catalonia 
where the dominance of the Generalitat by right-leaning coalitions 
(CiU) has favoured private and third sector delivery mechanisms.  
Fieldwork also revealed a more explicit focus on women’s issues in 
the PSOE-led Junta, where gender impact assessments are carried 
out, for example, as well as public health funding for sex-change 
operations (author’s interview with Coordinator, Department of 
Planning and Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of Finance and 
Public Administration, Junta de Andalucía 2015).  The turbulence in 
the political system of 2015/2016 resulting in the PSOE gaining fewer 
votes than the PP in Andalusia for the first time and the ECP winning 
more seats than the ERC-CATSI election coalition in Catalonia may 
                                               
170 The differential industrialisation of parts of Spain is noted in Chapter One, Section 3.0, 
but a discussion of the development of philanthropy is beyond the scope of this research. 
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change this pattern in the future.171  However, these patterns have 
been well established and were clearly recognisable during the case 
study research. 
 Geography 
The geographical landscape can influence the character of an area 
such as Andalusia and Catalonia and their respective identities.  For 
example, the physical geography of Andalusia clearly influenced the 
pattern of agricultural organisation of the latifundios with its social-
economic reverberations to the present day.  The physical location of 
Catalonia on the Mediterranean with its proximity to the rest of Europe 
has influenced the way in which Catalonia developed as a sea-faring 
community, not only in terms of its trading relations, but also the 
Catalan culture (Keating, Loughlin and Deschouwer 2003: 43). 
Equally, cultural geographers, with their concern with 
human/environmental relationships, point to the impact of people on 
landscape as the shaping of the earth over time.  In this way, 
landscapes reflect the combined impact of a society’s beliefs, 
practices and technologies (Crang 1998: 15).  Space is understood to 
play an active role in the constitution and reproduction of social 
identities (Valentine 2001: 7).  Humans seek to ‘endow landscape, 
space and place with specific meaning, including that of national or 
regional specificity’ (Davies 2012: 2).   
However, there are dangers in adopting such an approach when 
considering such large and diverse areas such as Andalusia and 
Catalonia.  Its analytical potential can be lost in over-generalisations 
and gross stereotypes.  Local identity can often be lost or ignored.  
Landscape influences over identity may also have been 
overshadowed by political and social–economic factors such as 
industrialisation, democratisation, globalization and the movement of 
                                               
171 2016 General elections results in Andalusia and Catalonia 
http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/.  Accessed 17.07.16. 
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people.  Even the physical, geographical borders are not fixed.  In the 
case of Catalonia there are different views of the extent of Catalonia, 
beyond the constitutional boundaries of the Autonomous Government 
of Catalonia and into neighbouring regions and across national 
borders into France. 
The Catalan First Minister’s announcement (in March 2016) of the 
need to put pressure on the Spanish Government to complete 
necessary infrastructure works to the Mediterranean corridor is a 
useful illustration of the geographical closeness of Catalonia to the 
rest of Europe and the related infrastructure issues (Gilbert 2016).  
The same announcement also confirms points made earlier in the 
discourse analysis of this thesis about the Generalitat’s relationship 
with Spain as it includes references to the failures of the Spanish 
Government, uses the term ‘Spanish State’, not ‘Spain’ and describes 
Catalonia as a ‘country’.  
6.6.3 THE INFLUENCE OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
Both Andalusia and Catalonia have been shown in this research to 
possess strong identities.  This section reflects principally on how that 
identification has influenced the Junta and Generalitat.  It is also true 
that the activities of the Junta and Generalitat have had an impact on 
identity, not only in terms of ‘external’ policy, how they project their 
territory and community, but also in terms of specific policies such as 
education.172   
Both Andalusian and Catalan identities are strong, but the drivers 
behind those identities are distinct and thus the impact of this factor 
was shown to be differential.  In the Junta the principal driver is one 
about community well-being.  The priority is for Andalusia not to be left 
behind, or seen as second class.  It is about addressing centuries of 
under-development and economic disadvantage.  The Junta’s focus is 
on ‘doing’ and not just ‘being’.  Service delivery is important for the 
                                               
172 See for example the 2005 study of Losada and Máiz of the impact of Autonomous 
Governments’ education policies on collective identity. 
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Junta as well as being the representational organ of government for 
the Andalusian community.  This is evidenced in the Statute’s content 
and preamble, in the configuration of the ministries and in the Junta’s 
policy towards the European Union.  In terms of Andalusia’s 
relationship with the rest of Spain, it sees itself as part of Spain, 
finding little contradiction between being Andalusian and Spanish 
(Echavarren Fernández 2014: 29).  In Catalonia the picture is 
different.  
The view of the Generalitat is of Catalonia as a country and as a 
nation.  (A clear distinction is being made here is that it is the stated 
position of the Generalitat.  The position of the people of Catalonia is 
less clear and continues to fluctuate.)  The Generalitat’s view is 
demonstrated in the analysis of the Catalan Statute’s content and 
preamble, in the prominence given to ‘external affairs’ in the 
ministerial structure, (Madrid being seen as ‘external’ alongside New 
York or Brussels for example), and the positioning of the Generalitat’s 
international work and its activities in the EU.  Catalonia’s status as a 
nation is underpinned by the Generalitat’s financial support of the 
Catalan language and promotion of Catalan cultural activities.  The 
cultural policy’s primary function has been described as a ‘nation-
building tool’ (Crameri 2008: 42). 
Catalans see themselves as different, and want to be recognised as 
different.  Higher per capita spend by the Generalitat is justified by the 
desire for Catalans for not only more, but for better public services.  
This driver can be detected in the aspirations for its public 
administrative modernisation policies (‘we looked for a model different 
from that of the Spanish state’ – author’s interview with Director 
General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, Department of 
Economy and Knowledge, and Head of Communications, Cabinet 
Office of Minister of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015).  ‘Being’ and not just ‘doing’ is important to the 
Generalitat.  Being recognised as the Government of Catalonia is 
pivotal to the Generalitat, as well as ensuring the delivery of services.  
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This sense of identification has influenced the way the Generalitat 
operates, and even if secession had not come to dominate current 
debate would continue to influential. 
It is in the Central Government-Autonomous Government relationship 
that the greatest differentiation can be seen.  As previously indicated, 
both the Junta and the Generalitat voiced their complaints about the 
unfairness of the financing system and the impact of Central 
Government macro-economic decisions on their respective territories.  
The failure, as perceived by the two Autonomous Governments, of 
vocal protest to bring about an improvement in the financial 
settlement, has been followed by a divergence in response by the 
Junta and the Generalitat.  Albert O. Hirschman’s model (1970) helps 
illustrate this divergence and provides a framework for explaining the 
different strategic approaches. 
This classic work of economics, which is based on a choice dichotomy 
of exit or voice, has been applied to a wide range of subject areas, 
from employees’ decisions to leave an employer, to the re-location of 
football fans, to investment decisions and nuclear responses to 
Fukushima.173  Although published almost fifty years ago, its prolonged 
relevance is evidenced by its continued use in these many areas of 
research including, and of particular relevance to this thesis, its 
application to public choice in relation to government institutions.174  
The Hirschman model is based on the dichotomy that a dissatisfied 
customer can either articulate their dissatisfaction (so as to achieve 
change or reform) or withdraw their patronage (Hirschman 1970: 4).  
This choice of ‘voice’ over ‘exit’ is related to the availability of 
alternative suppliers, the ease of switching suppliers, and the certainty 
or otherwise of success of the ‘voice’ option in securing reform.  The 
                                               
173 Whitford and Lee (2015); Kiernan (2015); Katselas (2014); and Ramana (2013). 
174 See Hirschman’s own application to the case of East Germany leaving the Soviet bloc 
(1995), and also as deployed by others to this case such as Brubaker (1990). 
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customer’s choice of response is influenced by ‘loyalty’, with the 
propensity to ‘exit’ reduced as loyalty increases (Hirschman 1970: 77). 
In applying this model to this case study, it is argued that the key 
determinant of the choice of strategic positioning by the Autonomous 
Governments in relation to Central Government is that of self-
identification.  Bel applied Hirschman’s model to Catalonia, arguing 
that for many Catalans the voice option was deemed ineffective and 
alternatives were reduced to either assimilation within Spain or 
secession (Bel 2015:  67).  The application of the model in this 
research extends its use in a comparative framework of the 
Autonomous Governments of Catalonia and Andalusia.  In this 
context, the Generalitat is choosing exit because it sees itself not only 
representing a nation but also a state.  The Junta chooses voice as it 
does see itself as part of Spain.  This argument is summarised in the 
figure below. 
Figure 24:  Application of Hirschman’s Exit and Voice Dichotomy 
to Choices of the Junta de Andalucía and Generalitat de Catalunya 
 
Hirschman’s Economic Model 
 
 
Choices of Junta and Generalitat 
 
 
Source:  Author’s elaboration, using Hirschman (1970). 
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Whilst there are limitations to this model, its use does highlight the 
impact of self-identification on the relationship between Central 
Government and the Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and 
Catalonia.  The strategic responses of the Junta and the Generalitat 
reflect the influence of a range of factors, not only self-identification 
but also allegiances to political parties, locally and nationally.  The 
PSOE, as the dominant force in politics in Andalusia for example is 
clearly a national political party, with interests across the whole of 
Spain, not just in Andalusia.  It is unsurprising therefore that they are 
not advocating secession from the rest of Spain (despite the weak 
position that an isolated PSOE-controlled Autonomous Government 
has in relation to a PP Central Government).  The economic position 
of Andalusia, as previously discussed, is the background from which 
the Junta has always argued for ‘solidarity’ across Spain.  The Junta 
seeks recognition of the need for support from the rest of Spain to 
address their historically underdeveloped economy. 
The opposite is the case for Catalonia, both in terms of the economy 
and the dominant political party.  In contrast with the dominance of the 
PSOE in the Junta, the Generalitat has been dominated by Catalonia-
only parties and party coalitions.  The CiU entered into numerous 
pacts with successive national governments of all political ideologies, 
including support for the PSOE Governments between 1993 and 1996 
and the PP Governments of 1996-2000 (Llamazares and Marks 2006: 
250).  This focus on Catalonia has continued after the dissolution of 
the coalition in 2015 (when one of the partners, Unió, lost all 13 of its 
seats in Catalan regional elections in 2015 following it split from CDC) 
with the creation of a new pro-secession electoral coalition of ERC-
CATSI.175  The size and relative wealth of the Catalan economy is 
such that secessionists have made the argument that Catalonia would 
be financially advantaged as a separate state. In particular, 
dissatisfaction in Catalonia with the Madrid Government has been 
                                               
175 http://ccaa.elpais.com/ccaa/2015/06/18/catalunya/1434618723_909552.html.  Accessed 
13.07.16. 
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intensified by controversy over the fiscal imbalance between tax 
revenues transferred out of Catalonia to Madrid and the resources 
transferred back to Catalonia from Madrid (Burg 2015: 293).   
In the use of Hirschman’s model in this way, consideration also needs 
to be given to changes over time.  In the period before the 2016 
General Elections the economy of Spain continued to be weak, having 
failed again to meet the 2015 budget deficit target agreed with the 
European Commission.176  The outcome of the 2016 general elections 
and its impact, particularly in relation to Catalonia, is unclear.  ‘The 
Catalan question’ has been a key negotiating – and sticking – point in 
agreeing any coalition government.177  Moreover the level of public 
support for secession may fall or rise in the future.  The dichotomies of 
such models also ignore ‘mid-way’ points.  The voice option is still 
being used by groups in Catalonia, making calls for a better deal for 
Catalonia within Spain:  ‘We want to renegotiate the financial 
settlement with Central Government, but within the Spanish state 
framework.  We want to continue to be Spaniards’ (author’s interview 
with Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament, 2015).   
The question within the context of this research is what impact does 
this strategic positioning have on the management of public services 
of the Junta and the Generalitat?  This case study, and specifically the 
statements of individuals involved in both Autonomous Governments, 
provide evidence that the strategic positions taken by the leaders 
have had limited impact on the way services are currently run.  The 
exception to this evaluation is the stated uncertainty felt by employees 
for their futures, for their pensions for example (author’s interview with 
Assistant Director General of Inspection of Personnel Service, 
                                               
176 http://www.blog.rielcano.org/en/spains-failure-yet-again-to-meet-budget-deficit-target-
strains-relations-with-brussels/.  Accessed 25.04.16. 
177 A commitment not to hold a referendum on independence for Catalonia was one of the 
points of a possible agreement between PSOE and Cs during the negotiation period 
following the December 2015 elections and the calling of further national elections in June 
2016.  www.ciudadanos-cs.org/var/public/sections/page-home/acuerdo-gobierno-reformista-
y-de-progreso-2016.pdf?__v=204_0.  Accessed 22.05.16. 
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Department of Government and Institutional Relations, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 2015). 
 
6.7 LIMITED DEGREE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE 
DIFFERENTIATION 
6.7.1 CHALLENGING AND RE-EVALUATING THE INITIAL HYPOTHESIS 
The initial hypothesis for this research was that Spain’s contemporary 
decentralisation would result in public administrative differentiation.  
The study has argued that differences do exist between the two sub-
state Governments of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya.  Divergence in relation to some spending priorities and 
service delivery models have been shown to exist, influenced by a 
range of factors, particularly territory, relative wealth, culture and self-
identification.  However, this research demonstrates that there is 
limited variation between the Junta and the Generalitat in terms of 
their organisational structures, the roles of politicians, public 
employment patterns, tactical responses to the economic crisis, 
respective policy priorities, and overall budget profiles. 
This is an initially surprising finding for three reasons.  Firstly, the 
territories and identities of Andalusia and Catalonia exhibit their own 
distinctive characteristics as outlined earlier in this thesis.  Secondly, it 
is anticipated that the decentralisation of public services is an enabler 
of adaptation to local needs (see Chapter Three, Section 3.3.3).  
Furthermore, the nature of the services for which Autonomous 
Governments are responsible, including health, social services and 
education, are highly ‘person-centred’ services, and so could be 
expected to be tailored to local need.  Thirdly, the degree of 
decentralisation to the State of the Autonomies is widely recognised 
as extensive, Spain being described as ‘one of the most decentralised 
[countries] in Europe’ (Colomer 1998: 40).  In theory, decentralising 
public services would have allowed for significant scope for variation, 
if so desired.   
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6.7.2 FACTORS FOR HOMOGENEITY  
The lack of variation has been attributed in this research to the 
homogenising effect of a range of factors.  Those factors include the 
national constitutional and institutional framework, the financing 
regime and the Spanish political culture.  The dominant factor was 
found to be the Napoleonic tradition.  This administrative tradition 
pertained at the time of the creation of the State of the Autonomies 
and has continued to be the underlying paradigm in Spain’s public 
administration to the current day, despite stated aspiration by the 
Autonomous Governments for reform. 
The response of both Autonomous Governments to the early stages 
of the economic crisis post-2008 has been shown to have been 
influenced by these homogenising factors, revealed in the 
implementation of a similar range of economic stimulus measures, 
followed by a series of incremental budget reductions, rather than a 
fundamental review of priorities and working practices.  Indeed, it has 
been argued that there has been a re-centralisation following the post-
2008 crisis (Colino, Molina and Hombrado 2014; Muro 2015), 
suggesting even greater homogeneity.  In the case of the Generalitat, 
its identification of Catalonia as a nation without a state has been 
fundamental to a subsequent divergence of the Generalitat from other 
Autonomous Governments in its response to the economic crisis.  Its 
self-identity has been instrumental (although not the only factor) in 
transforming a general opposition to Central Government macro-
economic policies, an opposition it shared with other Autonomous 
Governments including the Junta, into a rejection of the territorial 
distribution of power in Spain and a determination for secession. 
This case study also examined the approach to and progress with 
public administration reform within the Junta and Generalitat to assist 
the analysis of the differences and similarities between the two 
Autonomous Governments.  Specifically it examined the prospects for 
adaptation to local needs and variations from the public administrative 
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pattern shared with other Autonomous Governments.  The case study 
found progress on reform to be limited in terms of corporate and 
political management.  In the case of a corporate and strategic reform 
plan for the Junta, its publication was deferred three times during the 
course of this research.  The Generalitat’s Reform Plan is published 
and elements are being implemented.  However, with limited 
dedicated resources and the current uncertainty about the future 
constitutional status of Catalonia, it is difficult to envisage rapid 
progress being made.  Implementation of change, as demonstrated in 
this research, is constrained by a number of the features of the 
Napoleonic Administrative tradition as applied in the Junta and 
Generalitat, 
In conclusion therefore, whilst differences do exist in terms of some 
spending priorities, per capita spending levels, preferred service 
delivery models and modernisation strategies, the hypothesis that 
Spain’s contemporary decentralisation would result in public 
administrative differentiation in the corporate and political 
management arrangements has been not been proved. In the words 
of a leading opposition politician in Andalusia: 
Each territory may have its own culture, its own history but this 
does not mean that there should be differences in our public 
services. (Author’s interview with First Minister of Ciudadanos 
Group, Parliament of Andalusia, 2015) 
The most significant factors influencing the lack of variation evidenced 
have been the continued effect of the inherited administrative tradition, 
operating within the Spain-wide constitutional, financial and 
institutional context.  These factors also explain the initial (and in the 
case of the Junta, the continued) response of the two Autonomous 
Governments to the post-2008 economic crisis and Central 
Government’s macro-economic policies.  The influence of strong self-
identity as a nation can be seen in the subsequent, and divergent, 
development of the Generalitat’s response as the financial dispute 
contributed to the growth of the secession movement.  This research 
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provides explanations for the unexpectedly high degree of 
homogeneity in the corporate political and management arrangements 
across two Autonomous Governments, despite the fact that they each 
serve a very different community. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
7.1.1 THE IMPACT OF DECENTRALISATION ON AUTONOMOUS 
GOVERNMENTS RE-EVALUATED 
This research brings an original focus on the corporate and political 
management arrangements of the Autonomous Governments of 
Andalusia and Catalonia, re-evaluating the impact of decentralisation.  
Through means of a comparative framework, it highlights the 
differences and similarities between the Junta de Andalucía and the 
Generalitat de Catalunya, and analyses the factors which have 
influenced the structures, policies, procedures, overall budget profiles, 
and priorities which make up the strategic architecture of these sub-
state governments.  It interprets the public administrative features of 
these two territories, placing this interpretation in an historical context 
and within the academic study of public administration.  The research 
examines to what extent the post-Franco decentralisation of decision-
making powers has resulted in different approaches and 
configurations of sub-state government.  It tests the initial hypothesis 
that Spain’s contemporary decentralisation would result at sub-state 
level in public administrative differentiation, as defined in the 
introduction, ‘the degree of variation between the institutional 
arrangements, in this case, of the Junta and the Generalitat, in terms 
of their internal, organisational structures, policies, practices and 
processes’. 
7.1.2 MULTIPLE GROUNDS FOR ACADEMIC INTEREST 
The focus of the research is justified on a number of grounds.  First of 
all, it is an under-researched area, as set out in the introduction to this 
thesis.  Studies have already been carried out of the overall system of 
decentralised government in Spain, as well as of individual 
Autonomous Governments or specific services, but a comparison of 
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the core corporate functions (the ‘corporate and political management 
arrangements’ as defined in the introduction) of two similar 
Autonomous Governments has not previously been undertaken.  
Secondly, the Autonomous Governments of Spain constitute an 
important new tier of the country’s public administration.  They 
possess substantial powers and resources, are responsible for a 
significant proportion of public expenditure and for the delivery of key 
public services including health, education and social services, and 
are major employers.  Thirdly, Spain is currently in a time of political 
and administrative turbulence, following the post-2008 economic crisis 
which has brought new challenges to the politicians and civil servants 
who run the Autonomous Governments and the inconclusive general 
elections of 2015 and 2016.  As can be seen from the figure below, 
the two-party dominance of the political system has been broken, the 
PP and PSOE winning just 222 out of 350 seats, by the emergence of 
the new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos (Rodon and Hierro 2016).  
By way of contrast, back in 1982, the two leading parties won 309 out 
of the 350 seats. 
Figure 25:  Spanish General Elections Results (2015 and 2016) 
 
Source:  El País (02.07.16). 
The ‘Catalan question’, regarding the future governance of a 
Catalonia in or out of Spain, is a dominant theme of public debate and 
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the economic outlook continues to be challenging (González 2016). 
All of these factors suggest that it is now timely to reflect on the 
operation of the Autonomous Governments after a period of almost 
forty years’ existence.  
The examination of public management at sub-state level also 
provided an opportunity to utilise the researcher’s personal experience 
of senior, strategic management in the UK public sector, enabling an 
‘insider’ expertise, albeit from an Anglo-Saxon administrative 
perspective, to be exploited in the investigation of policy and practice 
in a Southern European state. 
7.1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESIS  
A review of existing literature on the development of Spain as a nation 
and a state, and on public administrative studies, provided an 
historical and theoretical context to the case study of the Junta and 
the Generalitat (Chapters One and Two).  An initial investigation of 
existing literature about these two Governments suggested that the 
original thesis was in need of reshaping, enabling its development into 
the following research questions to be tested through field work over 
two years in Andalusia and Catalonia:   
To what extent have historical, social, economic and political 
factors influenced the differential development of the 
Autonomous Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia? 
How do these factors help explain the response of these two 
Autonomous Governments to the austerity regime following the 
2008 economic crisis? 
Which factors are the most influential in understanding the 
contemporary corporate and political management 
arrangements of the Junta de Andalucía and the Generalitat de 
Catalunya? 
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The information derived from the fieldwork has been analysed and 
interpreted (Chapters Three and Four), the research questions 
discussed and conclusions drawn (Chapter Six) and the key findings 
are summarised below. 
 
7.2 KEY FINDINGS 
7.2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW AND CASE STUDY SOURCED FINDINGS 
The findings of this research are derived firstly from the review of 
existing literature, which provided the basis for further, and more 
specific, exploration through the case study and secondly from the 
case study itself.  In summary, the investigation of existing literature 
undertaken from the perspective of public administration in today’s 
decentralised Spain demonstrated a history of multiple nationalisms 
but a dominant paradigm of centralism, making the decision as part of 
the post-Franco Transition to decentralise government functions a 
break with the past.  The Spanish model is a union-state rather than a 
federal one, albeit with a high level of decentralisation to the sub-state 
level.  Whilst the current State of the Autonomies is now well 
established, the ambiguity of the ‘end state’ has undoubtedly been the 
source of conflict.  Existing literature revealed strong evidence of 
Spain’s location within the Napoleonic public administrative tradition, 
but a lack of focus on sub-state level government.  It also revealed 
stated aspirations on the part of Central Government to bring about 
administrative reform, but variable success in its implementation. 
The case study provided evidence of the influence of the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition at sub-state level, finding it to be the dominant 
factor in the limited degree of variation between the two Autonomous 
Governments of Andalusia and Catalonia.  Using a combination of 
some quantitative, but predominantly qualitative methods, the 
research has identified some divergence in the corporate and political 
management arrangements, due to the different characteristics of 
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these two areas, but the striking finding is the degree of similarity.  
The case study has provided evidence of limited trajectories of reform, 
despite stated aspirations for change, in both the Junta and the 
Generalitat.  It has isolated strong self-identity as a major influence, 
resulting in distinctive emphases in the way in which the two sub-state 
organs of government operate and present themselves.   
7.2.2 THE EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE NATIONALISMS BUT THE 
HISTORIC DOMINANCE OF CENTRALISM  
While there are different perspectives on the origins of nations 
(predominantly between primordialist and modernist explanations as 
expounded by Smith 1999 and Gellner 2006), Spain has been a 
component part of a Western European political landscape dominated 
by nation-states from the nineteenth century (Loughlin 2011: 46).  The 
concept of plurinationalism is relevant to Spain as it seeks to capture 
the existence of different national societies within a nation-state and is 
recognised in the 1978 Constitution (Requejo and Caminal 2011: 9).  
This concept does not fully reflect the Spanish paradigm, which is 
made up of regions as well as nations – large parts of Spain, such as 
Extremadura or La Rioja, have no aspirations to nationhood.  Spanish 
history has been characterised by a series of divisions, including 
monarchism versus republicanism and liberalism versus 
conservatism, as well as territorial cleavages.  
Despite the recent reduced dominance of the two main political 
parties, the well-established view of the “Two Spains” continues to 
resonate.  Spanish dogmatism has been described as a factor in the 
2016 elections, turning issues into black and white, encouraging a 
culture of confrontation and tension rather than dialogue (Amón 2016).  
Territorial cleavage has been a particular aspect of Spanish history in 
relation to the Basque Country and Catalonia and these parts of Spain 
have enjoyed periods of autonomy in the past.  In the case of 
Catalonia, the fueros or local laws from medieval times, were not 
abolished until 1714 when self-government ended (McRoberts 2001: 
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15).  For other territories such as Andalusia, historically there was little 
autonomy (except as a kingdom in the fifteenth century).  Rather, in 
the case of Andalusia, the relationship between centre and periphery 
has been described in terms of colonialisation (Machado Santiago and 
Kurs 2000: 172).  Although strong sub-state identities have existed in 
some parts of Spain, as demonstrated in the case study, centralism 
has been the dominant paradigm in terms of the territorial pattern of 
government, up to and including the Franco period. 
7.2.3 UNRESOLVED END MODEL FOR THE STATE OF SPAIN 
RESULTING IN CONTINUED TENSION 
The decentralisation of political decision-making, of resources and 
competencies, commencing in the late 1970s, is therefore a relatively 
recent phenomenon for Spain.  Devolution is not unique to Spain:  the 
number of countries transferring authority and resources to sub-state 
government has multiplied in recent decades (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Sandall 2008: 34; Ahmad and Brosio 2009: 1).  However, 
decentralisation was controversial during the Transition, and the 
creation of the State of the Autonomies was the result of compromise, 
a reflection of the widespread desire to reach political agreement 
(Moreno 2001: 60). 
The ambiguity deployed in the Constitution to allow co-existence of 
views about nations and identity (Balfour and Quiroga 2007: 46) left 
the final model of the state undefined and so open to debate, 
challenge and conflict.  During the course of this research, these 
tensions have been shown to continue, particularly in the case of the 
Generalitat, as covered in earlier chapters on the controversy 
surrounding the Constitutional Court’s 2010 ruling on the revised 
Catalan Statute.  Most recently, the negotiations following the 
inconclusive general elections of December 2015 and June 2016 
exposed the divisive nature of the ‘Catalan question’.  The case study 
interviews revealed strong emotions on both side of the debate in both 
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Andalusia and Catalonia, demonstrating that the territorial distribution 
of power in Spain is still unfinished business. 
7.2.4 SPANISH PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS AN EXEMPLAR OF THE 
NAPOLEONIC ADMINISTRATION TRADITION 
The study of comparative public administration provides a number of 
typologies, including a typology of administrative traditions.  Spain is 
firmly located within the Napoleonic Tradition, ‘the closest copy of the 
original model’ (Alba and Navarro 2011: 783), due to its 
characteristics of centralism, uniformity and a legal formality.  A newly 
decentralised Spanish state, reflecting a desire to accommodate the 
strongly articulated aspirations of some territories for autonomy and 
the desire to reverse the centralism of the Franco to deliver 
democracy (Colino 2008: 578), could be expected to result in 
distinctive configurations in each Autonomous Government.  The case 
study does not support this hypothesis.  When key features of the 
institutions of the Junta and Generalitat, both structural and cultural, 
are examined, they demonstrate the continuation of key elements of 
the Napoleonic tradition including its emphasis on administrative law 
and formalism, the blurring of the distinction between the roles of 
politicians and civil servants, its recruitment and employment practices 
and the inheritance of political clientelism. 
Mimetism, the mimicking or copying of the Central Government 
structures and administrative culture existing at the time of their 
creation, was found to be an appropriate description of the approach 
adopted by the Autonomous Governments.  The research confirms 
the overriding and continued influence of the inherited administrative 
tradition on these two Autonomous Governments, placing them 
squarely, alongside Central Government, in both the Napoleonic 
administrative tradition, characterised by formalism and the 
politicisation of bureaucracy, and, to a lesser degree, in the Southern 
European ‘sub-set’, particularly in relation to clientelism.  
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7.2.5 ASPECTS OF DIFFERENTIATION AT SUB-STATE LEVEL 
The research revealed points of divergence between the corporate 
and political management arrangements of the Junta and the 
Generalitat.  In particular, it highlighted a difference in the preferred 
model of service delivery, with a greater reliance on the private and 
third sector for the delivery of public services in Catalonia.  In 
Andalusia the public sector is seen as the motor of the economy, 
underpinned by a PSOE-led Junta commitment to the public provision 
of public services by (predominantly) public employees.  Other 
differences include specific spending priorities, per capital spending 
levels and relations with European institutions.  Many of these 
variations are explained by distinctive cultural and historical 
influences, including different political allegiances (as seen in the 
private/public sector debate for example) or dedicated spending on 
the Catalan language.  Differential geographical and economic 
characteristics of Andalusia and Catalonia can explain a greater focus 
in the Junta’s budget on supporting agriculture and tourism or the 
Generalitat’s cross-boundary work with neighbouring France.  The 
greater prosperity of Catalonia is an explanation offered in the case 
study research of the willingness to fund higher per capita spend by 
the Generalitat. 
Despite these divergences, greater homogeneity than heterogeneity is 
found in terms of structure, policies, budgets and employment 
practices.  The case study uncovered similarities in terms of 
democratic institutions, statute content, ministerial hierarchies, 
executive roles of politicians, definition of departments, civil service 
functions and practices, ministerial-senior civil servant relations, and 
the use of political appointments and arms-length Special Purpose 
Vehicles.  Budget totals and profiles are similar in key aspects (priority 
being given to health, education and social services). Thus it can be 
stated that corporate and political management arrangements do not 
diverge significantly between the Junta and the Generalitat. 
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This research attributes these continuities to three main groups of 
factors.  Firstly, the Spain-wide institutional and constitutional 
framework within which Autonomous Governments operate were 
found to reduce the scope for variation.  This has been a framework 
for competitive relations between Autonomous Governments, as well 
as between Central and Autonomous Governments, reflected in the 
race for competencies and the limited culture of benchmarking and 
sharing of best practice. It is also a context of shared competencies 
between Central Government and Autonomous Government, in which 
Central Government has the framework legislative powers and sets 
minimum standards, thereby limiting Autonomous Governments’ 
discretion.  The financial regime is a further factor in favour of 
homogeneity and has been the source of much intergovernmental 
conflict.  Claims have been made, and are reflected in the case study, 
that the control of finances and the macro-economic policies of the 
Rajoy Government in the wake of 2008 has led to a re-centralisation 
of power, and thereby an enforced greater uniformity. 
Secondly, the political culture in Spain fails to challenge the status quo 
and reduces the influence of individual citizens in relation to public 
administrations.  Factors contributing to this culture include the historic 
dominance of a single political party or coalition (PSOE in the case of 
the Junta and CiU/Catalan coalitions supporting greater autonomy in 
the case of the Generalitat), party cartelisation, corruption, a lack of 
transparency, and the relatively weak customer orientation. 
Thirdly, the case study revealed the public administrative culture to be 
the most powerful force for continuity.  Decentralisation may have 
been a departure from the administrative tradition for Central 
Government, but the devolution of competencies has been shown not 
to have led to significant differentiation to reflect local need and 
aspirations at the sub-state level. 
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7.2.6 LIMITED MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE INHERITED MODEL 
Not only has it been demonstrated that the Autonomous Governments 
copied the Spanish State’s administrative model at the outset, this 
study also proves the absence of subsequent significant movement 
away from those inherited, pre-decentralisation, patterns of public 
administration, even when aspirations for change are voiced.  
Globalisation and europeanisation have influenced the operation of 
public administrations in Spain, but have not altered core 
characteristics.  Reform initiatives have been made by successive 
Central Governments to change or modernise Spanish public 
administration.  While it is clearly possible that slow-moving processes 
of reform may be cumulative and therefore be less obvious (Pierson 
2004:  61), it is widely acknowledged that success in implementation 
has been variable in Spain (Parrado Díez 1996; Ongaro 2009).  The 
case study has provided evidence to extend this conclusion about 
Central Government to the sub-state level. 
Although the Junta and Generalitat have both presented themselves 
as being at the forefront of modernisation, evidence of a fundamental 
reform being implemented has not been found.  The Generalitat has 
stated its wish to move away from the model inherited from Spain and 
has developed a researched, comprehensive and ambitious Reform 
Plan to bring about fundamental change, explicitly stating its intention 
to distinguish itself from the rest of Spain (‘we looked for a model 
different from that of the Spanish state’, author’s interview with 
Director General of Analysis and Monitoring of Public Finances, 
Department of Economy and Knowledge, and Head of 
Communications, Cabinet Office of Minister of Economy and 
Knowledge, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2015).  In Andalusia, specific 
initiatives such as improvements to transparency have been 
introduced.  A more wide-ranging and corporate reform plan has been 
under preparation for a number of years but is yet to be published.  It 
is not known therefore what aspects will be covered, but the drive for 
fundamental reform in the Junta was not uncovered during the case 
285 
study.  Even the extreme test of the post-2008 economic crisis does 
not appear to have brought about a challenge to the status quo in 
terms of the public administrative paradigm, confirming the validity of 
a historical institutionalist interpretation of the influence of the past 
over Spain today.   
7.2.7 THE INFLUENCE OF SELF-IDENTITY ON STYLE AND VOICE 
The interviews carried out for this research, and the thematic analysis 
of those interviews, in addition to an interrogation of the websites, 
provide evidence of how the Generalitat and the Junta demonstrate 
different styles and emphases.  An obvious example is the preferred 
use of Catalan as the official language by the Generalitat, another is 
the distinct web domains (.es for the Junta, .cat for the Generalitat).  
The naming of government departments also reveals differences.  For 
example, the counterpart of the Andalusian Government departments 
‘Presidency and Local Administration’ and ‘Finance and Public 
Administration’ is not in Catalonia ‘Administration’ but ‘Government 
and Institutional Relations’, revealing the Generalitat’s articulation as a 
body of government, alongside other governments.  This research 
attributes the differences to the distinctive self-identity of each 
territory, with the Autonomous Governments giving voice to the 
distinctive Andalusian and Catalan communities. 
Themes of community well-being, provision of services, and solidarity 
with the rest of Spain dominate the Junta discourses, reflecting the 
socio-economic history and political allegiances of Andalusia.  In 
contrast, the Generalitat is directed by a view of Catalonia as a nation, 
where the imperative is to ensure that national status is recognised.  
This difference in approach has been encapsulated in this research as 
a focus on ‘doing’ and not just ‘being’ in the case of the Junta and 
‘being’ and not just ‘doing’ in the case of the Generalitat.  A driver for 
decentralisation policies is the recognition of communities with 
different linguistic and cultural traits (Guinjoan and Rodon 2014: 23).  
The Junta and the Generalitat have each been shown to play a 
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decisive role in relation to identity.  They each provide a vehicle for 
that identity and new political arenas for debate.  In particular, they 
have been instrumental in shaping a debate other than that provided 
by Central Government.   
 
7.3 CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE AND HISPANIC 
STUDIES 
7.3.1 FOCUS ON CORPORATE AND POLITICAL MANAGEMENT AT 
SUB-STATE LEVEL 
This research provides new analysis of the public administrative 
bodies of the sub-state governments of Andalusia and Catalonia in 
terms of their corporate and political management arrangements, 
creating a synthesis of features not previously collated, examining 
them in detail and testing them in a contemporary comparative 
Spanish framework.  To the comparative literature on public 
management, it adds the consideration that whilst decentralisation 
may have reinforced and enhanced some distinctive identities 
between territories in Spain, it does not necessarily result in public 
administrative differentiation.  Other factors, in particular a strong 
administrative tradition, have been shown to exert a powerful 
influence for continuity with the past resulting in greater homogeneity 
than could be expected in such territories so clearly differentiated by 
geography, culture, wealth and party political allegiance.  The main 
analytical contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate how sub-state 
institutions in Spain take their place within the classification of the 
Napoleonic model alongside the widely recognised inclusion of 
Spanish Central Government. 
7.3.2 PRACTITIONER INSIGHT 
The methodology adopted of one-to-one, semi-structured interviews is 
not new.  However, the exploitation of the researcher’s executive 
management experience enabled an informed interviewer, with an 
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objective and independent, non-Spanish perspective, to not only gain 
access to high-ranking politicians and senior civil servants but also, 
with the ability to speak Spanish, to probe responses from a position 
of knowledge of real practice.  This research therefore enriches 
previous academic public administrative studies with a new 
perspective, grounded in first-hand experience.  This new empirical 
work into the detail of strategic operation, not previously undertaken, 
brings insights offered to both the academic world and, as credible 
commentary, to practitioners in Spain.   
7.3.3 INVESTIGATION AT THE CONFLUENCE OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND CATALANIST UPTURN 
The timing of the fieldwork, over two years, in the post-2008 economic 
crisis, as well as the escalated tensions in Catalonia, also enabled 
new, up-to-date insights into the impact on public administration of 
external factors in the former and political factors in the latter.  This 
research found how existing tensions in inter-governmental relations 
were exacerbated in the context of the financial crisis, with the 
competitive nature of the State of the Autonomies and the 
Constitution’s ambiguous territorial division of powers providing fertile 
ground for conflict.  The strategy of vocal opposition and blame 
transference has continued in Andalusia.  The First Minister of the 
Junta, in rejecting the Government’s requirement to freeze spending 
in April 2016, accused the Finance Minister of having an ‘attitude of 
intimidation’ towards Andalusia.178 
In Catalonia, the dispute over finances has contributed to the rise in 
support for the Catalan independence movement, tapping into a 
sentiment held by many Catalans that Spain does not respect 
Catalonia for its difference and that separation would be financially 
advantageous.  The bringing of criminal charges against the former 
                                               
178 http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2016/04/07/actualidad/1460046427_984705.html.  
Accessed 30.04.16. 
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Catalan First Minister, Artur Mas, for the Catalan independence 
referendum can only have exacerbated those sentiments.  Deputy 
First Minister Ortega described the action as ‘a big mistake.  They are 
pushing us further and further away from Spain’ (Burgen 2014). 
7.3.4 TESTING MODELS FROM MULTIPLE DISCIPLINES 
This research tested the Napoleonic administrative model, taken from 
the discipline of Public Administration, in an original way, comparing in 
detail two sub-state Governments in Spain, focusing on corporate 
arrangements, and providing evidence of the model’s continued 
dominance.  It also tested the specific aspect of public administrative 
reform at a sub-state level, identifying how key characteristics of that 
tradition make the current arrangements highly resistant to reform.  
This analysis adds to published work on the resistance of the state-
level model to NPM-inspired reform (for example, Torres and Pina 
2004), demonstrating the existence of a sub-state level gap between 
expressed aspiration for modernisation and actual implementation, 
and attributing that gap to a mismatch of cultures.  The application of 
Hirschman’s economic model to the strategic responses of public 
bodies in relation to the post-2008 economic crisis creates new 
understanding of existing issues.  Hirschman’s model highlights 
loyalty as the main driver of divergence in responses to 
dissatisfaction.  This case study research has demonstrated that, in 
this case of the two Autonomous Governments, self-identity has been 
a major determinant of the response of voice or exit. 
 
7.4 FURTHER RESEARCH POSSIBILITIES 
New and emerging issues worthy of investigation have arisen as a 
result of this study, at both a macro and micro level.  Given the 
centrality of the inherited administrative tradition identified in this case 
study, further research areas present themselves within a Spanish 
context and also an international one.  Within Spain, a comparison of 
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the conclusions of this case study with an Autonomous Government 
controlled by the Partido Popular would reveal whether a congruity 
between the political party of the Autonomous Government and the 
Central Government resulted in a different approach, particularly in 
relation to responses to the post-2008 austerity programme.  The 
evidence of this case study could also be used as the basis for a 
comparative examination of the impact of decentralisation on the 
institutional design of Central Government corporate and political 
management arrangements.  An international canvas offers a 
comparison with developments in France, source of the Napoleonic 
tradition and, a country where decentralisation is also a relatively new 
development (Bezes and Parrado 2013).  A focus on corporate 
management at the sub-state level would contribute to knowledge, 
testing the tension inherent between the unitary, centralised state 
associated with the Napoleonic Tradition and the decentralisation 
policies adopted at the end of the twentieth century.  Similarly, the 
extent to which this inherited tradition has been continued or adapted 
in the former Spanish territories of Latin America, where there was a 
corresponding increase in decentralisation initiated in the same time 
period (Willis, da C. B. Garman and Haggard 1999: 7), would also be 
a focus of fruitful study. 
In addition to providing evidence of the organisational culture of the 
two Autonomous Governments, this research has demonstrated a gap 
between administrative reform aspirations and implementation.  An 
area for further research would be the exploration of any mismatch 
between the evidenced organisational culture at the heart of the Junta 
and Generalitat as reflected in the corporate and political 
management arrangements and the culture pertaining in the actual 
delivery of services.  Is there a different set of values, practices, and 
procedures operating at the ‘sharp end’, demonstrating a distance 
between the centre and the periphery of the Autonomous 
Government?  There is also an interesting geographical dimension to 
be explored within the existing case study subjects:  Andalusia and 
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Catalonia are large territories, with distinct areas.  Cádiz is very 
different from Málaga.  Barcelona is not the same as the areas of 
National Park near the border with France.  Is the impact of place 
differentiated within each sub-state government? 
A third area of research, potentially of interest to practitioners in 
Spain, is performance management.  Central to performance 
management is robust data on activity, including customer feedback.  
The case study revealed limited comparative information for 
performance management purposes.  Similarly, customer feedback 
and engagement in the activities of the Autonomous Government is a 
key component in the management of modern public services, but 
was found to be under-developed at a corporate level in the Junta and 
the Generalitat.  An area for investigation is the extent to which these 
performance management systems are being used not only at an 
individual service level but across the organisation as a whole. 
 
7.5 FUTURE PROSPECTS 
This thesis has argued that the Autonomous Governments of 
Andalusia and Catalonia, created in the wake of the 1978 
Constitution, inherited and have largely retained the administrative 
tradition of the pre-democratic Spanish state.  Spain’s constitutional, 
financial and institutional framework and political culture have also 
been factors in this homogeneity, ensuring limited differentiation 
despite multiple and distinct territorial identities. 
Recent elections have shown that the PP/PSOE dominance at state 
level has been broken and the Constitution’s territorial distribution of 
power has been seriously challenged.  The fact that Rajoy’s team has 
referred to the ‘defence of the unity of Spain and equality for all 
Spaniards’ as a proposed (but unaccepted) shared position for the 
PP, PSOE and Ciudadanos in the post-general elections discussions 
is an indication of the continued importance of the decentralisation 
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project (Casquiera 2016).  The economic recovery is still fragile with 
analysts forecasting that Spain will miss its deficit targets again for 
2016 (González 2016).  Significant changes are also possible at sub-
state level.  As the following tables show, the 2016 general elections 
results may also herald a time of change for Andalusia and Catalonia:  
for the first time in Andalusia, the PP won more votes than the PSOE.  
In Catalonia, ECP (En Comú Podem) won more votes than the ERC-
CATSI coalition. 
If the PP’s success in Andalusia is repeated at the regional elections, 
then the control of the Junta could pass from PSOE hands for the first 
time.  This might have significant ramifications not only for the way in 
which the Junta is run but also for the extensive network of public 
bodies, organisations, and SPVs built up over many decades based 
on a PSOE-led infrastructure. 
 
Figure 26:  General Election Results in Andalusia (2016) 
 
Source:  El País.179 
                                               
179 http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/.  Accessed 
17.07.16 
292 
In Catalonia, the future holds a wider range of possibilities. 
Figure 27:  General Election Results in Catalonia (2016) 
  
Source:  El País.180 
The former CiU coalition parties, Unió and Convergencia, have 
disappeared, replaced by new parties (CDC and PDC respectively) 
(Orquín 2016).  New national parties of Podemos and Ciudadanos, 
with Catalan variants ECP and Ciutadans have emerged.  Conflict 
between the Generalitat and Central Government continues over 
sovereignty.  An early indication of the approach of the new pro-
independence coalition, which was successful in the 2015 elections to 
the Generalitat, was the creation of new ministerial post for Foreign 
Affairs.  This Ministerial portfolio included the task of setting out ‘a 
road map for the constitution of a new state’.181  In July 2016 the 
Catalan Parliament’s resolution to advance the process for 
independence (Unilateral Disconnection Plan) was suspended by the 
Constitutional Court, a decision described as ‘unacceptable’ by the 
                                               
180 http://resultados.elpais.com/elecciones/2016/generales/congreso/01/.  Accessed 
17.07.16. 
181 www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/government/en/pressnotice/290172/raul-romeva-
takes-office-minister-foreign-affairs-institutional-relations-transparency.html.  Accessed 
17.01.16. 
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Catalan First Minister (Piñol 2016).  However, a recent opinion survey 
by the Generalitat showed that between the summer of 2015 and the 
summer of 2016 support for Catalonia as an independent state had 
not shifted from around 40% (CEO 2016).  Support for Catalonia as a 
state within a federal model of Spain, on the other hand, had gained 
increased support (22.2% to 26.5%), at the expense of the option of 
the status quo. 
In the event of secession, what public administrative model will be 
adopted?  What will the implications be for the remaining parts of 
Spain?  The emergence of new political parties has prompted 
discussion about the need for a second Transition in Spain, forty 
years on from the death of Franco (Kassam 2015; Wheeler 2016).  
The second decade of the twenty-first century may be the time for a 
second Transition, not only in terms of party politics, but also in terms 
of public administration in Spain.  
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APPENDIX A 
NAMES AND POSITIONS OF INTERVIEWEES 
AND DATES OF INTERVIEWS 
 
Name Location 
Position 
 
Date 
  
Barcelona 
 
Daniel Garcia Spokesperson, General Workers’ Union of 
Catalonia 
 
29.09.14 
Anonymous Academic, a University in Barcelona 
 
30.09.14 
Carles Ramió Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, 
Barcelona 
 
01.10.14 
Meritxell Masó i 
Carbó 
Secretary General of Administration and 
Public Services, Department of Government 
and Institutional Relations, Generalitat of 
Catalonia 
02.10.14 
  
Seville 
 
Jean Baptiste 
Harguindéguy 
Professor of Political Science, Pablo de 
Olavide University, Seville 
 
29.10.14 
Luis Escribano 
del Vando 
Head of Economic Cooperation, Department 
of Local Administration, Ministry of the First 
Minister and Local Administration, Junta of 
Andalusia 
 
29.10.14 
Rafael Ruiz 
Canto 
Member Andalusian Parliament and Popular 
Party Spokesperson 
 
30.10.14 
Nuria López Secretary for Institutions and Employment, 
Workers’ Commissions 
 
31.10.14 
María Teresa 
Castilla 
Director General of Planning and 
Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administration, Junta of 
Andalusia 
 
03.11.14 
María 
Concepción 
Becerra Bermejo 
Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public 
Administration (in post during 2014) 
 
 
03.11.14 
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Name Location 
Position 
 
Date 
 
Seville 
Javier Escalera 
Gámez 
Coordinator, Department of Planning and 
Organisation of Public Services, Ministry of 
Finance and Public Administration, Junta of 
Andalusia 
 
26.10.15 
Begoña 
Gutiérrez 
Member of Andalusian Parliament and 
Secretary General of Podemos in Seville 
 
26.10.15 
Jean Baptiste 
Harguindéguy 
Professor of Political Science, Pablo de 
Olavide University, Seville 
 
28.10.15 
Núria López Secretary for Institutions and Employment, 
Workers’ Commissions 
 
29.10.15 
José María 
Sánchez Burson 
Director of the Andalusian Institute of Public 
Administration (in post during 2015) 
 
29.10.15 
Juan Marín President of Ciudadanos Group, Parliament 
of Andalusia 
 
29.10.15 
  
Barcelona 
 
 
Alícia Romero Member of Catalan Parliament and 
Assistant Spokesperson, Socialist Group 
 
16.11.15 
Anonymous An academic, University in Barcelona 
 
16.11.15 
Isidre Estivill 
Galdón 
Assistant Director General of Inspection of 
Personnel Service, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, 
Generalitat of Catalonia 
 
17.11.15 
Carles Ramió Professor of Pompeu Fabra University, 
Barcelona 
 
18.11.15 
Esther Vera  
 
Head of Communications, Cabinet Office of 
Minister of Economy and Knowledge, 
Generalitat of Catalonia 
 
18.11.15 
Ivan Planas Director General of Analysis and Monitoring 
of Public Finances, Department of Economy 
and Knowledge, Generalitat of Catalonia 
 
 
18.11.15 
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Name Location 
Position 
 
Date 
Joan Xirau Serra Head of e government, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, 
Generalitat of Catalonia 
 
19.11.15 
Olinda Ania Modernisation Policy Officer, Department of 
Government and Institutional Relations, 
Generalitat of Catalonia 
 
19.11.15 
Laura Vílchez Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament 
 
20.11.15 
Elisabeth 
Valencia 
Ciutadans Member of Catalan Parliament  
 
20.11.15 
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APPENDIX B 
KEY POINTS FROM INTERVIEWS 
 
DANIEL GARCIA 
Impact of the budget 
 Impact of cuts has been enormous, not only in the short term but in 
the medium to long term 
 For public employees there has been a direct reduction in salaries, 
plus a freeze of salaries since 2011 which will continue to 2015 and 
also the complete withdrawal of the extra payment (unilaterally by the 
Generalitat in 2013, 2014 and possibly 2015) 
 Also seen the elimination of extras such as productivity bonuses, meal 
payments etc 
 Temporary staff have been particularly hard hit – in addition to the 
above, reduction of 15% 
 Significant loss of jobs, approx. 35,000 posts 
 Also seen significant externalisations and/or privatisations of services 
 CiU were the first to make cuts and most aggressive 
 All without a Plan, a lack of social priority nor attention to demand or 
needs of vulnerable people 
Impact of independence movement on services 
 None 
Public administrative reform 
 Primarily understood PAR in structural terms 
 Reform is more about aesthetics, image than about value, decisions, 
analysis and planning. 
 There are no strategies, objectives, and a real lack of will to put into 
action 
 Trades unions not been involved, not seen any documentation 
regarding reform 
 There is a need to look at objectives, models of service delivery, 
prioritisation, evaluation, and control to permit a dynamic and flexible 
model, able to adapt and transform to respond to demands and 
changes 
Political/administrative divide 
 High level of clientelism in the Generalitat, via libre designación, 
designación directa (assessors, de confianza), establishment of false 
structures, leading to the entrance of a large number of altos cargos, 
many of whom have little professional experience/background 
 This generates a lack of leadership, management capacity and a high 
dependence and complicity with political power 
 Lack of confidence amongst staff in these bosses and a frustration 
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 Only employees’ professionalism and public service ethos stops the 
worst impact on public services 
 The public are demanding greater transparency, following many cases 
of corruption 
 To do things differently [from current model] in future, there will be a 
need for greater transparency 
Citizens’ perception of public employment 
 Varies according to time and circumstances, but currently has a high 
value because of its stability (albeit less than before) 
 Seen as a desirable job to have because of job security, fixed salary 
 Clarifies that it is not that working conditions in the public sector are 
wonderful, it is just that conditions in the private sector in Spain are so 
poor 
Difference between civil servants and those on labour contracts 
 Civil servants operate in an administrative regime which guarantees 
values of impartiality, independence, neutrality, freedom of action and 
security 
 Those on labour contracts, under the Statute of workers, have fewer 
rights, are subject to political decisions, fewer guarantees and less 
security 
 Big gap between theory and practice 
 Situation is not changing – same as it was 10, 20 years ago 
 Some jobs such as teachers have the same conditions, irrespective of 
the part of Spain in which they work.  Others are different according to 
the Autonomous Government in which work 
 
ANOMYMOUS 
 
Public administrative structures 
 
 Made the point that public administration existed in regions before 
decentralisation and what changed after transfer of competencies in 
the 1980s/90s was not a change in structures but political bosses 
 So structures have stayed the same – due not only to this path 
dependency but also the shared legal framework in which the services 
operated 
 Ramió and Salvador study found structures were the same across 
Autonomous Governments but there were some differences 
Public employment 
 Employment base:  % of funcionario to laboral contracts in public 
employment (Andalusia employs more funcionarios than laborales, 
Catalonia has the reverse) 
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 Some of this is due to the view of the Autonomous Government of the 
role of public employment in the local economy. For example 
Andalusia sees public employment as important in the low presence 
of the private sector in many fields, such as health 
 Use of eventuales.  Catalonia has a ‘nube de cargos eventuales’.  A 
category which allows greater freedom in recruitment 
Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia 
 Differences in services of the welfare state, despite being subject to 
national legislation.  Central Government sets minimum national 
standards, beyond which it is up to each Autonomous Government.  
NB after the transfer of competencies there was an expansion of the 
welfare state, the decisions about these services resting with the 
Autonomous Governments.  
 So following transfer can see differences in ‘catalogue of services and 
coverage’ (but none contradictory to national regulations).  For 
example, sex change operation is covered by public health system in 
Andalusia but not in Catalonia 
 Also difference in the way in which services are managed.  All 
Autonomous Governments expanded health service following transfer, 
but each followed structure they had inherited.  In terms of hospitals 
for example, in Andalusia only had Central Government run hospitals 
and so with transfer, continued as direct public provision.  In 
Catalonia, majority of hospitals were in the ‘not for profit’ sector or 
private sector and so there continues to be indirect provision of public 
health services in Catalonia.  So path dependency very strong 
 In addition to universal primary health provision, individuals can also 
choose to pay for additional services (parallel) via health (mutual) 
assurance.  In Catalonia this is 23% of citizens, in Andalusia around 
5% 
 In services such as social services, which are wholly a competence of 
the Autonomous Governments and not shared with Central 
Government, there is significant variation.  There are no national 
norms 
 Government legislation in 2012 sought to change basis of 
universalism – for example, no access for illegal immigrants, citizens 
who have been out of the country for more than 6 months to pay extra 
on return, most significant is the loss of rights for over 26 year olds if 
they have not, by that age, made (the equivalent of NI) contributions.  
Aspects are being implemented, but slowly 
 ‘Variation between Autonomous Governments is more about models 
of management than catalogues of services’ 
 Also a function of level of Government – so Central Government is 
more concerned with regulation, Autonomous Government and local 
government with service delivery, so Central Government less likely to 
be interested in privatization 
 Ideological stance of party in power is not always determinant of 
model of management  
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Impact of secession debate 
 No evidence that the independence movement is having any impact 
on the running of services – not mentioned in debates 
 
CARLES RAMIÓ 
Blurred line between politics and administration 
 Absolute confusion between politicians and civil servants 
 No dirección pública profesional exists 
 Not regulated by law 
 The political culture, the administrative culture and legal incentives 
lead to a confusion of the political and strictly professional space 
 Leads to bad politics, bad administration and bad governance 
 Invasion of administration by politicians and invasion of political 
sphere by professionals 
 Very many political posts, relatively few professional posts (many DGs 
have less than 20 employees) 
 Especially in Ayuntamientos political posts extend down to operational 
levels and so politicians get involved in operational delivery 
 Also an issue in smaller Autonomous Governments like Rioja 
Grandes cuerpos 
 Aznar in 1996 wanted to reduce the political sphere, wanted to adopt 
a system similar to the British one 
 But in fact grandes cuerpos so powerful that they colonised the 
political posts 
 As a lot of the politicians were civil servants easier to do 
 In Rajoy’s government there are 15 (former) civil servants 
NPM 
 Grands corps model – French/European continental model – old 
fashioned 
 Advantages – well educated, prestigious, meritocratic 
 Disadvantages – fragment public administration, own interests first, 
internecine warfare 
 Transfer of staff at time of transfer of functions – mostly front-line staff, 
not senior civil servants, especially in Catalonia 
 Central Government did not want to transfer their top people – only 4 
people in top ranks of central departments 
 Also issue of status, some did not want to go 
 Less of issue for those Central Government staff already working 
outside of Madrid 
 Path dependency – still copied the central model – it was the only one 
they knew 
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 Despite passage of 30 years, Central Government model still very 
influential 
 State has improved since 1980s, Autonomous Governments have not 
– stagnated 
 As an institution, Catalonia is one of the worst examples, due to: 
o ‘anthropological optimism’ – the view that ‘everything is fine 
here’ 
o Lack of capacity to look elsewhere (for example Europe) 
o No tradition of public administration in Catalonia 
 In terms of EU ranking, Catalonia lowest, Andalusia second lowest 
and Madrid next – biggest are the worst 
 Staff are not trained in the values of the organisation, so employees 
don’t have shared values 
 ‘La Generalitat de Catalunya no es una institución pública, es 
huérfano’ because the concept of an institution encompasses shared 
rules values and rules of the game 
 In fact each department has its own, and values are professional, not 
institutional 
 His article in 2001 in the Revista Democratica de CLAD was very 
critical of NPM in its implementation in Latin countries 
 NPM is based on an assumption that public administration is 
excessively institutionalized and rigid and needs to be relaxed.  May 
be OK for UK and USA but in Spain where institutions are weaker it is 
more complicated 
Response to austerity 
 Lot of privatisation in Spain – been reactive, not proactive 
 Do it because they consider the private sector delivers highest quality 
at lowest cost 
 Started from wrong point – ‘got problems, so privatise’ 
 Don’t consider plan of costs, additional controls etc 
 Response is not part of public administrative reform, not a CiU policy 
priority (was the same under PSOE) 
 Gap between aspiration and delivery – ‘buy the formula, implement 
half’ 
 Only 50% of education and health in public sector hands – tradition in 
Catalonia 
 No transparency in Catalonia, no accountability 
 Citizens see inputs not outputs, don’t see how decisions are made, 
how resources are applied 
 Questions claim of Generalitat that transparency developments (eg 
website) are a ‘great innovation’ – means every 2 months information 
is published on the budget which no one can understand 
 Imbalance between heavy focus on NPM strategies, privatisation, less 
on public arm with focus on transparency, participation 
 No difference between parties of left and right 
 Politicians are not taking advantage of the austerity to reform, or to do 
things differently 
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 Work of the 5 experts was not taken seriously 
 
MERITXELL MESÓ I CARBÓ  
Response to the austerity regime 
 Upon election in 2010 discovered budget in poor state 
o Much debt 
o Many long-term commitments that had to be paid for 
o Investments lasting 50 years 
 Cuts were the only answer 
o Made reductions of 4.6% 
o 20% cut in spending across all ministries (4,000M €) 
o 23% cut in alto cargos (DG, SG) 
o 43% cut in eventuales (confianzas, staff, gabinete) 
o 29% in empresas publicas 
o Stopped all capital investment (roads, schools etc) 
o Cut 7,000 public sector posts in 3.5 years 
 Prioritised social spend, maintaining welfare state 
 For 3 years did not make extra salary payments and removed ‘perks’ 
such as luncheon vouchers 
 Generalitat made greater level of cuts [than other Autonomous 
Governments] 
 We are a rich country and in the past we have helped other parts of 
Spain, but Spain not willing to help us now 
 Government has passed the EU deficit reduction target to the 
Autonomous Governments 
 
Reform of public administration 
 When Autonomous Governments were created in 1980 had no 
choice but to copy state model 
 In times of expansion model was adequate but in times of 
reduction need greater flexibility 
 Need to move with the times 
 Problem now is that the model is rigid 
o Employees not playing multiple roles 
o Not orientated towards citizens 
o Not orientated towards results 
o Still paper based – need to use technology more 
o Still duplication of functions with Central Government (eg 
culture) 
 Need to reform to adapt to the 21st century 
 3 June 2014 agreed plan for reform, based on 9 axes 
 Each has actions – short, medium and long term 
 Need consensus internally, externally and in parliament because 
long term change 
 Not about tackling the current economic crisis but making it fit for 
21st century 
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 Cuts made so far have been made within framework of current 
model, not the new model we want for the future 
 Characteristics of new model include: 
o Transparency 
o Ethical standards 
o Multi skills (flexible workforce) 
 Part of our individuality is the collaboration with the private sector 
 For example in education, have 3 types of school, 100% private, 
100% public, “concertadas” – part funded by the Generalitat and 
part funded by parents 
 This mixed system is “a very good system” 
 Private and public sector each has something to teach the other 
 Eg trying to change the system so that headteachers can choose 
some of their own staff – idea imported from the private sector 
 Also want to change the way in which staff are recruited.  System 
of oposiciones tests things, not aptitudes 
 Got a lot of long term employees.  For them to advance need not 
only knowledge but also abilities and attitudes.  Changing ‘poco a 
poco’ 
 Catalonia is different from others because the Generalitat has a 
package of reform, not just a range of small changes 
Territorial differences 
 At outset most just copied the state 
 Wanted consensus, not rupture 
 Worked for past 20 years, but not anymore 
 We want more, we deserve more 
 Hecho diferencial continues – different language, culture, history and 
geography.  Want this to be recognised and it is not 
Separation of politicians and civil servants 
 We want to reform the model to establish ‘dirección pública 
profesional’ 
 An intermediate layer between the political and bureaucracy, between 
political direction and public management 
 Would have the confidence of the politicians but also be 
knowledgeable about the service 
 What causes conflict now is that the law does not prevent the 
nomination of a alto cargo to a portfolio about which he or she knows 
nothing 
 Different methods of recruitment exist but prefer open advert from 
which a shortlist of professionally qualified candidates would be put 
forward to the politicians for selection.   
 No party affiliation is required, but politicians would have to have 
confidence in the appointee 
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Relations with Central Government 
 Central Government wants to interfere in our business 
 Passing a series of laws which affect our services, eg education 
 Our system based on the Catalan language has worked well for 30 
years, but now they want to change this 
 Collaboration is limited as so many Autonomous Governments are run 
by the PP 
 Senate could be reformed in many aspects. 
 
JEAN-BAPTISTE HARGUINDÉGUY 
Response of Junta to financial crisis 
 Is radical reform suppressed by politicisation of bureaucracy and by 
bureaucratisation of politics, thus leading to maintenance of status 
quo? 
 Response of Junta is more of the same 
 Andalusia uses blame avoidance strategy – its all the fault of the PP 
Government in Madrid and accuse them of using crisis to recentralise 
the state 
 Europe is seen as the political arm of the Troika but Junta still blames 
PP Government for its financial problems 
 Andalusia has been most favoured region in terms of European 
investment, and even with the Eastern European accession, still is 
lobbying and obtaining grants. 
 Concludes that the crisis has exerted not only economic and social 
pressures on Andalusia but also political ones: 
o Limits efficiency of the PSOE to maintain its clientelistic 
networks 
o Isolated Andalusian Government in Spain 
o Modified its vision of Europe 
 But NOT a paradigm shift, rather a recycling of old behaviours, 
specifically the mindset of conflict 
 Junta will not or can not change – whole system is based on the 
clientelistic model based on the protection of the welfare state 
 No willingness to raise local taxes (unpopular) [plus can local people 
afford it is a legitimate question] 
 Domination by PSOE for 35 years 
 PSOE frequently criticised for its clientelist behaviour – most obvious 
example being the ERE scandal when the Junta sought to soften the 
impact of the cuts, allegedly helping their friends and family 
 Corruption of the left is seen as very much about distributing money to 
buy votes.  Corruption of the right is seen as being about commissions 
for public works 
 Are we seeing the end of the PSOE Junta model/dominance of 2 
parties?  Left undermined by loss of TTV channel, savings banks, 
ERE, right by Gurtel corruption  
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State of the Autonomies 
 Despite all Autonomous Governments now having same powers, 
competition still exists – viz Catalonia wanting same economic 
settlement as Basque  
 Lack of effective inter-governmental mechanisms (Senate inadequate, 
sectoral conferences unilateral, conflict via Constitutional Court) 
means reliance on intra party relations which only work, in case of 
Andalusia, if Central Government is PSOE 
 CiU influence increased when Central Government needed CIU 
support in the Cortes 
 Historically been lack of fiscal responsibility on part of Autonomous 
Governments – capacity to decide on spending but not in control of 
income 
 Huge growth in quangos, public businesses etc in all Autonomous 
Governments  
Re-centralisation 
 Re-centralisation by budgetary instruments – FLA to provide 
Autonomous Governments with huge deficits with loans at low 
interest, negotiated with each; CORA to reduce duplication 
 Central Government hold the money so they call the shots 
 Andalusia does not seek new financial powers (as is the case in 
Catalonia), Andalusia and other poor regions are not lobbying for that 
but rather for more money 
 Big difference between Spanish and British system is the politicisation 
of the bureaucracy.  At the top of the hierarchy there is little difference 
in Spain between politicians and civil servants so little challenge from 
civil servants about service/policy decisions, great deal of scope for 
corruption 
 No rule (or least not adhered to) like the restriction on UK public 
servants re involvement in party political activity 
 No “Public service bargain”  
 Measures of recentralisation include; 
o Article 135 – change to Constitution – achieved in 15 days in 
August to address financial stability requirements of Germany 
o FLA to assist Autonomous Governments 
o Some bonds issued 
o PPP – Plan de Pagadores Proveedores – public sector very 
slow to pay so this loan to facilitate speedier payments 
o El FROB – not a recentralisation measure really but a state 
agency to rationalise the bank system  
 Is national variation possible?  Have a national health service in 
Spain but there are variations in quality and quantity.  
Benchmarking info is not really available 
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LUIS ESCRIBANO 
Administrative culture 
 Inherited Napoleonic tradition but major difference between France 
and Spain is the level of decentralisation in Spain following 1978 
Constitution 
 Yes bureaucratic, but has to be because it involves the spending of 
public money and the decisions taken affect citizens lives (big 
companies have the same processes) 
 One of the differences between Spain and Anglo-Saxon countries is in 
latter citizens and Government are on an equal footing before the law.  
In Spain citizen participation is very low 
 Libre designación is a ‘cancer’ 
 At outset (early 1980s) expectation was that DG level would be civil 
servant but in 1988 PSOE Government changed this, allowing each 
pubic admin (at all territorial levels) to determine where line fixed, 
allowing parties to nominate posts 
 So people without relevant knowledge can be running services – ‘un 
horror’ ‘una barbaridad’ 
 There is no political wish to change things 
 No public outrage because they are unaware of what goes on (should 
make it like military service and require all citizens to spend a month 
inside a public administration) 
 ‘la huida del derecho administrativo’  
 Public companies, foundations, agencies – public law does not apply, 
not subject to same controls, no transparency 
 Influence of cuerpos was positive for the citizen – first law of PSOE 
was to eliminate cuerpos, so resulted in unqualified people in charge 
of technical services 
 Issue of capacity in public sector – need experts in Junta, to control 
the work contracted out to private sector  
  
Corruption 
 Why so much corruption?  Widespread corruption in society and fear 
 “Corruption is a cancer here” 
 According to Interpol guidelines, there are 10 elements of organised 
crime.  Andalusia meets 9, excluding only physical violence 
 Much apathy amongst the public 
 If you create a system of weak administrative and financial control, will 
allow corruption 
 Austerity should be an opportunity to reform, but not taken.  
Cartelisation is so strong, society so dependent 
Special Purpose Vehicles 
 Salaries in Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs hereafter) are much 
higher than in civil service 
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 Table showing the number of SPVs in each autonomous community – 
high levels in Andalusia and Catalonia, more than Madrid 
 Some SPVs such as ambulance service are useful – can respond 
quicker, but questions the value of the rest 
 There have been a number of modernisation plans but nothing 
happens 
 SPVs should follow the same rules but they do not, for example 
recruitment should be according to the Constitution, ie by merit, ability 
and open to the public.  In fact ‘a dedo’ 
 
RAFAEL RUIZ CANTO 
PP priorities 
 Principal challenge to Junta is same as all other Autonomous 
Governments and as Spain as a whole – to create employment and 
guarantee the principal of equality in terms of social rights 
 Argues for separation of political direction from management of 
services 
 Citizen have to go through many hoops to get access to services, they 
get fed up 
 ‘administration should be at the service of the citizen, not the reverse’ 
 Lack of IT skills/usage generates inefficiency/duplication, things take 
too long/months 
SPVs 
 Describes high number (‘infinity’) of businesses outside of public law 
but created by Junta (foundations, public companies,) which do not 
appoint on the basis of the Spanish Constitution (principles of equality, 
merit, ability and open to the public) and which are in competition with 
real private sector businesses 
 At the outset less than 3000 civil servants created the framework of 
competencies, but over the years the number of civil servants has 
been reducing while the number in the parallel administration of SPVs 
has been increasing 
 SPVs are full of party appointments, on higher salaries = use of public 
money to ensure votes 
 Transparency is via Camara de Cuentos, but not all aspects are 
mandatory and many things are hidden 
 This model is not illegal, but politicisation is the norm not the 
exception in Andalusia 
 SPV sector is large and salaries are higher than in civil service, 
growing at the expense of the public administration 
 There is a need for the Junta to justify each and every post, ask 
whether they are necessary 
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Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia 
 The only thing that makes Andalusia different from other Autonomous 
Governments is that it has been ruled from day one by the Socialists 
 With regard to secession debate in Catalonia, “I think Catalonia is the 
same as Andalusia, it is Spanish territory” 
 
NÚRIA LÓPEZ 
Financial crisis 
 2 phases to the response of the Junta to the economic crisis – 
measures to stimulate employment and then after 2012, acceptance 
of cuts 
 Great dependence on Central Government transfers – approx. 80% 
 Industry and big companies do not exist here - agriculture and tourism 
dominate 
 Tactic of Junta of complaining to Government re finances has not 
been successful.  Andalusian Government do not achieve anything in 
talks with Central Government 
Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia 
 Unlike Catalonia, Andalusia only wants what it needs (generosidad, 
solidaridad).  For Catalonia it is different – fundamentally it is about 
money 
 Andalusia wants the same rights for all, irrespective of where they live.  
Catalonia wants advantages for itself.  Question of money not 
competencies 
 Salaries always been lower in Andalusia than other parts of Spain 
 Comments on the underdevelopment of Andalusia’s economy.  There 
is a Spain which wants to keep Andalusia as its stereotype – sun, 
fiesta and beach, as a place of leisure. 
 Concerns re return of slavery in the countryside in Andalusia as a 
result of the economic climate 
Public employment 
 Understands public administrative reform as relating to structural 
reform of the levels of government 
 Gave example of payment of funeral costs for civil servant’s family 
following death in service – condition now removed 
 More work, fewer employees create poorer service, enabling 
privatisation 
 Ratio of public employees to population is lower in Spain than the EU 
average 
 SPV sector is not a parallel administration, it is to cover different 
functions (those needing rapid response) and so is complementary. 
Used where bureaucratic apparatus impedes rapid response 
 Employees of this sector are treated differently by the Junta 
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 However, unlike in other parts of the country where this sector is 
privatised, in Andalusia it is still in the public sector 
 Accepted that Spanish public administration could be slow, lacking 
agility and focused on the law, but there are mechanisms that could 
improve things 
 However not got enough people and service depends on resources 
 Also sector has weak controls, few inspectors 
 Problem based on the lack of order in the development of the 
Autonomous Governments. No minimum was set in order not to upset 
the Basques and the Catalans and so each Autonomous Government 
expanded according to its own interests, taking up the maximum 
competencies 
 Description of different employment contracts – no answer as to why 
different contracts apply, recognises that there could be two 
employees doing a similar job, employed on different contracts 
 Only civil servants have potestad administrativa – meaning that they 
can sign or authorise  
 All civil servants share same terms and conditions as covered by 
statute, but there are differences between Autonomous Governments.  
Example given of flexi-working in Andalusia, but this is not a national 
right 
Altos cargos 
 In terms of the blurred line between politicians and civil servants the 
biggest problem is that people can be in position of responsibility for 
services they do not know how to manage 
 Political parties, legitimately want to implement their plans post-
election, and want their own people to make them happen. 
 The job of civil servants is to make sure the rules are followed 
 Political appointees, once no longer de confianza, return to their posts 
in the civil service (or an equivalent is found for them) 
Corruption and transparency 
 Not everyone is corrupt.  If politicians were paid a proper salary there 
might be less corruption 
 A law on transparency will not end corruption.  Longer term issue of 
education, of values.  Citizens need to respect what is theirs.   
 Law on transparency is only about information giving, not involvement 
or participation of the public 
 
MARÍA TERESA CASTILLA 
Budget 
 Priorities of the budget are to promote employment and maintain 
public services and to reduce the deficit each year 
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 Income from Central Government is insufficient.  Drive is to increase 
income by reducing fraud 
 Impact of corruption on reputation.  Usually issue of poor 
management not personal enrichment 
 It is not a problem that politicians without technical knowledge are 
responsible for services – they have a nucleus of public employees to 
help 
 SPVs are valuable to deliver specific government functions, but they 
are still part of the public sector 
 Was the source of conflict in 2010-12 period when civil servants saw 
the SPVs as usurping their jobs 
 Created for specific purposes.  Now in process of reducing and 
increasing controls over them 
Public administrative reform 
 We have different processes of modernisation, plans for quality and 
simplification.  “We are pioneers in reform” 
 Crisis took away our focus on reform.  Want to create a culture of 
continuous improvement, with a focus on the citizen.  Need greater 
focus on evaluation 
 Need groups within each ministry to push change.  Public employees 
are well educated, but need to do more, to improve processes, be 
more efficient.  Want to be more dynamic, creative 
 It’s the civil servants job to plan, evaluate, modify.  The task of those 
on labour contracts, in the SPVs, is the direct provision of services.  
Our challenge is to make the connection between the two. 
 Difficult to break the inertia 
 New reform document should be available at the end of this year 
(December 2014) 
Differences between Autonomous Governments 
 Two phases:  in first phase no difference, in second phase we created 
SPVs, different to rest of Autonomous Governments 
 SPVs are public sector not private sector.  Wanted to protect services 
and employment 
 Only consider using private sector as way of supporting local 
businesses to improve their competitiveness not because they believe 
private sector is better/preferable to the public sector 
 Not so different now – largely a question of size, but also of politics 
and socio-economic factors 
 
MARÍA CONCEPCIÓN BECERRA BERMEJO 
SPVs 
 Agree that Spanish public administration can still be described as part 
of the Napoleonic tradition and that the Autonomous Governments 
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inherited it from Central Government when they were created in the 
1980s 
 Considers that the agencies are more part of the Anglo Saxon 
tradition – didn’t exist in the 1980s but do now 
 Agencies operate in health, culture and infrastructure, not education 
 Difference in contracts – civil servants have job for life and operate in 
a more rigid contractual regime.  Labour contracts are not so rigid 
 Now operate throughout Spain, but esp in Andalusia.  Unlike in Anglo-
Saxon model, they are not independent, operate within the Ministries 
and are kept close.  Are in the public sector 
 Perception when they were created was that they would be more 
agile, provide a more rapid response,. 
 Now they are increasingly being subjected to the same control and 
rule of public law 
 3 years ago a reform law sought to reduce the number of SPVs 
Public sector employment 
 Numbers of posts:  40,000 fixed contracts, including 8000 in health, 
18,000 in others 
 Same conditions for all civil servants across the country 
 Grandes cuerpos more influential in Central Government than in 
Autonomous Governments – not had so long to organise (centuries 
compared with 30 years) 
 In Madrid, with the exception of the minister, all politicians need to 
have been civil servants.  In the event of a change of political power, 
these political appointees return to the civil service 
 In the Junta, some political posts need to have been civil servants 
(especially technical posts) but most do not require it 
Modernisation 
 Junta gone through process of revising costs, what is necessary/what 
is not 
 Need to change – more transparency, less paper 
 Andalusia’s constitution has values (justice, liberty, security and 
political pluralism) 
 There has been tension between the SPVs and the institution of the 
Junta and the SPVs 
 238,000 employees of the Junta, 26,000 in the SPVs 
 Includes 99,000 in health, 95,000 in education 
 National survey of satisfaction for all Autonomous Governments 
 We are working on a revised plan of modernization – but not ready yet 
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JAVIER ESCALERA GÁMEZ 
Reform and cuts 
 Places reform in context of the national programme agreed between 
Central Government and all Autonomous Governments to reduce 
public spending 
 References in Junta budget to sustainability and efficiency measures 
are part of the required plan of savings in each Autonomous 
Governments in context of national programme 
 Lots of cuts to civil servants pay and benefits 
 Focus now is on maintaining the delivey and quality of public services 
and eveloping social policies in the context of severe financial 
restrictions since 2008. 
Altos cargos 
 Legal definition of altos cargos, including those top executives 
responsible for SPVs 
 Eventual and de confianza are the same.  Libre designación is the 
way appointments are made.  When alto cargo tenure ends, so does 
that of eventual 
 In situation where alto cargo is in charge of a function in which they 
have no expertise ‘they rely on the team of civil servants’ 
 Eventuales support the alto cargos but they are not civil servants in 
that they cannot make authorisations such as grants, contracts etc 
 Legal requirements that all alto cargos have background in civil 
service 
 Information in a press release of July 2015 - There is a commitment to 
reducing alto cargos by 10% over the life of this parliament 
Policies 
 In terms of coordination, HR function was centralised in 2010 so 
strategic HR decisions are taken corporately but ‘there is a lot of 
autonomy in health and education’ 
 When asked about joining up services for citizens, response 
concentrated on access issues 
 Zero privatization – priority is direct provision and direct management 
of services 
 Rejects R&S view of more public employees, very few labour 
contracts (26,000) 
 Strategy viz Government has been one of protest but also compliance 
with deficit targets 
Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia 
 Andalusian hymn includes reference to belonging to Spain 
 Partido Andalucista has disappeared and PSOE has taken over as 
nationalist party of Andalusia 
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 Only differences cited apart from copago [payment by the public 
towards cost of medical treatment] is public funding for transsexual 
operations, and (sex) equality implications.  Plus Catalan model of 
contracting out in education and health 
 
BEGOÑA GUTIÉRREZ 
Podemos priorities 
 Priorities are unemployment, housing, education and health 
 Tackling corruption is described as ‘recovering the institutions’ 
 Podemos are putting forward bills re transparency, civil service, 
independence of judiciary and guarantee for housing 
 Services like health are very good but badly managed 
 There is a parallel administration (instrumental, SPVs, libre 
designacion) 
 Describes their approach of one of consensus – what unites us rather 
than what divides us 
Reform 
 Over 30 years never been changed – there would be a conflict of 
interest for them 
 ‘political’ posts work for government not for citizens 
 The Junta is ‘una casa desorganizada’ 
 Wages of civil servants are not great but ‘with dignity’ 
 Since the arrival of Podemos and Ciudadanos, we can put a brake on 
the PSOE as they no longer have a majority  
 ‘no hay voluntad política para cambiar’ 
 Completely against privatisation as citizens end up paying twice 
 Model should be focused on citizens 
 Andalusia is a place of riches, it should be first 
 
JEAN-BAPTISTE HARGUINDÉGUY 
 Attempts to change things have been thwarted by powerful inertia 
(both within political party and trades unions) 
 Revolving doors is an issue  
 Concursos are ineffective – not about problem solving but the 
regurgitating of facts 
 In terms of impetus for improvement INAP [National Institute of Public 
Administration] exists to promote civil service, but no interaction 
between Autonomous Governments 
 Intergovernmental relationships are horizontal (with Central 
Government) not horizontal with other Autonomous Governments 
 There are no agents for change [not the politicians, civil servants, 
public, lobby groups or professional associations] [TU mixed 
motivations] 
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 EGovernment works relatively well –see UN Public admin network 
rankings 
 No sense of competition between Autonomous Governments in terms 
of management/performance 
 Finding comparative data is difficult 
 Part of public administrative culture is lack of consequences for 
actions of civil servants 
 
NÚRIA LÓPEZ 
Public sector employment 
 Civil servants still have not received the re-instated extra pay – 
although it has been announced a number of times! 
 Conditions for civil servants have reduced, but they have maintained a 
quality of employment not shared by other sectors of the economy in 
Andalusia – eg, construction and agriculture 
 Not all public services are provided by public employees (eg home 
helps, emergency control centres) 
 The administrative culture is very conservative.  Interests of some of 
those involved will hinder reform 
 No improvement to the problem of the lack of accountability and 
mobility of civil servants (eg of sideways moves of civil servants to 
improve motivation and productivity not implemented on grounds of 
costs) 
Inter governmental relations and comparisons 
 Lot of tension between political parties and between Autonomous 
Governments 
 Lack of governmental capacity to coordinate etc following transfer of 
competencies to Autonomous Governments.  Central Government 
machinery old fashioned  
 Reason some PP controlled Autonomous Governments have offered 
to re-centralise functions is because of a lack of resources but 
economic crisis has also been used to promote a political wish to re-
create a more centralised model of the state 
 Sees no difference in services as a result of the different 
characteristics of the various autonomous communities 
 (Compared with the Catalans) Andalusians enjoy themselves but also 
work hard.  More generous, have a greater sense of solidarity.  We 
work hard and capable of achieving great things, but we don’t 
publicise it.  We would be embarrassed to do that.  Catalans and 
Madrid people are much better at self-publicity and marketing. 
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JOSÉ MARÍA SÁNCHEZ BURSON 
Differences between Andalusia and Catalonia 
 Andalusian culture is more focused on living, on working to live well.  
Catalans are more likely to work to live.  But it is a cliche 
 Low participation of private sector in public services is because too 
weak in Andalusia 
 There are limited businesses in health and education to provide 
alternative 
 Furthermore, low average incomes in Andalusia mean less disposable 
income to buy private services 
 Plus 30 years PSOE policy based on equality and solidarity 
 Comparisons between Autonomous Governments on services such 
as health are invalid because of involvement of private sector.  Private 
sector only provides services not covered by public sector and so is 
incomplete. 
 E Government is a real success in Andalusia - ‘nearly all services are 
digitized’ 
 Using the sociability of Andalusians – esp young peoples’ use of 
social networks 
 Public sector is a motor of the Andalusian economy [unlike in 
Catalonia] 
Administrative culture 
 Our tradition, our training is based on the legal Napoleonic model.  It 
brings codification and systematic rules 
 DGs are not politicized – all are trained as civil servants 
 Libre designacion – can only choose from civil servants, and still via 
concursos.  Only the appointment of ‘eventuales’ is a free choice 
 There is very little change with the change of politicians 
 Would prefer recruitment and selection process of UK local 
government but would not be possible in Spain 
 Policy diffusion is possible, of País Vasco Autonomous Government 
as they have more resources/research capacity 
Reform 
 SPVs are necessary as they are more flexible than civil servants, 
‘significantly facilitate management’.  Problem is the necessary 
complex control mechanisms  
 Junta is working on a reform programme, but going for maximum staff 
participation so publication will be July 2016 
 Civil servant terms and conditions are broadly the same across the 
country.  An improvement in one Autonomous Government is quickly 
spread by the trades unions to others 
 More difference in health at primary level not hospital.  In Andalusia 
health services are more decentralised than in Catalonia where 80% 
of provision is in Barcelona.  Reflects rural nature of Andalusia 
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 National menu of health services exists onto which a Autonomous 
Government can add  
 
JUAN MARÍN 
Ciudadano perspective on decentralisation 
 In the past regional political parties (such as PNV and CIU) have used 
their position in the national Parliament to secure privileges for some 
autonomous communities.   
 These inequalities are not right for a country such as Spain 
 Not a question of centralising services, but of guaranteeing the same 
service for all citizens – same quality, same rights in all Autonomous 
Governments 
 Time for change since the Constitution of 1978 – society has 
developed, the system of two political parties has now been broken 
 Reform of electoral law needed, as is a consensus in education 
(referred to multiple reforms over past years).  In education Spain is 
20 years behind the rest of Europe 
 “Spain is a single nation, not 17 taifa kingdoms” 
 Multiple languages hinder mobility (in terms of jobs, education) 
 Wants reform in Spain (electoral system, education), but that does not 
mean that everything has to change 
 Each territory may have own culture, history etc but that does not 
mean that there should be differences in public services 
 NB Use of term ‘territory’ for the sub-state level in Spain 
Administrative culture 
 Duplication of administrative work, incompatibility of systems between 
public administrations in national services such as health 
 Administrative culture of Junta is slow and bureaucratic and reform 
needed of structure, HR, staff training and innovation 
 Processes are slow, expensive 
 Politicisation of the bureaucracy is a factor – greater 
professionalization is needed 
 Duplication with SPVs 
 SPVs created for reasons of political clientelism 
 Confirmed weakness of private sector is reason for direct provision of 
public services in Andalusia 
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ALÍCIA ROMERO 
Reform 
 Generalitat has received plenty of expert advice about need for 
reform, but no progress made 
 (Referring to Plan de Reforma) ‘Dicen mucho pero no hacen’ 
 It is much needed as the current culture is very bureaucratic, slow 
 Lot to do, but there is no political appetite for change, for 
modernisation 
 Politicians need to be braver 
 The crisis has been an excuse to reduce the public sector, not used to 
reform 
 The new parties’ solutions are too simplistic, they want to remove 
levels of government – it is easier to tear something down than 
create/build something 
 Work/presence of ayuntamientos has meant there is no pressure on 
the Generalitat to reform (as they deliver many services, public may 
be happy with their public services)  
 Third sector is very important – especially in social services 
Impact of secession debate 
 The debate about secession has overtaken all interest  
 For nationalist parties, all other issues (including administrative 
reform) are secondary.  Also used as a way of hiding responsibility for 
cuts 
 “Spain is the problem” is the mantra of the Generalitat 
 
ANONYMOUS (2) 
Reform of health 
 Health services have changed significantly since Transition – the 
model was created by the Generalitat, it was their ‘political project’ 
 In 1981 there were fewer actors than exist now, the Generalitat acted 
to create new players in the private sector.  As the number/range of 
activities for externalisation increased, new businesses have emerged 
for this work, businesses linked politically 
 This development was not an institutional re-design – it does not need 
to be. Generalitat does not use laws to change things  
 Comparative literature distinguishes between southern European 
countries which legislate a lot and do nothing and Anglo Saxon 
countries which are more agile, less dependent on legislation.  The 
existence of a plan is not an indication that something is happening 
 Nothing has happened on the Plan of Reform.  The existence of a 
document does not equate with reform taking place.  It could be called 
a ‘discurso aprendido’ 
 Use of private sector is not necessarily an indicator of modernisation 
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 Catsalut is headed by someone on same level as DG (and so libre 
designacion) but not required to operate within public (administrative) 
law 
 LOFAGE was a PP 1997 law requiring director generals to have CS 
experience (but exceptions are allowed as long as the case is made in 
the decree to justify exceptions) 
Comparison and competition between Autonomous Governments 
 There is limited means for collaboration between Autonomous 
Governments and limited national comparative information 
 Eg of lack of comparative information:  when Ministry of Health 
(Central Government) was asked for copies of the health plans of all 
Autonomous Governments, the researcher was told that they would 
need to apply to each Autonomous Government, as the Ministry could 
not require the submission of such plans 
 Autonomous Governments are distrustful of Central Government and 
each other – there are no formalised mechanisms for collaboration (no 
federal institutions such as a chamber of territorial representation) 
 
 
ISIDRE ESTIVILL GALDÓN 
Reform 
 Administrative culture here was very influenced by Central 
Government at time of transfer/creation 
 Confirmed the key problems are as identified in the Plan of Reform 
 Economic crisis and political crisis has slowed reform (eg freeze of 
posts meant unable to bring in new recruitment proposals) 
 A number of necessary bills are not yet passed to implement the 
reform 
 There have been opportunities to change, but these have not been 
taken 
 High level of externalisation in Catalonia.  Tradition of third sector has 
influenced party policy 
Public sector employment 
 Perceived lack of flexibility in civil service led to use of labour 
contracts, but in fact the collective agreements can make the labour 
contracted staff more rigid 
 Problem of civil servants’ inflexibility is not just about conditions of 
service, but processes  
 Negative influence of trades unions and cuerpos and politicians on 
reform/change 
 Impetus for change is from politicians 
 Comparison of staff numbers – difficult to comment when unclear 
whether comparing like with like. 
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 No network for collaboration between Autonomous Governments 
exists 
Impact of secession debate 
 Forward planning is not possible in context of political crisis.  Short 
termism – impossible to plan beyond 2 years. 
 Impact on staff of independence debate is not on day to day 
operations, but staff are fearful given uncertain future (pensions etc) 
 
CARLES RAMIÓ 
Comparisons between Autonomous Governments 
 Higher level of university level employees in Catalonia.  Andalusia has 
more administrative (clerical) posts.  This has happened because 
Andalusia used public administration as a employment centre and for 
clientelism 
 At institutional level little difference between Autonomous 
Governments. Despite higher technical ability Generalitat ‘has no 
superior institutional refinement, no greater transparency, no greater 
sophistication in terms of public accountability.  But the discourse is 
much more modern.’ 
 All have copied the (Spanish) State.  Catalonia wanted a model 
different from the State, but did not know what model, so ended up 
copying but not wanting to. 
 No formalised network for collaboration between Autonomous 
Governments, but series of conferences, meetings etc 
 It is the municipalities in Catalonia, esp Barcelona, who are leading 
the way in terms of reform, not the Generalitat 
 Clearly big difference between Catalonia and rest of Autonomous 
Governments is collaboration with private sector in all service areas, 
especially health and education 
 This difference was not driven by the Generalitat, but reflects pre-
existing provision:  Health service was poor under Franco, but wealth 
of area made it possible for Catalans to self organise and self provide.  
So at time of Transition, less public provision to transfer 
 Extensive externalisation, but poor design in terms of capacity for 
planning and control within Generalitat 
 Differences between Autonomous Governments exist but they are in 
the detail, not the substance because they all share the same political 
and administrative culture 
Reform 
 Economic crisis has not been used to reform.  Reductions have been 
made by salami slicing rather than a reappraisal of priorities 
 Plan of Reform is not really happening.  Reform rarely gets past being 
a document in most countries, and it is true in this case too 
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 Reforms that have happened are not real – just want to look good, a 
box ticking exercises (eg transparency) 
 No national comparative analysis  
 Lack of post entry training for civil servants – especially on institutional 
values 
 Public perception is negative about all institutions (including private 
sector ones like El Corte Ingles) so expectations are low of public 
services too 
 Lack of strategic planning at the Generalitat – should be thinking 
about the model needed for after the economic crisis 
 
ESTHER VERA and IVAN PLANAS 
Differences between Autonomous Governments 
 Differentiates between two categories of Autonomous Governments:  
those achieving autonomy via the rapid route and those via the slower 
route.  The former group have had responsibility for services for a 
longer period and so have greater level of development (that is, 
cannot really compare Andalusia and Catalonia with, for example, la 
Rioja) 
 A further differentiating factor, in the case of Catalonia, is the pre-
existence of models of service delivery. ‘In our case, the high level of 
involvement of civil society in public services has influenced our form 
of government.’  Our system is ‘singular’. 
 The challenges are also different:  coordination across the Catalan 
system is more complex because of the different nature of the bodies 
involved – the legal basis is not the same (unlike in Andalusia where 
all are public sector bodies).  There are cultural and organisational 
barriers 
 In social services, both the Junta and Generalitat need to coordinate 
across two levels of government, given the fact that Ayuntamientos 
have competencies in this field 
 In terms of describing the administrative culture of the Generalitat, 
there is no difference in culture [from that of the Junta], but there is a 
difference in the model of service delivery.  Private/public sector 
model is more developed in Catalonia 
The Generalitat’s approach 
 We looked for a model different from that of the Spanish state, 
especially the NPM as operating in the UK.  This does not exist in the 
rest of Spain 
 Catalan society is characterised by high levels of associations, with 
multiple organisations in health, education and social services 
 This dates back to industrial revolution.  Also means of resistance to 
Franco regime - reference made to Escuela Catalana during the 
Republic – Franco may have eliminated the schools, but not the 
associations (neighbours, parents etc) 
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 The financing system does not provide sufficient resources to fund the 
level of services to which Catalans aspire.  They do not want the 
average level of Spain.  So have looked for alternative ways to fund 
this. 
 We do not enjoy a high level of autonomy.  In the case of health, 
education and social services, the set of services are proscribed by 
Central Government and decisions such as which medicines to 
prescribe or the salaries of hospital staff, are made by the State, not 
by the Catalan Government. 
 Central Government relies on its function to ensure territorial 
equilibrium – and so limit the autonomy of Autonomous Governments 
 Level of autonomy limited by Government action in terms of menu of 
services and level of funding.  Limited scope for varying ‘service 
menu’ in health and education – set by government (and enforced via 
financing system) 
 Competencies are not shared – they are 100% CCAA but State can 
take back competencies whenever they want – transfers are not 
protected by the Constitution 
Arguments for greater autonomy 
 The issue for Catalonia is not just about culture and language but also 
about economics.  We explain the financial system to people, they see 
that they give the most through their taxes but receive in return the 
least.  So they are clear that the system is unjust.  Other Autonomous 
Governments may have offered to return some competencies to 
Central Government, but we will never return any functions. 
 “The State tries to characterise the Generalitat’s public 
communications as indoctrination.  This is a joke in bad taste.  There 
is no policy of one directional communication in the Generalitat.  
When we explain, people understand that they pay their taxes and 
they don’t get the services.  Much progress was made after the 
Transition but people feel things are now going backwards.” 
 People can tell who is responsible (State or Generalitat) for which 
service by the language used (in other words,Catalan or not).  Also a 
difference in style – the State is more bureaucratic, reflects the 18th 
century, housed in big imposing buildings.  Generalitat is more 
modern 
 Example given of overseas work.  Generalitat has offices of 
commerce abroad (not embassies) because the state embassies do 
not meet the need of Catalan companies (who by the way are 
responsible for a large percentage of Spain’s exports).  So there is 
some duplication of effort, because the original State ones are 
ineffective.  
 Employees are not affected by the nationalist debate in their day to 
day work.  Long term planning is impossible right now 
 Functions such as communications, HR, budgets, are carried out in 
each ministry (at different scales).  Ministries are autonomous.  
Coordination is by agreement (pactar) 
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Comparative information 
 There is limited comparative information available on a national basis.  
In terms of the production of the annual budget there is a national 
framework, but then it is up to each Autonomous Government to 
determine how it classifies its expenditure (eg administration) 
 National systems have lost their capacity to offer comparative 
information on indicators or outputs for example.  Therefore, 
Generalitat looks for its own (as varies so much from Autonomous 
Government to Autonomous Government to render them unusable) 
and use own historic data for efficiency comparisons 
 
Budget 
 Affected by infrastructure investment by the state and by the 
difference between budgets and liquidations.  More accurate to work 
with the latter but by then analysis is out of date 
 Explanation of debt levels – all about the financing system 
o Date of transfers and financing system – earlier ones did not 
get same rate of inflation as later ones 
o State of infrastructure inherited from the state 
o Impact of sufficiency fund 
o Unable to accommodate/address Catalans’ aspirations for 
higher levels of service 
o 2009 model was based on 2007 (pre crisis) figures and 
predicated on the ‘Mediterranean’ half of Spain (Catalonia, 
Valencia, Murcia, Andalucía) getting significant funds from 
taxes linked to the construction industry.  The other half got 
guarantees of compensation.  They continued to get 
compensation when the crisis hit and Catalonia, along with 
above others, experience plummeting of tax income. 
o So Catalonia had a deficit before, but doubled with the 
economic crisis 
 Catalans want higher level of service and as funding from 
Government is inadequate, they have to support that level with their 
own money 
 
 
JOAN XIRAU SERRA and OLINDA ANIA 
Reform 
 Plan of reform agreed in July 2014 so too early to see change 
 The diagnosis of the Plan is that the culture is bureaucratic, not 
focused on results, poor on evaluation, lacking in transparency, not 
focused on citizens 
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 No explicit cross party support - Parliament described as neutral in as 
much as no significant opposition, is really a Generalitat project [calls 
into question the embeddedness of the change and the lack of 
consensus building] 
 However, two out of four necessary laws have been approved – 
transparency and simplification. DPP (senior public management) is a 
bill in parliament now 
 Trades unions not supportive – difficult context of cuts, pay 
reductions, deletions of posts etc.  TU perspective is short term, this 
reform is long term 
 If change of political control, do not know if the plan would continue – 
different priorities – lack of building of consensus 
 Uncertain context – politically and in terms of financing 
 Lack of progress also due to change in minister – so lost 2/3 months 
 Some reform work can continue, others not 
 In terms of collaboration with other Autonomous Governments, 
reference made to commissions for discussion, exchange at different 
levels and in each section, but not in area of reform 
 But CORA just about reducing spend 
 Recognition that lack of own indicators hinders confidence about 
progress.  Need to systemise more to check on track 
 Describe plan of reform as not being about efficiency (for which can 
have measures).  More complicated as it is about changing 
perceptions and culture.  Do not have clear outcomes 
 Limited dedicated resources in terms of budget or staffing.  Reform 
can not cost anything, must be met within existing budgets 
 Recognition that without people and budget at centre, progress will be 
made at the pace of the slowest 
 ‘Need to convince the politicians that we have to change not so much 
to save money but to be better’. 
E govt 
 There has been a big increase in the use of IT for transactions  
 No formalised way to get citizens’ views on e administration changes  
 Use English terms to describe concept of front office/back office 
Differences in Catalonia 
 In terms of the Catalan identity, it is the importance of civil society 
which makes Catalonia different from other Autonomous 
Governments and from the state, particularly in terms of delivery of 
public services 
 Has historic basis – history of poor public investment, so when 
transfer of competencies started, civil society started to self organise, 
creating bodies within the church and the private sector.  These were 
then incorporated 
 No tradition of Catalans seeking a civil service career as in other parts 
of Spain 
 Responsibility for police and prisons adds a further difference 
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 History matters – self Government, culture, language, and impact of 
Barcelona as a big, modern city 
 Photos of ministers on walls of public offices across Spain.  Have 
these in Catalonia, only here they include photos of ministers from the 
1930s too, the first period of autonomous government. 
 
 
LAURA VÍLCHEZ and ELISABETH VALENCIA  
SPVs 
 Very critical of duplication of levels of local government, of duplication 
with SPVs and of corruption levels.  This overlapping needs to be 
reformed 
 SPVs are just there to provide jobs and advance [Catalan] nationalist 
argument 
 Referred to previous context of the domination by two political parties 
in which ‘structures were created to give jobs to people linked to the 
parties in government’ 
 A case for SPVs can be made, but need proper control mechanisms 
over spend, management and potential conflicts of interest 
Ciutadan priorities 
 Their focus is on the citizen and the services they receive – this is not 
a territorial issue 
 First step is the reform of public administrations 
 Nationalist debate has been used to divert attention away from the 
failings of the Generalitat 
 Want to renegotiate financial settlement with Central Government, but 
within Spanish state framework.  ‘We want to continue to be 
Spaniards’ 
 Culture of Catalonia is open, hard-working, entrepreneurial 
 Only Catalan is taught in schools, pupils only get 2 hours of Castilian 
per week 
 In describing the culture of Catalonia, they refer to it as a país or 
country (not a region or a nation) and use the term ‘radicalisation’ to 
refer to the work of the Generalitat in recent years (5) to convince the 
public of the value of independence 
 Ciutadans’ model is one of solidarity with the rest of Spain.  They want 
a model similar to that of Germany, with a Central Government and 
autonomous communities, based on cooperation between 
Autonomous Governments 
 Generalitat does not favour cooperation.  Narrative is of ‘Spain robs 
us’, ‘Spain treats us really badly’, ‘life will be better under 
independence’.  Independence is seen as the magic bullet 
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Reform 
 Nothing is happening in terms of plan of reform – all too busy with 
nationalist debate 
 Got no support from other parties for their 10 point plan – so nothing 
happened, but now they are “a force for opposition” 
 Describe the Catalan Parliament as paralysed, not properly 
constituted [during negotiations between parties on the position of the 
Presidency] 
 Want to eliminate most ‘puestos a dedo’  
 These posts are not just a financial problem, but also a problem of 
transparency 
 Despite nationalist debate, workers get on with delivering services 
 Plan of Reform is not being applied.  It has our support but nothing is 
happening.  Everything overwhelmed by the nationalism debate and 
culture of nationalism 
 Catalonia has a ‘tejido de asociaciones’ – important part of the 
Catalan culture. In describing the culture of Catalonia, they refer to it 
as a país or country (not a region or a nation) and use the term 
‘radicalisation’ to refer to the work of the Generalitat in recent years 
(5) to convince the public of the value of independence 
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APPENDIX C 
CORRESPONDENCE FROM THE GENERALITAT (July 2015) 
From: Vera Garcia, Esther <everag@gencat.cat> 
Sent: 21 July 2015 12:27 
To: jill.dixon 
Cc: Giles Tremlett 
Subject: los presupuestos de la Generalitat 2015  
Estimados Gilles i JIll, 
Adjunto el documento que hemos preparado contestando las preguntas iniciales y 
aportando algunos datos que creemos que son de interés.  Si queda algo por responder lo 
haremos encantados. Los técnicos del departamento de economia estan a vuestra 
disposición. Si necesitais las respuestas en inglés os las traducimos. Os las envio en 
castellano para ir más rápido, porque es como me las acaban de pasar desde la Dirección 
General de Presupuestos. 
Cordialmente 
Esther 
Esther Vera Garcia  
Cap de l’Oficina de Comunicació  
Gabinet del Conseller 
Departament d’Economia i Coneixement 
 
Rambla de Catalunya, 19-21 | 08007 Barcelona | Tel. 933162271 | Fax 933162140 
everag@gencat.cat | http://www20.gencat.cat/portal/site/economia 
 
 
 
De: jill.dixon [mailto:jill2.dixon@northumbria.ac.uk]  
Enviat: dimarts, 21 / juliol / 2015 12:40 
Per a: Vera Garcia, Esther 
A/c: Giles Tremlett 
Tema: los presupuestos de la Generalitat 2015 
Estimada Señora Vera García 
Mi colega, Giles Tremlett, le envió mi análisis, muy preliminar, de los presupuestos de la 
Generalitat y de la Junta de Andalucía.  Adjunta, para facilitar la referencia, es la tabla 
comparativa.  Las fuentes originales son: 
http://aplicacions.economia.gencat.cat/wpres/AppPHP/2015/pdf/QRESUM.pdf 
http://www.juntadeandalucia.es/haciendayadministracionpublica/planif_presup/presupue
sto2015/IEF/ief-3.pdf 
Mis preguntas son las siguientes: 
Los gastos de administración general de la Generalitat parecen significativamente más altos 
que los de la Junta y me interesarían mucho las razones. 
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¿Es la diferencia de gasto en de la protección civil y la justicia un reflejo de la competencia 
catalán para la policía y las prisiones (la que no se ejerce la Junta)? 
En cuanto a los transportes, me interesarían las razones por la diferencia importante entre 
la Generalitat y la Junta. ¿Es que las carreteras andaluzas siguen financiadas por 
subvenciones de la UE, por ejemplo? ¿O se refleje la financiación de las autovías de peaje 
en Catalunya? 
¿Son los gastos ‘credit oficial i sector financer’ en Catalunya igual a ‘regulación económica y 
financiera’ en Andalucía? Si es así, ¿por qué hay una diferencia tan grande? 
Por último, la deuda pública es mucho mayor que la de la Junta (y más alta que la provisión 
catalana de 2014). Además, no sé si la contingencia de la Generalitat (de nuevo 
significativamente más altos que el año pasado) sea para necesidades desconocidas o si 
hay una razón específica. 
No soy contadora, y entiendo que hay un montón de detalles bajo las cifras grandes en mi 
tabla sumaria.  Lo que me interesa es como los presupuestos se reflejan las prioridades de 
la Generalitat y de la Junta, y donde existen las diferencias importantes. 
Muchas gracias por su ayuda 
Atentamente 
Jill Dixon (Sra) 
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Comparación entre los presupuestos de Catalunya y Andalucía 
Introducción 
Para comparar los presupuestos de Catalunya y Andalucía es importante tener en 
cuenta algunos aspectos: 
Resultados del modelo de financiación 2012(*) 
 M€  €/hab   Índice  Ranking 
 
Capacidad 
tributaria Total  
Capacidad 
tributaria Total  
Capacidad 
tributaria Total  
Cap. 
tribut Total 
Madrid 16.728 13.208  2.574 2.032  135,7 94,5  1 12 
Baleares 2.627 2.407  2.347 2.150  123,7 100,0  2 9 
Catalunya 17.056 16.091  2.253 2.125  118,7 98,8  3 10 
Aragón 2.941 3.363  2.180 2.492  114,9 115,9  4 4 
Cantabria 1.270 1.592  2.139 2.681  112,8 124,7  5 1 
Asturias 2.208 2.607  2.049 2.420  108,0 112,5  6 6 
La Rioja 635 820  1.963 2.535  103,4 117,9  7 2 
Castilla y 
León 4.867 6.335  1.911 2.488  100,7 115,7  8 5 
Valencia 9.055 10.354  1.765 2.019  93,0 93,9  9 13 
Galicia 4.896 6.634  1.760 2.385  92,8 110,9  10 7 
            
Castilla-La 
Mancha 3.408 4.710  1.606 2.219  84,6 103,2  11 8 
Murcia 2.312 2.966  1.568 2.012  82,7 93,6  12 14 
Andalucía 12.703 17.215  1.503 2.037  79,2 94,7  13 11 
Extremadura 1.600 2.786  1.444 2.514  76,1 116,9  14 3 
Canarias 1.674 4.085  790 1.928  41,6 89,7  15 15 
TOTAL 83.980 95.174  1.897 2.150  100,0 100,0      
(*) En términos normativos y competencialmente homogéneos 
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 - Los ingresos derivados del modelo de financiación autonómica. A pesar de 
que en términos per cápita los recursos del modelo de financiación son similares para 
las dos comunidades, en términos de aportación de recursos Catalunya ocupa la 3ª 
posición de la ordenación de las CCAA de régimen común, mientras que Andalucía 
ocupa la posición 13ª. Ambas CCAA tienen unos recursos per cápita inferiores a la 
media, pero en el caso de Catalunya la situación es incoherente, ya que su capacidad 
fiscal es un 19% superior a la media, mientras que la aportación de Andalucía es 
muy inferior.  
- El impacto del gasto financiero. Hay que tener en cuenta que el gasto financiero 
(capítulos 8 y 9) y, muy especialmente, el capítulo de pasivos financieros (deuda), 
altera las cifras reales del presupuesto, entendidas como el gasto efectivo de los 
departamentos (nóminas, inversiones, gastos corrientes de funcionamiento de la 
administración, etc). Así, mientras que en el presupuesto consolidado de Catalunya 
el capítulo de deuda asciende a 6.468 millones de euros, en Andalucía éste es sólo 
de 1.875 millones. Si excluimos los dos capítulos de gasto financiero, el presupuesto 
consolidado de Catalunya es de 29.878M, mientras que el de Andalucía es de 
27.653M.  
Cabe destacar que, desde el año 2011, y gracias al esfuerzo sostenido para reducir 
su déficit público, Catalunya ha logrado contener considerablemente el ritmo de 
crecimiento de su deuda.  
Incremento anual de la deuda de la Generalitat (ESA terms) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
24,3% 36,6% 32% 19,4% 14,7% 12,3% 
- El pago de intereses de la deuda. Como consecuencia del elevado volumen de 
su deuda, el gasto en intereses (capítulo 3 del presupuesto) de la Generalitat de 
Catalunya en 2015 (2.055M), también es mucho más elevado que el de la Junta de 
Andalucía (869M).  
- Los compromisos de financiación diferida. En los últimos años Catalunya 
apenas ha realizado nuevas inversiones en infraestructuras, ya que todavía está 
pagando los compromisos de inversiones efectuadas en el pasado con métodos de 
financiación diferida (por ejemplo, los “shadow tolls”). Entre 2011 i 2014, el Gobierno 
de la Generalitat pagó 4.620M por este concepto y, en 2015, el gasto presupuestado 
es de 874 millones. Este año, el 43% del presupuesto del Departamento de Territorio 
330 
y Sostenibilidad, responsable del grueso de las inversiones del Gobierno catalán, se 
destina a pagos de inversiones realizadas en el pasado.   
- El compromiso con el proceso de consolidación fiscal. Hay que destacar que, 
entre 2010 y 2014, Catalunya ha reducido su gasto no financiero no finalista un 
18,9%, i un 23,2% si se excluyen los intereses de la deuda. En el proceso de 
consolidación fiscal se ha priorizado el gasto social: los gastos de Salud, Educación 
y Servicios sociales se han reducido un 15%, 18,9% y un 19,1% respectivamente, 
mientras que el resto del gasto se ha reducido un 22,4% de media. Después del 
enorme esfuerzo de contención de gasto efectuado entre 2011 y 2013, el Gobierno 
de la Generalitat concluyó que un ajuste superior perjudicaría la prestación de 
servicios básicos a la ciudadanía. Por esta razón, el Gobierno se comprometió a no 
reducir el gasto departamental no financiero en sus presupuestos de 2014 y 2015. 
- El carácter de prudencia con el que se elabora cada presupuesto, y ello es 
especialmente relevante en el caso de los ingresos y gastos finalistas. Así, entre los 
presupuestos iniciales de Andalucía y Catalunya, por ejemplo, Andalucía incluye en 
su presupuesto inicial los Fondos europeos de política agraria y la Generalitat no. En 
el caso de la Generalitat, el presupuesto se modifica mediante una generación de 
crédito una vez se reciben estos fondos. Por ello, la comparativa de los presupuestos 
iniciales de estas dos CCAA no es homogénea, al considerar de forma distinta los 
ingresos y gastos finalistas.  
- El diferencial de precios regionales. Al realizar comparaciones de gasto público 
per cápita, otra cuestión relevante es el diferencial de precios regionales, es decir, el 
coste de la vida en cada región. En este sentido, un estudio encargado por el 
Departamento de Economía y Conocimiento a la Universidad Pompeu Fabra (UPF) 
confirma un índice de precios para Catalunya de 108,5 respecto al índice nacional, 
mientras que Andalucía se sitúa en 92,7. La siguiente tabla muestra la posición de 
las comunidades de régimen común en el ranking recepción de recursos del modelo 
de financiación autonómica antes y después de aplicar la variable del coste de la 
vida. 
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Total per 
cápita ranking 
Total per 
cápita 
PPA 
ranking 
PPA 
Cantàbria 2.681 1 2.705 5 
Rioja 2.535 2 2.804 3 
Extremadura 2.514 3 3.131 1 
Aragó 2.492 4 2.585 6 
Cast. Lleó 2.488 5 2.934 2 
Astúries 2.420 6 2.753 4 
Galícia 2.385 7 2.581 7 
Cast. Manxa 2.219 8 2.522 8 
Balears 2.150 9 2.174 11 
Catalunya 2.125 10 1.959 14 
Andalusia 2.037 11 2.198 10 
Madrid 2.032 12 1.775 15 
València 2.019 13 2.171 12 
Múrcia 2.012 14 2.122 13 
Canàries 1.928 15 2.321 9 
rati màx/min 1,390   1,764   
 
Se presentan a continuación las respuestas a las preguntas planteadas, a partir 
de la comparación entre los enlaces facilitados: 
La clasificación por funciones de los presupuestos de las distintas comunidades 
autónomas no sigue siempre los mismos criterios y se observan divergencias en 
algunas políticas de gasto. El apartado “Servicios de Carácter General” es uno de los 
casos en que, comparando Catalunya con otras CCAA, encontramos divergencias 
importantes que no se explican por la dimensión real de sus estructuras 
administrativas, sino por la forma de clasificar los gastos.  
En la comparación específica de Andalucía y Catalunya, teniendo en cuenta sus 
estructuras administrativas, podemos deducir que las diferencias se deben 
principalmente a la inclusión de distintos tipos de gastos en la función “Servicios de 
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carácter general”. En el caso de Catalunya, el presupuesto del 2015 para 
“Administración y servicios generales” es de 1.330M. La mayor parte de este importe 
son gastos de las unidades de dirección y administración de los departamentos y 
organismos (por ejemplo, el personal de los departamentos, aunque éste gestione 
programas específicos). Catalunya sólo distingue en programas distintos a la 
Administración General al personal de colectivos específicos (policía autonómica, 
bomberos, administración de justicia, docentes, penitenciarios o estatutarios 
sanitarios). En cambio, Andalucía únicamente incluye en su presupuesto de 
Administración general 37M€ de gastos concretos de modernización y gestión de la 
función pública y selección y formación del personal, principalmente. 
De hecho, si consultamos los datos homogéneos de los presupuestos de las CCAA 
para el 2014 publicados por el Ministerio de Hacienda y Administraciones públicas182, 
comparando el gasto por el concepto “Políticas” se observa que en la política 
“Servicios de Carácter General” para Catalunya el importe es de 589 M€, y para 
Andalucía 388 M€. 
http://serviciosweb.meh.es/apps/publicacionpresupuestos/aspx/inicio.aspx 
Por estos motivos no consideramos relevante la comparación de este programa en 
concreto. 
Catalunya tiene transferidas las competencias de Servicios Penitenciarios y Policía, 
y Andalucía no. Por eso, Catalunya tiene un mayor gasto en Justicia y Seguridad y 
Protección Civil, respectivamente. El gasto de la Generalitat de Catalunya en el 
presupuesto 2015 para estos programas es de 1.552,56 millones, 378,71M€ en 
servicios penitenciarios y justicia juvenil y de 1.173,85M€ en seguridad y protección 
civil (policía). 
El presupuesto de Transportes de Catalunya incluye un gasto importante en 
infraestructuras ferroviarias (el 46% del presupuesto de transportes) y en apoyo del 
transporte público de viajeros (39% del presupuesto). Estos importes corresponden 
básicamente a la línea 9 del metro de Barcelona, que realiza la Generalitat, mientras 
que las inversiones del metro de Madrid, por ejemplo, las realiza el ayuntamiento. 
Por otro lado, hay que tener en cuenta que el nivel de inversiones del Estado en 
Catalunya es muy bajo. En el año 2013 las inversiones realizadas por al Ministerio 
                                               
182 Últimos datos disponibles 
333 
de Fomento en Catalunya representan el 11% del total, mientras que la población de 
Catalunya representa un 16% y su PIB un 18%. Al margen de estos porcentajes, la 
posición estratégica de Catalunya como puerta de entrada al resto de Europa ya 
justificaría un nivel de inversiones superior. 
En general, el problema de las autopistas de peaje en Catalunya se resume en un 
problema de falta de inversión estatal. La lentitud y escasa contribución del Estado 
en las inversiones en carreteras en Catalunya, unido a la necesidad de Catalunya de 
contar con infraestructuras que le permitan mantener su dinamismo económico, han 
obligado a la Generalitat a suplir la falta de inversión estatal asumiendo las 
inversiones. El alto coste de las mismas y la dificultad para financiarlas ha obligado 
a recurrir, en muchas ocasiones, al pago de peajes en las autopistas.  
Al igual que en la primera pregunta, en este caso encontramos diferencias que se 
explican por la forma de clasificar los gastos.  
El presupuesto de Catalunya en “Crédito oficial y desarrollo financiero” no es 
equiparable al presupuesto de Andalucía en “Regulación económica de carácter 
general” porque incluyen gastos distintos. En Andalucía este tipo de gasto se incluye 
en la función “Regulación económica de la actividad y los sectores productivos”. 
El programa “Crédito oficial y sector financiero” de Catalunya es de 974 M€, de los 
cuales 459 M€ son variaciones de activos financieros, principalmente concesiones 
de préstamos a empresas de fuera del sector público y avales. El resto son 
cancelaciones de préstamos a largo plazo y deuda pública del Instituto Catalán de 
Finanzas, entidad financiera de la Generalitat encargada de dar crédito al sector 
empresarial.  
En el caso de Andalucía, la función “Regulación económica de carácter general” 
supone un gasto de 369M e incluye un conjunto de actividades de unidades 
dedicadas a la gestión y administración de las finanzas y el patrimonio público que 
en el presupuesto de Catalunya se incluyen en la función de “Administración y 
servicios generales”.  
En cambio, en el presupuesto de Andalucía, en la función “Regulación económica de 
la actividad y los sectores productivos”, encontramos 108M de variaciones de activos 
financieros, principalmente para el “Desarrollo industrial y sociedad de la 
información” y “Planificación, desarrollo energético y fomento de la minería”. 
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Los gastos de la función deuda pública (intereses y amortizaciones) de Catalunya 
son superiores a los de Andalucía, porque la deuda viva es mayor. 
- La deuda pública de Catalunya en el primer trimestre del 2015 es 127,1% 
superior a la de Andalucía.  
- El presupuesto en deuda pública de Catalunya para el 2015 es un 118,5% 
superior al de Andalucía.  
La evolución del presupuesto también depende de forma importante del calendario 
de vencimientos de la deuda, y concretamente de la refinanciación de la deuda 
pública y el vencimiento de deudas a corto plazo.  
En cuanto al fondo de contingencia: El presupuesto de Catalunya para el 2015 del 
fondo de contingencia se incrementa hasta 200 M€ porque incluye una provisión de 
140 M€ para una medida retributiva no contemplada inicialmente y que motivó una 
revisión de los presupuestos. Concretamente, el importe está destinado a la 
devolución de una parte de la paga extraordinaria de los empleados públicos del 
2012, eliminada entonces, correspondiente a los primeros 44 días de devengo. En el 
momento de elaborar el proyecto de presupuesto la medida no estaba aprobada y 
por este motivo se incluyo su previsión en el Fondo de Contingencia. La Generalitat 
de Catalunya legisló el 11 de marzo una medida para hacer efectiva esta devolución.  
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APPENDIX D 
POLITICAL PARTIES (2016) 
 
Abbrev Spanish/Catalan name 
 
English translation 
National parties 
C’s Ciudadanos 
 
Citizens 
PP Partido Popular 
 
Popular Party 
PSOE Partido Socialista Obrero de 
Espana 
 
Socialist Workers Party 
UP Unidos Podemos 
 
United We Can 
Catalonia only Parties 
CDC Convergencia Democratica de 
Catalunya 
 
Democratic Convergence 
of Catalonia 
CSQP Catalunya Sí que es Pot 
 
Catalonia Yes We Can 
CUP Candidatura d’Unitat Popular 
 
Popular Unity 
ECP En Comú Podem 
 
In Common We Can 
ERC Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya 
 
Republican Left of 
Catalonia 
IVC Iniciativa Per Catalunya Verds 
 
Greens 
JxSí Junts Pel Sí 
 
Together for Yes 
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